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INTRODUCTION 
 
The terrifying is unsettling: it places everything outside its own nature. What is it that 
unsettles and thus terrifies? It shows itself and hides itself in the way in which everything 
presences, namely, in the fact that despite all conquest of distance the nearness of things 
remains absent 1 
Martin Heidegger 
 
We live in a world of dreams.  
It sounds absurd, it is true, to introduce a discourse, especially a critical, academic one, with 
such a prosaic statement. Written like this, out of the blue, the statement appears thoroughly 
vague, we might even whisper ridiculous. One cannot live in a dream, or in a number of dreams; 
one can only dream a dream, at the end of which one is bound to awake. Strictly speaking, 
dreams are uninhabitable, they cannot be possessed by the dreamer from the outside, they 
emerge from within, and their uninhabitability comes as a result of the fact of awakening. For 
if there were no awakening to come, no sober reality to shake the dream off of the dreamer, 
how could we say that the dream had been dreamed at all? If there were no end to the spectral 
plight of dreaming, how could we even say we lived in a world of dreams? We would simply 
say we lived in a world: period. Dreaming, which presupposes awakening, becomes a 
consequence of awakening. In this sense, awakening ontologically precedes dreaming, but 
dreaming itself assumes the primary epistemic position. Without awakening, there could be no 
dreaming; without dreaming, there could be no knowing, unless knowing is knowing a dream, 
from within a dream. 
It is my intention to write about awakening, or the lack of awakening, about a missed 
opportunity of awakening and the pervasiveness of a dream. The dream I would like to write 
about is one of a peculiar Victorian horror – of sinister places and shifting monsters. This 
horrific dream is precisely of the kind introduced above: persevering and deceptive, a dream 
that dreams its own awakening, like Jacques Derrida’s ‘labyrinth that includes its own exits.’2 
This dream, or a web of dreams, is a cultural one, spanning centuries and hypnotizing nations. 
Being so wide and profound, the statement that opened the discourse (that we live in a world 
                                                 
1 Martin Heidegger, ‘The Thing,’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1971), 164. 
2 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, and other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 104. 
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of dreams) holds for us the very key to questioning this dream; maybe even to the awakening 
itself.  
As a constative, the statement informs us that there is a world made of dreams, and that we 
live in this world. By that we presume a possibility of such a world: the statement rests upon 
the idea that a world can exist as a phantom, a specter, a ghost or a dream that comes before 
the dreamer. For how could we ‘live’ in this world, if there were no ‘world’ to live in? And 
what does ‘living’ inside this world mean? Dreams just might be inhabitable after all. But far 
more important in this statement that breaks the silence of a blank, yet unfilled page, is who 
‘we’ are, we who are permitted to live, not just anywhere, but in this world of dreams. The 
introductory statement, being a constative, apart from saying that we live in some spectral 
world, incorporates all the above-mentioned issues: how does ‘one’ ‘live’ in a ‘world of 
dreams’? These issues could appear benign, unimportant, or even completely unnecessary, just 
a vain exercise of mental gymnastics. Unless, what is at stake is the very world of dreams that 
is invoked. We could call it a world of dreams, or, viewed from a different angle, from a 
different horizon, a world of fears. Between these two worlds, between the realm of dreaming 
and the realm of fearing, there is a small, infinitely diminishing semantic space that opens to 
us the culture that dreams, the culture that is both the subject of dreaming and the object of its 
own fearing. And inside this opened space, this space that opens to us in the act of a cultural 
reverie, fears are materialized, desires are provoked, subjects are summoned, monsters are 
born. 
The monstrous dream in question, the one that is brought about by the fact of its own 
uninhabitability, is a dream that the European mind has been dreaming, mostly without 
knowing, for centuries. For this mind, which has just been uncritically generalized as European, 
this dream has never actually happened, it has never become an unfolding reality, a reality that 
was unfolding, and is unfolding as we speak/write. Since it is considered uninhabitable, it has 
always been just a text, just a space of cultural production devoid of actuality, a world always 
of the second order, always ‘only’ a dream. And in this ‘only,’ in this graphic and cognitive act 
of cultural naturalization, the dream reveals its powers, it spreads its stygian wings that cover 
the land, the sky and the sea, eclipsing all possible exits, overshadowing a possibility of 
awakening. 
What is precisely this ominous dream that has stayed with the European mind for so long, 
quietly and imperceptibly lulling it back to sleep over and over again? Being so persistent and 
enduring, one would assume that it is a pleasant dream, a fairy tale without an end, a happily 
ever after for the enchanted dreamer. Maybe it is indeed a tale of fairies, maybe it is pleasant 
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to the dreamer, but from the outside this dream looks like a nightmare. From the second half 
of the eighteenth century onwards, from 1764 and The Castle of Otranto by Horace Walpole 
at least, the European mind has been hexed by the centrality of a hellish nightmare of 
monstrosity. Ruined and haunted castles, demonic priests, gloomy villains and monsters of the 
night, animated corpses and ancestral curses: horror and monstrosity settled into the very heart 
of European literature, leaving the margins of medieval manuscripts and Renaissance 
unexplored lands behind. What was named the Gothic novel, a perverse pleasure of a few, stole 
the heart and soul of the nineteenth-century European public.3 Thus began a monstrous fantasy, 
and the European mind has been dreaming it ever since, along with dreams about an ostensible 
reality, about a beyond of the dream where the actuality of real life occurs. A dream that 
includes its own awakening, a maze that includes its own ends, a fantasy that fantasizes about 
its own death, a dream within a dream within a dream: monstrosity.   
It is my intention to discuss this circular dreaming maze that has been haunting European 
imagination for centuries now. The nightmare of horrid beings, disquieting, hybrid bodies and 
split, psychopathic personalities has been incredibly persistent and powerful. At the beginning 
of the twenty-first century, Western imagination is occupied with horror more than ever, and 
even a superficial glance at primetime TV shows, the pulse of audiences, reveals the 
truthfulness of this statement. With Dexter we root for a serial killer, who uses his murdering 
impulses for ‘good’; with Hannibal we take pleasure in killing by the cookbook, every murder 
bearing a name of a dish; in True Blood vampires ‘come out of the coffin,’ as they try to 
integrate into the human world; in Penny Dreadful we are taken back to the good old Victorian 
monstrosity of vampires and Dorian Gray. American Horror Story, Supernatural, Crime Scene 
Investigation, The Fall, The Twilight Saga, Underworld, Blade, Resident Evil, The Walking 
Dead, 28 Days/Weeks Later – examples of horror narratives are countless and they go on and 
on, as the saga of mutants, hybrid beings and bodies turned inside-out unravels. The fact is that 
today’s global population takes extreme pleasure in types of dread, torture and esthetics of 
mutilation that would make the heads of Marry Shelley, and the company from Lake Geneva, 
spin in disbelief of their own naïve horror. 
There is a feeling that Victorian times, the nineteenth century, is something far away, 
something finished, done, severed from the twentieth- and twenty-first-century modern life; 
                                                 
3 For Gothic fiction in general, see Clive Bloom, Gothic Horror: A Guide for Students and Readers (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), or J. E. Hogle, The Cambridge Companion to Gothic Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). For gothic imagination, see Richard Davenport-Hines, Gothic: 400 Years of Excess, 
Horror, Evil and Ruin (London: Fourth Estate, 1998). 
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there is a feeling that Victorian horror is enclosed within the appropriate confines of the term 
‘Gothic’ and that, once imprisoned in that nominal cell, we can approach it from a safe distance 
of another world, another time and another reality. Although it is not my aim to discuss all 
these historically contingent forms of horror, this thesis still aims at a particular kind of 
Victorian monstrosity. The small reminder above of the present-day situation only serves to 
point to the fiendish dream that, in many forms and going by many names, has plagued the 
European imagination for too long. I say for too long, because a dream must have an awakening 
if it is to be a dream; without an awakening, the dream becomes reality. And the European 
imagination has not awoken from its hellish fantasy yet, but it has only kept dreaming about its 
end instead.  
As Gil Anidjar truthfully observes in the preface to the Serbian edition of The Jew, the Arab: 
A History of the Enemy, there is no such thing as the ‘West,’ or at least that is what has been 
constantly repeated. There is no entity that has acted throughout history as an integral, coherent 
European self, but there is a specific context that such a claim comes from.4 In the same sense, 
there can be no specifically European dream, nor a specifically European subject, but there is 
a context, at the beginning of the globalist twenty-first century for writing about it. This 
especially rings true for the nineteenth-century Europe, whose interconnectedness of nations 
was of a far lesser degree than that of our own time. We live in a globalized world, in a Global 
Village, where technologically mediated (and thus circularly (re)constructed) knowledge is, 
sometimes and for some, only a click away. But saying that, confronting the nineteenth-century 
flow of ideas and meanings with the (post-post)modern one, does not make the former a 
conglomerate of separate national knowledge, a reality devoid of cultural exchange. As Eric 
Hobsbawm observed, seemingly contrary to Anidjar’s view, the nineteenth-century Europe 
was one juxtaposed entity, although far from global or coherent.5 Cultural exchange between 
the countries of the ‘Dual Revolution,’ (French and Industrial) as well as between the Old and 
the New World was live, but knowledge met with diverse semantic demands, depending on the 
latitude and longitude, reappropriating meaning, reconstructing and reinventing it. We could 
say that what we experience today – a cultural difference in sameness, as well as a cultural 
sameness in difference – has its roots in the nineteenth century. Monstrosity, the main focus of 
this research, is no different from any other cultural palimpsest, from any dream that had 
                                                 
4 Gil Anidjar, Preface to the Serbian Edition of The Jew, the Arab: A History of the Enemy (Beograd: Beogradski 
Krug & CZKD, 2006), 7.    
5 Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972); Eric J. 
Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975). 
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crossed national boundaries and in that flight became reborn. For instance, though they both 
treat the same topic of an inanimate matter ‘brought’ to life, there is a difference between Mary 
Shelley’s ostracized monster from Frankenstein, who has an identity and a history, and E. T. 
W. Hoffmann’s uncanny, passive automaton Olimpia from Der Sandmann. Faced with this 
difference in sameness and sameness in difference, much as my own desire disagrees, I am 
compelled to narrow down the abstract European mind to one small part of itself, to only one 
facet of the vast universe of the nineteenth-century horror. Bound by a limited textual space, 
we will have to settle for a specific, mostly Victorian British horror, the horror that surfaces 
throughout the British nineteenth-century cultural production. 
 This being said, one may immediately assume that the subject of this book, or at least the 
material to be discussed, is that of undying Gothic horror; that I hint at works of Ann Radcliffe, 
Mary Shelley, Elisabeth Gaskell, or any of their later successors, like Bram Stoker or Robert 
Louis Stevenson. No: the horror of Gothic bodies, Gothic skin, and the Victorian femme fatale 
has been written about so extensively that I hardly find it an innovative enough topic to be dealt 
with here.6 Without wishing to diminish other works in the mentioned area, what I have in 
mind, the dream that I would like to write about, the dream within a dream that precludes 
awakening and induces a false sense of reality (the only one possible after the dream has begun) 
is slightly different. It is an agonizing dream of love and ecstasy that has largely been neglected 
so far; it is a dream of sirens. 
 
The Levels of Monstrosity 
 
 At the beginning of his capital work Orientalism, Edward Said says:  
 
The idea of beginning, indeed the act of beginning, necessarily involves an act 
of delimitation by which something is cut out of a great mass of material, 
separated from the mass, and made to stand for, as well as be, a starting point, 
a beginning.7  
 
                                                 
6 See, for example, Kelly Hurley, The Gothic Body: Sexuality, Materialism and Degeneration at the Fin-de-Siècle 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Judith Halberstam, Skin Shows: Gothic Horror and the 
Technology of Monsters (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995); Jennifer Hedgecock, The Femme 
Fatale in Victorian Literature: The Danger and the Sexual Threat (Amherst, New York: Cambria Press). 
7 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1798), 16. 
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At the beginning of this book, we face the same problem of delimitation. When one needs 
to write about a dream that dreams about itself, about a never-ending horror of textual 
circularity, the idea of a beginning appears to be particularly difficult. Thus, for the purposes 
of clarity and easier treading through the dreaming, enchanted forest of Victorian monstrosity, 
I will separate the issue/argument of the book into two levels of generality.  
At the broadest level, the book discusses the relationship between the languages of 
monstrosity and commodified materiality in the nineteenth-century Britain. It presents the way 
the changes in the materiality of things, due to the Industrial Revolution, have influenced a new 
conceptualization of monstrosity. In addition to being haunted by vampires, curses and ghosts, 
the Victorian imagination gave birth to a particular type of fantasy that questioned the new 
relationship of man to things. Precisely at the historical moment when, according to Michel 
Foucault, a fundamental opposition between life (as organic, growing) and death (as inert, 
barren) emerges, animated matter in the form of golems, Frankenstein’s monster, and living 
portraits, becomes a burning Victorian fantasy.8 Giorgio Agamben calls this particular spin-off 
of Victorian fiction the ‘disturbing literature,’ and the dread that looms behind it ‘bad 
conscience with respect to things.’9 Building on Karl Marx’s work on commodity and Sigmund 
Freud’s work on fetishism, he argues that the new type of alienated capitalist production 
introduced a new type of alienated commodity that restructured man’s relationship to things, 
as well as man’s imagination of them. As the boundary between man and things grew blurry, 
animated objects began invading the Victorian imagination, while the humanity itself became 
commodified, objectified, and embodied in the figure of a ‘dandy,’ a human being bordering 
on a commodity. For Agamben, this process of people becoming inanimate things signaled an 
extreme human condition in the era of capitalist production – ‘the commodification of the 
real.’10 Starting from his imaginative analysis of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth century, I would like to argue that the change Agamben correctly observed, apart 
from obviously having had a strong impact on the idea of humanity, had a profound impact on 
the idea of monstrosity, as well. The changed ideas of materiality and monstrosity, of alienated, 
animated objects and monsters summoned into the very heart of the Victorian fantasy, echoed 
the same epistemic change at the level of the Victorian language, where the language is not to 
be understood as a living language, but as a structure of signs, langage. Inside this language, a 
                                                 
8 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. Tavistock/Routledge 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 251-252.  
9 Giorgio Agamben, Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture (Minneapolis and London: Minneapolis 
University Press, 1993), 47. 
10 Ibid., 52. 
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blank, unsignifiable space opened, a dark place of sinister desire, calling the monster into the 
heart of the Victorian subject, calling the subject as a monster into existence, and opening an 
unknown semantic space between people and things. Thus, in the last instance, this book 
discusses precisely this empty space of representational interruption, a part of language that 
cannot be expressed, described or attained – the burning object of the Victorian subject’s desire, 
namely, death proper.  
At the other, more concrete, level of analysis, the book is narrowed down considerably. 
Developing the idea of a representational interruption inside the Victorian language (thus inside 
the Victorian subject, the Victorian subject as an interruption in language), the book focuses 
on one specific commodity and one specific monster – the mirror and the siren. Both mirrors 
and sirens, together as well as separately, underwent profound changes in the nineteenth 
century, making them a perfect case study for the discussion of a rupture inside the Victorian 
language and the relationship of this rupture to the Victorian desiring subject.  
Firstly, during the nineteenth century, mirrors changed from hard-to-come-by things into 
fetishized commodities found literally on every corner. Secondly, during the same period sirens 
changed from vicious, pernicious seductresses into fragile virgins in pursuit of their own 
happily ever after. Thirdly, the relationship between mirrors and sirens changed: inseparable 
in their iconography at least since the medieval times, sirens and mirrors departed from each 
other in the Victorian times, the examples of sirens holding mirrors being almost impossible to 
find (thus the book, in a way, revolves around another absence, around the nonexistence of a 
specific material).11 It is my intention to show that these changes (of the commodified 
materiality of mirrors and the monstrosity of sirens) were related, echoing deep inner 
displacements at the level of language and the production of knowledge. Inside both the 
language of materiality and monstrosity settled a dark, unsignifiable object of desire, a place 
that will, as the book proceeds, turn out to be death itself. This place was the nature and the 
birthplace not only of the Victorian monstrosity, but of the Victorian desiring subject: it was 
the birthplace of the Victorian subject’s monstrosity.    
The Victorian subject in the book has been defined as male. This has not been done 
accidentally: the book essentially discusses language as desire of the male subject. By saying 
                                                 
11 In the field of material culture studies there are those who have already considered an approach to materiality 
through its absence. In Archaeologies of the Contemporary Past (London: Routledge, 2001), Victor Buchli and 
Gavin Lucas discuss the very foundation of archaeology as based on fragmentedness of the archaeological records 
and an inevitable speculation on what materials have not survived or have not been deposited in the records at all. 
In An Archaeology of Socialism (Oxford, New York: Berg, 2000) Victor Buchli calls for a ‘shifting away from 
our preoccupation with presence [of the material record and material culture in general] towards one of absence’ 
(5). 
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this, I do not assume that the subject is fundamentally male, in the way the Biblical subject is, 
the female subject emerging as his reflection only. As far as mirrors are concerned, many, if 
not most, of the arguments in the book could be, and sometimes indeed are, easily applied to 
the female subject as well, but since the thesis is about Victorian mirror narratives in relation 
to the representation of sirens, I have decided to limit the study to the male desiring subject 
only. Sirens have always been an essentially male fantasy, and bringing the female subject into 
the analysis would complicate it to the point of impossibility, at least in this book. Also, less 
important but still pertinent to the text is the fact that the field of the Victorian nineteenth-
century cultural production was largely (but certainly not exclusively) male, most of the 
material analyzed having been produced by male authors. This might seems to be a limitation 
and inconvenience, but it actually gives an interesting and original twist to the problem we are 
dealing with. I would like to show that in the representation of siren bodies, bodies primarily 
sexualized as female (with notable exceptions such as Matthew Arnold’s poem ‘The Forsaken 
Merman’ (1849) and John William Waterhouse’s visual treatment of the poem, The Merman 
(1892)), we can find a topology of a subject that is primarily sexualized as male. Contrary to, 
or, better, building upon, the readings of Victorian sirens (scarce as they are) as expressions of 
misogyny and acts of female discursive subjugation, I would like to propose that sirens in the 
nineteenth-century Victorian culture were not exclusively indicative of changing female gender 
roles (which they definitely were), but also (or even more so) indicative of the male subject 
who created them. This male subject had a very important idiosyncrasy: he essentially lived in 
the world of dreams we started the book with. And his Being, or a signifying illusion of it, was 
every bit as nightmarish and incoherent as the dream he inhabited.12 Using Jacques Lacan’s 
concept of the split subject, or rather appropriating it for my own ends, I would like to propose 
that the male Victorian subject himself was as monstrous as the siren body of his imagination. 
I would like to propose that the siren body was the Victorian male desiring subject’s vessel. 
 
Combining the Inappropriate 
 
The Victorian monstrous subject that the book discuss in relation to the representation of 
sirens is a fundamentally split subject, and its expression by means of the language of siren 
monstrosity is only a symptom of a deeper epistemic turmoil of the Victorian culture. The book 
                                                 
12 In order to distinguish between the metaphysical ‘being’ (Heideggerian ‘being’) and ‘being’ as a ‘creature,’ the 
prior will always be capitalized. ‘Being’ in cited paragraphs and sentences will be left in its original version. 
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draws primarily upon the theoretical works of two great twentieth-century French authors, 
Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan. In spite of Foucault’s early praise of psychoanalysis in 
The Order of Things, one might say that Foucault and Lacan are completely antithetical, 
especially having Foucault’s later view on psychoanalysis in mind.13 But, confessedly, this is 
exactly where I take my joy from – from combining the inappropriate. While Foucault’s 
analysis of the changed configuration of knowledge at the end of the eighteenth century 
provides the starting point for the book’s theoretical framework, Lacan’s concepts of the split 
subject, mirror stage, aphanasis, jouissance and objet a give us tools for an analysis of a 
specific Victorian subjectivity. Combined together, Foucault’s historical research into 
language and its relationship to representation, and Lacan’s research (following Sigmund 
Freud) into the very precondition of this language – the unconscious – allow us to explore the 
relationship between the subject and the language of monstrosity in the representation of 
Victorian sirens. The idea hiding behind my research is that the emergence of a Lacanian split 
subject, a semantically incoherent subject – an idea that Lacan, in a way, raises to the general 
level of human condition within culture – is highly historically specific and particularly 
pertinent to the nineteenth century.14 
According to the Lacanian psychoanalysis, a subject appears as a subject only at the moment 
of his invocation by/into language (I will specify the gender of the noun ‘subject’ in accordance 
with the general discussion of the male subject).15 In this sense, Lacan’s conceptualization of 
the subject does not differ considerably from Louis Althusser’s ideologically ‘interpellated 
subject,’ or Judith Butler’s subject resulting from performativity and exclusionary practices of 
language.16 Derrida too denies self-presence of the subject before speech and signs, arguing 
that  
 
                                                 
13 For Foucault’s early praise of the boldness of psychoanalysis, see Foucault, Order of Things, 411-424. For a 
summary of his ambivalent relationship to it, see Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘Michel Foucault et la psychanalyse,’ in 
Michel Foucault philosophe, ed. François Ewald (Paris: Édition du Seuil, 1989).  
14 For example, in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan says: ‘Consciousness has to come to terms with that 
outside world and it has had to come to terms with it ever since men have existed and thought and tried out theories 
of knowledge’ (Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-
1960, trans. Dennis Porter (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 56). This is one of the places where Lacan 
presumes universality of language. In his view, there has always been an outside to the representation and thought 
and thus of consciousness.  
15 See, Jacques Lacan, ‘The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,’ in Écrits, trans. Bruce 
Fink (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 2006), 179-268. 
16 Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation),’ in Mapping 
Ideology, ed. Slavoj Žižek (London and New York, Verso), 132-136; Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the 
Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’ (New York and London: Routledge, 1993), 3. 
16 
 
the subject becomes a speaking subject only in its commerce with the system of 
linguistic differences; or yet, the subject becomes a signifying […] subject only 
by inscribing itself in the system of differences. Certainly in this sense the 
speaking or signifying subject could not be present to itself, as speaking or 
signifying, without the play of linguistic or semiological différance.17  
 
According to all of them, language, structurally formalizing culture (in the Lacanian 
language, the Symbolic), is the signifier that calls the subject into existence. But in Lacan, by 
the very act of this call that cannot be ignored, the subject himself (previously a subject-to-be) 
becomes an element in the chain of signification, petrified into a signifier for another signifier. 
At the very moment of the subject’s entrance into culture, the subject becomes a sign in the 
chain of signification that moves on and on. Fossilized at the gates of the Symbolic (a culture), 
in order to became a bearer of meaning the subject has to die as Being, a process Lacan calls 
aphanasis. By this logic, although a sign himself, the subject as Being has no place in language; 
the subject, as Being, is literally not.0 What is left of the subject, though, after his initial 
appearance/disappearance, is language of the unconscious, the unconscious that is structured 
like language, through which the subject emerges. Emerging essentially from this language (of 
the unconscious), in which there is no place for him as Being, the subject is always not, always 
a negativity without coherence or stability. For Lacan, there is no coherent, solid core of the 
subject, or the subject per se; the centrality of the Freudian ego is only an illusion of the subject, 
initiated by the ‘mirror stage.’18 Since the book revolves heavily around these Lacanian 
concepts, it is vital that some of them be clarified from the start. 
The term aphanasis (from the Greek ἀφανής, aphanes, ‘invisible’) was originally employed 
in psychoanalysis by Ernest Jones in 1927 to designate the fear of seeing desire disappear.19 
As we have seen, Lacan uses the term to refer to the fundamental disappearance of the subject 
as Being. He argues that the subject is called into existence by a signifier in the field of the 
Other (in this case the Symbolic, language, culture) – an illustration of this invocation being 
the ‘mirror stage.’  
                                                 
17 Jacques Derrida, ‘Différance,’ in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1982), 
16. 
18 Jacques Lacan, ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,’ 
in Écrits, trans., Bruce Fink (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 2006). 
19 Ernest Jones, ‘The Early Development of Female Sexuality,’ Introduction to Journal of Psycho-Analysis 8 
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Lacan first outlined his idea of the mirror stage at the Fourteenth International 
Psychoanalytical Congress at Marienbad in 1936, relying on the previous work of Henry 
Walton. Walton had argued that chimpanzees, as well humans, seem to recognize their mirror 
images as images of themselves at the age of six months. While chimpanzees soon lose interest 
in their reflection, humans invest a lot of time into its inspection. This investigation into the 
relationship between the body and the image helps toddlers to develop a sense of selfhood.20 
Lacan developed this idea further, reshaping it in the decades that followed, making it the focal 
point of his writing on the split subject, as evidenced in first of his Écrits, ‘The Mirror Stage 
as Formative of the I Function.’ Somewhere between the first six and eighteen months of a 
toddler’s life, the Other (which is usually a parent) shows the toddler (who is a subject-to-be), 
a reflective surface (a mirror or any other device). As part of this act, usually followed by the 
words ‘Look, it is you!’ the Other signals to the subject-to-be (the toddler) to identify with his 
own mirror image. The subject-to-be looks at the mirror image and, verbally invited by the 
Other, for the first time recognizes himself as a whole. This whole appears to the subject-to-be 
the final resolution of his inner incoherence, fragmentation, struggle and anxiety, so he 
identifies with the external image, appropriating it as his own coherent core, his own coherent 
ego. This is the initial promise of the mirror – a wholeness that, once attained, ends the 
restlessness of the subject’s chaos of fragmentation. But, this identification of the self with an 
exteriorized image has a profound effect on the subject’s psychic life. By identifying with his 
externalized corporeal existence, by appropriating it, a fundamental méconnaissance of the 
ego’s coherence is initiated: the appropriation is only an illusion, as the subject is no more 
coherent and whole than he was before the encounter. The subject remains split between the 
promise of coherence and the essential illusion of that promise.   
At the Congress, Lacan’s idea met with a lack of interest, and universal validity of this idea 
still remains unproven. Raymond Tallis remarked, quite justifiably, that a literal interpretation 
of Lacan’s mirror-stage presupposes that blind people are incapable of forming a sense of 
selfhood, and are denied entrance into culture.21 Regardless of this doubt, we shall see that the 
scenario of the mirror stage is a powerful tool for discussing the Victorian monstrous desiring 
subject. 
                                                 
20 Dylan Evans, ‘From Lacan to Darwin,’ in The Literary Animal: Evolution and the Nature of Narrative, ed. 
Jonathan Gottschall and David Sloan Wilson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005), 38-55. 
21 Raymond Tallis, Not Saussure: A Critique of Post-Saussurean Literary Theory (London: Macmillan Press, 
1988), 153. 
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Returning to the issue of the subject’s relation to language, what we can deduct from the 
mirror stage scenario is the subject’s invocation into the circle of language, into the maze/chain 
of signification. Facing his mirror image, invited to identify with it, the subject-to-be enters the 
symbolic relations of culture, emerging as a full subject by the power of the signifier (the 
language), emerging as an effect of language. But, according to Lacan, as soon as he appears 
as a subject, as soon as he enters the language, he becomes a signifier himself – for another 
signifier and the chain of signification moves on. This way, by acquiring meaning, the subject 
‘loses’ his Being; he identifies with his external image, with the fullness of this image, which 
is an illusion nested in the very core of the subject’s existence. Thus, the moment the subject 
enters the language, he becomes a split subject, split between his fundamental incoherence and 
the illusion of coherence dwelling in his core, between his ‘lost’ Being and gained meaning, 
between the Real (of his Being) beyond language and the Symbolic (of his meaning) which is 
that language. Lacan calls this eclipse of the subject’s Being by meaning aphanasis, the ‘fading 
of the subject.’ It is one of the fundamental vels of logic for Lacan – either/either – that exist 
in language, as well as in experience. ‘Aphanasis is to be situated in a more radical way,’ says 
Lacan,  
 
at the level at which the subject manifests himself in this movement of 
disappearance that I have described as lethal. In a quite different way, I have 
called this movement the fading of the subject. […] There is no subject without, 
somewhere, aphanasis of the subject, and it is in this alienation, in this 
fundamental division, that the dialectic of the subject is established.22 
   
The scenario described above will provide us with a basic model for dealing with the 
Victorian mirror culture and its relationship to Victorian sirens and male Victorian desiring 
subject. It is vital, though, to note that one cannot take the Lacanian mirror stage for granted, 
since it suffers from several obvious flaws. Apart from the already mentioned visual issues, 
Lacan’s idea of the split subject, as well as that of the mirror stage, rest heavily on a relationship 
between the subject and language. This relationship has been argued about and criticized in the 
Western philosophy at least since the appearance of Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural 
                                                 
22 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 
1963-1964, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978), 207-208; 221. 
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linguistics.23 As Foucault, among others, has shown, language, as a formalizing relationship 
between meaning and representation, is historically specific, while Lacan’s psychoanalysis 
deals with language in absolute terms.24 Also, the applicability of the mirror stage is diminished 
by the idea’s gross generalization, and, as soon as it is presented, one may rightly wonder what 
happens with the subject in case a mirror is lacking? How can one use this scenario historically 
for a discussion of cultures with no mirrors, or clear reflecting surfaces? We could agree that 
there has always been a certain level of recognition of one’s reflection in stagnant waters, such 
as ponds, lakes or polished stones, but Lacanian identification with an external coherence takes 
the clarity of the reflected image to a whole new level. Was there no subjectivity before 
mirrors? These are all sensible questions to ask.  
Since there is no room for dealing with the history of subjectivity, I have decided to turn the 
above questions the other way round and ask: what whold be the necessary conditions for the 
mirror stage scenario to be possible? What kind of culture would allow identification with the 
mirror image, so intense that the mirror image becomes a reality? Firstly, the culture in question 
would have to be one in which mirrors are common and frequent enough. Secondly, it would 
have to be a culture in which mirrors are not only frequent, but large and clear enough, so that 
the subject could fall prey to his illusion. Thirdly, and most importantly, if the subject is 
fundamentally dependent on and subjectified by language, and the language is historically 
specific, it would have to be a culture whose language is appropriately incoherent so as to 
reflect, and produce, an incoherent subject. The Victorian nineteenth-century culture was 
precisely that kind of culture and the Victorian nineteenth-century language was precisely that 
kind of language. 
  According to Foucault, the classical episteme, spanning roughly the seventeenth and the 
eighteenth centuries, was characterized by a ‘duplicated representation,’25 an organization of 
meaning where ‘representation in its peculiar essence [was] always perpendicular to itself,’26 
cancelling meaning as we know it. The sign in the eighteenth century, was a sign only if it 
expressed in itself the relationship to the thing represented. The sign had to represent, but the 
representation had to be represented in it. Foucault calls this relationship of the sign to the 
                                                 
23 For an account on conceptualization of the relationship between the subject and language in Western 
philosophy, see Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Philosophy in Twentieth-Century France (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1987). 
24 The investigation of historicity of language pervades Foucault’s work as a whole, but the most explicit works 
on the topic are The Order of Things, and The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1972). 
25 Foucault, Order of Things, 70. 
26 Ibid., 72. 
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representation, and of meaning to language, the ‘binary organization of the sign.’27 He takes 
images rather than words to be crucial examples of this perpendicularity of representation. An 
image is, at the same time, a sign of what is represented and the content of the representation 
itself. Following this logic, according to which everything available to representation is already 
contained in the sign that represents, not only does the theory of signification collapse but also 
meaning as we know it (a differential relationship between the signifier and the signified) 
cannot even emerge. Foucault says that ‘[t]his universal extension of the sign within the field 
of representation,’ 
 
precludes even the possibility of a theory of signification. For to ask ourselves 
questions about what signification is, presupposes that it is a determinate form 
in our consciousness. But if phenomena are posited only in a representation that, 
in itself and because of its own representability, is wholly a sign, then 
signification cannot constitute a problem. Moreover, it is not even visible.28 
 
Foucault concludes that no meaning is exterior or anterior to the sign, because there is no 
intermediary element, no opacity between the sign and its content. Signs, therefore, have no 
other laws than those that govern their content: everything that is to be represented has already 
found its place within the representation, leading the representation to always fall back on itself. 
He goes on to exemplify the ‘duplicated representation’ by analyzing the fields of eighteenth-
century natural history, language and the theory of value. 
The nineteenth-century, i.e. modern episteme, witnessed a different relationship between 
meaning and language. For Foucault, this shift was ‘certainly one of the most radical that ever 
occurred in Western culture,’ when the classicistic configuration of knowledge changed into 
that ‘from which, even now [in 1966], we have doubtless not entirely emerged.’29 The 
representation stopped being perpendicular to itself, and the sign stopped encompassing 
everything that gives itself to representation. Within language, an irreducible element has been 
born: a representational blank space that could not be reduced to representation. From that 
moment on, ‘what gives value to the objects of desire,’ writes Foucault, ‘is not solely the other 
objects that desire can represent to itself, but an element that cannot be reduced to that 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 71. 
28 Ibid., 72. 
29 Ibid., 239. 
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representation.’30 The fullness of the classicistic configuration of meaning has been shattered, 
representation and language becoming incoherent, due to this disturbing element that exists 
‘exterior to the actuality of the representation itself.’31 A radical opposition emerged between 
the representation and what is represented, a blank space of rupture surfacing in-between and 
pervading the language of representation. And through this unsignifiable rift that now stands 
at the core of the representation, Being itself fell through. ‘The very being of that which is 
represented,’ continues Foucault, ‘is now going to fall outside representation itself.’32 Things 
represented now offer themselves only partially to representation, in fragments or profiles, in 
pieces; knowledge is created in the cracks and crevices of language. This withdrawing of 
knowledge and meaning beyond the reach of representation, this unrepresentability of Being, 
for Foucault crystallizes finally as metaphysics, as well as a transcendental subject whose 
metaphysical existence depends upon a space beyond language, representation and meaning; a 
subject whose impossibility becomes the very condition of his possibility.33  
It becomes clear that, as incompatible as Lacan’s idea of the split subject and Foucault’s 
archaeology of knowledge may seem, they actually converge in their antihumanistic attitude 
towards the subject. What Foucault describes as the split language and the metaphysical subject 
is just another, and more historically precise, face of the Lacanian split subject. Foucaldian 
‘falling of being outside representation,’ is structurally the same as Lacanian aphanasis. What 
is vital for my own argument is that both authors emphasize a space beyond language and 
meaning as the precondition of the subject’s existence: Foucault argued that this beyond was 
typical of the nineteenth-century configuration of knowledge, while Lacan maintained it to be 
the human condition within culture per se. Foucault’s space beyond language could quite 
plausibly be read as the Lacanian Real.  
Summarizing the theoretical argument outlined so far (and its pertinence to the idea of this 
book), I have decided to take Lacan’s psychoanalytic concepts and, through their placement 
within the structure of the Foucauldian historicity of knowledge, appropriate them as tools for 
a historically specific discussion of the Victorian male desiring subject. I do not claim that they 
would prove equally useful for analyzing other historical periods, but, through a more detailed 
analysis in the chapters to come, I hope to prove their usefulness in discussing nineteenth-
century commodified materiality, monstrosity and subjectivity. The Victorian time was the 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 257. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 260. 
33 Ibid., 263-265. 
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very first moment in history when mirrors, known and limitedly used on both sides of the 
Atlantic, became overabundant and thus an inescapable part of the everyday life; they became 
a commodity. Though the production of glass mirrors capable of reflecting a full image of the 
subject’s corporeal existence had existed since the thirteenth century, the Victorians were the 
first to encounter their externalized corporeality almost on every corner. In this respect, the 
nineteenth century introduced a phenomenon, whose extreme version is known to most people 
living in the (at least) Western cultural sphere today: the first thing to do when one is out of 
bed is to look in the mirror and reconfirm the coherence of one’s image. As it will be shown in 
the first part of the book reserved for an in-depth discussion of this phenomenon, at the 
beginning of the century, the interaction of the subject with his reflected image was still 
sporadic and frail, but it became a normalized cultural practice by its end. The introduction of 
mirrors into everyday life had a series of profound effects on the subject’s relationship with 
himself, and as a consequence, with the language of representation of the self. The subject 
gazed into his external coherence materialized before him in every street, on every corner, and 
he fell prey to the game of the appearance that the reflecting surfaces nurtured. He took this 
external image to be his own coherent self, entering a dream so profound and so reverberating 
(and so monstrous) that he would never awake again. The core of what he now perceived as 
his stable, coherent self, a permanent place of agency identified with the pronoun ‘I,’ rested on 
an illusion, masking the fundamental incoherence of the subject and his ego. Split between the 
illusion of semantic coherence that became a reality, and the reality of incoherence that was 
felt but not perceived, the subject became imprisoned in the realm of the in-between, reaching 
for a phantom fullness presented by the mirror, always falling short of it, experiencing the 
aggression of this fall time and again. As I discuss the material on mirrors, considered as mirror 
narratives in their essential relationship to the language of representation, we shall see, over 
and over again, that what the subject sees in the mirror is never what he wishes to see. 
Whenever in contact with a reflecting surface, or, rather, whenever testifying about this contact, 
the subject finds himself unable to express the fullness he desires, continuously falling short of 
words (language), with every attempt falling back into the rabbit hole of signification and 
expressing his ineptitude in a language of lack and excess. What, in these narratives, the subject 
perceives in the mirror is always more or less than the language he possesses, thus always more 
or less than the subject himself. Every confrontation with a mirror image invokes a haunting 
strangeness of reflection, a différance as sameness which is not identical; it summons a creature 
hardly recognizable as what the subject understands as the ‘self’ – incoherence, confusion, a 
nightmare, a monster. Through the looking-glass, the subject is drawn into a world of dreams, 
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a world made of dreams of a fullness that never comes, never achieves itself, never satisfies, 
but always calls, beckons, seduces and implores; a dream that dreams about awakening. Caught 
in this vicious circle, the subject fails to notice that what reflecting surfaces now actually mirror 
is a blank, unsignifiable space within him, a fissure in language that both Foucault and Lacan 
talk about: mirrors begin expressing the subject’s desire for this ravenous place, his essential, 
yet historically contingent, desire for death.  
 
The Monster of Our Own 
 
Before we proceed to the to the close reading of the material, there are two more issues to 
be discussed, if we want the analysis to be clear and tangible. We are dealing with languages 
of monstrosity and materiality in connection with the Victorian subject. Since we have already 
discussed the relationship between the subject and language, we need to turn briefly to the 
subject’s relationship to monstrosity, as well as to his relationship to materiality.  
How does monstrosity relate to subjectivity? This question is, of course, historically specific  
and it is my intention, by reading the monstrosity of sirens, to offer a possible answer that 
would prove convincing for the Victorian times. In the Victorian Britain, monstrosity, placed 
at the heart of literary and visual production, changed its language considerably. In 1981, Loren 
Daston and Katharine Park, later followed by a number of authors in the field of ‘monster 
studies,’ showed that from the Middle Ages until today, the conceptualization of the monster 
went from that of a prodigy, to a wonder, and then finally to a naturalized object.34 In 1998, 
they reconceptualized this linear evolution of the monster in their book Wonders and the Order 
of Nature, adopting a more heterogeneous approach, and historicizing the order of nature itself 
in its connection to the concepts of wonder and the pleasures of wondering. They showed that 
in the Renaissance appreciation of wonders there was a highly class-distinctive element of the 
European elite culture, a practice that changed in the Enlightenment. They pointed to a ‘sharp 
                                                 
34 Katharine Park and Lorraine J. Daston, ‘Unnatural Conceptions: The Study of Monsters in Sixteenth- and 
Seventeenth-Century France and England,’ Past & Present 92 (1981): 20-54. There is no an academic discipline 
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are, Jorge Luis Borges, The Book of Imaginary Beings (London: Penguin Books, 1974); Jeffrey J. Cohen, ed., 
Monster Theory: Reading Culture (Minneapolis: University Minnesota Press, 1996); John Block Friedman, The 
Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 2000), Jurgis Baltrušaitis, 
Le Moyen Age: antiquités at exotismes dansdans l’art gotique (Paris: A. Colin, 1955); Georges Canguilhem, 
‘Monstrosity and the Monstrous,’ in Knowledge of Life, trans. Stefanos Geroulanos and Daniela Ginsburg (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2008); Martin Monestier, Le Monstre. Histoire encyclopédique des phénomènes 
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24 
 
rupture in [their] narrative,’ the moment when wonders of nature became part of popular 
culture. ‘When marvels themselves became vulgar,’ Daston and Park conclude, ‘an epoch had 
closed.’35 With this rupture the epoch of their study closed, but that of this book opened. Most 
other studies on monstrosity throughout the twentieth century examined the monster from the 
perspective of natural history, but what I am interested in is the monster as a trope of 
imagination, as expressed in the arts. My own reading of the nineteenth-century material on 
monsters leads to a conclusion that the Victorian monster was essentially connected to the 
language of the subject’s desire.  
Two major ways of thinking about monstrosity dominate today’s criticism. They are 
inseparable, being locked in the dialectics of mutual reshaping, but for the purpose of clearer 
argumentation, they are artificially divided here into distinctive categories: the monster as an 
external and the monster as an internal condition of the subject’s possibility of existence.  
External (from the outside toward the beyond). The perspective on the monster as a 
dialectical outside of the humanity and the self has been immortalized by Jeffrey Jerome 
Cohen’s influential essay, ‘Monster Culture (Seven Theses).’36 Published in 1996, the essay 
capitalized on a long tradition of understanding the monster as a borderline entity. As the 
essay’s title anticipates, Cohen’s theory has seven theses and the fourth thesis states that the 
‘[m]onster dwells at the gates of difference,’ echoing Donna Haraway’s famous quote from her 
1983 essay A Cyborg Manifesto: ‘[m]onsters have always defined the limits of community in 
Western imaginations.’37 The view of the monster as foreign to sociality, as outlandish or 
liminal, is the most common approach in cultural criticism. In this view, the monster defines 
what it means to be human, and it does so from the outside. The monster’s inappropriately 
articulated body is scattered all around the field of subjectivity, drawing lines and painting a 
negative landscape whose shifting contours articulate the equally shifting notion of humanity 
and the self. For Judith Butler, these ‘zones of uninhabitability’ are irrevocably the land of 
monsters, of ‘those who do not enjoy the status of the subject’; they are places ‘which a subject 
                                                 
35 Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature (New York: Zone Books, 2001), 19. 
36 Jeffrey J. Cohen, ‘Monster Culture (Seven These),’ in Monster Theory: Reading Culture, ed. Jeffrey Jerome 
Cohen (Minneapolis: University Minnesota Press, 1996), 6. 
37 Donna Haraway, ‘A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth 
Century,’ Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991), 180. In the 
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fantasizes as threatening its own integrity with the prospect of a psychotic dissolution.’38 Where 
one’s notion of the self feels threatened, where the coherence of one’s illusion of the self falls apart, 
the monster is born. This monster, which faces one either from the other side of the abyss that 
protects one from what one is not, or which is itself precisely the abyss in question, polices the 
borders of imaginable possibilities. The monster thus becomes the very condition of the subject’s 
coherence, a place of refuge sine qua non. The subject exists as a coherent whole in so far as the 
monster cannot, the dialectical relationship shaping both of them in a never-ending play of the Self 
and the Other. This epistemic position of the monster is a perfect illustration of the Julia Kristeva’s 
abject, ‘something rejected, from which one does not part.’39 The abject gives the monster a chance 
to be not the Other, not a conditional negative of humanity, but the very border that puts the Self 
and the Other each in their respective places. The monster becomes the identity figure over and 
above all identity figures; it becomes the anti-identity whose impossibility bestows on it 
tremendous powers. In a way, we could say that, fleeing dialectics and becoming the dialectics 
itself, the monster, as a semantic trope, becomes a metaphysical entity capable of crushing any 
signifying order from without.  
In the same respect, Haraway theorizes the monster as an ‘inappropriate/d other’; not as that 
which is ‘not in the relation,’ ‘the authentic, the untouched,’ but that which is a ‘critical, 
deconstructive relationality,’ that which is ‘not […] originally fixed by difference.’40 In Haraway’s 
appropriation of the monster as an ‘inappropriate/d other,’ we can trace this move from dialectics 
to metaphysics. Leaving the field of the Other and becoming the very relation between the Other 
and the Self, the monster (that Haraway names ‘the cyborg subject position’41) is postulated as a 
critical modality whose purpose, and/or power, lies not in deconstructing the preexisting categories, 
or in a return to them; the power of the monster, as a critical modality, lies in opening a space of 
‘elsewhere’ beyond the clashing dualities.42 The monster gains the power of a beyond, an 
‘elsewhere’ which is a gift and a promise of the monster.  
Internal (from the outside inwards). The perspective on the monster as an internal quality of the 
subject has been developed in another highly influential essay, written in 1962 by the French 
theoretician Georges Canguilhem, entitled ‘Monstrosity and the Monstrous.’ Canguilhem starts 
from a general view that the monster is that which is ‘other than the same, an order other than the 
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41 Ibid., 300. 
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most probable order.’43 But he does not stop there, nor does he move to placing the monster beyond 
the system of signification, as Haraway does. On the contrary, Canguilhem moves the monster to 
the very heart of the subject, the monster becoming an inner condition of the subject’s possibility. 
He assumes that the idea of monstrosity essentially refers to organic beings (‘[t]here are no mineral 
monsters’), and that the fundamental value of life is its integrity of form – ‘by the regeneration of 
mutilated organs in some species, and by reproduction in all.’44 For Canguilhem, the monster, as a 
detour of integrity from itself, points to the contingency of life and living forms. Thus, the opposite 
of life is not death. Death is just part of life’s form, it is the condition that has already been included 
into life itself; death is ‘a limitation from without, the negation of the living by the nonliving.’45 
Monstrosity, on the other hand, is ‘the accidental and conditional threat of incompleteness or 
distortion in the formation of the form; it is the limitation from within, the limitation of the living 
by the nonviable.’46  
As we can see, Canguilhem also opposes the Self (as the living, the same) and the Other (as the 
monster, the nonviable), but in doing so he moves in the direction opposite to that of the 
theoreticians of the outside, pulling the monster into a conditional accidentalness of life. Instead of 
postulating the monster as a theoretical figure capable of transcending the dualities of modern 
dialectics from the outside, Canguilhem’s monster is the very condition of humanity from within. 
But in both approaches to monstrosity, in the external one that envisages the monster at the borders 
of the imaginable sociality (‘zones of inhabitability’) as well as in the internal one that takes the 
monster’s accidental singularity as the subject’s limitation from within, we perceive that, one way 
or the other, the monster epistemically faces the subject from without, no matter whether we 
conceptualize this without as an inside or an outside of the subject. The monster is that which is 
opposite to humanity, it is that which is the Other to the subject, be it an abyss of the abject that can 
never be crossed, or the transcendental Other that surmounts dialectics completely. The monster 
simply cannot be a subject.  
 I found it necessary to sketch this opposition between external and internal approaches to 
monstrosity as the subject’s conditionality, artificial as their separation may be, so that their clash 
can make a theoretical middle ground for my own understanding of the Victorian monstrosity. I 
would like to argue that the Victorian monstrosity that is to be discussed throughout the book is of 
neither kind, but that it borrows from and builds upon both of them. I would like to propose that 
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reading Victorian cultural texts about monsters (‘text’ taken as a formalization of the language of 
representation) unearths a subject whose Being is neither limited not conditioned by the language 
of monstrosity, but essentially identified with it. The Victorian subject that we find buried in the 
bodies of Victorian sirens is not a negative of these bodies, nor is it their product: the Victorian 
subject we find in the texts is himself a monstrous subject, his very Being conforming to the 
language of Victorian monstrosity. Neither dialectic, nor metaphysic; the Victorian subject is a 
monster himself. The monster can be a subject, after all.  
 
 
The Object of Our Own 
   
This brings us to the other issue to be discussed, namely, the relationship between materiality 
and subjectivity, or between man and things. It may seem that, by separating this duality from the 
monster/human one, I advocate its ontological or epistemic independence. On the contrary, I 
believe that the language of Victorian materiality conforms to the same structure to which Victorian 
monstrosity and subjectivity were subjected. In the last instance, I believe that the language of 
Victorian materiality, expressed in the commodity form, was as monstrous, as semantically 
incoherent, as the language of the Victorian subject.  
 ‘The definition of humanity has often become almost synonymous with the position taken 
on the question of materiality,’47 says Daniel Miller, as he develops a theory of things. What 
Miller, along with other leaders in the anthropological field of material culture studies, rightly 
observes is that the question of humanity and its historically contingent definition, is often, if 
not always, the question of the thing’s ‘thingness’ too, as Heidegger describes it.48 Defining 
what constitutes humanity is a problem of the epistemological grounding of animate and 
inanimate matter itself. In this definition, whole worlds are contained, the totality of 
mechanisms of social realities. The recognition of a shady and shadowy differentiation between 
humans and things, present in the nineteenth-century, allows the différance to slide in, to 
                                                 
47 Daniel Miller, ‘Materiality: An Introduction,’ in Materiality, ed. Daniel Miller (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2005), 2. 
48 Material culture studies are a borderline discipline between archaeology and anthropology. The central authors 
in this field are Daniel Miller, Christopher Tilley, Michael Shanks and Victor Buchli (among many others). They 
all come from different fields of archaeology and anthropology, treating material culture as a cultural palimpsest 
or an ideological, racial, gender (etc) battleground. Titles such as Christopher Tilley, Metaphor and Material 
Culture (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999) or A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places, Paths and Monuments 
(Oxford: Berg, 1994), Daniel Miller, The Comfort of Things (Cambridge: Polity, 2008) or Clothing as Material 
Culture (Oxford: Berg, 2005), and Arjun Apadurai, ed., The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural 
Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) exemplify the diversity of their interests well.  
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penetrate fixed appearances and summon unknown possibilities. A deconstructive journey 
leading to an inquiry into the issue of Where is the human? is always already an inquiry into 
the issue of Where is the thing? Giorgio Agamben says that things are not properly anywhere, 
 
they are not outside of us, in measurable external space, like neutral objects (ob-
jecta) of use and exchange; rather they open to us the original place solely from 
which the experience of measurable external space becomes possible.49 
 
But, ‘[d]o we really need anything like thing theory the way we need narrative theory […]?’ 
rightly asks Bill Brown. ‘Why not let things alone?’50 Materiality comprises our whole known 
world, but the way we conceptualize it is always a fantasy, full of historical imagination and 
preconceptions rooted so deeply in our doxa that they disappear out of sight. Miller calls this 
disappearance ‘the humility of things’51: things are important not because they are common 
and obvious or because they have an evident power of agency, but because they are culturally 
imperceptible. They determine what takes place to the extent to which we are unconscious of 
their capacity to do so. Objects are so thoroughly embedded into the veil of material and social 
reality that they are the most active participants in the creation of man. Pierre Bourdieu argued 
that ‘a whole cosmology [can be instilled] through [...] seemingly innocuous details,’52 and the 
more imperceptible material things are, the more we take their materiality for granted – it’s just 
a book, it’s just a mirror, it’s just a chair.53 The more we take the materiality of things for 
granted, the more we construct the abstractions from which the ultimate power of the things is 
derived. At the precise moment of saying ‘it’s just a mirror,’ the mirror is given a new life, an 
introduction into cultural naturalization, and a new phantasmagoria of revived inanimate matter 
comes to life by sinking the mirror into the world of cultural preconceptions.  
Judith Butler argues that materialization is not something that simply is, but something that 
happens – a story that unfolds like a palimpsest, a construction through performance of social 
                                                 
49 Agamben, Stanzas, 59. 
50 Bill Brown, ‘Thing Theory,’ Critical Inquiry 28:1 (2001): 1. 
51 Daniel Miller, Material Culture and Mass Consumption (Oxford: Blackwell   Publishers, 1987), 85-108. 
52 Pierre Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), 69. 
53 In the 1980s, the material culture studies have been strongly influenced by the Marxist theory (of commodity 
and ideology). Along with Miller’s ‘humility of things’ Shanks and Tilley have discussed this imperceptive ‘only’ 
as a tool of ideology (Marx) or hegemony (Antonio Gramsci). Michael Shanks and Christopher Tilley, Social 
Theory and Archaeology (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987). This was also one of the points 
of their highly influential book Re-constructing Archaeology: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987). 
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norms, and a mutation of those norms through the cracks in their repetition.54 Finding its root 
in the one-hundred-and-fifty-year-old tradition of historical materialism, it restates the Marxist 
argument that humanity is a product of its capacity to transform the material world through 
production, as a mirror in which humanity recreates itself.  
In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations wrote of commodity as 
triviality, something given, a conduit of exchange, a force external to sociality – like gravity – 
and therefore infinitely removed from the notion of humanity.55 The nineteenth century was 
the age in which changed social relations, in connection with technological progress, made an 
impact on the fragile understanding of the human/thing relation. Karl Marx’s famous chapter 
on commodity fetishism from Capital, describes the ‘mysterious character’ of commodity as a 
consequence of an ideological process, in which social relations between producers have been 
substituted in the minds of people for natural, objective relations between commodities. As a 
corollary of this alienation of humans (producers), an estrangement of the things produced 
(commodities) appeared, imbuing their use-value with a personified afterlife of commodity 
fetishism. The disturbing sentiment of commodity fetishism was for Marx so strong that he 
compared it to the ‘misty realm of religion’ where creations of the human mind ‘appear as 
autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own.’56 
‘How does the thing presence?’ asks Heidegger, and he immediately replies: ‘The thing 
things. Thinging gathers.’57 In the nineteenth century, the thing does not thing anymore, its 
Being disappears behind its existence as a representation, as a sign. This play of symbolic 
substitution is essential for the understanding of the human/thing differentiation in the age of 
accelerated technical progress. Once awakened, the change in the social relations of the 
industrial era put into motion an uncanny transformation of everyday things into fetishized 
commodities. According to Agamben, from the Industrial Revolution on, ‘the owner of [the] 
object will never be able to enjoy it simultaneously, both as a useful object and as value.’58 The 
                                                 
54 Butler, Bodies that Matter, 9-10. 
55 Adam Smith, ‘Of the Natural and Market Price of Commodities,’ in The Wealth of Nations (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1982), 157-66. 
56 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 165.  
57 Heidegger, ‘The Thing,’ 172. 
58 Definitions of the fetish are countless. For Marx, the mystery of fetishized commodities is ‘all the magic and 
necromancy that surrounds the products of labour’ (Capital, 169); for Freud it is a ‘substitute for the penis […] 
but for a particular and quite special penis that had been extremely important in early childhood but had later been 
lost […]: the fetish is a substitute for the woman’s penis (the mother’s) penis that the little boy once believed in 
and […] does not want to give up’ (Sigmund Freud, ‘Fetishism,’ in The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. XXI (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1927), 151-152); for G. A. 
Cohen, to make a ‘fetish of something, or fetishize it, is to invest it with powers it does not itself have’ (C. A. 
Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, 115). Agamben’s 
analysis of the fetish in Stanzas, 37. is the only analysis that I find as imaginative and playful as Slavoj Žižek’s 
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appropriator will be able to do anything with the object, even destroy it, ‘but in this 
disappearance the commodity will once again reaffirm its unattainability.’59 This 
unattainability is precisely the new life that the commodity gained – the life of a fetish. The 
commodity, which in Freud would be a fetish object, became a negative reference, a 
summoning of presence into existence by absence. The interplay of absence and presence in 
fetishized objects – not only their mutual substitution, but the very actuality of their opposition 
– would dominate the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Resting at the heart of the 
commodity, thus at the heart of consumerism, this breaking of the inanimate shell of the thing 
would bring a truly pervasive, uncanny feeling toward humanity’s semiotic control over things 
and also toward humanity’s self-possession.60 As we shall see, in one of the following chapters, 
Victorian commodities are literally running loose, confirming the validity of Thomas Richards’ 
comment that ‘things appear as independent actors on the historical scene,’61 and arousing 
Agamben’s ‘bad conscience with respect to things’.62 Out of this shaken language of things, a 
whole new genre of uncanny interests and literature would arise, such as Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein, or, The Modern Prometheus (1818), E. T. W. Hoffmann’s Der Sandmann (part 
of Die Nachtstücke, 1817), Edith Nesbit’s The Enchanted Castle (1907), Lewis Carrol’s Alice 
series (1865 and 1872), Lucy Clifford’s The New Mother (1882)  Android Clarinetist, a life-
size robot created by Cornelis Jacobus van Oeckelen in 1838, a procession of Madam 
Tussauds’ uncanny wax figures and many of Charles Dickens’ novels.63 All these works 
explored the topic of inanimate matter wondrously coming to life, where reawakening was 
understood as a real event or as a personal nightmare of the real and the unreal, of the animate 
and the inanimate, as in the case of Hoffmann’s Olympia. Der Sandmann and its disturbing 
                                                 
analysis of commodity fetishism in the postmodern era in ‘Fetishism and Its Vicissitudes’ (Slavoj Žižek, The 
Plague of Fantasies (New York: Verso, 1997)). 
59 Agamben, Stanzas, 37.. 
60 By referring to humanity's self-possession, I would like to introduce Agamben’s the idea of semiotic 
instability—the ever harder struggle to retain control over fixed definitions of humanity. An emphasis here is on 
control, on the inability of humanity to dominate the semiotic earthquakes of the nineteenth-century materiality.   
61 Thomas Richardson, The Commodity Culture of Victorian England: Advertising and Spectacle, 1851-1914 
(London and New York: Verso, 1991), 11. 
62 Agamben, Stanzas, 47. 
63 Many critics have commented on this aspect of Charles Dickens’ writing, where objects emerge as subjects 
while humans (protagonists) emerge as objects. See Richards, Commodity Culture, 2; Elaine Freedgood, The Ideas 
in Things: Fugitive Meaning in the Victorian Novel (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 
140-141; Dorothy Van Ghent, The English Novel: Form and Fiction (New York: Rinehart, 1953), 129; Catherine 
Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt, Practicing New Historicism (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2000), 189. 
Also, see Asa Briggs, Victorian Things (Phoenix Mill: Sutton Publishing, 2003), where he regards Dickens as a 
‘necessary reading for the historian of things,’ (7) and quotes Dickens himself: ‘The mightier inventions of the 
age are not to our thinking, all material, but have a kind of soul in their stupendous bodies.’ There is a story of a 
talking hat-stand titled ‘My Mahogany Friend’ by Dickens in Bradbury Evans, Household Words; A Weekly 
Journal, 1851: Conducted By Charles Dickens. Vol. 2. 1851 Reprint (London: Forgotten Books, 2013), 558-559. 
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subtext actually helped Freud in 1919 to develop his famous concept of the ‘uncanny’ – 
something repressed that comes back to haunt the subject, a peculiar feeling of strangeness 
aroused by an encounter with something vaguely recognized.64 The thing ceased to be an 
innocent object, its spectral existence coming back to haunt the Victorian subject in his desire. 
As a commodity, the thing became an abject entity, its abjection being, in Michael Taussing’s 
words, ‘the preeminent state of living death where subject and object stage their epistemic 
panic.’65 In Marx’s world, from the moment it appears as a commodity, a table  
 
not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in relation to all other 
commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain 
grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own 
free will.66 
 
Commodity fetishism opens a vortex leading to a new area of the thing’s Being, ‘the mystery 
that has now become familiar to anyone who has entered a supermarket or been exposed to the 
manipulation of the advertisement: the epiphany of the unattainable,’ as Agamben concludes.67 
 This book focuses precisely on this unattainable aspect of the commodity in the form of mirrors. 
As we have already seen in Foucault’s work on the modern episteme, language, as a formalizing 
aspect of a new configuration of meaning, opened the same unattainable space, an element of 
language impossible to reduce to representation, impossible to represent. I would like to read this 
representational void, this interruption, as the key element of the language of the commodity. As 
Richards observed in his extraordinary analysis of the Victorian commodity culture, while writing 
about the fetishized commodity Marx himself had to change metaphors over and over again, 
incapable of dealing with the commodity’s fleeting language.68 The very nature of commodity is 
that it cannot be described, it cannot be attained and it cannot be possessed, if only for one reason: 
the commodity is the ravenous heart of capitalist desire. ‘The real consumer,’ Guy Debord points 
out, ‘becomes a consumer of illusions. The commodity is this factually real illusion […].’69 As a 
true Lacanian objet a, a desiring object which is lacking and which ‘is not nothing but literally is 
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not,’ the commodity, in its nineteenth-century fetishistic form, constantly offers itself to the 
consumer, recreating itself in the consumer’s falling short of attaining it.70 As testified by the 
Victorian imagination gone haywire, the commodity in the nineteenth-century language has a life 
of its own, resting fundamentally upon this break in language that induces a différance, a spatio-
temporal dissimilarity of meaning ‘[that] derives from no category of Being, whether present or 
absent.’71  
 Understood in this sense, as an object of desire, as ‘beyond-of-the-signified,’72 a specter of a 
lost object that can never be found since it is always already found in its absence, the commodity 
is literary not, establishing a metonymic relationship with the subject who desires it. By reading 
various Victorian monstrous narratives (siren, as well as mirror narratives), I would like to show 
that what burns inside the commodity, inside every desired object in the Victorian culture, is that 
small unsignifiable place in language that epitomizes death (a Beingless signifier) itself. ‘Why is 
death the harbinger and index of the thing-world,’ capitalizes Taussig on the strangeness of death 
in things, ‘and how can it be, then, that death awakens life in things?’73 He might have described 
the very nature of Victorian, and post-Victorian, commodified materiality.  
 The argument for the relationship between Victorian humanity and materiality thus goes in 
circles. The Victorian male desiring subject is called into existence by the omnipresent mirror. The 
mirror, on the other hand, is the Victorian fetishized commodity par exellence, essentially 
embodying the rupture, death, the monstrosity of the Victorian language. Thus, the subject appears 
as split and as monstrous as the commodity he faces, as incoherent as the language he came from, 
reproducing the commodity and the split in language within himself, and reproducing it in many 
monstrous, disturbing forms, scattered across the Victorian mindscape – including the form of the 
siren. He reaches for the wholeness promised by the mirror, promised by the commodity, promised 
by the objet a; he reaches for a semantic fullness promised by the mirror as a commodity, as objet 
a. He reaches and falls short of this fullness over and over again, only to reach for it again. He 
dreams a dream of coherence, beyond broken language and meaning, a persistent and profound 
dream; he dreams about a beyond of the Real, he dreams about it as an awakening from his dream; 
he wanders through the maze of language, but the maze includes its own exists, so he strays; he 
fantasizes about death; he revels in his own monstrosity.  
                                                 
70 Lacan, Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 77. 
71 Derrida, ‘Différance,’ 6. 
72 Lacan, Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 65. 
73 Taussing, ‘Dying Is an Art,’ 305. 
33 
 
 Seen from this point, from the perspective of the world of dreams the subject lives in, from the 
angle of his desire for death and his devotion to the ‘shrine of Nothing,’74 the book, beyond all the 
narrative layers of sirens and mirrors, is about that dream of fullness beyond language; it is about 
nothingness, which is the other face of the fullness that the subject is longing for; it is about a 
promised awakening, which is a symbolic death within the Victorian language itself. Without it, 
without this Real of death that keeps calling the subject from the beyond, the Victorian language 
would not be possible at all. Just like in Lacanian aphanasis, the death of the subject, invoked by a 
mortal language, becomes the condition of his very possibility.   
 
On Things to Come 
 
 The corpus of this study is very vast and very diverse. In order to connect the dots between 
monstrosity, materiality and subjectivity, I was compelled to discuss the sources that could not 
be enclosed within the rigid confines of a single medium. Consequently, I considered all the 
analyzed material in view of its connection to the Victorian language, or rather as constituent 
parts of the Victorian language as such. The language (of monstrosity, of materiality, of the 
subject, of the monstrosity of the subject and of the monstrosity of materiality), is not to be 
understood in its literal sense of a living, specific language spoken or written; it is to be 
understood in its sense of langage, an ordering of signs, as language in its essential relation to 
representation, as the language of representation. Thus, the Victorian language that I will 
discuss in relation to the subject, assumes all the forms of structuration of signs, spoken, as 
well as written, visual, as well as material. It is my intention to show that the monstrosity of 
the Victorian subject originates from within the language taken as described, and also that it 
emerges from the material analyzed (the cultural production of the subject). In the same spirit 
of a constant return to the beginning of the text, to the ‘world of dreams’ that has been the 
world of the subject since the nineteenth century, the language of the book constantly returns 
to the monstrosity of the Victorian male desiring subject, and in describing and creating, 
creating by describing that monstrosity, the language collapses right next to itself never 
achieving a semantic fullness. This inevitable spiraling of the argument, where the subject is 
called into existence by language, only to recreate the language in the same act, brings forth a 
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set of issues concerning the relationship of the text at hand (the book) and the text(s) analyzed; 
between the author of the text at hand (the author of the book) and the author(s) of the text(s) 
analyzed. 
 The text of the book, apart from the introduction, the prolegomenon and the conclusion, is 
divided into three chapters, each dealing with the subject’s ‘world of dreams’ from a different 
perspective and further developing the argument of the book. Each chapter is divided into three 
or four parts: the first one is introductory to the chapter, while the following two (or three) are 
close readings deepening the argument of the introductory part. 
 Chapter One deals with the Victorian glass/mirror culture and with the language of the 
mirror image in its relationship to the mostly male desiring subject. If mirrors are concerned 
independently from siren narratives, the argument could be freely applied to the female desiring 
subject as well. After a brief historical overview of the mirror culture in general, the chapter 
looks into a new status of the mirror in the Victorian imagination. In the nineteenth century, 
the mirror stopped being a vehicle of religious moralization, or of didactics of proper conduct, 
and became an expression of the subject’s desire. The image perceived in the mirror is never 
what one wishes to see, it is always more or less than that; the mirror image is a stranger looking 
back at the subject, promising fullness and delivering the aggression of the subject’s fall. The 
chapter discusses the language of mirrors in connection with the language of commodity, 
therefore structurally revolving around the epicenter of the Victorian consumerist life and the 
epicenter of the commodity culture – the 1851 Great Exhibition. Analyzing the mirror 
narratives surrounding the Great Exhibition, which was held inside an enormous structure made 
of glass (the Crystal Palace), it becomes clear that most of the narratives struggle to verbally 
express the encounter with reflecting surfaces, but are unable to do so. The language of this 
encounter is always a language of lack and excess, the encounter being always either 
insufficient or excessive for the subject to express it. The subject constantly reaches for a place 
beyond language, but in his ineptitude to attain it, he experiences jouissance of the fall.   
 Chapter Two is dedicated to my monster of choice, a monster chosen as the cornerstone of 
the topology of the male desiring subject – the siren. Siren narratives undergo a dramatic 
change in the nineteenth century, when previously vicious murderesses with no respect for 
human life, turn into fragile maidens with sorrows of their own. The chapter traces this change 
in what I call the ‘siren literature,’ focusing my attention primarily on written, authorial 
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production of their monstrosity and the textual pleasures the Victorian sirens embody.75 I have 
identified a list of traits of these new modern sirens, but there are three of them that strike me 
as the most important. Firstly, in many of the narratives sirens become the protagonists. This 
movement toward the center of the Victorian narrativity is the first trait of their new-born 
subjectivity. Secondly, they tend to be depicted as innocent and pure, not responsible for the 
deaths of their victims (if any), or not in control of their murderous impulses. This shift usually 
turns them into victims in the stories, making it hard for readers to distinguish the prey from 
the hunter. This leads us to the last trait: the sirens and their victims tend to switch places so 
often and so profoundly that their monstrosity becomes absolutely inseparable from the 
humanity of their victims. In the Victorian narratives, the ‘Ulysses and the Sirens’ topos 
becomes an indispensable tool for analyzing the Victorian male desiring subject. As the 
protagonists (sirens and Ulysses in his many guises) change places back and forth, the male 
subject emerges both from the language of Ulysses as from that of the sirens. Building upon 
the analysis in Chapter One and the analysis of the language of the mirror-seduced subject, 
Chapter Two develops the argument that siren bodies (with the indispensable ‘Ulysses’ element 
in them), provide us with a topology of precisely this kind of a subject, the one caught inside 
the illusion of his own mirror image. 
 Chapter Three discusses siren narratives and their relationship to the mirror-seduced male 
subject from another perspective. One of the traits of Victorian sirens recognized in Chapter 
Two is their new, strongly visual nature. Nineteenth-century Sirens actually stopped singing, 
and the power of their monstrosity got transferred from their voices into their bodies. Chapter 
Three takes this notion further, as we discover Victorian scopic regimes of voyeurism in the 
visual nature of Victorian siren bodies. Not coincidentally, sirens and mermaids were an 
obsession of those who epitomized these scopic regimes in paining – the Pre-Raphaelites. By 
analyzing works of John William Waterhouse and Edward Burne-Jones in the wider context of 
the Pre-Raphaelite painting and philosophy, I demonstrate that behind the luscious mermaid 
and siren bodies they so eagerly painted, lurks not (only) a femme fatale, not (only) misogyny, 
but the male Victorian desiring subject in all his monstrous glory.   
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 The approach of the book would be accused by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick of ‘paranoid 
reading,’ paranoid as in having ‘faith in exposure.’76 Sedgwick claims that since Marx, 
Nietzsche and Freud, critical theory has been irrevocably paranoid, unearthing truth from the 
material analyzed and turning paranoid pleasure into truth. Paranoia, as a critical approach, 
presupposes the existence of hidden knowledge in the text analyzed, a thief veiled in darkness, 
so the paranoid reading initiates a game of cloak and dagger in which one sets ‘a thief (and, if 
necessary, becomes one) to catch a thief; […] “it takes one to know one.”’77 Her problem with 
this kind of reading is that it presents itself as the only cognitive/affective theoretical practice; 
it appears to be the one and only plausible approach to reading and knowledge that excludes 
all other readings. Though I agree that critical theory has been profoundly paranoid, and that 
my own approach is as paranoid as the rest of its history, at this point I depart from Sedgwick. 
I do not claim my reading to be ‘true’, and I confess enjoying playing with texts in Derridian 
sense; I enjoy keeping the conversation going.78 It is true that I take the greatest pleasure in 
uncovering the monstrous subject in the material that does not talk about him; in reading 
between lines; in searching through the areas of silence and cracks in language; in what has not 
been said and what has not been represented. But some of the material is very explicit about 
the issues we are dealing with, allowing me to proceed with a straightforward reading. My 
approach thus distinguishes between Lacan’s ‘subject of statement’ and ‘subject of 
enunciation.’ Resting upon his idea of the split subject and the fundamental méconnaissance 
of the self’s coherence, the subject of statement is the author of the material analyzed; the one 
who refers to himself as ‘I,’ as having an ‘I’ as the core of his writing/painting/sculpting. But 
this subject is always lying by telling the truth, since what he says comes from a fundamental 
illusion at the core of his conscious speech/act, what he presents as the obvious truth (the work 
of art/literature he produces) inescapably lies. On the other hand, the ‘subject of enunciation’ 
always tells the truth by lying, because unlike conscious speech his words does not come from 
the miscomprehended core of the self, but emerges from within this speech, from what is not 
said, from between the words, slips of the tongue, parapraxis.79 This subject is, thus, always 
lying, but by doing so he is always, actually, telling the truth. The material analyzed will often 
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be regarded as the subject’s language of the unconscious. The inconvenient and troubling part 
of this speech is that it fundamentally rests upon the reader, upon the one who interprets the 
speech in question. 
 I am fully aware of this consequence of my approach, but I also believe that it is an 
inescapable part of hermeneutics. That does not mean that ‘everything goes.’ It means that 
‘everything goes’ within the internal coherence of a specific ‘reading,’ within the coherence of 
the argument presented. The very nature of this introduction, and its opening statement (‘we 
live in a world of dreams’), points to the irreducibility of the analysis to the material analyzed. 
I have discussed this statement as a constative, analyzing what is impressed upon us as the truth 
of the statement, as the statement of truth, and we have seen that beneath the hard crust of its 
superficiality there are questions waiting to be asked: about the ‘world of dreams,’ about 
‘living’ in it, and, most importantly, about the pronoun that starts the chain, the ‘we’ that was 
allowed to emerge as the subject of the statement. Now, it may seem that the statement is a 
pure constative, that it only informs, says, delivers an inner truth, that it simply states, but that 
is only one of its faces, as far as the world of dreams we are discussing is concerned. As a 
perfomative, the statement not only informs about its content, about the fact that we live in a 
world of dreams, but it performs its content in so far as the Victorian language of monstrosity 
that I write about in the book continually recreates itself through what it says. The text of this 
book participates in the creation of the world of dreams as much as it discusses that world; the 
text performs the drowsiness of the subject by recreating the subject from the language 
analyzed. 
I find it hard to imagine an approach to text that does not include the researcher becoming 
enmeshed in the subject of his research, the process Bourdieu describes as ‘symbolic violence’ 
or the ‘transfer into the Other.’80 In dealing with desire of the Victorian subject, the writer of 
these lines, along with their reader is inevitably drawn into the interpretative spiral by his own 
passion, by his own desire, by his own objet a. If he is to talk about the Victorian ‘world of 
dreams,’ the reader/writer is bound to invade this world as well. There is no such thing as 
writing/reading from the outside.  
 
 
                                                 
80 Pierre Bourdieu, On Television, trans. Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson (New York: The New Press, 1998), 17; 
Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. R. N. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
80, 82. 
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PROLOGUE  
 
NEVER-ENDING HORROR OF ULYSSES’ ABJECT FACES 
 
She is a darker Venus, fed with burnt-offering and blood-sacrifice; the veiled image of that 
pleasure which men impelled by satiety and perverted by power have sought through way as 
strange as Nero’s.81 
Algernon Swinburne 
  
 
 
The story of Ulysses and the Sirens is very old, one might say ancient; the story is as old as 
the European literature itself.82 It starts with the words of a blind man, a bard whose actual 
existence has never been proven. Victorians adored this bard, his every word being as sweet as 
honey, and as moral as their belief in him.83 From Homeric epics, or more precisely from Book 
XII of the Odyssey onwards, the sirens have been aural seductresses, always on the lookout for 
another body or another soul. Their nature has been carnivorous, and their appetite insatiable. 
Depending on the period we peruse, we find them as envoys of the apocalypse, symbols of 
earthly sins, and facets of lies and deceit, as they hunt men down with their enthralling voices, 
destroy their dreams and lead their minds into the never-ending darkness of the sea.84 The sirens 
are all about love and death, about lure, ecstasy, and destruction. Their monstrous bodies invite 
men to drown themselves in them, to forget who they were, are, and could be, and to experience 
the violence of love and the ecstasy of death. Their voices, bodies, and faces – an impossible 
mixture of different species – cry out a wish for disappearance, promising omniscience, but 
delivering oblivion instead.  
                                                 
81 Algernon Swinburne, Notes on Poems and Reviews (London: J. C. Hoten, 1866), 12. 
82 ‘Ulysses’ is the Latin version of Odysseus’ name. I have decided to use it to avoid confusion and because many 
nineteenth-century sources I discuss, like John William Waterhouse’s painting in this prologue, use it. The noun 
‘siren(s)’ will be capitalized, when it refers to classical sirens (explained further in Part Two). When refers to 
sirens in general, or sirens from any other era, the noun will not be capitalized.    
83 See, for example, Richard Jenkyns, The Victorians and Ancient Greece (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980). 
84 For sirens as envoys of the apocalypse, see, for example, William J. Travis, ‘Of Sirens and Onocentaurs: A 
Romanesque Apocalypse at Montceaux-Létoile,’ Artibus et Historie 23:45 (2002): 29-62. For the general manner 
of their representation in the Middle Ages, especially as symbols of deceit and lies, see Leofranc Holford-Strevens, 
‘Sirens in Antiquity and the Middle Ages,’ in Music of the Sirens, ed. Linda Phyllis Austern and Inna Naroditskaya 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 16-51. 
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It seems strange that, after millennia of siren lust and cruelty, Victorians invented a type of 
sirens opposite to all the evil that their age-old sisters represented. Hans Christian Andersen 
took care of that, his tale The Little Mermaid becoming a prototype of the Victorian ‘siren 
literature.’ Ostensibly in accordance with the prevailing discourse of Victorian femininity, this 
type offered a seductive vision of mute virgin girls in search of their own happily ever after, of 
an ‘angel in the house,’85 or poor creatures desperately in love with their (former) prey. The 
situation is not so black-and-white, though. As Nina Auerbach remarks, 
 
[w]hile right-thinking Victorians were elevating woman into an angel, their art 
slithered with images of a mermaid. Angels were thought to be meekly self-
sacrificial by nature: in this cautiously diluted form, they were pious emblems 
of a good woman’s submergence in her family. Mermaids, on the other hand, 
submerge themselves not to negate their power, but to conceal it.86 
 
One feels compelled to wonder if the mute sirens were indeed disempowered by this 
silencing representational act. We have been given an opportunity to question the reality of 
their vocal deaths, and reveal sirens as essentially visual monstrous subjects. In order to do 
that, it is vital to understand that the language of sirens has never been theirs alone: it has 
always depended upon the language of their victims, whose faces bore the sign of Ulysses. For 
the language of Victorian sirens, the oscillation between these two figures, between the 
huntress and the prey, is essential, and it is the purpose of this prologue to introduce it. Its other 
purpose is to raise questions related to Ulysses’ desire and show that in the background of all 
his attempts not to succumb to the siren song, Ulysses craved one thing above all others – death. 
The core of the language of Ulysses and the Sirens, the object of desire inside the Victorian 
language as a whole was semantic oblivion of death itself.  
Analyzing the nineteenth-century visual masterpiece titled Ulysses and the Sirens and the 
twenty centuries older literary one, we observe deadly sirens as they rise from the abyss 
between words and images, from the blank spaces within representation, mapping the male 
Victorian subject for us. Taking the path of abjection, I would like to expose the constant game 
of absence and presence in the economy of representation of sirens, a game of interruption, 
which is the source of monstrosity of sirens and of the subject in the Victorian age. In their 
                                                 
85 Coventry Patmore, The Angel in the House (London and Cambridge: Macmillan, 1866).  
86 Nina Auerbach, Woman and the Demon: The Life of a Victorian Myth (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: 
Harvard University Press, 1982), 7.  
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atrocious faces that besiege the subject’s desire, we see the abject topology of the Victorian 
subject – split, horrified and deceived by his own mirror-image.  
 
Ulysses’ Abject Self 
 
 
Figure 1 John William Waterhouse, Ulysses and the Sirens (1891) 
 
In 1891 John William Waterhouse, one of the most famous late Victorian painters, eternally 
enraptured by the inner, implicit female power of transformation, presented the painting 
Ulysses and the Sirens (fig. 1) to the public. Modeled on the Greek red-figure Stamnos vase 
from the fifth century BC (fig. 2), the painting represents Ulysses in his ordeal of surviving the 
Siren song.87 
At first glance, it appears that the painting follows the well-known story in order to 
communicate the dread of the Sirens’ bodies and voices to the public. Christopher Wood, who 
wrote extensively on Victorian painting, with particular emphasis on the Pre-Raphaelite 
obsession with female devouring seductiveness, explains the subject of Ulysses and the Sirens 
as follows: 
 
It depicts the moment when Ulysses and his companions are threatened on their 
voyage home by the sirens, female monsters who lure men to destruction by 
their song. To counter them, Ulysses stopped up the ears of his men with wax, 
and had himself tied to the mast. All around flap the sirens, huge birds with the 
                                                 
87 The Siren Vase is currently in possession of the British Museum, registration number 1843, 1103.31. 
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faces of beautiful women. […] The boat, the frightened figures of the sailors, 
and the bleakly rocky setting are all painted with strong realism, and the 
intrusion of the sirens gives the picture a sinister and terrifying effect.88 
 
 
Figure 2 Ulysses and the Sirens, Stamnos (ca. 500 BC) 
 
In his straightforward description of the subject at hand – the well-known story of Ulysses 
– Wood’s explanation seems reasonable enough. But an eye in pursuit of what is not 
represented reveals certain discrepancies between the canvas and its final model, Book XII of 
the Odyssey. These discrepancies may seem unimportant and small, but they are indicative of 
the historical and cultural moment of the painting’s appearance. The choices Waterhouse made 
in his work are the ones made by an artist working within the late Victorian discourse of 
femininity, building upon the prevailing male fantasies of womanhood and constructing his 
perspective on the allure, danger and cultural fear of woman’s unleashed sexuality. As we shall 
see, although the model and the artist are separated by two millennia, Waterhouse can himself 
be seen as not so different from Ulysses, and yet quite different from him. Between the artist 
and the hero, there is a sameness which is not identical, a semantic postponement within the 
representational language of Ulysses that epitomizes the Victorian age. An abject desire resides 
in Waterhouse and Ulysses alike, a place of dark passion arising from fear and dissolution of 
the self. The difference is that, for the Victorian Ulysses, this place of tenebrous passion 
becomes the foundation of his subjectivity. This blank space in representation gave birth to the 
monstrosity of sirens and to the Victorian male desiring subject as well.  
But before we set our sails for Victorian Britain, let us first turn to the Sirens themselves 
and the first mortal ever to resist their enrapturing song. 
                                                 
88 Christopher Wood, Olympian Dreamers: Victorian Classical Painters (London: Constable, 1983), 230. 
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* * * * * 
 
Ulysses has been warned. He knows that the endeavor can cost him his life. But still, the 
unimaginable delight, and the danger that comes with it, keeps him from stopping up his ears. 
He has to hear them, he has to know. He is willing to encounter death with his eyes wide open 
and ears liberated from ignorance. He approaches them thinking that what he wants – what he 
needs – is the charm of their voices and the knowledge these voices offer. It is high noon, the 
dog hour, and the demon of the hour is ready; it is the time of the Sirens, the moment when 
everything melts away like the wax in Ulysses’ hands.89 The temptation, though, starts well 
before the voices, long before the Sirens: it consumes Ulysses from the moment he was warned, 
his desire, introduced by Circe’s words, called upon by language, invited by her words acting 
as the signifier. There is a place inside Ulysses that craves and cries for what in his mind 
appears to be beauty, knowledge, and immortality. He is convinced, by the apparent and the 
obvious, that what drives him towards this distant shore and makes him face the danger so 
boldly, is a spark of heroism and curiosity mixed together in the image of ecstasy Circe 
presented to him: 
 
‘First shalt thou reach the Sirens who, once heard, 
Charm with their strains the souls of all mankind. 
If unawares come floating on the wind 
That clear sweet music which the Sirens pour, 
He who hath quaffed it with his ears shall find 
No voice, no welcome, on his native shore, 
Shall on his dear wife gaze and lisping babes no more.’90 
 
What are these creatures that possess such power? What is the nature of their voices if they 
are capable of translating destruction into joy?  
                                                 
89 In Ancient Greece the planet Sirius was called the ‘Dog Star’ and it symbolized the hottest days of summer. 
The dire influence of the ‘Dog Star’ was said to cause fever in men – and madness in dogs. During the Middle 
Ages, it came to represent the hottest hour of the day – noon – the time of dizziness, sloth and temptation, the 
moment when medieval monks were tempted away from their discipline and faith. Sirens, being symbols of flesh, 
deceit and earthly sin, epitomized this hour in the medieval mythography, but as we can see in the Odyssey, the 
connection between the two is far older. 
90The Odyssey of Homer, Vol. 1, books I – XII, trans. Philip Stanhope Worsley (Edinburgh and London: William 
Blackwood and Sons, 1861), XII, verse 6, 289. 
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So it began – the tradition of sirens’ alluring faces. Although it would last for centuries, it 
begins and ends with the first one who dared open himself up to them, because from that 
moment on, every man will always be Ulysses, as far as sirens are concerned. For what he 
craves is neither simply the Sirens’ love, nor the fulfillment of his desires, nor is it a simple 
yearning for the mythical female body or voice. No human love can ever compete with that of 
the Sirens, since no human love can dissolve the essence of selfhood so profoundly, forcing 
the subject to drown in his own ecstasy. Thus what Ulysses truly yearns for, although he does 
not recognize it, is death and decay itself. 
By deciding not to stop up his ears, to encounter the Sirens, and to literally expose himself 
to them, Ulysses embodies a desire that comes not from celestial place of beauty, love and 
everything divine, but from hell-like depths of the netherworld, from the lair of death, 
destruction, and fear. Ulysses’ desire is, to appropriate the view of George Bataille, an ecstatic 
experience of looking not towards the light from above, but towards the things from below 
(choses d’en bas); it is a diversion of the gaze that leads to the underground (souterrain) of 
lucid consciousness, a hidden, essential dimension of human existence, where Eros and 
Thanatos meet.91 This desire, already visible in the ancient Ulysses, will be the essence of the 
Victorian one. He is both afraid of and aroused by dread. Horror is what keeps him going, but 
also what makes him order his shipmates to tie him even more tightly: 
 
“First of the Sirens, couched among the flowers, 
She warns us fly from the delusive song. 
I only, as we pass the fatal bowers, 
Have leave to listen; yet with many a thong 
Need is ye bind me, and with cordage strong, 
Against the socket of the mast upright, 
Lest I should move; and though I urge you long 
To loose me, and implore with all my might, 
Still bind me with more cords and strain them yet more tight.”92 
 
                                                 
91 For Bataille’s conceptualization of desire from below and the relationship between desire and death, see George 
Bataille, Histoire de l’oeil (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), L’Expérience intérieure (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), as well as 
L’Érotisme (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 2011). 
92 Odyssey, XII, verse 23, 294. 
44 
 
‘The phobic has no other object than the abject,’93 Kristeva says, and in the moment of 
Ulysses’ peril, the Sirens appear as what he desires and fears the most – they appear as his 
abject self. Their song of knowledge and bliss has its dark and sinister side, the one that leads 
to disintegration of selfhood, transformation of the Self into the Other and back again, tapping 
the ‘deep well of memory that is unapproachable and intimate: the abject.’94 Like a subject and 
his abject, Ulysses and the Sirens are interlocked in one and the same image, inseparable in 
their mutual haunting, as the abject becomes a subject and the subject repels the abject. As it 
will be shown in the chapters to come, Ulysses and the Sirens are both irreducible words in the 
sentence of the Victorian male subject’s monstrosity. 
Ulysses is an archetype of the Victorian male abject fascination. Kristeva explains that the 
abject is  
 
a treat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside [of being], 
ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies 
there, quite close, but it cannot be assimilated. It beseeches, worries, and 
fascinates desire, which, nevertheless, does not let itself be seduced. 
Apprehensive, desire turns aside; sickened, it rejects.95 
 
Following Kristeva’s thoughts, we are able to approach that dreadful place inside Ulysses, 
this death in language that has become the heart of the subject in the nineteenth-century. It 
became the dream that has not receded since, still manifesting itself in our obsession with, and 
pleasure in horror at the beginning of the twenty-first century. From the nineteenth century on, 
deep down inside the subject, inside us, dread-consumers and terror-seekers, close to the 
imaginary wellspring of our Being, dwells a fiercely burning horror-driven desire. Its flame is 
black and cold and if we approach it too openly, we risk losing that which we name ourselves. 
This desire entices us, seduces us to come closer and look directly into its heart. But the desire’s 
very voice hurts us, penetrates our skin from the inside, repelling us. We cannot but want this 
horror of torment, we yearn to be scared. From our own psyche rises the all-pervading horror 
that haunts our minds, our lives, and our self-knowledge. We are afraid of the monster under 
the bed or inside the closet, but what we fear most is that once the monster announces itself 
letting out an anguished roar, we will hear its horror, comprehend its voice, and connect to its 
                                                 
93 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 6. 
94 Ibid.  
95 Ibid., 1.  
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words.96 It is then that we realize that the monstrosity we dread – the true abject – is the one 
within. If we read the episode of Ulysses and the Sirens bearing this key in mind, we will see 
that the Sirens are Ulysses’ own dreaded monstrosity, as well as his subjectivity, the rejected 
and desired part of his ego that can never be overcome and will always hover over the 
construction of his identity. 
 
“For the shrill Sirens, couched among the flowers, 
Sing melodies that lure from the great deep 
The heedless mariners to their fatal bowers […] 
Thou through the waves thy course onward keep, 
And stop with wax your comrades’ ears, that they 
Hear not the sweet death-songs which through the wide air stray. 
But if thyself art fain to hear their song, 
Let thy companions tie thee, hands and feet, 
Upright against the mast with cordage strong. 
So mayst thou hearken to the voices sweet 
Of the twin Sirens, as thy white sails fleet 
Along the perilous coast; yet though thou yearn 
To linger, and with tears thy friends entreat, 
Let them remain hard-hearted, doubly stern, 
Yea, with more chains enwind thee, and thy anguish spurn.”97 
 
Circe’s wise counsel, which Ulysses scrupulously follows, enables him to continue his 
voyage unscathed. What matters here, though, is not the storyline, which is all too well known, 
but Ulysses’ desire to encounter death, his unfathomable will to expose himself, his senses and 
his mind, against all odds, to a landscape that is truly transgressional, truly abject, and truly 
                                                 
96 Joseph Conrad addresses this fear explicitly in his 1899 novel Heart of Darkness, at the moment when Charles 
Marlow encounters the natives. I have italicized some parts of the cited paragraph to emphasize his desire for fear: 
‘The Earth seemed unearthly. We are accustomed to look upon the shackled form of a conquered monster, but 
there – there you could look at a thing monstrous and free. It was unearthly and the men were – No, they were not 
inhuman. Well, you know, that was the worst of it – this suspicion of their not being inhuman. It would come 
slowly to one. They howled and leaped, and spun, and made horrid faces; but what thrilled you was just the 
thought of their humanity – like ours – the thought of your remote kinship with this wild and passionate uproar. 
Ugly. Yes, it was ugly enough; but if you were man enough you would admit to yourself that there was in you 
just the faintest trace of a response to the terrible frankness of that noise, a dumb suspicion of there being a 
meaning in it which you – you so remote from the night of first ages – could comprehend’ (Joseph Conrad, Heart 
of Darkness (New York: Dover Publications, 1990), 68). 
97 Odyssey, XII, verse 7-8, 289. 
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monstrous. It is very important to note a sharp contrast between the Sirens’ voices and 
everything that surrounds them. Their enthralling song comes from a pile of rotting corpses, 
human skins are stretched on the rocks, and horror is looming in the air. Still, Ulysses is 
seduced; the words of Circe have imprisoned him. 
As he approaches the Sirens, Ulysses is taken by the landscape as a whole. To borrow the 
expression from Inna Naroditskaya and Linda Phyllis Austern, he is captured by ‘the nameless 
and deadly sirens in their bone-strewn seaside meadow,’98 which makes Ulysses want to jump 
from the ship, free himself from the ropes of reason and unite with the dread and the love, in 
one last act of all-consuming joy. Analyzing the painting by Waterhouse, Patrick Hunt 
expresses a general view on the episode as a whole, where Ulysses is drawn to the voices of 
the Sirens: 
 
There is an urgency throughout the painting as his men pull hard on their oars, 
a tautness in this dramatically imagined scene […] only because its intention 
seems to be showing Odysseus in a moment of madness he will survive, 
straining in ecstasy at which any other human, less heroic, could only wonder. 
This is the moment […] Waterhouse chose, a tantalizing image of musical 
madness that ravished the soul until the body gave in and men threw themselves 
overboard, often to drown in churning seas. Odysseus is rapt, internally safe 
from their “honeyed voices” [translation of the Odyssey by Robert Fagles] only 
as long as the external ropes hold him tight.99 
 
Ulysses’ ecstasy has always been explained as an aural experience, a vocal drug causing 
him to go crazy and jump overboard, but this emphasis on the aural aspect of the Ulysses and 
the Sirens topos renders the landscape of the encounter almost completely imperceptible and 
Ulysses almost completely blind. In this tradition, Lawrence Kramer argues that ‘[f]or Homer’s 
Odysseus, the siren’s song is a lure to simple dissolution; for his modern descendants, the 
dissolution is the sirens’ song itself, the pleasure of which is its own fatality.’100 But, in the 
                                                 
98 Inna Naroditskaya and Lynda Phyllis Austern, ‘Introduction: Singing Each to Each,’ in Music of the Sirens, ed. 
Linda Phyllis Austern and Inna Naroditskaya (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 5. 
99 Patrick Hunt, ‘Homer’s Odyssey in Art: Sirens from Greek Vases to Waterhouse,’ last modified 4 October 
2009, Viewed 13 April 2013, 
http://traumwerk.stanford.edu/philolog/2009/10/homers_odyssey_in_art_sirens_f.html. 
100 Lawrence Kramer, ‘“Longindyingcall:” Of Music, Modernity, and the Sirens,’ in Music of the Sirens, ed. Linda 
Phyllis Austern and Inna Naroditskaya (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 199. 
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image of the Sirens’ accursed isle, we are presented with so much more than vocal enticement, 
much more than a simple dissolution:  
 
Where around about them, piled in many a heap, 
Lie the bleached bones of moldering men that sleep 
For ever, and the dead skins waste away.101 
 
From the stack of human bones, where death lurks, abject is calling.  
‘These body fluids, this defilement, this shit are what life withstands, hardly and with 
difficulty, on the part of death,’ says Kristeva. ‘Such wastes drop so that I might live, until, 
from loss to loss, nothing remains in me and my entire body falls beyond the limit – cadere, 
cadaver.’102 The sweet alluring Sirens’ voices and the rotting, decomposing landscape are a 
single abject image, virtually inseparable from each other. The abjection of the corpses 
encroaches upon Ulysses and limits between life and death are fading away – fainting away, as 
Kristeva says.103 The border between life and death has become an object itself. It has become 
the object of Ulysses’ desire. The Sirens, with their invisible bodies (since physically not 
described at all in the poem) sing and lure from a place where death reins, and Ulysses will die 
for it. Not for the Sirens – he will die for death itself. The Sirens’ song is a call to death, but it 
is also a call to otherness – Ulysses is in the process of becoming the Other at the expense of 
his own life. ‘If dung signifies the other side of the border,’ continues Kristeva, ‘the place 
where I am not and which permits me to be, the corpse, the most sickening of wastes, is a 
border that has encroached upon everything.’104 This blurring, fading away of the boundary 
between life and death, is a rhapsody of decay, of bodies dismembered and turned inside out. 
It is an ecstasy of devoured flesh; it is the expulsion of the ego. 
As remarked before, there are some notable discrepancies between the Homeric description 
of the Ulysses and the Sirens episode and the canvas by Waterhouse. One of the most obvious 
is that the despicable shore of rotting human flesh on which the Sirens dwell has changed into 
a rocky, narrow passage, with only one way out. The semiotic disturbance in Homer, caused 
by the violent relationship between the sweetness of the Sirens’ voices and the landscape that 
surrounds them, moved into the half-female sexualized bodies of the Victorian Sirens 
                                                 
101 Odyssey, XII, verse 7, 289. 
102 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 4. 
103 Ibid. In the English translation we have been using, Kristeva’s s'évanouir has been translated as ‘fall in a faint.’ 
We have translated s'évanouir as ‘fainting away,’ in accordance with our sentence. 
104 Ibid.  
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themselves. This shift from the horrendous landscape to the menacing Sirens’ bodies is exactly 
where the late nineteenth century portrayed itself most clearly. Describing the Victorian 
cultural imagination, Auerbach rightly observes that the nineteenth century was above all a 
mythical era – one in which female sexuality, and its connections to the unbridled nature and 
power of transformation, found expression in the most subtle and innocent looking female 
representations.105 By the end of the Victorian era, feminist thought and gender changes have 
become powerful and demanding, giving birth to the cultural paranoia of the ‘New Woman’ 
and drilling their way into works of art that at first sight had nothing to do with them.106 The 
changes at a deeper cultural level were in motion, molding cultural imagination in previously 
unimaginable ways, the misogyny of the period creating the devouring femme fatale of the fin-
de-siècle and her serpentine hair, enchanting hands, and shifting body.107 This is the climate 
behind Waterhouse’s visual choices, shaping his mindscape, and leading his hand between the 
sharp rocks of Ulysses’ ordeal – a visual, representational and cultural one-way passage.  
In the Odyssey the Sirens were only two. And most importantly: they were not physically 
described at all. We, western readers, writers and dreamers picture them with feathered arms 
or fish-like lower parts, but the Odyssey does not give us that information. From their first 
appearance in the Western literature, the Sirens appear as a visual void, an interruption in visual 
semiotics. ‘Everything starts with an interruption,’108 says Paul Valéry, and by embracing this 
view, I am making the Ulysses episode a strong issue of spatiality of language, as well as of 
the visuality of the episode itself. The real space, the repulsive landscape of the Odyssey moved 
into the loathsome bodyscape of the Sirens in Waterhouse’s painting, following the myth of 
female transformational power, increasing their number to no less than seven, while they haunt 
Ulysses not from afar, like in the Odyssey, but this time from up close. Derrida once said that 
                                                 
105 Auerbach, Woman and the Deamon, 1. The most notable examples definitely come from the Pre-Raphaelitism 
(like works of Dante Gabriel Rossetti, John William Waterhouse or Edward Burne-Jones), but, according to 
Auerbach, the characters of Trilby O’Ferrall from Trilby by George du Maurier, Lucy Westenra from Stoker’s 
Dracula and ‘Frau Emmy’ from Freud’s Studies on Hysteria, fall into that category too. Poems such as ‘The 
Origin of the Harp’ by Thomas Moore, and ‘The Mermaid’ by William Butler Yates, can be said to belong to the 
type.  
106 See Duncan Crow, The Victorian Woman (London: George Allen & Uwin Ltd, 1971). For the Victorian 
woman, see also the book by Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Mad Woman in the Attic: The Woman 
Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000). 
107 In the now unavoidable guide for any student of Victorianism, Walter E. Houghton describes the many faces 
of the fundamental Victorian anxiety. See Walter E. Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830-1870 (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1957). For the Victorian fascination with women’s hair, see Meghan 
Edwards, ‘The Devouring Woman and Her Serpentine Hair in Late Pre-Raphaelitism,’ last modified 26 December 
2004, Viewed 14 December 2012, http://www.victorianweb.org/painting/prb/edwards12.html, but also the 
seminal paper by Elisabeth G. Gitter, ‘The Power of Women's Hair in the Victorian Imagination,’ PMLA 99: 5 
(1984): 936-954. 
108 Paul Valéry, Mauvaises pensées et autres (Gallimard: Paris, 1943); our translation.  
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a woman seduces from a distance and that it is necessary to keep the distance in order to 
succumb to that distance.109 This is particularly true of the Victorian culture and its 
representational spiral. Waterhouse’s Ulysses wants to surrender to the fascination, but the 
Victorian Sirens are too close. He cannot succumb to them, nor can he embrace them, because 
they are both parts of the same mortal Victorian language. They are all around him, populating 
the representational space of the painting that Wood describes as ‘weird, menacing, and 
nightmarish.’110 They are invading his boat as a floating piece of land, his own little heterotopy, 
in a reverse semiotics of the social order where monstrosity now embodies social norms and 
Ulysses, in turn, embodies a detached piece of stray territory floating in abject waters. There is 
a semiotic confusion in this representation, an implosion of meanings.  
Reading the Sirens of the Odyssey with their bodies visually left blank echoes gazing at 
them in midair on the canvas by Waterhouse. These remarkable beings, capable of knowing 
everything, promising everything and destroying everyone, are neither properly here nor there 
– there is a rupture in their representation. Kristeva says that ‘[abject] is what disturbs identity, 
system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, 
the composite.’111 And exactly there, in that in-between, in the rift of representation and the 
temporary blank space of collapsed meaning, is the birthplace of the Sirens’ abject monstrosity 
and of the Victorian male desiring subject alike. The Sirens and Ulysses are one and the same 
image, two parts of the topology of the Victorian male subject. 
Blank space is what Ulysses often encounters on his journey. He expects the sweetness of 
the Sirens’ voices, but if we go back to their dreadful isle once again we shall see that, being a 
heterotopy in itself, a place where all norms and values are perverted and turned upside-down 
(or inside-out like putrefying bodies), their home presents itself first as an abrupt nothingness, 
as another interruption in language: 
 
Anon the wind slept, and for many a mile 
Some god in silence hushed the marble mere. 
Forthwith, our men the canvass furl, and pile 
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Safe in the hollow ship their naval gear, 
Lean to their oars, and whiten the blue waters clear.112 
 
As if at the gates of Hades itself, the home of the Sirens, a presumed residence of joy and 
bliss, is actually this still, smooth, aquatic grave, covered in human gore. But Ulysses 
nevertheless is seduced by the ghoulishness of the place, by the threshold of the beyond. No 
other place can offer him the thrill of enjoyment like the residence of fear itself. This non-
existent place to which Ulysses and his companions arrived is ‘[t]he Nether Nightmare of 
misogynist fantasy, home of the subject as devoured and drowned’113 as Kramer puts it, but it 
is also Kristeva’s place of fear – the word which hollows out representation and fills it with a 
‘hallucinatory, ghostly glimmer.’114 This calm place of nothingness is exactly what the 
nineteenth century bestowed on the monstrosity of sirens and on the male desiring subject. 
As stated above, while introducing Ulysses into his transgressive search of ecstasy from 
below, from fear, destruction, and death, what we fear the most is the monster that dwells inside 
us. Monstrosity is a text-book example of Kristeva’s realm of the abject, 
 
something rejected from which one does not part, from which one does not 
protect oneself as from an object. Imaginary uncanniness and real threat, it 
beckons to us and ends up engulfing us.115 
 
Victorian monstrosity is not an object, it cannot be fixed and properly introduced into a 
semiotic system; it rests on its cultural impossibility that haunts identity, leading to that dark 
flame inside of us. Victorian monstrosity is an abject, but an abject taken as the very essence 
of subjectivity. However paradoxical it may sound, I would like to argue that the male Victorian 
subject is that abject, he is that monster, and has been ever since. We cannot deal with the dread 
of our own skin, so we compel ourselves to express it, to render it intelligible. We write the 
monstrosity, paint it and sculpt it, rarely recognizing in it the exhausting and painful path of 
self-knowledge.    
Thus the Sirens, coming from the netherspace of the monstrous subject, are not opposed to 
Ulysses, and he cannot reject them by himself. He has to be tied to the mast of the ship, that 
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symbol of defense against the piercing, deadly voices of the Sirens. But they are not the same 
with him either, so he craves them. Ulysses and the Sirens, in their representational language, 
are the ‘sameness which is not identical,’ they are words of the Victorian language, a language 
in whose heart resides a différance. Filled with desire and at the same time afraid, robbed of 
his reason somewhere half-way there, Ulysses is trapped facing the Sirens, trapped by the fact 
of their inseparability. He is neither the subject nor object, but the abject – that Other which is 
always already in the core of the ego, because the Other comes before the ego, before 
representation, before meaning.116 The abject screams from the undivided space of always 
already before, a space beyond language and meaning the male Victorian subject had been 
dreaming of since he appropriated his mirror image. The Sirens are Ulysses’ abject mirror 
image, calling, imploring, promising fullness, promising happiness and stability, just like it was 
in the beginning, like it was in front of the mirror. They promise the whole that will never be. 
Because it is false, because it is not who we are (if we are at all), it is always the Other we seek, 
and the Other we need. In the age of mirrors, Sirens are monstrous faces of the male Victorian 
subject. Risen from this eternal abyss of self-recognition and self-identification, the abject 
roams the semiotic space and reaches out, while Ulysses the Victorian and his sinister abject 
siren faces, steering his dream-bound vessel, approach. 
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PART ONE 
 
MIRROR: THE NIGHTMARE I INHABIT 
 
In the mirror, I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual space that opens up 
behind the surface; I am over there, there where I am not, a sort of shadow that gives my own 
visibility to myself, that enables me to see myself there where I am absent: such is the utopia 
of the mirror.117 
Michel Foucault 
 
Reflection: This morning I caught myself staring at my reflection in the bathroom mirror. 
It was not just a passing glance, like any other morning, nor was it a vain gaze that appreciated 
or rejected what it saw. It was more a look of wonder, one that interrogated the image perceived. 
And it was not alone, that look that penetrated the clear, alluring, imperceptibly silvered surface 
of the looking-glass; it was followed by a sentiment, haunted by puzzlement, overburdened by 
doubt. It was a stare that asked – what? – something ungraspable to my half-benumbed mind.  
 It lasted a moment, an effervescent heartbeat maybe, but it felt like ages to me. And I 
wondered – not what one would expect from a dialogue with a mirror, namely, who was that 
person looking at me from behind the glass, peering into my eyes with feverish intent; what I 
wondered was who was ‘I’ who stared at the mirror and was I, as I know myself as ‘I’, there at 
all. As I continued staring, a half-forgotten verse came to my mind: ‘Take off your faces from 
your masks.’ How could I have been sure that there was anything even remotely extant as a 
perceiving ‘I,’ a point in the experiential life of an individual, a convergent spot of thoughts, 
emotions and sensations capable of a true act of seeing? Was this person an individual at all, 
or was it a void of chaos that stared at this smooth, rounded phantasmal being whose left eye 
was my right and whose right eye was my left? There was a sort of bewilderment in the 
encounter that morning, as I could not shake off the feeling of emptiness, and a certain scent 
of death that filled the space between me – whoever ‘I’ was, and whatever ‘I’ signified – and 
the mirror. Something was not there, where I had assumed it would be; something was lost to 
me, something that might not had been there at all. But I could tell with certainty that I lacked 
it, that I felt its absence – and I could feel it was absent since the beginning, any beginning. 
How come that, from that moment on, my reflection carried an imprint of death? How come 
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that this emptiness would not go away, disappear, wither away? How come that what I saw 
was somehow not what I wished to see, but both more and less than my wishful image? And 
how come that at the thought of it, at the most distant inclination of that void that stared at its 
own fully rounded reflection, I felt an urge to stretch out my hand and reach for it? How come 
I felt excited? 
 
* * * * * 
 
Gazing at oneself in order to see the Other, and imagining the Other in order to embrace 
oneself – these are only two of the limitless possibilities of a mirror. It is said that a mirror 
could tell us who we are, if we just looked at it from the right angle. In truth, it could show us 
what we wish to see, but it could also terrify us with fears and desires that are hard to fathom. 
As an instrument of self-knowledge, the mirror allows endless possibilities for the self and the 
Other, reaching toward the inside, while exteriorizing an abject self like a fleeing ghost of a 
man eternally chained to its tomb. There is a monster behind the mirror, because even in a full-
length reflection all we can see are fragments of possibilities, never knowing if the next time 
the mirror image will be a nightmarish one. Sabine Melchior-Bonnet observes: ‘monstrosity – 
the part representing the whole.’118 The eternal dread of facing fragments of the self, while 
imagination and culture do the rest, leads a fixed gaze right into the center of the silvered 
phantasm, only to expose a monster that lurks on the other side – the unfathomable self.  
The task undertaken in this chapter is to show the way mirrors, as Victorian commodities, 
embodied the semiotic interruption of the Victorian language discussed in the introduction. 
Scattered across the Victorian mind- and cityscapes, mirrors became vehicles of a new 
monstrous/fragmented subject, the one who dreamed about his semiotic wholeness; he 
inhabited a queer dream of his own perverted mirror image. It will be shown that mirrors 
embodied the semiotic incoherence of commodities and expressed the monstrosity of the 
subject through the language of material culture – a new, shifting, troubling space that, within 
the culture, opened up between men and things. This space was a small one, as small as a slip 
of the tongue, as minute as the blank space between words in a sentence. And it was essentially 
empty, meaning that it acted as a symbolic, nameless residue that attracted desire. This 
impossible, monstrous space arrived on the wings of three new moments in the history of 
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mirrors that separated the Victorian culture from its previous history: 1) As commodities, 
mirrors became omnipresent in the second half of the nineteenth century, they grew in size and 
advanced in clarity, enabling a perceiving subject to grasp himself as a visual, almost clear, 
corporeal unity for the first time; 2) The spectacularity of mirrors in the nineteenth century 
accounts wore off as the century wore on, making them naturalized, culturally inperceptible; 
3) In most of the accounts, mirrors came not to reflect the world without but the world within 
the subject – his desires, fears and fantasies. These factors, taken together, changed something 
at the level of desire. Among countless Victorian objet a commodities, one of them transformed 
the male desiring subject into a stranger to himself, into a monstrous, haunting subject. If the 
Victorian subject was monstrous because he was split between his existential chaos and a 
miscomprehended illusion of coherence, Victorian mirrors, as semantically shifting 
commodities, were fragments of the grotesque and monstrous Victorian modernity’s endless 
dream. 
 
The Spectacular Modernity of the Mirror Image 
 
What happens when the gaze penetrates its own reflection so deeply that the spot from which 
it reaches the upside-down world disappears? This absolute loss of representational parameters 
is the story of our own times. The first half of the nineteenth century was in this respect still 
young, although not innocent. The representational labyrinth that started eating away at Being 
from within the language was new to the century that had just become overloaded with mirrors. 
In the first half of the century, mirrors, abundant as they were, still inspired awe; they were still 
culturally perceptible, freshly taken into the world of devious commodities. They were still 
spectacular, their conspicuousness resonating with wider scopic, voyeuristic tendencies of a 
culture that began manifesting itself as a theatre.  
Nothing exemplifies this convergence of spectacle and mirror image better than the 
‘mirrored curtain’ of the Royal Coburg Theater. On the south bank of the river Themes, at the 
New Cut that connected Blackfriars and Westminster road was the Coburg, one of the smaller 
theaters of London.119 In its day it was famous for its name ‘Blood Tub,’ a name earned by 
frequently staging violent melodramas.120 The Coburg’s patrons were Their Royal Highnesses, 
Princes Charlotte and Prince Leopold, and it struggled to survive, competing with major 
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London theaters right into the twenty-first century. Today it is still there and bears the name of 
Old Vic. 
The interior of the Coburg was extravagant itself. In 1822, Augustus Frederick Glossop 
Harris, the first manager of the theatre, commissioned a marine salon that featured panoramic 
views by the prominent English marine painter Clarkson Frederick Stanfield, representing the 
recent triumph of the British navy in the bombardment of Algiers in 1816, huge mirrors, as 
well as portraits of the theatre’s patrons.121 Two large galleries encircled the building, providing 
the majority of seats. But more than anything else, the Coburg stayed remembered for the visual 
spectacle of the ‘mirrored curtain’ novelty (fig. 3). 
 
.  
Figure 3 The Mirrored Curtain, The Royal Coburg Theatre (1821) 
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In December 1821, the managers of the Coburg installed in the proscenium of the stage an 
enormous plate-glass mirror, later to be called the ‘mirrored curtain.’ Since it had still been 
impossible to produce a one-piece mirror of that size, it was comprised of sixty-three mirrored 
panels carefully put together and enclosed in an extravagant gilded frame featuring a radiant 
sun and groups of nude female bodies resembling Caryatides of the Athenian Erechtheion. On 
the evening of December 26, 1821 the mirror was lowered between the stage and the audience, 
inspiring awe, provoking the feeling of strangeness and causing commotion. It was so big that 
it reflected the majority of the perceiving subjects who waved at themselves and at each other. 
Thirty years before Joseph Paxton’s Crystal Palace, everyone in the audience became everyone 
else’s reflection, surveying one another, the mirror homogenizing the crowd and killing the 
distance between the subject and the reflection. In a single, discontinuous stroke of the sixty-
three panels of a fragmented monstrous mirror, the audiences could see themselves as 
participants in their own spectacle. Entering the world of commodities – abstracted in awe, 
spectacularized in a Victorian voyeuristic fantasy and alienated in the same extravaganza – this 
mirror embodied the scopic pleasures of the Victorian culture, reflecting, as Edward Fitzball 
said in 1859, ‘every Form and Face in the gorgeous house, from the topmost seat in the 
galleries, to the lowest bench in the pit.’122 Richardson believes that the society of spectacle 
consolidated itself around The Great Exhibition of 1851, but we can see that some traits of this 
scopic cultural phenomenon had already emerged in small, dim ‘places of noise, dirt […] and 
unbridled sexual commerce,’ as Jane Moody describes Georgian theaters.123 The very act that 
allowed the boundary between the perceiver and the perceived to be obliterated in the Coburg 
mirror, allowed audiences to enter a representational loop of appearance, introducing a distance 
from Being in the visual spectacle. Later we shall see that the Victorian age was an age of the 
world picture where Being came into being only by being represented, but we have already 
discussed aphanasis as the subject’s dying as Being and emerging as meaning. Nothing 
exemplifies better this distancing death of Being at the conjunction of spectacle and commodity 
than this mirror that reflected ‘every Form and Face,’ accentuating the illusion and eclipsing 
the reality of the stage. 
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The responses of the spectators to the curtain were diverse. Horace Foote was carried away 
by the enchantment of the commodity, where ‘crowded audiences testified their delight at 
seeing themselves in this immense mirror, and for the first time “on the stage”.’124 So, as early 
as 1821, mirrors came to embody the awe of the Victorian voyeuristic stare, returning the gaze 
of the subject to him and catching him behind the peephole of the world. Everyone could see 
everyone else – not like in Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon where vision was dominated from 
an invisible blind spot of the architectural state power, but in a democratized illusion of scopic 
equality. The viewers became protagonists of their own melodrama allowing the mirror – the 
looking-glass – to look back from the ‘flesh of the world’ that would otherwise have stayed 
concealed. Imagining the novelty of the mirrored curtain, Foucault’s words ring true: ‘The 
mirror […] enables me to see myself there were I am absent,’ in the blind spot of the 
existence.125 The bill from the evening of the premiere summarized the new phenomenon of 
the mirror-commodity concisely: ‘the most NOVAL, SPLENDID & INTERESTING OBJECT 
ever displayed in a British Theatre’ – the very definition of the commodity.  
Matthew Kaiser commented that the Coburg mirror ‘implicates its audience, resituates them 
onstage, and reduces the whole world to a melodramatic spectacle.’126 But there is more to this 
mirror than an inversion of the perceiver-perceived relationship. This grand mirror introduces 
a semiotic interruption in the visible public space, not only by inverting the roles in the scopic 
spectacle, but by perverting them, leading them astray (as in Latin pervertere: ‘to overthrow,’ 
‘to turn away’). This distortion of meaning is the blueprint of the Victorian spectacle. In this 
spectacle the epistemic lines between people and mirror-commodities were not erased or 
inverted but convoluted, leaving the perceiving subject in a nameless spectral space that drives 
the desire to always crave for more – never becoming satiated and always creating a stronger 
distance from Being. In the Coburg mirror we can see the same implosion of meaning that we 
will observe latter in the monstrosity of the mirrorless sirens of the Pre-Raphaelite painting: 
the spiral labyrinth of signification, which includes its own exits, and in which Being dies at 
the expense of meaning, while the desire of the perceiving subject roams in never-ending 
torment of dissatisfaction, searching for a satisfaction. Another contemporary account, a bit 
less flattering, by James Robinson Planché, clearly expresses this monstrous labyrinth of the 
visual drive: 
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[…] it was a large mass of plate-glass, and in those days must have cost a great 
deal of money. There was a considerable applause at its appearance. The 
moment it ceased, someone in the gallery, possessing a stentorian voice called 
out, “That’s all werry well! Now show us summat else!” What more cutting 
commentary could the keenest wit have made upon this costly folly?127 
 
In the world of commodities, desire always craves for more. In the field of desire, objet a is 
never reached, never attained, the thirst for more of ‘it’ is unquenchable. The mirror invoked a 
vortex of a broken signifying chain, broken somewhere half-way between the audience and the 
mirror image. In this chain, the representation did not fall back upon itself like in the ‘duplicated 
representation’ of Foucault’s eighteenth century, cancelling the meaning as we know it.128 In 
the Coburg mirror, as in the Victorian language as a whole, the signifier falls not upon itself 
but always upon something else, introducing the différance into signification. This epistemic 
premise of the nineteenth century – the  death of Being and the birth of the 
monstrous/fragmented subject from the body of a differential sign – assumes that what is 
revealed by the mirror (however nonsensical and disturbing it may be) is the ‘truth’ of the 
subject. In 1821, George McFarren sharply summarized this in a satirical verse on the Coburg 
mirror submitted to the periodical Drama: 
 
The giant houses, t’other side the water  
Who give to our humility no quarter,  
Say, nought but nonsense live within our portals,  
And call our heroes monsters, and not mortals;  
And henceforth to astound these native elves,  
Our portals must be true for you’ll behold yourself.129 
 
In this verse, we see that as long as the subject beheld himself what came as an image 
presented itself as the truth. As the subject was entering the labyrinth of signification and 
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revealing himself as rambling, hence monstrous, the words of Matthew Kaiser resonated true: 
one should know how to ‘survive the looking-glass.’130 
 Horrid as this semiotic implosion, and thus desire, might have been, the perceiving subject 
was still both frightened and astonished by the revelation of the mirror, its spectacularity not 
allowing the mirror to sink completely into the third world of commodities, to gain the 
introductory element: ‘just (a mirror).’ In 1821, mirrors had still not been naturalized; the image 
in them still not appropriated fully, hence the fear and astonishment. On the surface of the 
Coburg mirror, one could see the imprints of the workers, greasy smudges that still alluded to 
the world without, outside the reflection in the mirror and outside the semiotic implosion of 
différance. ‘The glass was all over fingers or other marks,’ said the unimpressed Planché.131 
The monstrous subject still wrestled his image and his monstrosity, the imprints hinting at the 
Real outside the representation. As Kasier wittily observes, big as the Coburg mirror was, it 
‘was not large enough to swallow the world. […] [It] might have swallowed [it]; the signifier 
might have devoured the referent, existence might be irrevocably in play.’132 But it had not, 
yet. The relationship between the subject and his mirror image was not inverted, but perverted. 
Mirrors had not acquired their humility yet, and the troubling effect they had on the subject 
was the striking feature of that time. Once mirrors had become fully integrated into the fabric 
of the society – naturalized, imperceptible, and taken for granted – the mirror image either 
disappeared or was broken, as in so many twentieth-century narratives. This scenario slowly 
began unfolding in the second half of the nineteenth-century. The early nineteenth century 
subject summoned his will to penetrate his own reflection, and the image he perceived did 
come to life. There was still a spectacular reflection to be grasped, one that would, by the 
second half of the century, turn into a nightmare. 
 
The Cornucopia of Selfhood 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, mirror, as an artifact, had come a long way from being 
a rare object, used only by the nobility, highly expensive and hard both to make and acquire.133 
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The history of mirrors is very long and complex.134 Most of their story is not directly pertinent 
to our argument, but a short survey could illuminate the argument’s background.  
When Venetian glassworkers were moved to the famous Murano islands in 1291, mirrors, 
although extant in various forms for centuries before, were miracles of technology.135 For 
centuries, Venice had the monopoly over the production of mirrors, so pure and so clean that 
they were called crystalline, and for a long time these mirrors were perversely expensive.136 In 
the second half of the seventeenth century, by a series of events worthy of the best espionage–
counterespionage novels on The Cold War, France broke the Venetian monopoly and founded 
the Royal Company of Glass and Mirrors. The Sun King was crazy about mirrors, and for 
another century, mirrors basically remained limited to those connected to the court.  
The mirror was never larger than what could be cut from a glass ball, and the curvature gave 
it a bulging shape that could be found in Flemish paintings and German engravings of the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.137 This is the mirror on the table in Quentin Metsys’ 
Moneychanger and His Wife, and on the bedroom wall in Van Eyck’ Arnolfini Portrait; no 
larger than a tea saucer and reflecting a distorted image. The game of looking into oneself had 
different rules, because what one could see was only a distorted image of reality, literally 
darkened and twisted. In the late Middle Ages and throughout the Renaissance, mirrors were 
associated with good as well as evil.138 They had strong religious significance, and Heinrich 
Schwarz shows that  
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the mirror – that is to say, the unblemished mirror, speculum sine macula – was 
the symbol of the Virgin’s purity, one of the many symbols referring to St. 
Mary’s Perfection and the miracle of Christ’s incarnation.139 
 
The mirror also became the symbol of Truth or Veritas, as well as of the Deadly Sins: 
Superbia or Pride and Luxuria or Lust were frequently represented with a mirror in medieval 
miniature paintings, as well as in sculptures (Bordeau, Moissac and Arles) and stained glass 
windows (Notre-Dame, Auxerre and Lyons) of the great French cathedrals.140 In the Italian 
Renaissance the classical heritage connected Vanity and mirrors, transforming them into the 
‘tools of Venus’ – emblems of seduction and prostitution.141 Thus, although the mirror had 
always been an ambiguous and contradictory symbol, its most persistent attributes were those 
of lies and deceit — one could not trust its reflection, nor could one identify with it. Mirrors 
were regarded as miraculous or demonic, capable of predicting the future.  
As long as the mirror remained rare and luxurious – existing, but somewhere else – one’s 
disappearing inside one’s own image, objectifying oneself, was not possible. Clear reflection 
and a persistent gaze were still quite far away.  
But things changed. With the French aristocracy, crystal mirrors gradually replaced metal 
ones, which almost completely disappeared from estate inventories in the last third of the 
seventeenth century.142 When the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, a joint project of architects 
Charles Le Brun and Jules Hardouin-Mansart, was presented to the public in 1682, it was met 
with resounding admiration. As the production of mirrors became cheaper, mirrors slowly 
started populating everyday space of illustrious salons in the eighteenth century, giving rise to 
the cabinet de toilette. ‘Mirrors thus invaded household decor,’ explains Melchior-Bonnet, ‘and 
transformed furniture throughout the eighteenth century.’143 A certain amount of time was 
needed to get accustomed to mirrors, however, for their visual effects ‘turned the relationship 
between empty and full surfaces on its head and defied equilibrium. But soon people could not 
do without the light brought by looking-glasses.’144 
Then, a very curios mirror-piece appeared, one that can be quite interesting for a discussion 
of mirror-commodities and their impact on loosening the border between people and things. 
                                                 
139 Ibid.,98. 
140 Ibid.,105-106. 
141 Cathy Santore, ‘The Tools of Venus,’ Renaissance Studies 11:3 (September 1997): 179-207. 
142 Melchior-Bonnet, Mirror, 25. 
143 Ibid,, 81. 
144 Ibid. 
62 
 
The mirrored armoire, a mirror embedded in furniture, emerged in the nineteenth century 
capturing one of the paradoxes of commodity.145 Once a mirror of God or Satan, held by Vanity 
or Pride, this amazing invention that merged luxury and everyday life, now held piles of sheets, 
household linens and utensils. In our own time, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it 
is hard for us to appreciate the grandeur of this invention. Today, every apartment, house or a 
household possesses a piece. We wake up in the morning, we open our closet or approach a 
sideboard, and as we fold our sheets or arrange our china, we see our faces reflected within 
these commodities. In our time, we do not even acknowledge it – a human face within a 
commodity has become our everyday reality. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the 
mirror was still young in pulling the subject into this space of blurred semiotic boundaries, but 
the more common mirrors became, the more enchanting they were. As we have seen in the 
introduction, this is what Daniel Miller calls the ‘humility of things’: once a thing becomes 
common, we tend to take it for granted. Our vigilance, then, becomes low and we start referring 
to the thing as ‘just (a mirror).’ But the less vigilant we are the greater the impact of the thing 
on our lives, the stronger its influence on the construction of meaning becomes. The thing then 
sinks into the third world of objects – an imperceptible, marginalized reality that strongly 
influences us nevertheless. 
The amazing discovery of the mirrored armoire allowed the monstrous subject to appear to 
us once again – in order to see himself, the subject gazed into the furniture. His image was now 
part of the thing, not framed in gold, ivory or wood, but covered in shelves, blankets and china. 
The commodity, an alienated human child, an offspring of changed relations of production, 
expressed the anxieties of the Victorian language, taken as the Lacanian Symbolic, and created 
a background from which the agonized, disjointed subject both appeared and announced 
himself, spirally enraptured by his own reflection. In the nineteenth century, the future of the 
post-modern self was born: to see one’s own face was to see a commodity. To gaze into oneself 
was to gaze back into one’s own commodified nature. 
The Victorian culture was undoubtedly a culture of glass and mirrors. Due to the intense 
innovation in the technology and production of cheap glass, London – as one of the capitals of 
the nineteenth century – was, by the middle of the century, completely covered in it.146 
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Everything could be made of this old but new material. ‘Ink stands, paper weights, knives, pen 
trays,’ lists the Illustrated Exhibitor and Magazine of Arts in 1852, ‘lamp pedestals, candelabra, 
candlesticks, salt cellars, knife-rests, mustard pots, sugar basins, butter coolers, smelling-
bottles, flower-vases, door-knobs, moldings, panels, chandeliers, surgeons’ speculae, railway 
and other reflectors.’147 Every building in the center of London had ground floor covered in 
glass shop windows (fig. 4). Interiors of cafés, shopping malls and restaurants reflected 
consumers as they browsed the goods.  
 
 
Figure 4 Shaftesbury House, Aldersgate street, Thomas Hosmer Shepherd (26th July 1830) 
 
In his essay The World as Exhibition, Timothy Mitchell recounts a story describing the 
experience of two Egyptians who traveled to France and England in the company of an English 
orientalist. The 1882 story Alam al-din by Ali Mubarak was one the first fictionalized accounts 
of Europe to be published in Arabic. On their first day in Paris, the visitors walked into a 
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wholesale shop and lost themselves in the endless corridors and crowds of people infinitely 
multiplied by omnipresent mirrors. As they wandered in horror through the endless maze of 
reflections, passers-by did not even acknowledge their desperation. ‘They stared at the two in 
silence as they passed,’ concludes Mitchell, ‘standing quite still, not leaving their places or 
interrupting their work.’148 This and similar stories show how the glass culture appeared to the 
subject from outside the Western representational labyrinth, and how exuberant mirrors 
actually were. Today, mirrors are so completely naturalized in our culture that it is really hard 
to appreciate the astonishment of the Middle-Eastern visitors, and a sense of novelty the 
Western subject experienced. In the city’s shop windows, public mirrors, barber mirrors and 
café mirrors, one never saw one’s own image from the same angle, there was always a different 
subject reflected back to the perceiver. The copiousness and size of public reflective surfaces 
literally revolutionized the way a subject interacted with his own corporeal and psychic 
coherence. 
There is ‘an inordinate love of plate glass,’ complained Charles Dickens in Gin Shops, ‘[…] 
door knocked into windows, a dozen squares of glass into one [in shops and gin palaces].’149 
Transparency and reflection became prime architectural, artistic and social elements. Isobel 
Armstrong shrewdly observes that Victorian ‘glassworld’ – the fantasy of the ‘dreaming 
community,’ to borrow Walter Benjamin’s phrase – embodied the cultural dream, or better the 
illusion, of a transparent, democratic society.150 
By the middle of the nineteenth century the fetishization of the mirror and its turning into a 
commodity became evident at the Great Exhibition, which Benjamin immortalized as 
‘pilgrimage-sites of the commodity-fetish.’151 Tracing the steps of Marx, Agamben concluded 
that Marx’s visit to London in 1851 when the first Great Exhibition took place in Hyde Park 
led his thinking to the analysis of commodity fetishism. ‘The “phantasmagoria” of which he 
speaks in relation to the commodity,’ argues Agamben, ‘can be discovered in the intentions of 
the organizers, who chose, from among the various possibilities presented, Paxton’s project for 
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the enormous palace constructed entirely out of glass.’152 This exhibition used glass and 
reflection game to capture,  
 
the transfiguration of commodity into an enchanted object [...] In the galleries 
and pavilions of its mystical Crystal Palace, […] the commodity is displayed to 
be enjoyed only through the glance at the enchanted scene.153 
 
Reflecting surfaces proved themselves as commodities, objects miraculously came to life 
by acquiring the bluish halo of the Crystal Palace in Hyde Park. Wherever they turned, people 
were haunted by their own reflections. In the streets, during meals, in city shops, transparent 
and reflecting surfaces surrounded the subject every step of the way. For the first time in the 
history of the West, the subject was not only able to encounter himself on every corner, but 
also to experience fully the externalization of his body. The full-length image of one’s body 
was a new experience. In 1889 The Turn of the Screw by Henry James, the governess 
experiences her full-length mirror image for the first time.154 In the course of the century, the 
Western world became a mirror; the subject was being mediated by reflective surfaces 
everywhere.  
The sentiment that the world of the nineteenth century (the age of the world picture, the 
world as a stage, or a peepshow) itself became a mirror grew strong. In the 1930s, Benjamin 
was able to note in one of his convolutes from The Arcades Project: 
 
Paris is a city of mirrors. The asphalt of its roadways smooth as glass, and at the 
entrance to all bistros glass partitions. A profusion of window panes and mirrors 
in cafés, so as to make the inside brighter and to give all the nooks and crannies, 
into which Parisian taverns separate, a pleasing amplitude. Women here look at 
themselves more than elsewhere and from this comes the distinctive beauty of 
the Parisienne. Before any man catches sight of her, she already sees herself ten 
times reflected. But, the man, too, sees his own physiognomy flash by. He gains 
his image more quickly here than elsewhere and also sees himself more quickly 
merged with this, his image. Even the eyes of passersby are veiled mirrors, and 
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over that wide bed of the Seine, over Paris, the sky is spread out like the crystal 
mirror hanging over the drab beds in brothels.155 
 
There are a myriad of things to read in this convolute by Benjamin. In his account, in his 
male fantasy, women see themselves multiplied, the same as male subjects, but always in 
anticipation of the male gaze. Their reflection cannot step out of Benjamin’s fundamentally 
male, objectifying gaze. Also, man merges with his image. He appropriates it quickly, 
embodying the exteriorized image of the self. The hyper-abundance of and obsession with 
reflection is clear in Benjamin, even exaggerated. Every little thing – passersby, their eyes, 
even the sky above the river – sends the subject’s image back to him, pointing to the same 
circle of desire that troubled Freud in his excerpt from the ‘Uncanny.’ 
 
As I was walking, one hot summer afternoon, through the deserted streets of a 
provincial town in Italy which was unknown to me, I found myself in a quarter 
of whose character I could not long remain in doubt. Nothing but painted 
women were to be seen at the windows of the small houses, and I hastened to 
leave the narrow street at the next turning. But after having wandered about for 
a time without enquiring my way, I suddenly found myself back in the same 
street, where my presence was now beginning to excite attention. I hurried away 
once more, only to arrive by another detour at the same place yet a third time. 
Now, however, a feeling overcame me which I can only describe as uncanny, 
and I was glad enough to find myself back at the piazza I had left a short while 
before, without any further voyages of discovery.156 
 
As Freud always comes back to the same red-light street, performing the repetition of a 
repressed sign, so does Benjamin’s gaze always come back to him no matter where he looks, 
staging the trauma of the lost self-coherence (the one that is experienced as a lack, as an absence 
of something that has never been there in the first place), a dissatisfaction of desire, a misstep 
– like grabbing water in a hollow cup. As Hanna Arendt observes, Benjamin’s imagination was 
essentially superannuated, essentially Victorian, ‘as though he [Benjamin] had drifted out of 
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the nineteenth century,’ and his writing reflects the Victorian age haunted by its own mirror 
image – precisely because this image was false.157 Beyond this reflection, where the ‘true’ 
coherence of the self dwells, waits the Real that always comes back to itself. It inhabits the 
space beyond the representational labyrinth that the subject will never reach. Is not this 
convolute by Benjamin perturbing; is it not something uncanny that comes back from beyond, 
or below, like from Bataille’s ‘underground’? Does it not make us apprehensive, this reflection 
that comes at the same time from everywhere and nowhere? Is it so unimaginable that in an 
age obsessed and haunted by its reflection something changed at the level of desire?  
Another convolute by Benjamin citing S. F. Lahrs shows that the reality of 1837 was quite 
similar to his own experience of a reflective Paris.  
 
Egoistic – “that is what one becomes in Paris, where you can hardly take a step 
without catching sight of your dearly beloved self. Mirror after mirror! In cafés 
and restaurants, in shops and stores, in haircutting salons and literary salons, in 
baths and everywhere, ‘every inch a mirror’!”158 
 
In the above quotation, we see the subject enraged by the encounter with himself every step 
of the way, his external existence loathed and despised; he is almost tired of this skirmish with 
mirror images. As Armstrong suggests, these abundant public reflective ‘surfaces, recording 
the random, dispersed, and evanescent images of the body in the world, gave a new publicity 
to the subject, who could exist outside of itself in these traces.’159 This external existence, and 
its re-appropriation, is the new Being of the Victorian male desiring subject. 
In an environment in which, for the first time, the subject was able to live his own reflection, 
to visually experience an almost clear (a mirror is never completely clear, especially in the 
nineteenth century) and coherent image of the self, what happened with the perceiving subject? 
What did this change mean to him? As we shall see shortly, the narrative of the mirror, the 
fantasy it conveyed, inevitably had to change. The spatial democratization of reflective 
surfaces, the mediation of the self by mirrors and windows, by the glass of the nineteenth 
century, led the subject into the same representational loop of the Victorian language that we 
have already diagnosed for the materiality of the commodity in general – because reflective 
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surfaces were commodities. Through the looking-glass, the Victorian world of appearances 
opened, it started descending into the nothingness of its own reflection. ‘It blinks,’ this mirror 
world, says Benjamin. ‘[I]t is always this one – and never nothing – out of which another 
immediately arises.’160 The mirror world, the Victorian ‘glassworld,’ slowly established a 
world of simulacra at the expense of the unattainable Being. ‘The space that transforms itself 
does so in the bosom of nothingness,’ continues Benjamin anticipating Gilles Deleuze’s claim 
that the ‘modern world is one of simulacra.’161 Contrary to the absolute transparency of the 
twentieth-century glass culture, Armstrong argues, the subject of the Victorian transparency is 
a ‘subject in difficulties,’ signified by scratches and fingertips on the glass that created internal 
contradictions.162 In a counter-movement to the externalization of his image, the subject 
appropriated the image perceived taking it as his own coherent self. And out of this 
misrecognition the split was born, a dark and horrid place impossible to signify, which kept 
summoning the subject in, the subject in search of congruity and escape out of the 
representational horror. Towards the Real, towards the lack, towards the object a that has never 
been there – towards a coherence of the self. From this anxiety of an attainable desire, the one 
reaching towards commodities as false objects of satisfaction, a dream arrived, fundamental to 
the Victorian modernity – a dream of wholeness, a dream dreaming its own awakening. This 
dream expressed its spiral horror in a new mirror narrative, one that kept haunting the subject 
and the culture for more than a century – the narrative of similarity that is not identical, of 
anxiety and strangeness. Once more the subject expressed himself in a disquieting, agitating 
language of the unconscious – in a haunting mirror image – as yet another face of the haunting 
commodities, the inanimate things miraculously came to life. And the subject kept dreaming 
his fantasy. But the dream that came to him, the one he was born from, turned out to be a 
nightmare.  
 
The Haunting Strangeness  
 
In 1891, through the pen of Oscar Wilde, Lord Henry said to Dorian Gray: ‘It is only shallow 
people who do not judge by appearances.’163 Fleeting as it might be, this remark bears in itself 
a culture, a history, and a language. As any cultural creation, it reaches deep down into the pool 
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of socially possible and impossible imageries, bringing back to the surface the inner structure 
of the society itself. If something as an appearance, which has been for centuries conceived of 
as a synonym for the superficial – even diabolic – could have emerged as its own opposite, 
then this substitution tells us about the specific cultural moment of fin-de-siècle, as much as it 
speaks of the inner demons that haunted Dorian Gray. At the core of this remark, we find an 
inversion of form and content, absence and presence, humanity and commodity – an inversion 
that established itself as a prerogative of the society of spectacle. Putting it into the wider 
context of the novel from which it appeared, what Dorian Gray allowed himself was to abstract 
his existence and transcend his humanity. By doing that, he entered a game of categories that 
were not erased but blurred, raising with this act the mentioned fears of an uncanny 
transgression of commodity. He became an object, materiality deprived of growing old, his self 
eternally stored in a picture frame which would be his reward and punishment. Oscar Wilde, 
the dandy of the era, captured the spirit of the age in a single evanescent remark. 
As the commodity became the ‘centerpiece of everyday life,’ the ‘focal point of 
representation,’ and the ‘dead center of the modern life,’ as Richards stresses, the mirror joined 
the vast and diverse family of commodities and assumed a primary position in Victorian 
culture.164 By its newly acquired commodified and fetishized nature, this curios object 
developed a new narrative, showed its new face – one that proved essential to the new male 
desiring subject. It showed, or was beginning to show, the essential dependence of the subject 
on the material language of commodity. Contrary to its medieval, Renaissance and 
Enlightenment history that considered the mirror as an instrument of God, as well as an 
instrument of Satan, a tool of moral purity or fall – but rare and small all the same – the moment 
the mirror became omnipresent as a cheap, widespread commodity, its representation in art and 
literature stopped reflecting God, sins and virtues – it stopped moralizing and educating on 
proper values of life as it did in the ages past. Now a new role of the mirror consisted not in 
reflecting what was without and external to the subject who gazed into it, but precisely what 
was within and internal to him – his dreams, his fears, his fantasies. The mirror and its fantastic 
story became a playground for the subject of the unconscious, causing the subject to reveal 
himself from inside the language. In a nutshell, mirror, in its guise as a commodity – an object 
raised to the status of a Thing, desired, yearned for, ostensibly acquired, but always leaving a 
craving for more – became, almost literally speaking, a creature of desire.  
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In the poem The Lament of the Looking-Glass by Thomas Hardy we can see this twisted 
nature of the mirror’s materiality that gets morphed into the selfhood of an object. In it, the 
looking-glass laments its forsaken existence, revealing the subject that once stood before it, 
confusing the categories of the perceiver and the perceived. The mirror discloses the ghosts of 
the perceiving subject’s desire: ‘I flash back phantoms of the night / That sometimes flit by me 
[…],’ says the mirror.165 The limits of representation of materiality collapse in the mirror-
commodity, leaving man immobile and inanimate, and turning a thing – the mirror – into a 
talking subject. The looking-glass literally looks. It is alive. It discloses for us the language of 
monstrosity, and in its disturbing undead materiality, it reveals the monstrosity of the Victorian 
subject who dreams of it. This subject has a nightmare without realizing it, expressing his 
tormented non-Being in a displaced representation of the animate object. Time and again in 
Victorian poetry we encounter the same theme of strangeness and appropriation of the 
reflection in the mirror.  
We are principally discussing the male subject, as expressed in his creations (poetry, 
painting, sculpture, etc). But, as it has been said in the introduction, many of the issues 
discussed could be seen as relating to the female subject too. We will analyze a couple of 
examples together with the examples of the male subject. 
In A Royal Princess (1866) by Christina Rossetti, mirrors obsessively reveal to the princess, 
dissatisfied with her golden cage, her ubiquitous, multiplied and fragmented self:  
 
All my walls are lost in mirrors, whereupon I trace  
Self to right hand, self to left hand, self in every place,  
Self-same solitary figure, self-same seeking face.’166 
 
She cannot escape her mirror image, reflected in her every move, on every wall. The face 
in the mirror image, the same as her own, keeps searching, isolating her in a solitary figure. As 
she sits on the dais, her mirror image keeps haunting her, showing both her fear and her desire, 
as she comes to despise her comely face: ‘A mirror showed me I look old and haggard in the 
face.’ 
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 In George Meredith’s Modern Love (1862), a husband observes his wife’s struggle to 
confess: 
 
She has desires of touch, as if to feel  
That all the household things are things she knew.  
She stops before the glass. What does she view?  
A face that seems the latest to reveal!167 
 
We can almost feel the desire for the comfort of things, the subject’s reaching for 
subjectified commodities, ‘things she knew,’ as the wife turns towards the mirror to view the 
reflection in which her face comes to be reflected last. The subjectivity of the wife (in the eyes 
of her husband) is first expressed in the form of familiar commodities, leaving a chasm of 
unsignifiable space gaping from the mirror, between the revelation of things and the revelation 
of the human face.  
 In By the Looking-Glass (1866) by Augusta Webster, a girl sitting in front of a mirror, 
displeased by the superficiality of the society says:  
 
A girl, and so plain a face!  
Once more, as I learn by heart every line  
In the pitiless mirror, night by night,  
Let me try to think it is my own.  
Come, stranger with features something like mine,  
Let me place close by you the tell-tale light.168 
 
The girl pretends that the face she sees in the mirror is hers, precisely because it is not, 
because the mirror reflects not what it is, but what the perceiver desires. The image is here 
literally a stranger, with features that resemble the girl’s, but they are not hers nevertheless. 
The mirror again opens a nameless part of the language, it opens up a différance, in which what 
one sees is always both more and less than what one wishes to see. Desire pulls the subject in, 
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towards the appropriation of this nameless, horrid, and troubling stranger. ‘There,’ the girl says, 
‘looking back from the glass, is my fate.’ 
 Finally, The Other Side of a Mirror (1882) by Mary Coleridge, capitalizes on all the 
fragments of the strangeness of the mirror image we have discussed. Almost every line of the 
poem is dripping with the queerness of one’s reflection, hinting at the void in representation, 
introduced and epitomized by the mirror’s commodified nature. ‘I sat before my glass one day, 
/ And conjured up a vision bare […] / The vision of a woman, wild / With more than womanly 
despair.’169 This image is not only wild and overly desperate, emotionally too much and too 
little, but it is conjured, summoned like an otherworldly minion in a hellish fantasy. This 
specter invoked through the commodified nature of the mirror comes to our summoness as an 
essentially silent image – mute and commodified. 
 
Her lips were open – not a sound  
Came through the parted lines of red.  
Whate’er it was, the hideous wound  
In silence and in secret bled.  
No sigh relieved her speechless woe,  
She had no voice to speak her dread.170 
 
This silence of the subject is a dreadful silence. It is the silence of desire’s dreadful spiraling 
around the semiotic implosion of the Victorian language. This desire grows mad, enraged, 
furious, berserk, its dissatisfaction never-ending, jealous, vengeful and unceasing.  
 
And in her lurid eyes there shone  
The dying flame of life’s desire,  
Made mad because its hope was gone,  
And kindled at the leaping fire  
Of jealousy, and fierce revenge,  
And strength that could not change nor tire.171 
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And then it collapses in the jouissance of appropriation, in the experience of the fall of the 
subject:  
 
Shade of a shadow in the glass,  
O set the crystal surface free!  
Pass – as the fairer visions pass –  
Nor ever more return, to be 
The ghost of a distracted hour,  
That heard me whisper, “I am she!”172 
  
The poem perfectly embodies the themes of strangeness of the mirror; a mirror reflection 
that presents itself as haunting, mad, insatiable, ghostly, silent; a reflection that reveals the 
within of the perceiving subject; and finally the appropriation of the hallucinated image as 
one’s own in the final ‘I am she.’ The poem epitomizes the Victorian world as a mirror, a 
maddening desire of the subject in search of coherence, dreaming about wholeness, but 
misrecognizing the external mirror fantasy as her own self, and, by doing that, expressing 
herself as fundamentally incoherent and monstrous.  
 
* * * * * 
 
There are authors who have already acknowledged this shifting narrative of the mirror in 
various spheres of the Victorian culture. Isobel Armstrong takes up this new notion of the 
reflection in the mirror. Discussing Victorian ‘glassworlds’ – the metaphors and socially 
constructed meanings of the Victorian glass culture – the chapter on the Victorian mirror-poetry 
includes themes such as ‘ghosts,’ ‘fragments,’ ‘surfaces and depths,’ and ‘a stranger’s look’ as 
common tropes in the nineteenth-century poetry.173 
Analyzing the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century romantic poetry and criticism, M. H. 
Abrams identifies two great metaphors of artistic creation, and the role of poets and artists in 
it: the mirror and the lamp. He explains them as two ‘common and antithetic metaphors of the 
mind, one comparing the mind to a reflector of external objects [the mirror] the other to a 
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radiant projector which makes a contribution to the objects it perceives [the lamp].’174 The 
mirror had been a basic metaphor for critical thinking since Plato, until the end of the eighteenth 
century, while the lamp exemplified the romantic tradition. Abrams sets an artificial dividing 
line between these two attitudes around the year 1800, taking Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical 
Ballads as a convenient document to ‘signalize the displacement of the mimetic […] by the 
expressive view of art in English criticism.’175 Although he identifies that the mirror metaphor 
disappears precisely in the period of our analysis, this disappearance speaks. As the mirror 
slowly entered the world of commodities, disappearing into naturalization towards its cultural 
imperceptibility of ‘just (a mirror),’ (that would not happen suddenly, but slowly in the course 
of the century), the mirror disappeared from the language of art criticism too, giving way to the 
metaphor of the lamp, to ‘the internal made external.’176 Thus the mirror and the lamp embody 
a change, not only on the surface of words, preferring one to the other, but they express the 
cultural imagery of art which, from the nineteenth century onwards, describes the Victorian 
subject as ‘the internal made external,’ (the radiating lamp), just as the haunting strangeness of 
the mirror presented the internal as external. In the same fashion, Oscar Wilde exclaimed in the 
Preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray: ‘It is the spectator, and not life, that art really 
mirrors.’177 
 The above poetic material shows that the Victorian subject appears as a fundamentally 
tortured and shattered one. The abyss in the representation of the commodified materiality 
pushes the mirror to the fore in form of an object that miraculously comes to life, expressing 
the anxiety of a disjointed subjectivity. This rift in the representation of mirrors as tools of a 
monstrous, split, desiring self, reveals itself to us in a number of Victorian narratives. We have 
already found it in the mirror poetry – various nineteenth-century poems that use the ‘mirror 
reflection’ trope, expressing this new, disturbing, unknown place within the subject, which 
presented itself as ghostly, strange and nameless. We will find, shortly, the same rift in Through 
the Looking Glass by Lewis Carroll, the undying Victorian classic that deals explicitly with 
this disturbing figure of language wrapped in the images of mirrors. We find it in the 
unavoidable image of the Crystal Palace of the World Exhibition of 1851 by Paxton, which 
materializes Victorian social, political and class fantasies, as Armstrong shrewdly observes. In 
the next chapter, it will be shown how the Palace embodies the desiring fantasy of the male 
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subject – a place where the subject falls, exhausted and overwhelmed by his own reflection, 
dissolved in the joissance of materiality. Finally, we find this new mirror figure in a number of 
monstrous narratives that span the century: from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein to Bram 
Stoker’s Dracula, as well as in a number of siren stories that are the subject of Part II of the 
book. In all of these cultural pieces – material, visual, and written – the mirror expresses a new 
relationship of the perceiving subject with the thing reflected and perceived, or better, revealed. 
In all of them, something disturbing lurks behind the reflected image, a dark fantasy that haunts 
the subject and his relationship with his image. For this reason, Lacan’s analysis of the mirror 
stage proves convenient for thinking about the dream behind this change in representation. For 
Lacan, the ‘mirror stage is always a drama,’ a place where everything begins and ends in a 
swirl of misrecognition of the image perceived.178 Nothing can be truer of the Victorian 
mirrors. The subject who looks in the mirror rarely sees what he expects to see; he rarely sees 
what he wishes to see. He always sees more or less. As we dive into the Victorian mirror 
reflection through the two segments to follow this introductory chapter, time and again we find 
an exhausted, puzzled subject, one afraid of what might appear next in the mirror. In this 
context, the Lacanian mirror stage is completely Victorian. Arriving from the intellectual 
milieu of the mid-twentieth century (precisely at the moment when everything Victorian gains 
its strength again), the imaginary of the Lacanian mirror stage seems as nineteenth-century in 
its nature, as any heir of Freudian psychoanalytic vocabulary. As Auerbach convincingly 
showed, analyzing Freud’s narrative of hysterical Dora, Freud’s theory was brutally subjected 
to the Victorian male fantasy about female sexuality, an unknown field Freud himself 
confessed he had never understood.179 Building on Freud’s theory, Lacan argued for the split 
subject that mistook the coherence of his mirror image for his own self. In this image, he 
exposed the fanciful reality of the Victorian desiring subject.  
 Though, on the surface, many things Victorian met their respective deaths at the hand of the 
twentieth century, the desiring subject of the twentieth stayed profoundly Victorian in his 
nature. The split that opened in representation and inhabited language from within – the chasm 
that, circularly, both gave birth to the monstrous subject and emerged as a result of his split self 
– stayed there in the centuries to come, becoming wider and more bloodthirsty as it grew. What 
was a dilemma in nineteenth-century narratives, what presented itself as exhaustion of the 
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subject and the impossibility of coherence that troubled the mind of the Victorian desiring 
subject, became the nature of reality itself for his twentieth-century descendants.  
 One thing remains certain: the encounter with a reflecting surface must have profound 
effects on the perceiving subject, regardless of the age when it takes place. Whether we agree 
that the trans-historicity of Lacanian analysis is questionable, or that his mirror scenario can 
help us deal better with the representation of the self in the nineteenth century and the centuries 
to come, the moment a subject first sees himself as whole, comes as an important moment in 
the construction of selfhood. This is the point in time when the subject realizes that he is not 
the Other that cares for him (a parent) and that he has a corporeal existence of his own. In this 
light, the historical moment that introduces the mirror as an everyday, omnipresent artifact, 
revealing reflective surfaces at almost every step, must be considered as an important moment 
in the history of selfhood, as well as in the history of language. The nineteenth century was that 
moment, the first moment when the looking subject could gaze at his own reflection 
everywhere, all the time. It was a time of commodities and a time of mirrors – it was a time of 
mirrors as commodities. In this chapter we saw how this particular conjunction of the 
historicity of mirrors and that of commodities resonated together through the Victorian 
semiosphere, transforming mirrors from elite, luxurious, hard-to-get object into everyday 
commodities, at the same time when an afterlife of these commodities, in the form of desire, 
expressed the split of the subject. The transformation of mirrors and the afterlife of 
commodities were two sides of the same nineteenth-century modernist dream – a sustaining 
dream of a whole, coherent, untroubled selfhood in the age of a split, fragmented self – 
monstrous precisely due to his unending, semiotically troubling nightmare that weaved itself 
into the very fabric of the society. 
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FALL 1: EXHAUSTED AT THE LAKE’S SHORE 
 
[A]ll of the things that are used to signify derive, from the very fact of their pointing to 
something else, a power which makes them appear no longer commensurable with profane 
things, which raises them into a higher plane, and which can, indeed, sanctify them. 
Considered in allegorical terms, then the profane world is both elevated and revalued.180 
Walter Benjamin 
 
In the previous chapter we saw how, at the historical moment of the mirror’s overabundance, 
its commodification transformed the perception of the self. The mirror introduced a split in the 
language of representation through which the perceiving subject fell. The anxiety of this fall 
we read in the language of the mirror’s materiality and of the mirror’s reflection. In the 
nineteenth-century mirror narratives, the image coming to the perceiver back from the mirror 
was still extant; the mirror was not broken, nor did it reflect an absence. Instead, it reflected a 
stranger who was often more or less than what the perceiving subject expected. The Victorian 
imagination brought the mirror to life, the mirror assuming a speaking subjectivity and looking 
back from within its silvered, smooth surface. Even more often, the reflection in the mirror 
appeared as a menacing selfhood, haunting the perceiver in a troubling, nightmarish dream. In 
this respect, the mirror and its image embodied in their spectral existence the very nature of 
commodity fetishism discussed in the introduction – the phantasmal desired object in the 
commodities, death itself.  
This fantasy of convoluted and perverted epistemic lines between people and commodities 
was one of the expressions of the split subject – the subject seduced by the congruity of his 
own mirror image, by the omnipresent reflection of his corporeal existence. In this respect, the 
materiality of Victorian mirrors presents itself to us as a borderline between the perceiving 
subject and the object of his gaze, as a battle for the humanity of people as distinct from the 
materiality of things. In this Fall, as well as in the following one, it will be shown that the 
mirror in the Victorian imagination became a dividing line, beyond which inanimate things 
came to life and animate humans turned into objects. We are talking about the workings of the 
Victorian imagination that allowed the subject to overcome the rigid boundaries of the animate 
and the inanimate and reach towards a place that does not exist, or better, that exists only in its 
                                                 
180 Walter Benjamin, On the Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London: New Left Books, 
1977), 175. 
78 
 
own absence – the objet a – the coherence of the Self, the awakening from the dream of 
language. This coherence that lured the desire, as a fundamental illusion of the Victorian (and 
post-Victorian) culture, has been rediscover through the mirror narratives, but only to be sought 
again, since it was rediscovered only in its absence, as an absence that was there in the first 
place. In this illusion the subject keeps reaching out through the mirror for this empty space 
that promises wholeness, continuously enacting his own fall, and experiencing jouissance as a 
result. This jouissance of an unattainable object – an experience that leaves only the absence 
of the objet a behind – is the topic of this chapter. By analyzing the narrative of ‘The Grand 
Boudoir Glass’ through the prism of a larger architectural structure also made of reflective 
surfaces – the Crystal Palace – we shall see how the subject experiences jouissance of the fall 
in face of the unattainability of commodified materiality that mirrors came to embody and 
signify. 
 
Jouissance as the ‘Pleasure-in-Pain’ 
 
Lacan developed his concept of jouissance on the wings of Freud’s late introduction of the 
‘death drive’ to his theory. Being only ostensibly a sort of pleasure, the title of the work in 
which the ‘death drive’ appears clearly states that it is Beyond the Pleasure Principle.181 The 
difference between the ‘pleasure principle’ and the ‘death drive’ beyond it is at the level of 
excitation a person experiences in relation to the object of his/her desire. While the pleasure 
principle functions as an ‘economic speculator,’182 as Adrian Johnston calls it, calculating the 
probable and possible level of satisfaction – maximizing pleasure and minimizing 
pain/displeasure – the ‘death drive’ goes beyond this moderated/mitigated level, bringing 
extreme pleasure to the subject. Freud developed this concept by identifying a strong tendency 
among war veterans and neurotic patients to keep reliving their painful experiences over and 
over again, their psyche constantly repeating the pain in spite of its obvious displeasure.183 
Lacan identifies his idea of jouissance at this register. Jouissance as an extreme psychic 
experience of transgression always involves a limit to be transgressed. There has to be a line to 
be crossed, a Law to be broken, after which jouissance is promised to the subject. In The Ethics 
of Psychoanalysis, Lacan argues for this concept by criticizing Kant’s example from the 
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Critique of Practical Reason. Simplified for the purposes of this chapter, Kant says that a man 
faced with a choice between sexual satisfaction that results in death or non-satisfaction, by 
default chooses the latter. As an example he takes a man who is offered a choice to sleep with 
the woman of his dreams but be hanged afterwards, or not to sleep with her at all. Contrary to 
Kant, Lacan says that the psychoanalytic experience shows that there are many cases where 
individuals actually choose the former; it even shows frequent examples when they choose 
satisfaction precisely because it involved the possibility of death.184 We have seen an example 
of this scenario in the prologue, with Ulysses desiring death itself. Seen in this way it seems 
that jouissance involves a final satisfaction, a pure pleasure by transgressing against the Law 
and finally attaining the Thing (das Ding) – the phantasmal, always already absent objet a of 
desire. But, of course, this is not the case. In the Encore, Lacan distinguishes between two types 
of jouissance – jouissance expected and jouissance obtained.185 The subject expects the 
jouissance promised by the very existence of the Law (that prescribes the limit of socially 
acceptable satisfaction) to be transgressed in the attaining of the Thing, but in the process of 
reaching for it he always falls short – the Thing always stays out of reach by its very absence, 
which orients the desire towards it. In this fall the subject experiences jouissance obtained, a 
sort of extreme pleasure that, nevertheless, falls short of the idealized standard. Thus, this 
jouissance of ‘falling short,’ of not reaching the goal, in most cases manifests itself as 
‘pleasure-in-pain.’ This jouissance, through the fall and exhaustion of the subject, always says: 
‘This is not it!’ Jouissance expected is a mythical experience orchestrated in the libidinal 
economy by and around the missing object; jouissance obtained, the only existing type, is an 
‘enjoyment that is enjoyable only insofar as it doesn't get what it's allegedly after.’186 Extreme 
pleasure does not have to be pleasant. 
 
The Context of the Mirror 
 
The Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of all Nations was the epicenter of Victorian 
commodities, and thus we will be returning to it again and again. Signifying the temporal center 
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of the nineteenth century (1851) as well as the center of the world – politically, socially, 
culturally, evolutionary – it was hosted at the Crystal Palace (fig. 5), an enormous glass 
structure designed by Joseph Paxton.187 As it shall be seen in a drawing by George Cruickshank 
from Henry Mayhew’s 1851: or, The Adventures of Mr. and Mrs. Sandboys, the Crystal palace 
literally embodied the center of the world by pulling the works of industry and all the nations 
towards its reflective/transparent structure. The Palace was made out of 300,000 plates of glass 
covering a 92,000 m2 area, its size and its glitter causing amazement, the effect of what 
Agamben calls a ‘bluish halo.’188 
 
 
Figure 5 The Crystal Palace designed by Joseph Paxton, Sydenham (1854) 
 
Being such a huge and enchanting structure, it hardly suffices to say that it received a 
reaction of equal magnitude. It came to represent the very tissue of the Victorian culture and 
the role of Britain as the leader of economic and evolutionary progress. The Exhibition, said 
Eliza Cook’s Journal, was  
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to industry what galleries of painting and sculpture are to art – what a library is 
to literature – what a museum is to science – what a zoological and botanical 
garden is to natural history – a chart of the progress of mankind.189 
 
The number of written reports from the years of and after the Exhibition, was superseded 
only by the number of academic works about the Exhibition that runs through the second half 
of the twentieth century. The Official Descriptive and Illustrated Catalogue of the Great 
Exhibition of Works of Industry of All Nations (maybe the only creation more monstrous, larger 
and more incomprehensible than the Exhibition itself) was published in six volumes by the 
Royal Commission, its size and unintelligibility giving birth to a number of explanatory works, 
such as The Crystal Palace Exhibition Illustrated Catalogue or The Crystal Palace and its 
Contents, as well as a vast number of unofficial reports and accounts. When, from the 1950s 
onwards, academics became interested again in everything Victorian, the Crystal Palace and 
the Great Exhibition became unavoidable parts of every analysis of the Victorian culture.190 
There, inside that gargantuan structure, we encounter ‘Section 22 (General Hardware),’ 
where the object of our interest is stored. ‘The Grand Boudoir Glass’ (fig. 6), as it was called 
by the Official Catalogue, was made for the Duchess of Sutherland by the flamboyant 
                                                 
189 Jericho, ‘Exhibition of the Industry of All Nations,’ Eliza Cook’s Journal 2:40 (2 February 1850): 217. 
190 The literature on this topic is so vast that it would be impossible to cover it completely. Some of the more 
important and comprehensive studies, besides the already mentioned Mitchell and McClintock are: Christopher 
Hobhouse, 1851 and the Crystal Palace (London: John Murray, 1950); Yvonne Ffrench, The Great Exhibition of 
1851 (London: Harvill Press, 1950); Paul Greenhalgh, Ephemeral Vistas: The Expositions Universelles, Great 
Exhibition and World’s Fairs, 1851-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988); Louise Purbrick, ed., 
The Great Exhibition of 1851. New Interdisciplinary Essays (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001); 
Patrick Beaver, The Crystal Palace 1851-1936: A Portrait of Victorian Enterprise (London: Hugh Evelyn, 1970); 
John R. Davis, The Great Exhibition (Sutton: Stroud, 1999); Jeffrey Auerbach, The Great Exhibition and 
Historical Memory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); C. R. Fay, Palace of Industry, 1851: A Study of 
the Great Exhibition and its Fruits (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951); George W. Stocking Jr. 
addresses the Exhibition in the context of the idea of civilization before and after 1851 in Victorian Anthropology 
(London and New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1987); Paul Young, Globalization and the Great 
Exhibition: The Victorian New World Order (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); many authors 
use the Exhibition to discuss the commodity culture in the nineteenth-century novel, such as Andrew H. Miller, 
Novels Behind Glass: Commodity Culture and Victorian Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995); Elaine Freedgood, The Ideas in Things: Fugitive Meaning in the Victorian Novel (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006). James Buzzard, Joseph W. Childers and Eileen Gillooly, ed., Victorian Prism: 
Refractions of the Crystal Palace (Charlottesville and London, University of Virginia Press, 2007) is an excellent, 
relatively recent, compendium of important issues on the Crystal Palace, including an analysis of ‘The Grand 
Boudoir Glass’ by Isobel Armstrong; Thomas Richards, The Commodity Culture of Victorian England: 
Advertising and Spectacle, 1851-1914 (London and New York: Verso, 1990) is an extraordinary, in-depth analysis 
of the Exhibition as a consolidating point of the Victorian society of spectacle; I favor the view of Isobel 
Armstrong, Victorian Glassworlds: Glass Culture and the Imagination, 1830-1880 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), where the Exhibition and the Crystal Palace are approached as part of the wider context of the 
Victorian glass and mirror culture. This list is far from exhausted. From the 1950s, the Victorian culture has 
become an object of various types of academic interest, with the Palace in its epicenter in every sense. 
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manufacturer of ornamental products, William Potts from Birmingham, and embodied the 
paradoxicality of glass under glass. 
 
 
Figure 6 ‘The Grand Boudoir Glass’ by William Potts (1851) 
 
The Crystal Palace and its Contents – one of the guides to the Official Guide of the 
Exhibition – stated that this ‘toilet-glass’ was one of the ‘largest mirrors cast in bronze 
manufactured in England and that its design and workmanship reflect[ed] the highest credit on 
its spirited manufacturer.’191 Henry Cole, a hard and rigid Victorian authority on design, 
occasionally commented on the work of William Potts as expressing ‘exuberant fancies,’ as 
well as having ‘much fertility of imagination, much cleaver modeling, much originality and 
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dash.’192 A year later, he commented on a fascinating candelabra made by Potts and exhibited 
at the Society of Arts (fig. 7) as embodying ‘vigor and originality in the grotesque.’193 In the 
light of his other works, William Potts was exhibiting ‘progressive improvement’ with his 
grotesque creations that crashed human forms onto animal ones. 
 
 
Figure 7 Candelabra by William Potts (1850) 
 
In this chapter we will see how the perceiving subject experiences jouissance in the 
encounter with this looking-glass and how he expresses a ‘pleasure-in-pain’ in a language of 
excess and wonder. We will show how the same exuberant experience resonates with the 
accounts of the Crystal Palace and its content, as well as through the accounts of other 
encounters with reflective surfaces in the nineteenth century. The Palace, as a large mirror, and 
the Exhibition as its diagnosis, are in the accounts always too much, beyond words, 
unrepresentable, they are surfaces that transform things into a spectacle of commodities, 
bestowing upon them an imaginary afterlife. In the encounters, the subject marvels at the 
Palace’s excess and reaches for the jouissance expected beyond the Palace’s symbolic limit. 
This limit, that presents itself as the possibility of this jouissance, is the limit of materiality and 
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it is embodied in the mirror-commodity. Even the very name ‘Crystal Palace,’ given by the 
editors of Punch, illustrates this language of excess and exorbitance, since, in reality, the Palace 
was just a large greenhouse made of glass. As Richards observed, this enormous 
reflective/transparent structure ‘built to house one hundred thousand commodities had been 
designed to make ordinary glass look like crystal and the shape of a greenhouse look like the 
outline of a palace.’194 Victorian commodities in their semiotic incoherence were objet a of the 
Victorian capitalist culture, the mirror being a special case among them. In our mirror made by 
William Potts, we will find encapsulated this wider context of the unattainability of 
commodities, the dream of representational stability and wholeness, a Real that always keeps 
receding in loops, a labyrinth of language that includes its own exits. The jouissance that the 
subject experiences in the process, in the accounts on the Exhibition comes to us in two 
different versions: as exhaustion by ornamentation and exhaustion by wonder. Both of them 
express a similar overload of visual experience that the subject cannot bear, the exhaustion 
finally leading to the fall. 
 
Elephantiasis of Ornamentation as the ‘Horror of Sight’  
  
Armstrong has noted that Potts’s mirror perfectly embodies the Victorian grotesque – 
representation of different species forced into one another, producing disturbing effects of a 
grotesque material amalgam.195 The mirror’s grotesqueness notwithstanding, we will move the 
emphasis to a different aspect of its materiality. On the surface of the mirror, two nymphs are 
gently and idly seated on both sides, as they gaze into the silvered surface of the glass. Their 
soft, pale porcelain bodies make a strong contrast to the rest of the mirror’s physicality. All 
around them, dark bronze twists and twirls in the shapes of an aquatic fantasy, water lilies 
underneath the nymphs’ soft bodies mimicking a lush shore of a fairytale lake. At the top of 
the frame a pair of herons holds two candle-burners whose long, straight chains visually cut 
the spirals of the mirror’s plant life and the voluptuousness of the nymphs’ bodies. Both 
nymphs are almost naked, only their thighs are covered with silky drapery exposing their bodies 
to a voyeuristic gaze of the spectator. Leaves of reed spring from the wild floral undergrowth, 
and hard straight lines of cast bronze frame the mirror at its bottom. At the top of the reflecting 
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surface, flanked by the herons, there is a sign that reads: frangas non flectes.196 The words 
frangas and flectes flank a small cast, hardly perceptible, face. 
As the spectator gazes at the mirror, the mirror tells a story. In fact, it tells a number of 
stories, when put in the wider context of the language of commodified materiality, which 
expressed the anxieties of the age. The first and the most obvious story is the designer’s intent 
to convey the calmness of an enchanted lake. There is almost a successful totality in the 
execution of this idea. All the elements are present: the stillness of the lake’s surface 
represented by the reflective surface itself; the abundance of plant and animal life at its shore; 
and, of course, the figures of delicate and apathetic nymphs, whose presence introduces an 
enchanting, fairytale element into the mirror’s narrative. The first extraordinary thing is that in 
a relatively small space (small comparing to the abundance of details) we encounter a plethora 
of species – plants, animals, fairies – the fairies, by their humanoid nature, also bringing a 
human element into the picture. They are all forced into the frame of the mirror, simulating the 
calmness of the shore, but actually pushing one another around the silvered surface whose 
conspicuous emptiness seems to be the center of the representation. The only element that was 
actually not crafted, but introduced ready-made (the mirror itself), in the light of the fabula that 
unfolds around it, becomes the center of the image. The stillness of its surface highlights the 
saturation of the frame, the frame’s species being in a clash for the representational space. On 
this calm shore the ornaments are running loose, enveloping the bodies of the nymphs, pushing 
them towards the mirror’s surface. Seen from this perspective, it seems only natural that the 
nymphs are facing the surface, since they are being claustrophobically forced into the only 
open space left. And there, in the salvation of the mirror’s depths they see their own reflected 
faces. 
Commenting on the commodities of the Exhibition, Agamben says that there is an aura ‘that 
bathes the commodity-fetish, so the elephantiasis of ornament betrays the new character of the 
commodified object.’197 He might as well have commented on Potts’ mirror itself. The 
ornaments of this mirror frame are so abundant and so densely packed that the eye that gazes 
at the mirror becomes invaded by the grotesque cornucopia of overstressed details, the 
perceiving subject becoming suffocated by the busyness of the frame. As the eye stares in the 
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mirror, reaching towards the reflection, one experiences exhaustion by ornamentation, the 
reflected image literally being drowned at the bottom of the lake the mirror is intended to 
represent.  
This exhaustion by the ornamental elephantiasis of commodities was not limited to Potts’ 
mirror and its alluring narrative of the ostensive calmness of a secluded aquatic wonderland. If 
we broaden the scope of our interest, we see that the same exhaustion appears over and over 
again in the accounts dating from the year of, and years after, the Exhibition. It is the same 
exhaustion that we will find latter, in the panoptic ‘naturalism’ of the Pre-Raphaelite painting, 
best exemplified by Holman Hunt’s The Awaking Consciousness. What can be seen in Potts’ 
mirror frame is not only the Victorian exhibitionism, voyeurism and scopophilia (to be 
discussed later in greater depth), but a type of jouissance, an aggressive experience that follows 
encounters with reflective surfaces at the 1851 Exhibition, as well as with its content. This 
jouissance arises as a result of the subject’s investment in his own image through the troubled 
materiality of mirrors – artifacts that bring the blurred boundaries of the humanity/commodity 
relationship into play. As the subject gazes into his own reflection, entering the loop of a 
disrupted signifying chain, reaching for a phantasmal wholeness, the only thing he gets, the 
only thing he can get (since wholeness is always found only as absence) is jouissance, as a 
substitution for the fundamental dissatisfaction of desire. This is the place where the subject 
falls: what he craves he cannot get, experiencing jouissance in the fall. 
For the visitors at the Great Exhibition, where our mirror was exhibited, the Crystal Palace 
was a magical place. 14,000 exhibitors showcased 100,000 items. As Benjamin pointed out, 
Victorians of the mid-nineteenth century experienced, for the first time, ‘the intoxication of the 
commodity around which surges the stream of customers.’198 For 1851 this number was beyond 
imaginable, and it was represented as such. A quick glance at the Official Catalogue shows 
pages and pages of numbers and names and lists attacking the eye of the reader in an 
incomprehensible jumble that was supposed to help the readers digest the Exhibition, but all it 
did was make them tired (fig. 8).  
 
                                                 
198 Walter Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism (London: Verso, 1983), 55. 
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Figure 8 A page from the Official Catalogue (1851) 
 
As a response, a number of ‘official’ guides to the official guide emerged, systematizing the 
plethora of commodities. Until 1851, there had never been an occasion that induced such a 
proliferation of discourse, all in an attempt to survive the semiotic anxiety of the overabundance 
of commodities. A cunning story in Punch by Henry Morley – intended to be sarcastic and 
funny – captured this discursive maze by conjuring the image of a talking catalogue giving an 
account of itself. ‘I am the Catalogue of the Great Exhibition,’ begins the catalogue: 
 
[…] I, as a celebrated Catalogue had much to go through with ere I lernt that 
which I reach now in the illustrated edition, the official edition, the French 
edition, the German edition, and the twopenny edition.199 
 
Through the insurmountable chaos of the visual and semantic overload of the Exhibition, 
the language that was supposed to describe the commodities got transformed into a commodity 
itself, taking on a new life of selfhood – literally becoming alive. This language turns upon 
                                                 
199 Henry Morley, ‘The Catalogue’s Account of Itself,’ Household Words 3 (23 August 1851): 519-23. 
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itself (or upon him/herself), creating a paradoxical spin of signification in loops worthy of M. 
C. Escher’s mid-twentieth century op-art. 
The same overload can be found in George Cruikshank’s two drawings from Henry 
Mayhew’s 1851: or, The Adventures of Mr. and Mrs. Sandboys. Both drawings wonderfully 
express this ‘horror of sight’ induced by a ‘sensory overload,’ as Armstrong calls it.200 The first 
drawing was named ‘All the World Going to See the Great Exhibition’ (fig. 9) and it has already 
mentioned it as an example of the Exhibition as the center of the world. But this time the 
emphasis will be, temporarily, shifted from the Crystal Palace to the rest of the drawing, so as 
to appreciate the overload of the visual field.  
 
 
Figure 9 ‘All the World going to See the Great Exhibition,’ by George Cruikshank (1851) 
 
A monstrous crowd, of all shapes and colors, populates the world taken, literally, as a 
picture. Cruikshank’s work is a prime cross-sectional example of the exhibitionistic nature of 
the Victorian culture and the incomprehensible visual maze that surrounds the Exhibition as 
the center of commodity culture. The crowd inhabits the representational space that keeps 
getting denser the closer people get to the Palace; the closer they are to the Palace the more 
indistinguishable they get too. The eye finds it hard to follow the invasion of details in the 
                                                 
200 Armstrong, Victorian Glassworlds, 250; Henry Mayhew, 1851: or, The Adventures of Mr. and Mrs. Sandboys 
and Family who came up to LONDON to enjoy themselves and to see the GREAT EXHIBITION (London: George 
Newbold, 1851). 
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image, but the tension develops in the opposite direction in the other Cruikshank’s image called 
‘The Dispersion of the Works of All Nations from the Great Exhibition of 1851’ (fig. 10). 
 
 
Figure 10 ‘The Dispersion of the Works of All Nations from the Great Exhibition of 1851,’ by George 
Cruikshank (1851) 
 
Here the ‘horror of sight’ moves in the opposite direction: the things are fleeing the Crystal 
Palace with an invasive aggressiveness that threatens to shatter the drawing’s frame. These 
things are alive, they are running loose – in the most sincere sense of the word. There is a pair 
of boots that flee without an owner in the lower left-hand corner; stuffed animals are holding 
hands in exile; there is even a pot running away in the lower right-hand corner. There is too 
much of them, they overlap in the madness of their flight. And at the center of their exodus is 
the Crystal Palace – the immense reflective structure that fills spectators with wonder and 
horror. Considered together, these two drawings tell a two-way story: people are entering the 
palace of glass and reflection, but anthropomorphized commodities are coming out instead. A 
machinery of human/commodity transformation, these two images embody the fantasy of the 
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limits of materiality that follow the reflective surface of the Victorian culture of glass, with the 
subject going through an excessive experience in the invasive ‘sensory overload’ of 
commodities.  
The visual madness and overload of the Exhibition was so strong that hardly anyone was 
capable of experiencing its totality in one visit. People kept coming back over and over again, 
magically drawn to the abundance and aura of commodities. A Punch reporter, Mrs. Fitzpuss, 
confessed:  
 
Ever since the 1st of May, I’ve driven directly after early breakfast to the Palace 
of that Great Jin, Paxton, in Hyde Park, where for hours I’ve done nothing but 
think myself a great Princess of the Arabian Nights, with the Koh-i-noor my 
own property, whenever I liked to wear it.’201 
 
All people could do was look at the commodities, since the policy of the Exhibition was that 
there were no price tags and the exhibits were not for sale. This must have heightened the 
scopic pleasure of the visitors, whose experience was limited to ‘just looking.’202 Deprived of 
other forms of consumption, the visitors must have been extremely susceptible to the impact 
of the visual overload in question. Many of the objects at the Exhibition expressed the 
‘elephantiasis of ornaments,’ particularly visible in the design of furniture and gadgets. A funny 
example of sheer invasiveness of details would be the now famous ‘Eighty-blade Sportsman’s 
Knife,’ by Joseph Rodgers & Sons, with gold inlaying and etching of Windsor Castle (fig. 11). 
Literally unusable, the knife hosted blades that struggled within the physical space of the 
exhibit, making it plainly monstrous. 
 
                                                 
201 Mrs. Fitzpuss, ‘How We Hunted the Prince: Mrs. Fitzpuss, of Baker Street, to Mrs. Macthistle, of Klinkumpans, 
N. B.’ Punch 20 (1851): 222. 
202 For the introduction of ‘just looking’ into the nineteenth-century consumerism, see Rachel Bowlby, Just 
Looking: Consumer Culture in Dreiser, Gissing and Zola (New York: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1985). 
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Figure 11 Eighty-blade Sportsman’s Knife,  
by Joseph Rodgers & Sons (1851) 
 
The ‘sensory overload’ or the ‘horror of sight’ that leads to the language of excess in the 
experience of jouissance is nowhere better expressed than in Tallis’s account of the Exhibition: 
 
Fountains were sparkling and flashing in the subdued sunlight: in living 
sculpture were suddenly seen the grand, the grotesque, the terrible, the beautiful; 
objects of every form and colour imaginable, far as the eye could reach, were 
dazzlingly intermingled; and there were present sixty thousand sons and 
daughters of Adam, passing and re-passing, ceaselessly; bewildered 
charmingly; gliding amidst bannered nations – through country after country 
renowned in ancient name, and great in modern: civilized and savage. […] The 
soul was approached through its highest senses, flooded with excitement; all its 
faculties were appealed to at once, and it sank for a while, exhausted, 
overwhelmed.203 
 
                                                 
203 Tallis’s History and Description of the Crystal Palace and the Exhibition of the World’s Industry in 1851, 3 
vol. (London and New York: The London Printing and Publishing Company, 1852), vol. 3, 1. 
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In this passage we find all the elements of the excessive experience, as well as a reaction of 
the subject to it: the objects are seen as both ‘grand’ and ‘grotesque’ and ‘beautiful,’ in ‘all 
forms and colors imaginable.’ In the visual experiences of the perceiver, they are all 
‘intermingled’ together in the grotesqueness of their overwhelming juxtaposition, just like the 
overlapping madness of Cruikshank’s fleeing commodities. There are too many things, too 
many colors, too many people; the subject experiences an overload he cannot bear. His eye is 
excessively invaded and he is ‘flooded with excitement.’ He experiences the ‘sparkling and 
flashing’ of fountains. The chosen language is brisk and strong, intended to strike and move. 
He is promised an experience of transgression against the symbolic law, brought about by the 
intermingled objects, transcending crude materiality where objects morph one into another. In 
the jouissance promised, everything appears as elevated and enchanted, like Henry Mayhew’s 
description of the crystal fountain at the entrance to the Palace:  
 
[S]hining, as the sun’s rays came slanting down through the crystal roofs, as if 
it had been carved out of icicles, or as if water streaming from the fountain had 
been made solid, and transfixed into beautiful forms.204 
 
The materiality changes in the jouissance promised, the potentiality of ‘as if’ heavily 
populating the sentence. Water becomes solid and is aggressively elevated into the realm of 
beauty. But the promised pure experience is an illusion – like the illusion of the fountain – and 
the subject falls in jouissance ‘exhausted’ and ‘overwhelmed,’ as it was melancholically 
concluded in the Tallis’s account. 
 
Experience of Wonderland as the ‘Horror of Sight’ 
 
Now we should go back to the mirror we started from, ‘The Grand Boudoir Mirror’ by 
William Potts. There is another story of excessive experience in the narrative of the mirror’s 
design, and it is centered on the nymphs’ bodies and faces. Their enticing figures are given the 
task of introducing a fairytale into the representation. The seductiveness of their bodies’ 
exposure is obvious and this is probably as close as we shall get to a Victorian representation 
of sirens/mermaid mirror reflections. Of course, they are neither sirens nor mermaids, not 
having feathers or tails. The context of the lake also precludes such a conclusion, sirens and 
                                                 
204 Mayhew, 1851, 134; my emphasis. 
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mermaids being mostly creatures of the open sea. Adding to the lure of their bodies, what 
strikes a spectator is the game of gazes that the seductresses play with the surface and with the 
spectator himself. Though tridimensional, the mirror is designed for the spectator to see the 
nymphs’ faces only as reflections. In the only drawing of the mirror where we can actually see 
the reflection of their faces, from the Official Catalogue, we encounter not two nymphs, but 
four – two made of porcelain and two made of reflection, occupying the male desiring subject’s 
dreams. The pair of nymphs on the left seem consumed by each other, the spectral nymph 
gazing at the porcelain one, the porcelain one into the spectral. On the other hand, the pair on 
the right almost seem as if looking at the left pair, making it the visual center of the image. But 
no one is looking at the spectator, cutting him loose from the voyeuristic pleasure of this 
secluded scene. Unlike a painting or an image, analyzing a tridimensional object in this respect 
is questionable, since the spectator may have more than one point of view. But the gazes of 
nymphs do show a certain asymmetry that slightly confuses the viewer regarding the possible 
visual center of the mirror. For Victorian male spectators, though, it seems that the allure of 
their naked flesh was enough to summon the famme fatale experience into the picture and 
transport the spectator into a fairyland. A reporter from Reynolds’s Weekly Newspapers framed 
his experience of the mirror as following: 
 
Suppose the frame of a mirror modeled after aquatic objects, such as the lotus, 
with fowl congenial to the watery element, and so arranged that they convey to 
the mind an outline of the performance in question; again, suppose two Naiads, 
sculptured in porcelain, seated on aquatic foliage on each side of the mirror, 
whose beautiful forms are reflected in its surface, while in the act of trimming 
their locks after bath. 205 
 
This excerpt is of great value to us because, if we look at the language of the description, 
we can see that the reporter has already been transported to the beyond of materiality of the 
mirror-commodity, to a place where inanimate things come to life. In accordance with the 
Victorian male obsession with women’s hair, these Naiads are in ‘the act of trimming their 
locks after bath’ (an act that is usually reserved for mermaids), while, in fact, there is nothing 
in the physicality of the design that points to that conclusion. Neither are the nymphs holding 
combs, nor do they appear like they just had a bath. In his account, we can sense movement in 
                                                 
205 Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper (4 May 1851): 5; my emphasis. 
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the otherwise still physicality of the mirror: the figures move to plunge into the surface of the 
mirror/lake, they move to comb their hair. By the sheer presence of nymphs, the spectator revels 
in an exhibitionistic male fantasy that has taken him over the threshold of crude materiality. In 
the fantasy of the Reynolds’s reporter, the mirror becomes alive. The language expresses not a 
rigid materiality of ‘here,’ but a fluid potentiality of ‘elsewhere.’ Even as we are presented with 
the hard matter of the mirror, we are invited to ‘suppose a mirror’ (some indefinite, fantastic 
one), as in ‘assume,’ ‘imagine,’ the same as in the already mentioned Mayhew’s description of 
the fountain. The male subject loses himself in the experience of a wonderland beyond 
materiality; he reaches out to something ‘out there’ in his dream, but he falls short of it in his 
encounter with it. The Victorian reflective surfaces had a substantial role in this fantastic fall. 
We can trace this exhaustion by wonder and awe in other encounters with reflective surfaces 
and commodities at the Exhibition. 
In ‘Languages of Glass,’ Armstrong marvels at ‘how often representations in the Exhibition 
portray states either steeped in sleep or reverie or else galvanized into startled and violent 
life.’206 This strikes true, especially in the representation of mirrors and of the Crystal Palace 
itself. These states of ‘sleep/reverie’ and of ‘violent life’ apply particularly well to the fantasy 
of reflective surfaces, where the experience of reflection is more or less than the subject 
expected, like depression and rage we saw in ‘The Other Side of a Mirror’ by Mary Coleridge. 
The language of excess is clearly evident in the accounts such as the one from Sharpe’s London 
Magazine: the Crystal Palace felt like ‘stolen from the golden country of the “Thousand-and-
one-Night”,’207 or in a description from the Times: 
 
The vast fabric […] an Arabian Nights structure, full of light, and with a certain 
airy unsubstantial character about it which belongs more to enchanted land 
than to this gross material world of ours. The eye, accustomed to the solid heavy 
details of stone and lime or brick and mortar architecture, wanders along these 
extensive and transparent aisles with their terraced outlines, almost distrusting 
its own conclusions on the reality of what it sees, for the whole looks like a 
splendid phantasm, which the heat of the noon-day sun would dissolve, or gust 
of wind scatter into fragments, or London for utterly extinguish […] The vast 
                                                 
206 Isobel Armstrong, ‘Languages of Glass,’ in Victorian Prism: Refractions of the Crystal Palace, ed. James 
Buzard, Joseph W. Childers and Eileen Gillooly (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2007), 
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207 Sharpe’s London Magazine 14 (1851): 250. 
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extent of area covered, the transparent and brilliant character of the structure, 
the regular and terraced elevations, the light airy abutments, the huge transept, 
with its arched and glittering roof shining above the vitreous expanse around it, 
and reminding one of nothing that he has ever heard of before.208 
 
This extensive exposé on the marvel of glass architecture, as well as the short one from 
Sharpe’s Magazine, convey the omnipresent language of experiential and emotional excess in 
the encounter with the reflectivity of the Crystal Palace. Over and over again, the Palace 
becomes a wonderland of pleasure, an ‘enchanted land’ of promised ecstasy. Through its 
reflective surfaces, all that is solid melts into the air, hard materiality dissolves through a 
fantasy of the mirror-narrative. In the Times account, materiality is ‘dissolved,’ ‘scattered,’ 
‘extinguished.’ The Palace is a ‘splendid phantasm’ that invites the subject into a fairytale of 
jouissance that cannot be reached, leaving him exhausted instead. ‘Nothing can strike us as 
more preposterous than an attempt to convey by language any adequate description of the 
Crystal Palace,’ says Chamber’s Edinburgh Journal. ‘Everyone who has seen it will have felt 
the impossibility of giving the account of either the fabric or its content […].’209 The Crystal 
Palace is literally beyond words, but the subject tries to express it nevertheless. He tries to reach 
for the fullness of the experience, but realizes that what he gets can never be up to the mark 
with that which he has been promised in his desire. The Crystal Palace, as well as other glass 
surfaces around London, always reflects a world beyond materiality in the Victorian language, 
presenting an epistemic limit, and within that limit a possibility of transgression and excessive 
experience – of pure, unattainable, mythical pleasure of the void, the pleasure of semantic 
death. 
Richard Sennett wrote that plate glass is a ‘material which lets [one] see everything 
inaccessible to desire.’210 This is more than true for the Crystal Palace and ‘The Grand Boudoir 
Glass,’ where the semiotic coherence of materiality is what is desired. What the Victorian male 
subject sees while looking at reflective surfaces is what he cannot get, but he desires it all the 
same, he wants the amazement of the jouissance expected. We can see that, for example, in 
Jude the Obscure, the last novel by Thomas Hardy, where Jude experiences an emotional 
                                                 
208 Times (January 15 1851); my emphasis. 
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96 
 
excess, because of the impossibility to approach the barmaid’s face directly, but only as a 
reflection: 
 
At the back of the barmaids rose bevel-edged mirrors, with glass shelves 
running along their front, on which stood precious liquids that Jude did not 
know the name of. The barmaid […] was invisible to Jude’s direct glance, 
though a reflection of their back in the glass behind her was occasionally caught 
by his eyes […] when she turned her face for a moment to the glass […] he was 
amazed.211 
 
Commenting on glass shop windows, Charles Eastlake said that iron columns ‘are furtively 
introduced, and as carefully concealed […] by craftily contrived mirrors, so that when all is 
finished the upper portion of the building seems absolutely suspended in the air.’212 Mirrors 
summoned a new vision of materiality that inversed the architectural principles of solidity and 
void. This fantasy is always accompanied by the language of wonder and awe, by an ineptitude 
of expressivity. ‘Silvered mirrors of polished plate glass, in gilded frames cannot be too 
profusely employed in a drawing room,’ advises John Claudius Loudon, ‘[…] and when the 
cut-glass chandeliers are lighted at night […] the scene becomes fairy-like and brilliant beyond 
description.’213 In the jouissance promised by mirrors, everything ‘sparkles,’ ‘flashes,’ is 
‘brilliant,’ ‘magnificent,’ ‘fairy-like’, ‘beyond imagination,’ ‘beyond words,’ ‘beyond 
description.’ Like in ‘The Grand Boudoir Mirror,’ in all the accounts of the marvelousness of 
the mirror experience, the readers are invited to ‘suppose’ the completeness of that experience, 
to ‘imagine’ or ‘assume’ it, because to the writers this totality of the textual pleasure was 
continuously being denied. Lacan would probably say that they kept missing the appointment 
with the Real. In the Real, there is no beyond, the Real does not fall somewhere else; it is what 
always comes back to the same place. 
At the end of the century, though mirrors started sinking into a cultural status quo, the awe 
of reflecting surfaces was still occasionally encountered. In The Arcades Project we find 
Benjamin citing Julius Lessing and his memory of the Exhibition’s marvels: 
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[…] At the center stood an imposing crystal fountain. To the right and to the left 
ran galleries in which visitors passed from one national exhibit to the other. 
Overall, it seemed a wonderland, appealing more to the imagination than to the 
intellect. ‘It is with sober economy of phrase that I term the prospect 
incomparably fairy-like. This space is a summer night’s dream in the midnight 
sun’ (Lothar Bucher). Such sentiments were registered through the world. I 
myself recall, from my childhood, how the news of the Crystal Palace reached 
us in Germany and how pictures of it were hung in the middle-class parlors of 
distant provincial towns. It seemed than that the world we knew from old fairy-
tales – of the princess in the glass coffin, of queens and elves dwelling in crystal 
houses – had come to life…, and these impressions have persisted through the 
decades.214 
 
The dream and ecstasy of the Crystal Palace were almost indestructible, thanks to the 
reflective fantasy of transgressed materiality. The glass transformed everything behind it and 
anyone in front of it, offering the experience of an extreme pleasure. As Anthony Trollope said, 
‘[t]o that which is ordinary, [the glass] lends grace; and to that which is graceful it gives a 
double luster.’215 
‘The Grand Boudoir Mirror,’ in its design and in its narrative, functions along the same lines 
as the Crystal Palace and the rest of reflective surfaces around London. For us, it serves as a 
suitable example of the wider context of the mirror fantasy of fetishized commodities, where 
materiality changes through the looking-glass, allowing things to become alive, while the 
perceiving subject experienced the jouissance of the fall. This wider context of the language of 
excess, of exhaustion by ornamentation and by wonder, materializes in William Potts’s 
creation, placing the mirror firmly into the semiotic coherence of the fantasy of materiality. 
The optical shock and the exhaustion of the subject are the effects that keep pulling the subject 
into the world of appearances, where he hopes to reach the Real that always comes back to 
itself, evading the subject. And the subject keeps dreaming the world of the beyond, a 
wonderland, though he cannot express it, making this impossible fantasy a driving force behind 
his endless search. As a mesmerized, enchanted commentator in Tallis’s History exclaimed 
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215 Anthony Trollope, The Struggles of Brown, Jones and Robinson (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1870), 37. 
98 
 
about the Crystal Palace: ‘It was like – like nothing but itself, unsurpassable, indescribable, 
unique, amazing, real!’216 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
216 Tallis’s History and Description of the Crystal Palace and the Exhibition of the World’s Industry in 1851, 3 
vol. (London and New York: The London Printing and Publishing Company, 1852), vol. 1, 100; my emphasis. 
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FALL 2: ALICE IN MIRRORLAND  
 
To the Looking-Glass world it was Alice that said, 
“I’ve a scepter in hand, I’ve a crown on my head; 
Let the Looking-Glass creatures, whatever they be, 
Come and dine with the Red Queen, the White Queen, and me!”217 
Lewis Carroll 
 
Picking up the threads of the argument so far, we have seen that the Victorian culture was a 
culture of mirrors, as well as a culture of commodities – of mirrors as commodities. 
Furthermore, we have seen that the fascination with reflecting surfaces lead the subject towards 
the fall, an unfulfilled promise of pure enjoyment. The Victorian male subject, expressing 
himself in various forms, dreamed about the Real beyond the representational labyrinth that 
opened inside the Victorian language as a result of the appropriation of his mirror image. This 
appropriation, which sparked an illusion, was expressed by the subject in many semiotically 
incoherent, monstrous forms – commodified mirrors being one of them.  
The incoherence of commodities has already been discussed in the introduction, but it is 
important to remember that this incoherence took many forms, many of which resonated with 
the theme of inanimate things coming to life. The mirror fantasy quite frequently played out 
this theme – the mirror becoming alive or acting as a transgressive surface, beyond which the 
materiality changes, categories implode and forms collapse into one another. In the fantasy of 
a mirror-reflection, the difference between subject and object collapses, while the subject is 
trapped at the border itself, reaching for the other side that always remains an illusion. In a 
way, the subject is trapped in a permanent state of the abject, where the boundary between life 
(animate) and death (inanimate) encroaches upon everything, as Kristeva says.218 There is no 
beyond to be grasped, the Real keeps backing away, but the subject keeps dreaming about it all 
the same. We have seen this scenario in many mirror examples, as well as in the language of 
excess that frequently followed the accounts of the largest reflecting surface of the nineteenth 
century, the Crystal Palace.  
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But what happens with the subject at the border? What happens when the subject touches 
the surface of the mirror and gets caught in the process, disappointed by the insatiability of 
desire?  
Materially, as well as historically, this moment was caught in the semiotic incoherence of 
the Victorian material culture of mirrors. This incoherence that plagued the Victorian subject 
found its expression in a materiality that destroyed the fragile limits of the animate and the 
inanimate; a materiality that crashed humans and objects into one another, instilling fear, 
apprehension and horror in spectators. From this perspective – of a materiality that does not 
conform to the strict rules of the Linnaean species or to the accepted rules of the animate and 
the inanimate – we shall approach the immortal novel by Lewis Carroll Through the Looking 
Glass. We are not interested in the fantasy of a dreaming child, the nonsense of logic or 
Carroll’s so-called ‘infatuation’ with children (or girls more specifically).219 By reading the 
novel through the language of the material grotesque and the mirror fantasy, we approach the 
transformation of materiality in the encounter with the mirror. The grotesque materiality in the 
novel, though quite innocent-looking, drew a fragile line between species, embodying the 
nature of the capitalistic fetishized commodity in its fullest. The peculiar relationship between 
people and things captured in it is the core of the mirror fantasy – it is the core of the fantasy 
of commodified mirrors. Through the Looking Glass plays out this fantasy fully, it dreams the 
dream to the end of its loop.  
 
Stuck at the Border of the Beyond 
 
In Guildford, Surry on September 18, 1990, two days after the centenary of the death of 
Lewis Carroll, a sculpture was unveiled to the public. Slightly over a meter high, the bronze, 
made by the local artist Jeanne Argent, depicts the famous Alice at the moment she steps 
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through the looking-glass (fig. 12). For Lewis Carroll, Guildford had for decades been a family 
retreat and a place of inspiration. He visited it for the first time in August 1868, two months 
after his father died, looking for a house that would be suitable for his six unmarried sisters. 
The same year in November, the family moved into the house, which has remained famous to 
this day by its name ‘The Chestnuts.’ It was here that, in 1971, he would write the novel that 
interests us, Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There.  
The bronze sculpture – cast in plaster of Paris with a metal armature – stands in the part of 
the Guildford Gardens that the Guildford Borough Council acquired in Castle Street in 1988. 
Designed by Argent, the final work was cast in bronze by the Morris Singer foundry and it 
incorporated a sheet of bullet-proof glass.  
 
 
Figure 12 Jeanne Argent, ‘Alice’ (1990) 
 
This sculpture perfectly combines all the important points of mirror narratives. In one single 
piece of plaster, we see a human figure merged with a mirror, two forms (or two species – 
animate and inanimate) crashed into one another, collapsing the limits of human subjectivity, 
but also of the thing’s objectivity. With her right hand stretched, Alice is reaching for the world 
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beyond the mirror, while rest of her body stays eternally imprisoned on the other side. An 
attempt to cross the fragile border of the beyond and to merge with what dwells ‘out there’ is 
an attempt at the final appropriation of one’s mirror reflection – the Victorian mirror fantasy 
pushed to its extreme. If taken together with the novel from which it draws inspiration, the 
Guildford sculpture proves incredibly useful in understanding this fantasy, following the 
encounter with mirrors in the Victorian culture. Argent’s work is recent, for sure; it does not 
belong to the era of the Victorian material and mirror culture, but if we keep this historical and 
temporal distance in mind and approach it only as a vivid illustration of the issue in question, 
we will see that the nature of the Guildford Alice is far more Victorian than it seems. 
   
* * * * * 
 
 In the material Alice, from the end of the twentieth century, a crucial moment in the subject’s 
fantasy is frozen, but what happens to the textual Alice? How does her adventure embody this 
fantasy of shifting notions of materiality? It seems that what we are left with are only words, 
but Alice, published in 1872, was intended to be much more than a linear textual story from 
the start. John Tenniel, a famous Victorian cartoonist, worked quite closely (and sometimes in 
strong disagreement) with Lewis Carroll on the illustrations for the book, and it so happens that 
sometimes Tenniel’s brilliant drawings push the structure of the story even further than Carroll 
intended.220 The illustrations and the text complement each other, the drawings being not 
always completely true to the text. But both languages of the story, the visual and the textual, 
conform to the prevailing notions of overcoming of materiality in mirror encounters, and we 
shall glide through both of them simultaneously. If we add the above-mentioned sculpture, 
which is a hundred and fifty years older, to the representational bundle, we see that all forms 
of language (textual, visual, and material) follow the same structural lines. It might be that 
mirror narratives were still the same in 1990, but it might as well be true that Jeanne Argent 
complied with the structural rules of the Victorian fantasy that allowed Through the Looking 
Glass to exist. 
 The fabula of Through the Looking Glass is quite famous and its outline is well-known. It 
picks up the story of Alice six months after she returned from her trip to Wonderland. Alice is 
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now ‘exactly’ seven and a half years old, but her imagination remained restless. Her mindscape 
is full of dreams and stories, and her life revolves around her favorite sentence ‘let’s pretend.’ 
‘I could tell you half the things Alice used to say,’ says Carroll,  
 
beginning with her favourite phrase “Let’s pretend.” She had had quite a long 
argument with her sister only the day before – all because Alice had begun with 
“Let’s pretend we’re kings and queens;” and her sister, who liked being very 
exact, had argued that they couldn’t, because there were only two of them, and 
Alice had been reduced at last to say, “Well, you can be one of them then, and 
I’ll be all the rest.”221 
 
From the very beginning of the story, even before she climbs the fireplace and reaches for 
the other side, Alice’s world is fictional and unstable. Through the Looking Glass being a 
children’s story, we could ascribe Alice’s worldview to the perspective of a child enraptured 
by the creations of the mind, before the reality kills the wonder. But, childish as this amazement 
by things not possible or logical may seem, Alice’s world perfectly embodies the Victorian 
culture itself. As we approach the mirror in the story, ‘let’s pretend’ and ‘as if’ become modus 
operandi of the narrative, and we are asked, alongside Alice, to assume the possibility of the 
impossible, to expect a transgression that brings joy, jouissance expected. For Alice, the 
journey through the looking-glass she is about to take is not the first fantastic trip. She has 
already visited Wonderland. But, unlike the imaginative introduction to the mirror encounter 
in Through the Looking Glass, where we are being prepared, invited and promised a fairyland 
before the story even started, Alice in Wonderland does not involve this language of excess. In 
Alice in Wonderland we are pushed straight into the fantasy itself, chasing the white rabbit as 
he disappears underground literally on the first page of the book. There are no mirrors in the 
story, no ‘let’s pretend’ or ‘as if’ to make the language of the fantasy work anticipatively. We 
cannot be sure that it is a fantasy at all (except for the rabbit with a watch). Through the Looking 
Glass introduces the mirror properly, as a mirror should be introduced; it promises a 
transgression instead of just pushing the subject into it. There is no joy without a promise. 
 At this moment – the moment of a fantastic promise – the adventure starts. But whose 
adventure? Alice’s? Perhaps, but also the adventure of Victorian commodified, fetishized 
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materiality itself. Once the looking-glass is introduced, we immediately witness, the now 
familiar story of transcendence of materiality. 
 
“Let’s pretend that you’re the red Queen, Kitty! Do you know, I think if you sat 
up and folded your arms, you’d look exactly like her. Now do try, there’s a 
dear!” And Alice got the Red Queen off the table, and set it up before the kitten 
as a model for it to imitate: however, the thing didn’t succeed, principally, Alice 
said, because the kitten wouldn’t fold its arms properly. So, to punish it, she 
held it up to the Looking-glass, that it might see how sulky it was – “and if 
you’re not good directly,” she added, “I’ll put you through into Looking-glass 
house. How would you like that?”222 
 
We are still on ‘this’ side of the looking-glass – on the ‘right’ side, the firm side – and the 
morphing of materiality comes both as a promise and a threat. On this side of the mirror, 
humans and animals are what they seem to be – they are alive and animate. On this side of the 
mirror the kitten resists the guise (or materiality) of a chess-piece; it resists the form of a thing. 
What Alice needs to do, then, is to introduce it to the ‘other side’ – she has to promise something 
more than just a game. Alice has to promise a possibility of transgression; she has to threaten 
the kitten with the looking-glass. When things and beings refuse to morph by themselves, a 
mirror always does the trick. ‘How would you like that?’  
Alice turns to the mirror – a barrier between the worlds and a conduit of desire – just to 
realize that the only thing she cannot see is the very spot on the fireplace where she is standing. 
‘I can see all of it,’ she says, ‘when I get upon a chair – all but the bit just behind the fireplace. 
Oh! I do so wish I could see that bit!’223 As soon as she encounters the mirror, Alice’s eye 
searches for wholeness of vision, a completeness eclipsed by the point of view. What she sees, 
though, is not what she wishes to see, so the desire for exposure and wholeness drives her 
toward the mirror. All the sentences end with exclamation marks, accentuating Alice’s wish to 
see what escapes the eye, what is beyond. She needs to appropriate her image completely, to 
catch herself in the visual spectacle of the mirror reflection. This is a Victorian mirror narrative 
par excellence. As it will be discussed in one of the chapters to follow, the Victorian culture 
was above all voyeuristic and exhibitionistic. In accordance with the secretive lines of 
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Victorian voyeurism, Alice, though a female and conveniently veiled by the asexuality of a 
child, still expresses Lewis Carroll’s fantasy. ‘You can just see a little peep of the passage in 
Looking-glass House,’ decides Alice,  
 
“if you leave the door of our drawing-room wide open: and it is very like our 
passage as far as you can see, only you know it may be quite different on 
beyond.”224 
 
The very language, as well as the idea of the paragraph, hints at something that should not 
been seen, something that the subject feels apprehensive about witnessing. Alice does not look 
openly at what she wishes to see; she ‘peeps’ – secretly and alone. She wants to embrace an 
empty wholeness in the mirror, an invisible and unreachable spot behind the glass, a lure that 
pulls the desire towards the unattainable coherence of the reflection in the mirror. But what lies 
‘beyond’ might be quite different from what it appears to be. The subject is caught in the act 
of voyeurism.  
The only thing left for Alice to do now is to actually step through the looking-glass and see 
what the reflection in the mirror is all about. It is very important to bear in mind that the 
workings of imagination are what we are dealing with here. We are dealing with Lewis 
Carroll’s imagination – the male subject’s imagination – embodied in the character of Alice. 
The moment Alice passes through the glass, we are immediately transported into the dream 
that characterizes the Victorian commodity culture – things immediately become alive. 
Invoked by the language of lack and excess – something too small, something too big, 
something smaller and bigger that the crude materiality itself – things are summoned to invade 
the imagination of the subject and to embody the cultural tendencies of the Victorian material 
anxiety.  
What is the first thing that hints at a wonderland when Alice finally touches the mirror? 
What is the first thing that is promised to the subject in the mirror? ‘Let’s pretend that glass has 
got all soft like gauze,’ calls Alice, ‘so that we can get through. Why, it’s turning into a sort of 
mist now, I declare!’225 Alice ‘declares,’ by the right and by the might of the imagination, that 
the first thing to happen is for materiality to change. The glass becomes soft and liquid and the 
subject is immediately invited to experience it, to enjoy the transformation of the mirror image 
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and the materiality itself, as the ‘glass [is] beginning to melt away,’ tells us Carroll, ‘just like a 
bright silvery mist.’226 It is almost impossible to imagine any other description of this 
transgressive experience, than in terms of something ‘silvery’ and ‘bright,’ something that 
flares up the imagination and hints at a fairyland beyond. As we move through the text and 
through the encounter with the mirror, it becomes increasingly clear that Through the Looking 
Glass shares the same explosive, excessive language with the rest of the mirror narratives of 
the nineteenth century. It almost seems that the language appropriates the excitement that 
promises, but as in all other mirror stories, what comes about is far from satisfaction. If a mirror 
promises something that cannot be, then what comes next always manifests itself as troubling 
at the level of meaning. And what comes for Alice is a very grotesque aspect of the Victorian 
material culture itself.  
 
That Horrifying Materiality  
 
 We are still at the very beginning of the story, but if we look at the scene from the proposed 
angle – from the angle of a change in materiality in the face of a mirror – we shall see that this 
scene is so powerful and so important that it sustains the rest of the story. As soon as Alice 
passes through the glass, formerly inanimate things come to life. ‘[T]he pictures on the wall 
next the fire seemed to be all alive,’ noticed Alice in amazement,  
 
and the very clock on the chimney-piece (you know you can only see the back 
of it in the Looking-glass) had got the face of a little man, and grinned at her.227 
 
The mirror creates a crack in the representation of materiality, a void born of the split subject 
himself. At this frontier things are talking and running, while animate beings – like Alice 
herself – slowly deteriorate to ‘object-ness’ by the end of the book. And Carroll is not the only 
one to play upon this theme. If his mind had resonated with the wider ideas and anxieties of 
materiality at the moment of the book’s creation, Tenniel was in no way bound to push the 
same idea himself. But not only do we read about things becoming alive – ‘The chessmen were 
walking about, two and two!’ – and not only do we see (in Tenniel’s illustration) the mentioned 
clock on the mantelpiece smiling, but we also see the vase on the other side smiling too!228 (fig. 
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13). Tenniel was having a hard time illustrating the story in accordance with Carroll’s wishes, 
even though they were both operating within the same framework, within the same Victorian 
fantasy. Here we depart from the textual narrative for a moment and shift our focus to Tenniel’s 
illustration of the scene. Nothing in the text describes the smiling vase, but the vase in the 
drawing is smiling all the same. The moment Alice steps through the mirror is the moment 
things assume their new faces and bodies – in the text, as well as in the independent elements 
of the illustration.  
 
 
Figure 13 John Tenniel, ‘Alice on the other side of the Mirror,’  
in Through the Looking Glass (1872) 
 
These new, animate things embody the same fear and fantasy as Victorian fetishized 
commodities, overstepping the limits of forms, and postulating a semiotic implosion as the 
essence of their existence. The things are freed from their crude inanimate materiality and are 
running loose in the same fashion as the commodities flee the Great Exhibition in the drawing 
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by George Cruikshank. Becoming alive, they establish a new relationship with people. 
Agamben calls this anxiety a ‘bad conscience with respect to objects,’ but Shelagh Wilson has 
a better term: she calls it the ‘double body’ of Victorian commodities.229 Discussing the 
grotesque design of many Victorian objects (such as the ‘Man-eating tiger mounted as an Arm 
Chair’ (1896) or earrings made from stuffed hummingbirds (c. 1875)), Wilson analyzes the 
debates concerning the widespread Victorian design that invoked fear and apprehension by 
clashing different species and forms one with another. This kind of design was ‘ritually labeled 
monstrous by design reformers and Modernists.’230 A story by Henry Morley, ‘A House Full 
of Horrors,’ from Household Worlds illustrates vividly the contemporary preference towards 
this grotesque material miscegenation. The story satirically deals with the new Museum of 
Manufactures established by Henry Cole, a Victorian authority on design, and its collection of 
objects that was to instruct the population on the ‘false’ principles of decoration. In the story, 
Mr. Crumpet, after visiting the collection, comes home only to find that ‘he had been living 
among horror up to that hour.’ Since he has educated himself on the false principles of 
decoration, he takes up his butterfly cup (a cup with a little butterfly at the bottom that appears 
when the liquid is gone), and exclaims in horror: ‘Butter-fly-inside-my-cup! Horr-horr-horr-
horr-ri-ble!231 
In Through the Looking Glass we see the same clash of species and forms. Human faces are 
literally crafted onto the hard materiality of everyday objects and the only reason why these 
objects do not exhibit a visible grotesqueness is because they are situated within a children’s 
story, where the semiotic incoherence of materiality and monstrosity are disguised by the 
sanitization of the narrative. But otherwise, the materiality in Through the Looking Glass 
follows the same principles as the materiality of the grotesque Victorian design – a design that 
disturbs and frightens. From the beginning of the story to its very end, Through the Looking 
Glass follows the Victorian script of transcendence of materiality. The story itself is a perfect 
example and embodiment of the split subject that we are after in his many expressions and 
guises.  
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And what about Alice? If previously inanimate things strive towards their new materiality 
as alive and animate, humanoid and grotesque, what happens to Alice as she passes through 
the mirror?  
The story of Alice goes in the opposite direction, it seems. As soon as she is in the beyond, 
she appears to be broken, incoherent, and insufficient. She sees the White King and Queen 
(chess pieces) struggling to get out of the ashes of the fireplace – the graveyard of things – and 
she tries to help them by lifting them to a nearby table. ‘I don’t think they can hear me,’ Alice 
observes, ‘and I’m nearly sure they can’t see me. I feel somehow as if I were invisible –’232 As 
in so many other mirror narratives, the reflection that the mirror shows is troubling, strange, 
uncanny, ghostlike. At this point, Alice acknowledges herself for the first time since she arrived 
at the ‘Looking-glass House’ (the house on the other side of the mirror), but she does it only in 
reference to the Other who does not recognize her existence. And this Other, in this scenario 
the White King, breaks the lines of visibility too: ‘[…] the King took no notice of the question: 
it was quite clear that he could neither hear her nor see her.’233 The invisible and voiceless 
Alice is Alice’s own reflection in the mirror-world and it shows the fundamental fantasy of 
wholeness we have been talking about. What the subject wants (coherence, wholeness, totality) 
and how he expresses it in his fantasy is never the same thing. The subject dreams about the 
wonderland, something he cannot have, and this impossibility of his desire turns into a 
nightmare, albeit a sweet and sugared one like Alice’s. On this side of the border, where 
everything slips away like too much water in an open palm, it is Alice that instills horror in 
others by her monstrous split – invisible to everything and everyone but herself. As she lifts 
the White King into the air the only thing the King can see is a void – nothingness lifting him 
out of nowhere. ‘The horror of that moment,’ […] admits the King, ‘I shall never, never 
forget!’234 For Carroll, it was obviously not enough to voice the dread once and deal with the 
horrific void of the silent subject; it was necessary to repeat it, and them to italicize it, too.  
Fantasies and narratives are rarely what they seem on the surface. If we dig deeper beneath 
the surface of the words, we find hidden motives for representation, usually the ones at least 
partially shared by the rest of the culture. The narrative of the rest of the story is a good 
example. Throughout the book, Alice encounters many extraordinary creatures and goes 
through many, sometimes obscene and irrational, adventures. The world beyond the mirror is 
actually a chessboard, and Alice has to go through all the fields in order to reach the end of the 
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game of chess. What happens there, at the end of the mirror world? Alice is to become a queen. 
But not any kind of queen: she is to become a chess piece herself. So here is the two-way street 
of a classic Victorian mirror fantasy: while everything previously inanimate becomes animate 
and alive in the encounter with the mirror, Alice (the dreamer, the perceiver, the voyeur) strives 
to become a thing herself. Alice arrives as a silent and invisible subject, and her ultimate goal 
is to transgress against her own humanity by becoming a full-fledged chess piece. But this 
fantasy beyond the mirror has its drawbacks, as ever. The jouissance expected is a myth, a lure, 
and it never says ‘That’s it!’ 
 
In the Beyond 
 
 After the mirror scene is over, Alice starts her journey towards objectification. What Alice 
would not do to become a thing! She boards a train full of strange talking animals; she mediates 
between Tweedledum and Tweedledee; she loses her name in the nameless forest and she eats 
a cake only to cut it afterwards. Alice’s journey through the looking-glass is very much like 
Homer’s Odyssey, with temptations and curious events lurking at every corner of the newly 
discovered world. There is even Circe in the guise of the Red Queen (also a chess piece). Just 
as Circe explains to Ulysses what ordeals lie ahead, so does the Red Queen explain to Alice 
what she has to do to become a thing. In a way, Alice’s odyssey is an odyssey of the Victorian 
materiality. But this world, the world behind the looking-glass, has its own rules. Seemingly, 
Carroll imagined the looking-glass world to have no rules at all, except maybe that not having 
rules is its only and thus basic rule. Martin Gardner says that  
 
any work on nonsense abounds with so many inviting symbols that you can start 
with any assumption you please about the author and easily build up an 
impressive case for it.235 
 
That is why Alice and her adventures inspired such diverse readings, ranging from 
reflections on Carroll’s own life as Charles Dodgson, to the psychoanalytic reading of Alice’s 
tears as the amniotic fluid and the birth trauma in ‘The Child as Swain.’236 Since Through the 
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Looking Glass was conceived as irrational and without a reference point, it easily makes the 
commentators of Alice ‘amateur head-shrinkers,’ as Alexander Woollcott says.237 Gardner 
might be right. But if we drop the idea of psychoanalyzing Carroll’s life and analyze the culture 
he came from instead, there is a very strong argument for the resonance of Through the Looking 
Glass with wider cultural tendencies and fears.  
 By now, Alice has left the Looking-glass House, and the first place she arrives to is the 
‘Garden of Live Flowers.’ As the name of the chapter indicates, in the Garden Alice encounters 
talking roses and lilies and daisies, as the story continues to unravel in ever more fantastic 
ways. But this Garden has very specific rules of physics: wherever Alice goes and whichever 
way she chooses, she always comes back to the house – she always returns to the mirror.  
 
[W]andering up and down, and trying turn after turn, but always coming back 
to the house, do what she would. Indeed, once, when she turned a corner rather 
more quickly than usual, she ran against it before she could stop herself.238 
 
The house, and the mirror in it, is the central reference point for Alice; it is the place where 
her adventure starts and it is where it ends, too. Thus, the house stands as a border itself, the 
barrier between fantasy and reality, the place where materiality transforms into a fluid and 
disturbing concept – it stands for a looking-glass. If Alice’s adventure through the looking-
glass is a journey in pursuit of wholeness as a thing, pushing the fantasy of transgression to the 
extreme, the mirror is where it all ends: the end of desire, pure enjoyment, the jouissance 
expected. That is where Alice is going, in the end – back home – but before she can do that, 
desire lures her the other way in pursuit of material completeness and semiotic stability. ‘I’m 
not going in again yet,’ declares Alice running into the house again. ‘I know I should have to 
get through the Looking-glass again – back into the old room – and there’d be an end of all my 
adventures!’239 
The return back is the ultimate satisfaction, but the insatiability of desire always takes the 
subject on a longer route, never a straight one or the shortest one. ‘Full satisfaction implies a 
kind of “psychical death,”’ says Adrian Johnson discussing the jouissance in Lacan, ‘an 
evacuation of the tension of dissatisfaction that perpetually drives the libidinal economy.’240 
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There is no pure jouissance in the end, and Alice will not pass through the glass again to go 
back home, so going back is not an option; it would mean the end of desire, the end of the 
subject’s ‘psychical life.’ 
In the ‘Garden of Live Flowers’ (the name of the chapter, as well as of the garden), we are 
deep inside the subject’s fantasy, and we find ourselves lost in the confusion that the Garden 
presents us with. But in terms of the Victorian mirror fantasy, the Garden perfectly embodies 
the elements of a labyrinth of meaning that pervades the Victorian language. The garden is 
where everything comes to itself, but also where things are not what they seem. On the one 
hand, we have the semiotic labyrinth opened by the looking-glass through which Alice arrived; 
on the other, the ‘Garden of Live Flowers’ is the ‘Garden of the Real’ – the one which always 
comes back to the same place. 
Let us take the encounter with the Red Queen as an example. Alice has found a way around 
the Garden by walking ‘in the opposite direction.’241 This turning away from the Real leads her 
deeper into the semiotic confusion that lurks behind the Garden and, eventually, she stumbles 
upon the Red Queen. Like all other animate chess-pieces, the Red Queen is a walking and 
talking thing too. But, whatever comes out of Alice’s mouth appears to actually be something 
else, just like in the Victorian mirror fantasy of commodified materiality. 
 
“I only wanted to see what the garden was like, your majesty –” 
“That’s right,” said the Queen, patting her on the head, which Alice didn’t like 
at all, “though when you say ‘garden,’ – I’ve seen gardens, compared with 
which this would be a wilderness.” 
Alice didn’t dare to argue the point, but went on: “– and I thought I’d try and 
find my way to the top of that hill –” 
“When you say ‘hill,’ the queen interrupted, “I could show you hills, in 
comparison with which you’d call that a valley.” 
“No, I shouldn’t,” said Alice, surprised into contradicting her at last: “a hill 
can’t be a valley, you know. That would be nonsense –” 
The Red Queen shook her head. “You may call it ‘nonsense’ if you like,” she 
said, “but I’ve heard nonsense, compared with which that would be as sensible 
as a dictionary!”242 
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We are not dealing only with nonsense to be rejected or discarded, since even nonsense does 
not stay still here. We are dealing with a perversion of meaning where the hill becomes a valley, 
and the garden a wilderness, with a displacement of meaning, with the Being postponed, where 
things turn into each other and slide down the spiral of signification ad infinitum. This 
perversion is a characteristic of the Victorian mirror language, as well as of the Victorian 
language in general, just pushed to its obvious extreme in the Alice books – the structure of the 
Victorian language stripped bare and exposed. But this exposure makes it tame and funny, 
allowing the perversion of language to hide in plain sight. Like in Alice in Wonderland, the 
subject is falling down, down, down the rabbit hole (‘Would the fall never come to an end!’243), 
only there is no hole or rabbit here, just a mirror and an endless différance of meaning in the 
never-ending labyrinth of semiosis. The garden started as a promise of the real, of wholeness, 
of an end; it started as ‘The Garden of the Real’ that always came back to the same place, but 
as soon as Alice found her way through – ‘walking in the opposite direction’ – the Real kept 
receding, wrapping Alice in layers of semiotic displacement, pushing her away from the house, 
away from the mirror, deeper into the mirror-world, towards the final transformation of her 
humanity into thingness. For a moment, it almost seems that the mirror fantasy will bring the 
final satisfaction, but the chain of signification moves on, carrying Alice on its tide. She will 
have to find another way out. 
 
The Small Shop of Consumerist Curiosities 
 
 The odyssey of materiality that Alice fantasizes about consolidates itself again pages later. 
By that time, Alice had passed through the Third and the Forth Square of the chess-board, and 
all of a sudden she found herself in a small, very curious shop (fig. 14). In this shop, the story 
of Victorian commodities comes to its fullest. Asa Briggs says that ‘Lewis Carroll […] was 
almost as interested in things as in numbers, recognizing just how important things – and their 
names – were for the secure scaffolding of Victorian life.’244 All the other places in Wonderland 
and the looking-glass world aside, the small shop of the Fifth Square is where Briggs’s words 
ring truest. Here Tenniel’s illustration penetrates the story again. The shop in the illustration 
that Alice mysteriously arrives to is faithfully modeled on a real grocery shop at 83 Saint 
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Aldgate’s Street in Oxford.245 Although Alice (and the reader) sees the Sheep sitting behind 
the counter, knitting in an arm-chair, making small pauses to look at Alice through her 
spectacles, this shop is as far as the book goes in the representation of  the ‘reality’ of the 
Victorian Oxford.  
 
 
Figure 14 John Tenniel, ‘The Shop,’ Through the Looking Glass (1872)  
 
And as in the ‘real world’ of the nineteenth-century England, Alice decides to just ‘look 
around’ adopting a real-time Victorian attitude to consumption that triumphed at the Exhibition 
in 1851. ‘My Dear, it is so very agreeable,’ says a reporter from Punch: 
 
“You cannot tell how amusing it is! It is much better than going a-shopping. 
The whole place is full of some of the prettiest things in the world – laces-silks-
brocades – and such lovely jewels – and the beauty is you may look at them 
ever so long, without being expected to buy a single thing!”246 
 
Thus, on this side of the mirror, the Victorian fantasy becomes scopic again. ‘You may look 
in front of you,’ says the Sheep, ‘and on both sides, if you like, […] but you can’t look all 
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round you – unless you’ve got eyes at the back of your head.’247 Alice, unfortunately, does not 
have them, so again she is faced with the impossibility of complete visual satisfaction and the 
tension escalates as she stares at the goods carefully arranged along the shelves.  
Like a visitor to the Crystal Palace, where all the wonders of the commodities shine bright 
and tempting and where the visitor can look but not possess, Alice turns to the goods in this 
little shop of curiosities just to find that what she desires, what she wants to have, is always 
slipping away. 
 
The shop seemed to be full of all manner of curious things – but the oddest part 
of it all was, that whenever she looked hard at any shelf, to make out exactly 
what it had on it, that particular shelf was always quite empty: though the others 
round it were crowded as full as they could hold.248 
 
 This is the place where Victorian commodities fully express their disturbing semiotic state 
– things fleeing the Exhibition, things fleeing ownership, things slipping to the semantic 
afterlife of fetishism from where they lure desire. We have already discussed in the introduction 
that for the Victorian subject, commodities were much more than things; they were out of reach, 
their significance surpassed the simplicity of man-made objects. Following Freud, Lacan calls 
these sublimated and unreachable coordinators of libidinal life – the objet a – the Thing (das 
Ding), and it is hard to imagine any other term to stand for the unattainability of 
commodities.249 The subject always reaches for the Thing – as Alice will – but the Thing 
belongs to the Real, so its attaining would mean the end of the psychic life. Instead, the subject 
substitutes the Thing with many different things throughout life, always expecting that the next 
one will be ‘it.’ In our analysis of the nineteenth century, the subject seeks the wholeness 
promised by the mirror at the entrance of the Symbolic (the culture). But since it is only a 
promised illusion, it exists only by being absent (like the empty shelf in the shop), a phantasm 
that the subject’s split self exhibits in many monstrous, semiotically incoherent forms, 
commodity being one of them. The nineteenth-century capitalist production that went (and still 
goes) hand in hand with commodity culture is all about desire, all about a promised fulfillment 
if the alienated and estranged product – the commodity – is attained. But the very incoherence 
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of the commodity resists possession, it resists satisfaction, always asking for more and more – 
more things, more objects, more phantasmal ‘it.’ Lewis Carroll belongs to the era one hundred 
years before Lacan, but a reader familiar with Lacanian psychoanalysis would be hard-pressed 
not to interpret Alice’s shop scene in terms of the Thing. 
 
 ‘Things flow about so here!” she [Alice] said at last in a plaintive tone, after 
she had spent a minute or so in vainly pursuing a large bright thing, that looked 
sometimes like a doll, and sometimes like a work-box, and was always in the 
shelf next above the one she was looking at. “And this one is the most provoking 
of all – but I’ll tell you what –” she added, as a sudden thought struck her, “I’ll 
follow it up to the very top shelf of all. It’ll puzzle it to go through the ceiling, 
I expect!” 
 But even this plan failed: the “thing” went through the ceiling as quietly as 
possible, as if it were quite used to it.250 
 
Alice is reaching for the Thing – and we can freely capitalize it here, since it is obviously a 
specific thing whose nature and description is not evident even to Alice – but the Thing keeps 
running away, making Alice want it even more. Seen in the context of a shop, a consumerist 
space par excellence (even identifiable as a real space in Oxford), the workings of the 
consumerist desire are evident, since the things ‘flow about so here!’ Things in this shop, as in 
the Crystal Palace and other ‘places of pilgrimage of commodity fetishism’ are unstable and 
incoherent; they cannot be possessed for they reveal their monstrous nature, which is constantly 
changing along the signifying chain. The Thing Alice wants the most is, of course, ‘large’ and 
‘bright’ as only the spectacularized Victorian commodities could be, and it keeps changing its 
shape and meaning from a bright, unnamed ‘something’ into a doll, from a doll into a work-
box; it flees Alice’s desire on the shelf and all around the shop. Things in this shop are like 
things at the Exhibition, and the ‘modern exhibition always means things out of place,’ says 
Armstrong.251 They are never where one expects them to be. In her fantasy, Alice thinks she is 
saved – she thinks that she has found a way of chasing the Thing, the object of her desire, to 
the top shelf, but the Thing knows no bounds, has no beginning and no end, because it was 
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never there in the first place. So the Thing disappears through the roof, forever escaping Alice’s 
grasp.  
The Thing always belongs to the Real. 
Alice’s temptation is not over, though. The rest of the scene follows the same pattern of 
insatiable desire. The knitting Sheep and she are in a boat now – the naturalness of the transition 
being understandable in a dream – and Alice is rowing down a river. All around her are ‘darling 
scented rushes,’252 so alluring, provoking, and enchanting that Alice has to pick them up.  
  
“Oh, what a lovely one! Only I couldn’t quite reach it.” And it certainly did 
seem a little provoking […] that, though she managed to pick plenty of beautiful 
rushes as the boat glided by, there was always a more lovely one that she 
couldn’t reach.253 
 
 The Thing from the shop – the one always changing into something else – continues to evade 
Alice’s reach, as the boat keeps moving further downstream. Nothing can satisfy Alice’s desire, 
not even the beautiful rushes. As soon as an ‘it’ is acquired (all those ‘its’ that present 
themselves to us as embodiments of the Thing which literally is not), there is another ‘it’ even 
better than the previous one, more beautiful, brighter and more alluring. ‘The prettiest are 
always further!’254 says our sad Alice. Not even the beautiful, darling rushes that she has 
already picked up can make her feel less empty, because as soon as an ‘it’ is acquired, desire 
loses interest in it and rejects it. Like a bird of prey, the nature of desire is to conquer the 
unconquerable, to appropriate the unappropriable, and to reach the fullness promised at the 
beginning, in front of the mirror. But this fullness is an illusion, and the desire surpasses all the 
conquered ‘its,’ moving forward (or in spirals), ever forward. Desire – the ‘primer of my 
culture,’ as Kristeva remarks about the abject.255 
 
What mattered it to her just then that the rushes had begun to fade, and to lose 
all their scent and beauty, from the very moment that she picked them? Even 
real scented rushes, you know, last only a very little while – and these, being 
dream-rushes, melted away almost like show, as they lay in heaps at her feet.256 
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 Even the real scented rushes cannot fill the void of the subject, cannot stand for the 
wholeness of Being, forever gone before it even existed. Along the signifying chain, down, 
down, down the spiral of representation, the Victorian language leads desire further and further 
away, morphing the ‘it’ into something else, into some new illusion, while ‘dream-rushes’ – 
rushes made of dreams – ‘melted away almost like snow.’ 
Where does it end, this odyssey of Alice’s desire? Where does the Thing lure the subject to? 
Does it end at all? Of course it does not, because Alice’s desire runs in circles, so before she 
even realizes it, she (and the Sheep, for sure) are back inside the small shop of curiosities – at 
the Exhibition of commodities – at the heart of the Victorian material (and consumerist) culture. 
‘Now what do you want to buy?’ asked the Sheep. All the way around, down the river and 
through the beautiful rushes, we are back at the consumption point where the shop scene 
started. Somehow, it seems that the whole boat trip was just a ride in circles that always comes 
back to its source.  
 
“To buy!” Alice echoed in a tone that was half astonished and half frightened – 
for the oars, and the boat, and the river, had vanished all in a moment. And she 
was back in the little dark shop.257 
 
Like the reporter with Punch magazine - the visitor at the Exhibition from the previous 
chapter, who always comes back to the Crystal Palace – Alice always comes back to the place 
where the fascination with the Thing started, a murderess coming back to the crime scene. 
Riding in circles, on the wings of desire, the crime scene – the shop, the Exhibition – brings 
joy and fear, ‘astonishment’ and ‘fright.’ In order for Alice to get anywhere, she has to find 
another way out again; she needs to do things backwards. Thus, she stops ‘looking around’ and 
she settles down for something not so bright, not so shiny, not so enchanting or everlasting – 
an egg. Is it finally over? Can Alice finally move on with the egg in her hands? 
 
[S]he groped her way among the tables and chairs, for the shop was very dark 
towards the end. “The egg seems to get further away the more I walk towards 
it.” […] However, the egg only got larger and larger, and more and more human: 
when she had come within a few yards of it, she saw that it had eyes and a nose 
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and mouth; and when she had come close to it, she saw clearly that it was 
Humpty Dumpty himself.258 
 
No, it never ends. The Thing never stays still, because it is not absent, it is literally not. The 
bright, shiny ‘something,’ the doll, the work-box, the beautiful rushes, the egg – all things made 
of air, all the ‘its’ made of dreams, of illusions. As the Thing lures Alice towards the ‘very dark 
end’ of the shop, deep towards the black heart of the subject’s desire, a place reachable only in 
a dream or a fantasy, things become alive once again – with eyes, and noses and mouths. And 
as in a final stroke of irony, or maybe of a psychical justice, the egg Alice thought she acquired, 
the egg that turned half-human – Humpty Dumpty himself – falls from a wall and breaks into 
pieces as Alice experiences the fall as a subject. The chain goes on and on, never ending and 
never pausing, while the boundaries disappear, commodities flee and change and change and 
change. ‘Any person, any object, any relationship can mean absolutely anything else,’ says 
Benjamin rightly from the fringes of the Victorian age. ‘With this possibility a destructive, but 
just verdict is passed on the profane world.’259 And on this side of the mirror, everything ends 
in the fantasy of transformation of materiality and in the fall of the subject in the face of the 
impossible, incredible, world-breaking jouissance expected. ‘Well, this is the very queerest 
shop I ever saw!’260 concludes Alice. Wouldn’t we agree? 
 
The Violence of the Fall 
 
 As the story draws to an end, the transformation of materiality on this side of the mirror is 
getting more and more violent. Alice has passed all the Squares and now she is at a dinner party 
in her honor. She has finally achieved her goal – she has become a Queen, a full-pledged chess-
piece. She is seated between two other figures with a weird material transformation, the Red 
and the White Queen, as they celebrate her successful journey through the looking-glass world. 
Over the brooks and through the squares, Alice came to her final destination. But is it really an 
end? In Carroll’s marvelous story, does the subject, our Alice, get satisfaction in the end? Has 
she redeemed herself in the face of the semiotic monstrosity of slippery animate/inanimate 
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phantasms by pushing her objectification to the extreme, to its own logical conclusion – the 
chess-piece? 
 As it is always the case in mirror narratives, the subject reaches for wholeness, for the pure 
jouissance expected, but he always falls short of it. This fall is always beyond words, beyond 
description, something lacking and excessive at the same time; there is always a certain degree 
of violence involved. Alice’s destiny is no different, it seems. She can only fantasize about the 
end, about completeness, but its impossibility always turns the fantasy into a nightmare. As she 
sits at the table, where all the impossible things have found their place – from a walking leg of 
mutton to a talking pudding (not to mention the talking chess pieces we are accustomed to by 
now) – the fantasy of ‘queenhood’ (or rather, of ‘thinghood’) turns into a violent mess. 
 
And then […] all sorts of things happened in a moment. The candles all grew 
up to the ceiling, looking something like a bed of rushes with fireworks at the 
top. As to the bottles, they each took a pair of plates, which they hastily fitted 
on as wings, and so, with forks for legs, went fluttering about in all direction: 
“and very like birds they look,” Alice thought to herself, as well as she could in 
the dreadful confusion that was beginning.261 
 
 The dream turns into a nightmare, as things go completely berserk. They are running loose, 
just like in the previous chapter, jumping in a bowl of soup or just simply fleeing the (crime) 
scene. It almost seems like George Cruikshank had this scene in mind when he drew ‘The 
Dispersion of the Works of All Nations from the Great Exhibition of 1851.’ Or it might be that 
the similarities are so striking because Through the Looking Glass shares the theme with the 
Crystal Palace – a grand mirror-fantasy of material transcendence and the subject’s 
impossibility to grasp wholeness. The moment the subject thinks to himself ‘That’s it!’ the 
desire says ‘That’s not it!’ and in the violence of the fall, the subject experiences the horror of 
the jouissance obtained. ‘I can’t stand this any longer!’ cries Alice in desperation, ‘as she 
jump[s] up and seize[s] the table-cloth with both hands: one good pull, and plates, dishes, 
guests, and candles c[o]me crushing down together in a heap on the floor.’262 
 At the end of the fantasy, violence and dissatisfaction are waiting; a feeling, or an awareness 
that, after everything, the objet a, the Thing, is still out there, out of the subject’s reach. It still 
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calls, lures, and fascinates desire, transforming a dream into a never-ending nightmare. After a 
fantasy – a fall. After the fall – an awakening. Is it? That would be too easy; that would be a 
way out. This dream does not have one, as Alice asks in the end: ‘Which dreamed it?’ Thus, 
after the awakening there is no salvation. The subject is forever haunted by the mirror image, 
by the phantom of fullness, roaming through the endless maze of the Victorian language. 
 
Still she haunts me, phantomwise, 
Alice moving under skies 
Never seen by waking eyes.263 
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PART TWO 
 
IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE WORD OF DEATH 
 
The Sirens, say one, are the charms of the Gulf of Naples. No, says another; they were chaste 
priestesses. They were neither chaste nor priestesses, but exactly reverse. They were 
sunbeams. They were perilous cliffs. They were a race of peaceful shepherds. They were 
symbols of persuasion. They were cannibals. They were planetary spirits. They were 
prophets. They were species of Oriental owl. They were harmonious faculties of the soul. 
They were penguins. 
Penguins! This is the final pronouncement of commentatorial erudition. 264 
Norman Douglas 
 
 
A long time ago, in a past so distant that one finds it imperceptible and hence natural, 
somewhere in the Mediterranean Sea, on a pile of pallid bones and rotting flesh, stood two 
creatures called Sirens, waiting to offer ignorant sailors the joys of ultimate knowledge and 
bliss. We could not see them, the shape of their bodies being so utterly wrong that it was 
eclipsed by their voices. On a pile of cadavers they sang of glorious deeds, promising future 
and everlasting happiness, luring equally the innocent and the guilty, and abusing the deepest 
desires of souls. The water was deathly calm in this baleful place of desiring sorrow, there was 
no wind to warn or distract, and no omen that the grace of their seductive voices was an entrance 
to Hades itself. For whoever approached these bodiless, aural beings, left everything they 
possessed behind, all the loved ones, all the hated ones – they left behind the reality and 
firmness of life itself. And in return they got nothing but blue depths, a watery grave, waiting 
on the other side of the promised bliss. 
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But there have always been those who managed to escape, whose eyes bore witness to death 
and joy, beauty and decay, cruelty and love, without succumbing to any of them. Their ears 
were stopped; their arms tied fast; and their ships sailed steadily between desire and demise, 
silencing the great lure of the most intimate depths of their Being. Those extraordinary men 
fought wildly to fulfill their destinies and bequeathed the antidote to the Sirens’ call to the 
generations of men to come. From the farthest corners of the Greek epics to nineteenth-century 
Europe, all men, each in their own way, bore the name of Ulysses.  
In this chapter we will introduce us with the history of these chimerical beings. Examining 
their history in its entirety is beyond possible, considering that sirens – and all their sisters 
mermaids, naiads, nymphs, rusalkas – span the whole history of humankind, defying the 
natural borders created by oceans, mountains, rivers and continents.265 There are no imaginary 
and mythical creatures more familiar to people in all corners of the world, in almost every 
known historical era. Sirens, in their local versions, roam the Andes as well as Russian lakes; 
they are known in Japan and are spotted combing their hair and beckoning to sailors in both 
northern and southern seas. And in all the accounts, their beauty and voices are pervasive, the 
ecstasy they offer is unending: existentially unbearable and historically indestructible. And as 
if it were not enough this geographical and historical omnipresence bestowed upon their 
melodious sounds and everlasting grace, sirens assumed another unsurpassable feature: a 
staggering ability to change. Ancient feathered enchantresses or medieval fish-tailed whores, 
sirens and mermaids never cease to morph, mutate, to transcend their impossible corporeal 
existence, merging into one another, abandoning feathers for tails, the instruments they play 
for the fish they hunt, the fish for mirrors, mirrors for souls.  
Facing their worldly pervasiveness, both spatial and temporal, and a constant fantastic flux 
of their bodies, the desire for a comprehensive survey collapses exhausted, depressed. This 
chapter, as well as the rest of the book, deals with only a fragment, located narrowly in the 
Western European countries at its widest, Victorian Britain at its narrowest. The Victorian 
sirens and mermaids underwent profound changes during the nineteenth century, changes even 
more radical than their bodily transmogrification. The only assets that loyally remained with 
their figures since their Homeric Genesis – their voice – and the medieval/modern one – their 
mirror – disappeared into thin air in Victorian times. For that reason, this book draws an 
arbitrary dividing line at the time of Hans Christian Andersen’s conception of The Little 
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Mermaid (Den Lille Havfrue) in 1837, discussing siren and mermaid narratives of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries in greater depth. But if we want the argument to be fruitful 
and intelligible, if we want the reader to truly understand the dramatic change and the turning 
point in the history of sirens, a short introduction, or better a survey of the main representational 
traits should precede it. This task follows or precedes every work on sirens ever written, and 
for that reason we will go though it briefly, leaving more room for some new insights on the 
Victorian times.  
 
In the Beginning, All Things Shine Bright 
 
Before we start with the basic concepts of ‘sirenology’ it is very important to understand 
that sirens came to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – and thus to us – in two different 
monstrous forms. For the population that came of age with Disney’s adaptation of Andersen’s 
heartbreaking story, it might come as a surprise that mermaids and sirens are actually not the 
same (though they could be), and that the modern Victorian, post-Victorian and post-modern 
era all suffer from a major misconception regarding their nature. Mermaids – those professedly 
lovely, fragile beings we sympathize with – are fish-women, that much is clear, but sirens (bird-
women) are of a different sort altogether. 
The linguistic distinction between sirens and mermaids still troubles the authors who let 
themselves become immersed in this wonderland of joy and suffering – of joy in suffering. On 
the one hand, the mermaid hybrid form – chilling, aquatic and soothing, but diabolical and 
covertly dangerous – appears more or less unambiguous. When the term ‘mermaid’ is used, it 
always means a fish-tailed maiden. But the ‘siren,’ believed to be a feathered creature, is far 
more complicated; the term covers the fish-tailed femme fatale form too, and is truly worthy of 
a Victorian monstrous narrative. The ‘siren’ is a linguistic and semiotic battleground of 
elements, merging water with air and vice versa, accommodating every meaning the history of 
sirens and mermaids brought to light. Sleek as a mermaid’s tail, evanescent as the siren song, 
the term itself dwells in a place of the in-between, leaving a blank representational space to be 
filled with dreams, fears and fantasies. As such, it comes as no surprise that the Victorian male 
subject – the split, tortured and hollowed one – emerges through the language of this creature 
to express his otiose desire for completeness. 
Sirens are old, very old, and when they appear in the European imagination, they descend 
from the sky with wings widely spread, and claws sharp and ominous. Both sirens and 
mermaids, more or less until the nineteenth century, share the same narrative traits – they sing 
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and lure and deceive men to their doom. But their histories, intertwined as they are, can still be 
separated and distinguished, at least as far as ancient sources are concerned. 
Winged sirens arrive at the dawn of European literature. What better place for a fantastic, 
mythical creature to be born from (especially from a Victorian perspective) but the heart of the 
Homeric epics? A famous passage from Book XII of the Odyssey sets the stage for the sirens’ 
long and complicated history. Since this particular episode has already been discussed from the 
Victorian perspective in the prologue, we will just give the basic overview here, beginnings 
and roots always being essential to historians.266 
Ulysses has just broken Circe’s spell and is eager to continue his journey home. Although 
it has been more than ten years since he left his beloved Ithaca, Penelope and Telemachus, his 
desire for life and return is inextinguishable. He is prepared to survive all the ordeals that gods 
(mostly Poseidon) have prepared for him. Three millennia later, in 1833, Tennyson’s Ulysses 
will lament his unbearable, sedentary life; he will be tired of waiting, benumbed by the 
boredom of mundane existence.267 But at the beginning, ‘when [things] emerged dazzling from 
the hand of a creator or in the shadowless night of the first morning,’ as Foucault says of the 
beginnings, Ulysses’ desire for return was insatiable, leading him even into Hades itself.268 
Circe warns Ulysses that once he leaves her enchanted home, many hardships await him, and 
the first of these is the dreaded isle of the Sirens. These ephemeral creatures are irresistible and 
unique, in ancient Greek culture always capitalized and personalized. They sing, they kill and 
their promises strike in the dark recesses of the listener’s soul: 
 
First the shrill Sirens, couched among the flowers, 
Sing melodies that lure from the great deep 
The heedless mariners to their fatal bowers, 
Where round about them, piled in many a heap 
Lie the bleached bones of mouldering men that sleep 
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For ever, and the dead skin waste away.269 
 
Ulysses follows Circe’s advice: he stops his shipmates’ ears with wax and gets himself 
leashed to the mast lest he should succumb to the song of the Sirens. For all those who had 
heard their silky, enthralling song lost their minds in the ecstasy of sound, ending up on the 
Sirens’ isle, inanimate, hollow and putrefying. Ulysses withstands the Sirens, though their song 
is forceful, their promises euphonious and canning, and he yells and begs and orders and 
threatens to be released and allowed to drown in the jouissance promised.  
Thus in the beginning was a word: the dulcet, destructive word of death. In the beginning 
was the end itself, the desire promised, la petite mort.  In the three thousand years that followed, 
this episode of seduction, death and desire remained at the heart of the siren legend. While 
mortals had to let themselves be mollified, drowned, devoured or to simply disappear, 
occasionally, in cracks and crevices of history, there had been those who annihilated the Sirens, 
but those were largely gods, demigods and undisputed heroes of old. Ancient tradition knows 
of these obliterating occasions that persisted as borderlines of the siren myth. 
From the moment Ulysses stepped on his adventure-bound ship to Ithaca (in the tenth to 
seventh century BC, depending on the school of classical scholarship we follow), Sirens had 
been feathered and winged creatures.270 True, in the Odyssey itself we cannot see their form. 
Intentionally or not, this information was denied to us, possibly because the general bardic 
audience had already been introduced to their shape. J. R. T. Pollard claims that scenes from 
the Odyssey are rare in the seventh century BC visual art and that the earliest depiction of the 
episode comes from a black-figure Corinthian aryballos from the second half of the sixth 
century.271 This is to be expected, since the Greek Dark Ages suffered from an almost complete 
loss of human representation. After centuries of silence, following the collapse of the 
Mycenaean civilization, the Geometric style of pottery decoration gave way to human figures 
only at the end of the eighth century BC.272 Discussing, like Pollard, the prominence of Sirens 
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in visual arts, Leofranc Holford-Strevens holds that at the beginning (as in the Odyssey) their 
number was always two, but that shortly after, they began appearing in trios. When there were 
only two, one of them would play the aulos and the other the kithara. When coming in threes, 
the remaining one would assume the role of a singer.273 This formula persisted for two 
millennia.  
On the famous Attic stamnos from Vulci in Italy, dated ca. 475-460 BC (fig. 1, mentioned 
and shown in the prologue), the one that inspired John William Waterhouse to paint his timeless 
work Ulysses and the Sirens in 1891, we find Ulysses’ ship surrounded by three Sirens. Two 
of them are perched on the nearby cliffs, while the remaining one is diving headfirst into the 
sea. The scene may represent the Siren’s suicide as a result of the defeat that never happened 
before, but it is quite possible that the diving Siren represents the same one perched on the rock 
above.274 
Unlike their medieval descendants, classical Sirens all had names; their figures assumed a 
place in the overall universe of gods, men, heroes and monsters, as developed by Homer and 
Hesiod.275 Nevertheless, the facts of their characters, their names as well as their number and 
parentage, were an issue of dispute in ancient times. The Catalogue of Women gives Sirens 
their family tree and history for the first time, elaborating on their unending story: ‘[T]heir 
names are Thelxiope or Thelxinoe, Molpe and Aglaophonus’ (‘Charming-with-her-voice’ (or 
‘Charming-the-mind’), ‘Song,’ and ‘Lovely-sounding’).276 According to The Library, an 
ancient source previously attributed to Apollodorus of Alexandria of the second century BC, 
Sirens were daughters of Sterope and Achelous, an Aetolian river god, whom Hercules wrestled 
                                                 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 97-136; Anthony Snodgrass, The Dark Age of Greece (Abington: Psychology 
Press, 1971), 22-105; Morris, Archaeology as Cultural History, as well as works of V. R. d’ A. Desborough, 
Protogeometric Pottery (Oxford: Claredon, Press, 1952), The Last Mycenaeans and their Successors (Oxford: 
Claredon Press 1964), The End of Mycenaean Civilization and Dark Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1964) and The Greek Dark Ages (London: Ernest Benn, 1972). All the authors mentioned are leading 
authorities in the field of classical studies and entire body of their work is considerably larger. 
273 Holford-Strevens, ‘Sirens in Antiquity,’ 18.  
274 Servius’s Commentary on Aeneid of Virgil is of this opinion. On the other hand, the events from the 
Argonautica presumably happened before the Odyssey, so this discrepancy breaks the plot of the Greek myth a 
bit.  
275 For the resonance of Homeric epics with a wider cultural context, see a beautiful study by Barbara Graziosi 
and Johannes Haubold, Homer: The Resonance of Epic (London: Duckworth, 2005).  
276 Catalogue of Women is a compendium of myths presumably attributed to Hesiod. The work itself does not 
exist anymore, though, and the edition in circulation is a compendium of later references by various ancient 
authors. Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns, Epic Cycle and Homerica with an English Translation by Hugh G. Evelyn-
White (Catalogue of Women) (Cambridge, (Mass.): Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 
1914), fragment #47. Holord-Strevens, in ‘Sirens in Antiquity,’ 40, n.8, translates their names more romantically 
and with much more charm as ‘Beguiling the Mind’ (Thelxinoe) or ‘Beguiling of Speech’ (Thelxiope), ‘Song’ 
(Molpe) and ‘Illustrious of Voice’ (Aglaophonos). 
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in one of his tasks.277 Though this has become their most common lineage, in Epitome 7.18ff 
of the same source, we find a Muse to be their mother and we learn the Sirens’ names too:  
 
[n]ow the Sirens were Pisinoe, Aglaope, and Thelxiepia, daughters of Achelous 
and Melpomene, one of the Muses. One of them played the lyre, another sang, 
and another played the flute, and by these means they were fain to persuade 
passing mariners to linger.278 
 
Melpomene was first the Muse of Singing, before she became the Muse of Tragedy, both of 
her aspects suiting the imagery of Sirens. Other sources, though, had a different opinion on the 
Sirens’ genealogy. According to one of Sophocles’ lost tragedies, Sirens were daughters of the 
old Phorcys, the father of the Gorgons and other menacing creatures of the Greek mythology. 
In this Sophoclean fragment, Ulysses places the Sirens at the heart of the ravenous Hades: ‘I 
came to the Sirens, the daughters of Phorcys, the two that sing the lays of Hades.’279 Siblings 
of Echidna, Medusa and possibly Scylla, they were born out of darkness, lethal elements – 
poison, death and destruction – forming the very tissue of their noxious bodies. 
Although they come to us as sinister enchantresses of a half-human nature, Sirens have not 
always been under the curse causing them to look like animals. In ancient Greek culture, being 
half animal to some extent meant being less than a human, the vertical scale of being 
descending from gods to men and ultimately to animals. Demigods and hybrid creatures existed 
in this vertical universe precisely to mediate these fluctuating and historically contingent 
concepts.280 There are a number of versions of the tale how sirens became half-birds, and most 
                                                 
277 Apollodorus, The Library, with an English Translation by Sir James George Frazer, 2 Volumes (Cambridge, 
(Mass.): Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1921), 1.7.10. The Library or Bibliotheca 
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278 Ibid., E.7.18. 
279 Tragicorum Greacorum fragmenta 4: Sophocles, ed. Stefan Radt (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977), 
fragment #861., translation by Leofranc Holford-Strevens in Holford-Strevens, ‘Sirens in Antiquity,’ 40, n.12. In 
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two were undying and grew not old’ (Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns, Epic Cycle and Homerica with an English 
Translation by Hugh G. Evelyn-White (Theogony) (Cambridge, (Mass.): Harvard University Press; London: 
William Heinemann Ltd., 1914,) 270-275). 
280 Developing a vertical, structuralist, co-ordinate system of Greek culture and mythology, Marcel Detienne 
shows in The Gardens of Adonis how exciting and fun classical scholarship can be. See, Martin Detienne, The 
Gardens of Adonis: Spices in Greek Mythology, trans. Janet Lloyd (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1994. 
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of them, if not all, tell us that their avian form came as a kind of punishment, a personal story 
gone wrong. According to the Catalogue of Women, Sirens earned their feathers as a result of 
their incessant virginity, a behavior that Aphrodite, the goddess of love and their nemesis, could 
not bear. After acquiring their feathered wings, they left for the Tyrrhenian Sea and settled on 
an island called Anthemoessa.281 In a different version, rewriting the Sirens’ fate centuries later, 
Ovid tells us in the first century AD Metamorphoses, that they grew wings so they could search 
for Proserpine, Ceres’ daughter, after she disappeared into the Underworld: 
 
The Gods were kind: 
ye saw your [Siren Maids] limbs grow yellow, with a growth 
of sudden-sprouting feathers; but because 
your melodies that gently charm the ear, 
besides the glory of your speech, might lose 
the blessing, of a tongue, your virgin face 
and human voice remained.282 
 
Sirens have always been on the side of oblivion, their existence marked by the word of 
death. Chaos has always lurked close to their velvety voices and hideous bodies. The ancient 
world, starting from Homer was enthralled by their otherworldly scent, producing endless 
versions of Sirens’ histories, transformations and destinies.  
Being the symbols of the gates of the Underworld, in Ancient Greece, Sirens not only 
perched atop rocky cliffs, waiting for new souls to arrive, but also lamented the deceased, as 
their statues decorated tomb stones.283 Holford-Strevens asserts that, being frequently 
represented on graves, Sirens ‘constituted a poetic commonplace, being made into mourners 
themselves,’ placed even in the Underworld itself, like in Sophocles’ mentioned fragment or 
Euripides’s Helen.284 In this play from 412 BC, Helen cries: ‘[w]inged maidens, virgin 
                                                 
281 Holford-Strevens, ‘Sirens in Antiquity,’ 18; Hesiod, Catalogue of Women, fragment #47. 
282 Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. Brookes More (Boston: Cornhill Publishing Co., 1922), 551-557. 
283 The Siren from Xanthos is a good example of sirens appearing along with harpies, see Catherine Draycott, 
‘Bird-Women on the Harpy Monument from Xanthos, Lycia: Sirens or Harpies?’ in Essays in Classical 
Archaeology for Eleni Hatzivassiliou 1977-2007 (Oxford: Stelios Ioannou School for Classical and Byzantine 
Studies, 2008), 145-153. A. A. Barb interprets the Siren from Xanthos as a child-steeling Lilith, see A. A. Barb, 
‘Antaura. The Mermaid and the Devil’s Grandmother: A Lecture,’ Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld 
Institutes 29 (1966): 8. 
284 Holord-Strevens, ‘Sirens in Antiquity,’ 19. 
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daughters of Earth, the Sirens, may you come to my mourning.’285 At the time, Euripides’ 
Sirens were at least five centuries old, and in Ovid’s time almost a millennium; they had been 
defeated or punished for their insolence. But one thing was constant: whether to call mariners 
to the Underworld, to ironically mourn them after they died (the nineteenth century will 
playfully exploit this irony), or to lure their souls (Pseudo-Plutarch preferred this option), 
Sirens preserved their puissant voices, those enchanting tones throbbing with desolation and 
death.286 
Never having any allies, the Sirens were essentially creatures of solitude, and the wrath of 
gods was their only faithful companion. Male heroes were able to defeat them (which says a 
lot about gender roles hidden in the myth), but female goddesses and demigoddesses 
encountered the Sirens only in contests. Besides Ulysses and his crew, only the Argonauts were 
important enough to be remembered as the survivors of the siren song, thus they represent the 
first group of siren conquerors: the male heroes. All of the siren tales are strikingly aural, their 
visual potency overruled the narrative only in the Victorian vast and in-depth rewriting of the 
myth. As such, the story of Jason, Nestor, Philoctetes and Hercules (to name only a few of 
more than eighty-five members of the Argo’s crew) follows the same route of ravishment, ruin, 
and vocal ecstasy. In the only surviving Hellenistic epic (the third century BC), Argonautica, 
Apollonius Rhodius tells of their heroic encounter with the Sirens on their quest for the Golden 
Fleece, one generation before the Trojan war and the events of the Odyssey. We learn again 
that Sirens are daughters of a Muse, this time Terpsichore (the Muse of Dance), and that ‘they 
were fashioned in part like birds and in part like maidens to behold.’ But Orpheus, famous for 
the power of his voice and lyre, ‘rung forth the hasty snatch of a rippling melody so that their 
ears might be filled with the sound of his twanging; and the lyre overcame the maidens’ voice.’ 
One of the shipmates, Butes, jumped overboard nevertheless, almost proving that sirens always 
receive their share. But before he arrived to their flowery island Anthemoessa, the one we 
already know from the Catalogue of Women, he was rescued by Aphrodite, leaving the Sirens 
empty-handed.287 A much later version of the same tale, Argonautica Orphica from the fourth 
century AD or later, adds an interesting moment to the plot: defeated by Orpheus’ song, the 
                                                 
285 Euripides, The Complete Greek Drama (Helen), 2 volumes, ed. Whitney J. Oates and Eugene O'Neill, Jr. (New 
York: Random House, 1938), 167-170. 
286 ‘[T]he power of their music is not inhuman or destructive; as souls depart from this world to the next, so it 
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Sirens dived into the sea.288 In the beginning was the word of death, but if reflected back, 
reproduced, the word could be vanquished and banished into oblivion. 
Muses belong to the second group of those proving that sirens can be overcome and 
punished: the divine contests. The Greek mythology is full of these, as contests between gods, 
mortals and demigods served as moral and historical guidelines. The myth of the Sirens and 
the Muses has been retold in a number of sources, namely Pausanias (the second century AD), 
Julian the Apostate (the fourth century AD) and Stephanus of Byzantium (the sixth century 
AD).  
 
 
Figure 15 Signed S. Olrik,  Musernes Kamp mod Sirenerne (ca. 1900) 
 
Pausanias informs us that the Muses, elsewhere considered to be mothers of the Sirens, were 
challenged to a singing contest by the Sirens, foolish enough to offend the gods. Doomed to 
defeat, the Sirens were punished for this daring attempt at vocal supremacy. The Muses plucked 
the Sirens’ feathers, turning the loot into extravagant accessories and mortifying Sirens by this 
mutilation.289 A relief on a sarcophagus from Villa Nero, Rome, dated to the third century AD 
                                                 
288 Martin Litchfiled West, ed., The Orphic Poems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 25, 32. 
289 ‘On the market-place of Coroneia I found two remarkable things, an altar of Hermes Epimelius (Keeper of 
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9.34.3; Julian, Selected Works of Julian the Emperor and Some Pieces of the Sophist Libanus, 2 volumes, trans. 
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Ethnicorum quae supersunt, ed. August Meineke (Berlin: G. Reimar, 1849).  
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commemorates this event.290 This aggressive story of song and demise will be quite popular in 
the nineteenth- and twentieth-century painting. Signed S. Olrik’s (1874-1921) despondent 
Musernes Kamp mod Sirenerne (fig. 15) is plunged into an azure, aquatic mermaid palette in 
the manner of Edward Burne-Jones’s The Depths of the Sea (1886), chromatically merging (or 
confusing) the Sirens’ avian nature with the mermaids’ marine one. Much more disquieting 
and malevolent in the choice of colors and strong, rough surfaces, is Rupert Bunny’s (1864-
1947) The Muses Plucking the Wings of the Sirens (ca. 1922) where the Sirens’ pale, 
otherworldly bodies provide a sharp contrast to the pinkish flesh and carnal, red hair of the 
Muses (fig. 16).  
The Muses and the Sirens have moved in tandem since the beginning of the Sirens’ journey. 
Both were believed to have the power of voice and the ability to bestow eternal knowledge 
upon heroes.  
 
 
Figure 16 Rupert Bunny, The Muses Plucking the Wings of the Sirens (ca. 1922) 
 
Iliad beseechingly opens with Achilles’ wrath and an invocation of the omniscient Muse: 
‘The wrath sing, goddess, of Peleus’ son, Achilles [...].’291 And so embarks the European 
                                                 
290 The Metropolitan Museum of Art, ‘Marble sarcophagus with the contest between the Muses and the Sirens,’ 
no. 10.104. 
291 Homer, Iliad with an English Translation by A.T. Murray, 2 volumes (Cambridge, (Mass.): Harvard University 
Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1924), 1.1 
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literature on its epic journey, and along the way it summons the Muses to reveal what was (‘[...] 
who was far the best among them do thou tell me, Muse [...]’292) by using their ‘sweet voices’293 
resonant of the Sirens’ seduction. Like the Muses, the Sirens from the Odyssey promise 
knowledge and satisfaction with their song that brings rapture:  
 
We know what labours were in ancient day 
Wrought in wide Troia, as the gods assigned; 
We know from land to land all toils of all mankind.294 
 
Holford-Strevens holds that the Sirens were symbols of ‘the false and the trivial,’ contrasted 
to the ‘truthful and serious Muses.’295 Generally, it was hard to mistake these two kinds of 
beings one for another, the Sirens being utterly sinister and Muses personifying everything 
beauteous and praiseworthy, as Porphyry says in The Life of Pythagoras in the third century 
AD:  
 
Of pleasures there were two kinds; one that indulges the bellies and lusts by a 
profusion of wealth, which he compared to the murderous songs of the Sirens; 
the other kind consists of things honest, just, and necessary to life, which are 
just as sweet as the first, without being followed by repentance; and these 
pleasures he compared to the harmony of the Muses.296 
 
Nevertheless, occasional equalizing of the two was bound to happen, like in Alcman’s 
fragment #14 (‘The Muse crieth aloud, that Siren clear and sweet’).297 One of the rare places, 
though, where this merging of Sirens’ and Muses’ attributes is evident, is an obscure passage 
from Plato’s Republic that recounts the myth of Er (the myth about the Underworld). Here we 
find celestial Sirens that stand on top of the eight spheres that represent stars and planets. They 
all revolve around the spindle of Necessity:  
 
                                                 
292 Ibid., 2.734. 
293 Ibid., 1.568. 
294 Odyssey, XII, verse 27, 295. 
295 Holford-Strevens, ‘Sirens in Antiquity,’ 21. 
296 Porphyry, Life of Pythagoras, visited 20 June 2014, 
 http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/porphyry_life_of_pythagoras_02_text.htm. 
297 Lyra Greaca, Volume I: Terpander, Alcman, Sappho and Alcaeus, trans. J. M. Edmonds (Cambridge, (Mass.): 
Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1922), fragment #14. 
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And the spindle turned on the knees of Necessity, and up above on each of the 
rims of the circles a Siren stood, borne around in its revolution and uttering one 
sound, one note, and from all the eight there was the concord of a single 
harmony.298 
 
In this passage, the menacing Sirens are closer than ever to the benevolent Muses, and some 
critics claim that the myth of Er represents the very dawn of a parallel siren mythography, one 
that paints them in benign and propitious shades.299 It would be tempting to search for the roots 
of the Victorian virgin-like sirens in this soothing image. Pollard even undertook the task of 
distinguishing the Sirens and the Muses once and for all, arguing against Ernst Buschor’s view 
that the Sirens were the Muses’ infernal counterparts. He states that their natures are so 
radically ‘opposed that is seems misleading to describe one, however loosely, in terms of the 
other.’300 
Defeated, beaten, plucked or killed by their celestial superiors, the Sirens still held an 
unprecedented dominion over their mortal inferiors. They were believed to ‘tear them [mortals] 
to pieces,’301 as Pliny the Elder suggests in Historia Naturalis, and their song was an invitation 
to an ecstasy that should never be, devastating the minds and souls of sailors and depriving 
them of their property, bodies, and, ultimately, of their lives. It might seem surprising that what 
we, modern readers, find to be the most familiar aspect of the Sirens – their penetrating sexual 
lure – consolidated itself firmly only in the late Middle Ages with the arrival of their fish-tailed, 
demonic sisters. But the Sirens’ sexual nature was introduced at least as early as the third 
century BC if not earlier, if we are to believe a writer named Heraclitus: 
 
They [sirens] were harlots outstanding in both instrumental music and 
sweetness of voice, very beautiful; those who approached them found their 
property eaten up. They were said to have birds’ legs because they departed with 
speed from those who had lost their money.302 
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We find the same theme seven centuries later in Servius’ Commentary on the Aeneid of 
Virgil from around 400 AD:  
 
Those whom they enticed with their music they led into shipwreck. But in fact 
they were harlots; it was because they reduced passers-by to beggary that the 
fiction arose of their causing shipwrecks. Ulysses, by scouring them, brought 
them to death.303 
 
Since the dawn of their mythical creation, theirs was the realm of air and water, merging the 
fantasies of sexual excitement with deep, dark dreams of dissolution and drowning. These two 
aspects went hand in hand and the Sirens’ promises hinged on this will to die, the necessity of 
perishing, the desire to encounter the great beyond of water, of matter, of life. Whenever they 
spread their nightmarish wings, the wind would die out, calm would ominously creep in on a 
hot, sunny, dog-day of the high noon, matter would transform itself, life would turn into death, 
solid bodies into putrefying half-liquid cadavers, steady minds into voracious insanity. Their 
monstrous, voluptuous bodies and their devouring lustrous voices – their punishment and 
reward – persisted for centuries, millennia, surviving wars and nations. As it will be seen, many 
of the elements rising from the bottom of the siren history endured until the present day: some 
changed, some did not. But some faded away completely, and this book, despite all the 
meandering and delaying, aims at this representational death that is more than just a change of 
fashion. Once the Sirens were annihilated and silenced, they rose as heralds of a new modernity 
to come.  
 
At the Fish-Tail Apocalypse and Beyond 
 
With the Middle Ages and the wide spread of Christianity, the siren myth began meandering 
and gaining additional complexity, meaning and confusion. Its structure remained virtually 
unchanged: sirens were still luring men to death with their song. But new elements appeared 
in their iconography. Mermaids (fish-tailed sirens) from the park-fountains of European 
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capitals, celluloid tapes and the Starbucks logo and coffee cups, were a late arrival in written 
European history. It was quite queer, this beautiful metamorphosis that the sirens’ bodies 
slowly underwent in the course of the ‘dark’ centuries. Not many fantastic beings were allowed 
to change their corporeal form so profoundly, becoming almost unrecognizable. Sirens came 
to the Homeric mind in the shape of a void – two invisible, unison voices, singing the song of 
omniscience and desire. In Classical times they grew wings, soared into the sky and mastered 
the sweet, irresistible sounds of their instruments. And then, in the Middle Ages, they exuviated 
their feathers, as their lower-bodies crystallized into scaly, aquatic, sexless tails, splashing the 
water and capturing desire once again. This being said, it is not implied that the classical Sirens 
simply changed their feathers for tails. Sirens have not actually transformed into mermaids, but 
fought them for the representational space in the Middle Ages. 
Mermaids have their own personal history. The term itself came into use only after the battle 
between them and their winged sisters was partially over. We know them by this name since 
Chaucer noted that ‘mermaydens’ is English for ‘sereyns.’304 The story of their beginnings is 
far more obscure and veiled than the sirens,’ as they do not surface at the dawn of the European 
imagination. For almost a century, authors searched for the earliest representations of human-
fish hybrids, female as well as male, in the old Babylonian culture: the Syrian goddess Atergatis 
was known as a ‘fish-goddess,’ and the Babylonian Ea or Oanness was represented as part man 
and part fish.305 But, this pursuit for the origins of human-fish hybrid iconography is brimming 
with methodological issues and leads inevitably into comparative religion studies at best. These 
waters are too far removed from the purposes of this chapter and not directly pertinent to them. 
In visual arts, creatures with fish tails have been known since ancient Greece, some of them 
in the proper siren context. Half-fish half-women, the monstrous hybrid bodies remained 
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vehicles for the power of voice. We can see this representational confusion on a bowl from the 
third century BC found on the Athenian Agora. On the bowl, Odysseus is shown tied to the 
mast of his ship in a trance of the siren song, surrounded by two human-fish beings, along with 
figures that Homer A. Thompson identified as Scylla and Charybdis.306 Fish-tailed sirens 
appear in a similar context on a lamp from Volubilis from the second century BC, which Michel 
Ponsich discussed in his exhaustive study on more than five hundred lamps found in 
Mauretania Tingitana.307 Ever since ancient Greece, sirens and mermaids have occasionally 
been mistaken for each other, their power over elements of both air and water not equal, but 
existent. But what had been sporadic iconographic confusion in the classical world, became a 
continuous, enduring reality of the Carolingian Middle Ages. 
The first written record of fish-tailed sirens appeared in the seventh century AD with Liber 
Monstrorum, an Anglo-Saxon catalogue of marvelous creatures. For the author of this 
compendium, sirens 
 
are sea-girls, who deceive sailors with the outstanding beauty of their 
appearance and the sweetness of their song, and are most like human beings 
from the head to the navel, with the body of a maiden, but have scaly fishes’ 
tails, with which they always lurk in the sea.308 
 
As we can see, the accent was still on the ‘sweetness of their song,’ but with the introduction 
of tails, the ‘outstanding beauty of their appearance’ strengthened. This change, small and 
insignificant as it may seem in the seventh century, will gradually advance in anticipation of 
the nineteenth century and the annihilation of the sirens’ voices by their bodies.  
Like many things ancient, the siren/mermaid iconography was gradually appropriated by 
Christian mythography, and sirens throughout the Middle Ages (and later) became a graveyard 
of all the earthly sins mortals were accused of. Passages from the Septuagint (Greek Bible) and 
                                                 
306 It is hard, if not impossible, to discern whether the depicted hybrids are mermaids (as Homer A. Thompson 
believed in 1948) or tritons (as Susan L. Rotroff believed in 1982). Simpson described the scene as ‘a figured 
piece rather more ambitious’ than the rest of the Megarian pottery found on the site. Led by the obvious narrative 
of the Odyssey, he remarks that the whole scene is ‘apparently a fantastic contamination of the story of Scylla and 
Charybdis with that of the Sirens. See, Homer A. Thompson, ‘The Excavation of the Athenian Agora Twelfth 
Season: 1947,’ Hesperia 17:3 (1948): 160-161; Susan L. Rotroff, Hellenistic Pottery: Athenian and Imported 
Moldmade Bowls, The Athenian Agora 22 (Princeton: The American School of Classical Studies in Athens, 1982), 
67, #190 (catalogue). 
307 Michel Ponsich, Les lamps romaines en terre cuite de la Maurétanie Tingitane, Publications du Service des 
Antiquité du Maroc 15 (Rabat : Service des Antiquités du Maroc, 1961), 54, #176-177. 
308 Andy Orchard, ‘The Liber monstrorum,’ in Pride and Prodigies: Studies in the Monsters of the ‘Beowulf’ 
Manuscript (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1995), 263.  
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the forth-century AD St. Jerome’s Vulgate (Latin Bible) laid the foundation for a meaning of 
the siren myth far more malevolent than its ancient predecessors. While the ancient Sirens had 
been pernicious and all-knowing, the medieval sirens were straightforwardly diabolical – they 
were creatures of sin and the world’s suffering. Isaiah 13.21-22 says in the description of the 
destruction of Babylon that ‘[n]ow beasts make their home there,’ in the ruins of the erring 
city, ‘and an empty echo is heard in the houses. Sirens have their habitation there and demons 
dance.’309 No one could mistake these sirens for Muses anymore, as their nature became 
generic, bleak and demonborn. From this moment on, they have no names or parentage; they 
are only abstract symbols of everything wrong with the mortal flesh of the world. Their image 
has been hollowed, used to describe an ‘empty echo’ of a devastated city. ‘And nettles shall 
sprout up in their cities,’ prophesied Isaiah 34.13 in the destruction of Edom by the Lord, ‘and 
in the securest places in the land and the hamlet shall be full of sirens and the house shall be 
full of sparrows.’310 In biblical texts and the medieval ethics of purity, sirens had no right to be 
capitalized any more. They were turned into pure signs of destruction and desolation, 
embodying fear and suffering, but most importantly signifying the iniquitous pleasure. ‘But 
wild beasts shall rest there,’ St. Jerome’s Vulgate adds, recounting the destruction of Babylon 
once again, ‘and the hairy ones shall dance there and owls shall answer one another there, in 
the houses thereof and sirens in the temples of pleasure.’311 William J. Travis has sagaciously 
observed that from the Greek to Latin translation of the Bible, everything became ‘darker, 
eerier, [and] noisier.’ In the Latin version, the ‘empty echo’ of the houses is gone, and the 
melancholic cries of owls fill the air instead. He notes that sirens changed too: in the Greek 
Bible ‘their existence recalls the desolation of Babylon, but in the Vulgate they desecrate the 
very idea of worship.’312 Steering through the medieval sources, Travis makes a powerful 
argument about the role of the medieval siren imagery. He concludes that, read in the wider 
context of Christian iconography, sirens invoked images of the Apocalypse, their unholy bodies 
signifying all the undoing of the world’s order. Being essentially female, sirens embodied the 
Original Sin, their sleek lower-bodies becoming more dominant and connected to the body of 
the Snake. Sirens became harlots once again, but this time the moral lesson of the narrative 
drew on an ever wider context of the Christian mythology. Isidore of Seville’s Etymologies, 
                                                 
309 See Septuaginta: Vetus Testamentum Graecum, ed. Joseph Ziegler (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1983), 172f. (Cf. William J. Travis, ‘Of Sirens and Onocentaurs: A Romanesque Apocalypse at Montceaux-
l'Etoile,’ Artibus et Historiae 23:45 (2002): 33). 
310 Ibid. 
311 See Vetus Latina: die Reste der altlateinische Bibel, vol. 12, part 1 (Esaias), ed Roger Gryson (Beuron: Vetus 
Latina Institut, 1987), 9-29, 388-390 (Cf. Travis, ‘Of Sirens and Onocentaurs,’ 59, 20f). 
312 Travis, ‘Of Sirens and Onocentaurs,’ 34. 
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from the seventh century, stole the description of the sirens from Servius’s Commentary on the 
Aeneid almost word for word, but still succeeded in transforming them into creatures of pure 
flesh.313 By the twelfth century, the meaning of the sirens expanded from ‘luxuria and voluptas, 
to vice, vanity and vainglory, pride and presumption, flattery, hypocrisy, betrayal, sloth, greed, 
malice, false happiness, demons, evil portents, and Hell.’314 As centuries went by, sirens kept 
attracting more and more sins and negative connotations. Physiologus or Naturalist, written in 
the second century AD and translated into numerous languages throughout the medieval period, 
played a significant role in the process. Its Latin version came into existence around 600, and, 
in the words of Travis, ‘based on scripture, easy to understand, and colorful, the Physiologus 
became a medieval bestseller.’315 Depending on the version, sirens were half-birds or half-fish, 
generally fish predominating in earlier versions. Physiologus was the ancestor to numerous 
bestiaries rampaging through the Middle Ages, introducing, describing and composing natures 
and histories of a plethora of fantastic beings that populated the margins of medieval 
manuscripts and fringes of the Christian world.316 In a version of Physiologus by Bishop 
Theobald, who was believed to have lived in the eleventh century, sirens finally became 
beautiful fish-virgins, a melancholic image that was to reign over the nineteenth century.  
 
Those who have seen them will say, that the nature / of them is as follows, / 
From the waist upwards they’re shaped in the form / of a beautiful virgin, / What 
makes the wonder so great, is from thence / lower down they are fish like.317 
 
Feathered sirens and fish-tailed mermaids had unobtrusively begun their battle in classical 
times, but through the Middle Ages the fish-demon prevailed. From the twelfth to the 
                                                 
313 ’People imagine three Sirens who were part maidens, part birds, having wings and talons; one of them would 
make music with her voice, the second with her flute, and the third with a lyre. They would draw sailors, enticed 
by the song, into shipwreck. 31. In truth, however, they were harlots, who, because they would seduce passers-by 
into destitution, were imagined as bringing shipwreck upon them. They were said to have had wings and talons 
because sexual desire both flies and wounds’ (The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, ed. Stephen A. Barney, W. 
J. Lewis, J. A. Beach and Oliver Berghof (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), XII. iii.30-31, 245)  
314 Travis, ‘Of Sirens and Onocentaurs,’ 39-40. 
315 Ibid., 36. 
316 Already in 1880, Llewellynn Jewitt, a Victorian illustrator, writer and natural scientist, covered a wide range 
of Bestiaries and medieval manuscripts describing or representing siren/mermaid images. See, Llewellynn Jewitt, 
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(the kingdom of Prester John) into a novel. 
317 Theobald, Physiologus, a Metrical Bestiary of Twelve Chapters, trans. Alan Wood Rendell (London: John and 
Edward Bumpus, Ltd., 1928), 87. 
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fourteenth century, the clash raged in written and visual sources, but as the medieval period 
drew to a close, the scaly, voracious virgin-like whores were winning.  
Both versions would continue to exist until the present day, dominating different contexts 
that emphasized classical or medieval imagery in turns. It is quite interesting to observe how 
in the thirteenth century – the period marked by indeterminacy regarding this matter – authors 
expressed this shifting notion of sirens’ fantastic, monstrous existence. ‘Syrenas, popularized 
in poetic fable, are marine monsters,’ says Augustus Magnus,  
 
whose upper body has the figure of a woman with long pendulous breasts with 
which it suckles its young; its face is horrible and it has a mane of long free-
flowing hair; bellow they have eagle’s claws, and above are aquiline wings, and 
behind a scaly tail used as a rudder to guide their swimming.318 
 
A number of images echo this description of sirens and mermaids clashing, merging into 
one body, a female body with claws, wings and a fish tail, like in the late thirteenth-century 
Psalter from Artois (fig. 17) or Brunnetto Latini’s Li livres dou tresor in the century that 
followed.319 The artists could not decide what kind of body suits the sirens best, pilling up 
centuries of their history onto these images. 
 
                                                 
318 Albertus Magnus, ‘Man and the Beast: De Animalibus,’ in Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies 47, 
trans. James J. Scanlan (Binghamton: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1987), 412. 
319 Psalter, late thirteenth century England (Oxford: Bodleian Library, MS Douce 118, fol. 9r); Brunetto Lattini, 
Li livres dou tresor, fourteenth-century France (London: British Library, MS Yates Thompson 19, fol. 50v); 
Brunetto Lattini, Li livres dou tresor, fourteenth-century France (St. Petersburg: National Library of Russia, MS 
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Figure 17 Psalter Artois, late 13th century 
(Oxford: Bodleian Library, MS Douce 118, fol. 9r) 
 
With the advent of the early modern era, the Age of the Encounters began. Boria Sax notes 
that the image of the mermaid known to us today emerged in maritime culture with the 
expansion of trade at the end of the Middle Ages. Aboard ships, the folklore of cultures from 
around the world blended.320 All over the world, seafarers, condemned to months of solitude 
and surrounded only by miles of deep, dark, moody aquatic fantasies, began reporting the 
sightings of sirens and mermaids on their travels. Still dangerous and cruel, these beings now 
populated the uncharted waters of the unknown gloomy sea, their bodies signifying the 
unfathomable and the unexplored: the place where no ship has ever sailed to was marked on 
the map with words: ‘hic sunt sirenae’ (‘here be sirens’). In 1625, Henry Hudson testified to 
the existence of sirens by recounting his voyage to Novaya Zemlya: 
 
This evening (June 15) one of our company, looking overboard, saw a mermaid, 
and calling up some of the company to see her, one more of the crew came up, 
and by that time she was come close to the ship’s side, looking earnestly on the 
men. A little after, a sea came and overturned her. From the navel upward, her 
back and breasts were like a woman’s, as that saw her; her body as big as one 
                                                 
320 Sax, ‘Mermaid and Her Sisters,’ 47-48. 
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of us, her skin very white, and long hair hanging down behind, of colour black. 
In her going down they saw her tail, which was like tike the tail of a porpoise, 
speckled like a mackerel. Their names that saw her were Thomas Hilles and 
Robert Rayner.321 
 
Hudson’s description is formulaic of a siren encounter in the modern era, and these 
encounters were abundant. Sir Richard Whitebourne, a sea captain of Exmouth in Devon, 
reported one in 1620 and published the account in his Discourses and Discovery of New-found-
land.322 In 1610, Captain John Smith encountered a mermaid in the West Indies, with ‘large 
eyes too round, finely shaped no […], well-formed ears, rather too long, and her long hair 
imparted to her an original character by no manes unattractive.’323 Sirens and mermaids were 
always witnessed by someone else, their existence always both second-hand and undeniable at 
the same time. Richard Carrington humorously observes that in the seventeenth century the 
‘existence of sirens was as firmly established as the existence of shrimps,’ while Celeste 
Olalquiaga comments in The Artificial Kingdom that precisely in the age of reason, when one 
would expect otherwise, ‘an unprecedented number of mermaid sightings took place on the 
European coasts, witnessed and legally certified by highly respected professionals and 
community members.’324 Like all fantastic creatures, sirens reflected dominant epistemologies 
and construction of knowledge. Their bodies resided between observers, inside words and 
sentences, their split hybrid skin invoking fantasies and delineating the humanity itself. But as 
the eighteenth century began, sirens and mermaids started their steady descent into zoological 
taxonomies or outside of them; one part of their narrative was reduced to natural history, the 
other to folklore. François Valentijn, a Dutch colonial chaplain, published his Natural History 
of Amboina in 1726. In the book, in the caption underneath the drawing by Samuel Fallours, 
the official painter to the Dutch East India Company in 1718, Valintijn describes the siren: 
 
ZEE-WYF: A monster resembling a Siren caught on the coast of Borneo in the 
administrative district of Amboina. It was 59 inches long and in proportion as 
an eel. It lived on land for four days and seven hours in a barrel filled with water. 
                                                 
321 Cf. Carrington, Mermaids and Mastodons, 9. 
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From time to time it uttered cries like those of a mouse. Although offered small 
fish, mollusks, crabs, crayfish, etc, it would not eat. After its death some excreta, 
like that of a cat, was found in its barrel.325 
 
As far as zoological nomenclature and natural history were concerned, the siren myth was 
officially dying. Facts mattered now – length, proportion, life span – not lure, voice or grace. 
This poor, wretched creature with a voice of a mouse from Valentijn’s record, was so 
profoundly different from the Sirens of the Odyssey, or even the demons and harbingers of the 
Apocalypse. The siren from Valentijn’s account was so degraded and debased that it died inside 
a barrel, helpless, leaving only excrement behind, the final proof of her wretched nature. In 
Erik Pontoppidan’s 1755 Natural History of Norway we find a similar, though still fantastic, 
story of a merman who spoke Danish fluently and foretold the birth of King Charles IV. 
Pontopidan says:  
 
When such fictions are mixed with the history of Mermen, and when that is 
represented as a prophet and an orator; when they give the Mermaid a melodious 
voice, and tell us that she is a fine singer; one need not wonder that so few 
people of sense will give credit to such absurdities; or that they even doubt the 
existence of such a creature.326 
 
Lynda Phillis Austern says that the ‘siren’s body and voice were severed by scholars during 
the eighteenth century as completely as her literary and natural scientific histories.’ Pontopidan 
testifies to this new attitude. Sirens became, Austern continues, ‘silent objects of systematic 
inquiry or creatures of the human imagination.’ They were banished to the ‘fields of history, 
folklore and the manifold realms of the poetics and the mind.’327  
These realms of the poetics and the mind are exactly what we are concerned with in the 
book, because the nineteenth century banished sirens even in the deepest recesses of the poetic 
and literary imagination. This death was not in vain – it expressed a new Victorian 
epistemology and a new Victorian desiring subject. 
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Literature notwithstanding, the Victorian sirens fell even deeper into the silencing abyss that 
opened within their monstrous bodies. On the wings of the eighteenth-century natural history 
and the nineteenth-century Darwinian evolutionism, sirens were further petrified into grotesque 
exhibits intended for mass consumption, entertainment and advertisements. Skeletons and 
‘stuffed mermaids’ became an enormous attraction in London and the States, P. T. Barnum’s 
famous ‘Fiji Mermaid’ being only one of many.328 Francis Buckland mentions a number of 
these exhibits in Curiosities of Natural History published in 1889.329 All of them ended up 
being elaborate hoaxes, mostly made of upper parts of monkeys and lower parts of fish. Richard 
Carrington explains how a whole little industry of these grotesque silent things existed in Japan, 
supplying the British market.330 In this sad commodified and still state, sirens embodied the 
‘grotesque design’ we have already discussed. Artificially produced, two or more species were 
merged into one another, causing the collapse of the Linnaean classification, and exhibited for 
the visual pleasure of the audiences. Sirens were completely tamed by capitalism, consumerism 
and industrialism. Sax might be right in saying that the mermaids’ power waned as the ocean 
lost its terror.331 The Egyptian Hall at Piccadilly or the White Hart at Spitalfields’ walls and 
exhibition chambers were the final resting place of sirens. 
 
* * * * * 
 
In the light of this short exposé on the history of sirens and mermaids, we have to agree that, 
in their own respective ways, both the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries scientifically 
silenced, tamed or killed sirens so profoundly that the image that remained has been one of 
benevolence until the present day. Sirens became mere toys, exhibits, objectified on the shelves 
or under glass, offering themselves to the gaze of visitors and scientists. This image still 
remains with us, for example in the movie Splash! (1984) where we see Daryl Hannah as a 
mermaid, literally falling apart in a tank of muddy water, an image reminiscent of the three 
centuries old Valentijn’s story. It seems that sirens have been dying for centuries now, the 
length of their death reminiscent of the length of their fantastic lives. 
Now, on the verge of the Victorian times, the ones that we care about the most in this book, 
we hear the melody that all these traits played in the minds of Victorian and post-Victorian 
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artists and writers. The Victorian sirens assumed a role quite specific to the Victorian culture. 
Their myth was being rewritten in such peculiar ways that one feels compelled to ask what this 
rewriting actually meant to the Victorians. Every monster is a culture waiting to be read, a 
palimpsest of cultural fears, dreams and desires, but what characterized the Victorian sirens, 
and truly separated them from the rest of their history, is the literal meaning of ‘reading.’ In 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we read about them as frequently as ever. The Victorian 
sirens were pushed into the very heart of popular culture: novels and poems and countless 
multivolume works. Certainly, sightings of sirens continued, the inquiry into their nature 
undying. In 1809, a letter from a certain Mr. William Munro, was published in The Times with 
the headline ‘The Mermaid Seen on the Coast of Caithness,’ where Mr. Munro described the 
mermaid he had seen as ‘combing its hair.’332 Five years later, York Chronicle wrote that their 
‘curiosity has been greatly excited by appearance of a mermaid on th[at] coast.’333 Even today, 
YouTube is full of ‘real’ mermaid videos.334 But sirens of the nineteenth-century live mainly 
in the realm of the poetic mind and in literature, and it is here that we encounter the real object 
of our study: the Victorian male desiring subject. Contrary to the three-millennia-long history 
of reading about the sirens’ voice or threat, in the nineteenth century we read about their lives. 
The sirens have become the protagonists of their own stories. They suffer in silence, but what 
they truly want is something new; something shiny and worth living for; something that 
represents the unprecedented fullness of existence; something that constantly keeps receding; 
something dreaded and desired at the same time; something that mirrors jouissance promised; 
something the male subject might want too – a soul as the signifier of the fullness of death. 
 
Mirrors and Souls of Victorian Sirens 
 
Two characteristics of medieval and Renaissance sirens have been left for this small, 
separate sub-chapter, so that their significance could be emphasized. Throughout their long 
history, sirens and mermaids have appropriated a number of objects as their symbols, but from 
the Middle Ages right up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, their iconography was 
inseparable from the fish and the mirror. The depiction of these two objects in medieval and 
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Renaissance times could be discussed in relation to one another, but that analysis would go 
well beyond the scope of this thesis. Since, in medieval Christian iconography, fish was a 
symbol of the soul and mirror was a symbol of lies and deceit and/or of the purity of soul, the 
connection between these two objects could seem obvious. The middle ages were the times of 
sirens and mermaids as soul-catchers, frequently represented holding fish in their hands or 
having them inserted between their two tails, if they had them. Most of the examples come 
from bestiaries (fig. 6), or other medieval manuscripts.335  
 
 
Figure 18 Bestiary, 13th century England  
(London: British Library, Sloan 3544, fol. 28v) 
 
Victorian sirens are closely connected to the soul narrative and symbolism, but, as we shall 
see shortly, in an altogether different fashion. Medieval sirens devour men, hunting their souls 
as trophies and food; Victorian sirens desire them, even at the expense of their own 
monstrosity. 
As far as mirrors are concerned, most of the authors writing on the subject of siren lore agree 
that the mirror is the siren’s inseparable traditional iconographic accessory, as the voluminous 
medieval and modern material confirms.336 Again, as with the iconography of the fish, most 
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medieval examples come from manuscripts like The Book of Hours (fig. 19) or Artois Psalter 
(fig. 17), while Renaissance examples come as emblems in books.337 There are also examples 
of the already mentioned conflation of sirens and mermaids, but now with mirrors, like in 
Henry Peacham’s Minerva Britanna.338 
 
 
Figure 19 Book of Hours, France,  ca. 1400 France  
(Oxford: Bodleian Library, MS Douce 62, fol. 51r) 
 
All the authors, unequivocally, or maybe simply uncritically, assume that this tradition has 
continued uninterrupted until the present day. Meri Lao believes that mirrors in the siren hand 
mean to ‘speculate, in the sense of searching, examining, investigating, sounding, scrutinizing, 
meditating […] knowing.’339 Although the nineteenth century could be the right place for this 
interpretation, we would not go so far as to claim that it is applicable to the medieval history 
and symbolism of mirrors. Taken in a different context, medieval mirrors could be interpreted 
as symbols of speculation, scrutiny and knowledge, but in the context of the representation of 
sirens, the message appears far more religious and moralizing – the sin of flesh, vanity, 
femininity, witchcraft, and the devil.  
Sax reads the siren and the mirror as an image that ‘anticipates the self-absorption that is 
characteristic of consumer society,’ an opinion close enough to the view of the book, except 
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for the fact that mirrors disappear from the siren/mermaid iconography exactly during the 
Industrial Revolution and the boom of consumerist society.340 Sure enough, her reading will 
prove true for the twentieth-century consumerism. For Austern, the mirror was a symbol of 
vanity, having a ‘longstanding association with the female pudenda,’ while Calogero explains 
the siren and mirror connection in terms of the ‘sixteenth- and seventeenth-century revival of 
equation of sirens with prostitutes.’341  
But probably the most famous example of this famous duo comes from Nuremberg Bible 
(1483). This image, apart from combining mermaids and mirrors in one biblical scene, 
reinforces the story of the sin of siren reflection in the mirror (fig. 20).  
 
 
Figure 20 Nuremberg Bible, woodcut (1483) 
 
It tells the story of Noah as he embarks on his voyage toward salvation of 
human(animal)kind, carrying his family, and two of each animal species onboard. But sirens 
are left behind. Sure, they are aquatic monsters, capable of surviving the biblical storm, but the 
apocalyptic waters of the obliterating diluvium were more than mere waves and thunder. The 
Noah story is about one’s worthiness for salvation, absolution from sin, and starting again with 
a clean slate. There is no place for mermaids and their inviting flesh in the new world order, 
their vanity and the Original Sin of seduction and femininity emphasized by the mirrors they 
are holding. It is not just vanity, though, that keeps the gates of the Ark closed to them, since 
peacocks, traditional symbols of vanity, are depicted as allowed to enter (the upper right-hand 
corner of the Ark).  It must be something else, then: it must be the reflection of their monstrous 
skin. 
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      Figure 21 P. T. Barnum's Pamphlet for ‘The Fiji Mermaid’ (ca. 1850) 
 
In the nineteenth century, portraits of sirens holding mirrors conspicuously disappear. While 
the soul theme has been rewritten, turning sirens from soul-catchers into soul-seekers, mirrors 
have entirely vanished, with only a couple of examples left that continued to linger on as 
remnants of the medieval and Renaissance tradition.  
 
 
 
Figure 22 W. M. Thackeray’s The History of Pendennis (1848-50) 
 
The only examples to be found are P. T. Barnum’s pamphlet for the mid-nineteenth century 
attraction The Fiji Mermaid (fig. 21), an illustration from Thackeray’s The History of 
Pendennis (1848-50) (fig. 22)342, and his description of mermaids in Vanity Fair:  
 
“They look pretty enough when they sit upon a rock, twanging their harps and 
combing their hair, and sing, and beckon to you to come and hold the looking-
glass; but when they sink into their native element depend on it those mermaids 
are about no good, and we had best not examine the fiendish marine cannibals, 
reveling and feasting on their wretched pickled victims.”343 
                                                 
342 William Makepeace Thackeray, The History of Pendennis (London: H. Frewds, 1851), 686. 
343 William Makepeace Thackeray, Vanity Fair (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963 [1848]), 617.  
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Even in Thackeray, mermaids do not hold the mirrors themselves, but they invite victims to 
come and hold the mirrors for them.  
 
 
       Figure 23 August Moreau, ‘The Siren’ (ca. 1900) 
 
In the sphere of material culture, there is an unnamed mirror made by the French artist, 
August Moreau around 1900, later wrongly dubbed ‘The Siren,’ although it depicts a nymph 
with human legs (fig. 23).  
Our overall conclusion is that in the age of mirrors, when mirrors could be found at almost 
every corner, the monsters that for centuries firmly held onto their mirrors were denied them. 
This change is striking, and not even a couple of examples we were able to find reduce the 
severity of this iconographic transformation.  
Since we are interested in the relationship of various mirror and siren narratives, and their 
relevance for the Victorian desiring male subject, this sudden, sweeping change seems pivotal 
to the argument of the book. It gives an impetus to the crucial question we are to proceed with, 
the one around which all other questions revolve: what does this change mean for the Victorian 
concepts of monstrosity, materiality and subjectivity? How do we approach the illusion of 
fullness created by the mirror, the monstrosity of sirens and desire of the male Victorian subject 
from this point?  
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The Victorian Subject’s Monstrous Skin 
 
In this conclusion on the life of the siren myth, all the scattered pieces of the puzzle called 
‘Victorian male desiring subject’ will be put together, in order to show that Victorian literature 
was one of the places where the subject assumed his monstrous form. The main argument of 
the chapter, as well as of the book in general, is that in the age of the mirror’s commodification, 
something went amiss at the epistemic level of the production of meaning, and slipped into 
language. A void opened inside language, introducing a differential order of meaning in 
representation. Seduced by the mirror’s promise, by an illusion of fullness and semiotic 
coherence, the subject fell through a signifying rabbit hole, and from that moment on he has 
not stopped spiraling down the signifying chain. His eyes were blind to this semiotic maze that 
put up walls tall and firm, leading the subject through the corridors of différance, never 
allowing him to attain the object of desire that the illusion promised – the wholeness of the self, 
the subject’s objet petit a. This pursuit is both compulsory and futile, because the object he has 
been searching for has never been there to begin with, the subject falling prey to his own 
nightmarish fantasy. In front of the mirror, the subject looked at himself; he gazed into his 
exteriorized image and could not look away. At the end of the nineteenth-century, his image 
was everywhere, the subject’s externalized corporeal fullness transfixing his eye at every 
corner, in every café, in every shop, in every room. If there ever was a perfect embodiment of 
the capitalist desire, the mirror was it and conquered this realm.  
Since the nineteenth-century, commodities have embodied the capitalist production of 
desire, leading the subject through an ever darker maze of symbolic displacement. The 
language of commodity holds onto a shady, unsignifiable place in representation, from where 
it signals the subject that there is always some new object to have, a new place to see, a new 
thing to desire. Entangled into the alienating, enchanting, and acutely desiring nature of the 
nineteenth-century capitalism, the Victorian subject stared into this place for too long, reaching 
for the tenebrous flame of the inexistence of the desired object. Friedrich Nietzsche 
immediately comes to mind: ‘Whoever fights with monsters should see to it that he does not 
become one himself. And when you stare for a long time into an abyss, the abyss stares back 
into you.’344 Writing these chilling words he might as well have had the commodity or the 
                                                 
344 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 69.  
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Victorian subject in mind. The subject appropriated his mirror image, taking it for its own inner 
coherence. He fell for this sly illusion of totality, and remained trapped between the reality of 
his inner chaos and the fallacy of coherence – split, disjointed, and interminably seduced by 
obscurity of the desiring void. He truly stared into an abyss for too long.  
The game of appearance and reality brought about by the mirror’s flight into 
commodification and ubiquity – where the ‘real’ reality was taken as something whole, pure 
and bright, something that transcends the crudeness of materiality, as well as the power and the 
incoherence of language – had another important consequence for the subject. From now on, 
as a split subject, he produces split ontologies, too. How can an estranged subject produce 
anything but an estranged object, a commodity, a thing robbed of its ‘thingness,’ as Heidegger 
says. In the heart of the subject dwells a void of the split, a little death, thus nothingness dwells 
in the heart of his produced, commodified progeny too. 
It was shown how this split subject, the Victorian dreamer, expressed his own inner rift in 
the narratives about the very commodity that drew a veil of fantasy over his eyes in the first 
place – the mirror. It is worth remembering that when we talk about the split subject as a result 
of the mirror’s omnipresence in Victorian culture, we do not assume that the subject had 
previously been whole. The fantasy of wholeness appears only as a consequence of the mirror 
image; but it is still only a fantasy, a supporting, dreamy web weaved around the missing object. 
Its role is that of a script, a scenario that supports circles of desire, all of which revolve around 
the objet a – semiotic wholeness. Before the nineteenth-century mirror, there had been other 
dreams, other fantasies, as well as other desired objects; before the Victorian age there had 
been other splits and other scripts to support desire. But for the Victorian subject, the object a 
was within the language itself. The language (langage, structure of representation) of the 
Victorian epoch, being both the subject’s creation and the place of the subject’s entrance into 
culture, exposes itself as differential and split against the background of the Victorian holistic 
fantasy. In the nineteenth century literature, monsters (as embodiments of the differential 
organization of language) became words in the sentence of the subject’s existential anxiety and 
chaos. Monsters became textual, visual and material bodies of the subject himself.  
The illusion of the wholeness of the mirror image, thus, introduced a historically important 
objet a – the semiotically coherent Self – or rather a dream that there was a coherent Self on 
the other side of materiality, language, and desire. At one level, the Victorian subject was 
having a nightmare; he was dreaming of monsters – of vampires and the Frankenstein’s 
monster, of golems and mermaids and sirens. The abominations of his dreams were 
substantially incoherent, figments of his imagination acquiring hideous forms, split skins and 
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shifting bodies. But beneath this outer, phenomenal layer, beneath the veil of fantasy, beneath 
this straightforward language of the ‘subject of the statement’ that always lies by telling the 
truth, we find a desire for wholeness, for the coherence of the Self, hidden and buried in these 
monstrous bodies, in these palimpsests of the historical contingency of language. This desire, 
in literature or painting, is not expressed straightforwardly (I desire a cake, so I dream 
about/write about/paint eating one), but we can ‘paranoically’ read it off the material we 
analyze, and will continue to analyze. It appears as  Lacan’s ‘subject of enunciation’ – that 
which in an analyzed narrative is not said, what is omitted, barred from sight, like the split, 
barred subject himself. It is the language of the unconscious; the very structure of knowledge 
in its historical contingency. Thus, since the subject lives and breathes within the supportive, 
indispensible dream he will never fully realize (because it is only a dream), he expresses his 
desire for a coherent self (that he cannot have) in all the incoherent, fragmented bodies he 
manages to imagine, continuously re-enacting his own fall. He expresses his own shattered 
Being through monstrous bodies, monumentalizing his existential agony of rupture in their 
broken skin.  
 
 
 
 
* * * * * 
 
It is from this perspective that sirens of the Victorian era are to be approached. It is the 
book’s aim, and desire, to show that many, if not all of the traits of the split subject that we 
have found in the mirror narratives, can be found in siren and mermaid narratives too. This 
structural overlap of the languages of monstrosity and the mirror’s commodification, leads to 
a conclusion that siren and mermaid bodies of the century hold for us a topology of the male 
desiring subject, seduced into a nightmarish fantasy by the reflective surfaces of the Victorian 
glass/mirror culture.  
Though one would never guess it, judging by the lack of scholarship on Victorian sirens, 
literary works starring sirens and mermaids are abundant to say the least. There are famous 
pieces that have been discussed extensively, and they appear in almost every survey on sirens 
and mermaids written in the second half of the twentieth century. The most famous one, 
especially for the generation coming of age watching Disney in the 1990s, is, of course, The 
Little Mermaid, by Hans Christian Andersen, written in 1837. Its conception is taken here as 
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an artificial starting point for the modernity of sirens, or rather for the historical moment 
signaling their crossing from myth into literature, where they began expressing the male 
subject. Andersen was Danish, and thus not so far from the Victorian cultural circle. His 
enormous popularity in the fin-de-siècle culture, and the first translation of The Little Mermaid 
in 1872, puts him in the center of this study.  
As a piece of siren literature, The Little Mermaid was a flash of thunder in the blue sky, its 
uniqueness unrivalled. It was the first literary work to turn the three-thousand-year old history 
of siren representation on its head. Its main character, the Little Mermaid (in Disney’s version 
called Ariel, like the air spirit from Shakespeare’s The Tempest) is a young, innocent aquatic 
virgin, in love with a human prince and enraptured by the idea of a human soul. Another story 
with the same blasphemous crime perpetrated against the traditional siren lore is Undine by 
Friedrich de la Motte Fouqué published in 1811, and written with the French folk-tale of 
Melusine in mind. Undine is a young, willful nymph and she too is in search of a soul, but her 
being a nymph and not a siren makes her inappropriate for our analysis.  
Another famous piece of siren literature is Oscar Wilde’s The Fisherman and His Soul. 
Published in a book of short stories, A House of Pomegranates, in 1891, Wilde’s story revolves 
around the destiny of a fisherman who, in order to be loved by a siren, banishes his soul. The 
main protagonist of the story is actually the soul itself, roaming the world in search of its 
fullness, an interesting twist on the sirens’ nineteenth-century quest. 
The next famous piece, though not as famous as the previous two, is an infrequently read, 
atypical short novel by H. G. Wells, The Sea Lady: A Tissue of Moonshine, written in 1902. 
Wells conjures a mermaid who has come to land to teach men ‘better dreams’ of limitless 
actuality. The story has a very strong political substratum (as most of Wells’ fiction). We find 
an overwhelming mermaid, a creature existentially both more and less than the limited 
existence of man, a creature of the Great Beyond. She belongs to what we consider the last 
phase of the modernist siren lore, when sirens became abstract to the point of total 
representational emptying. In a way, The Sea Lady anticipates the The Professor and the Siren 
by Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa from 1957, a short story that, in our view, closes the era of 
the modernist Victorian siren fiction. This story was written long after Queen Victoria’s death 
in 1901, even long after everything Victorian had been refuted and discarded as sentimentalism 
and kitsch. It comes from the period of Victorian revival, but structurally and in terms of the 
problems it explores, it continues the Victorian siren tradition. The same applies to a short 
parable from the 1920s, written by Franz Kafka, entitled The Silence of the Sirens. All three of 
them belong to the nineteenth-century’s closing act or to the Victorian dying throbs, whose 
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nature is close to the Victorianism of Walter Benjamin. But once analyzed, their importance 
for the Victorian times becomes undeniable, so they are all included in the analysis. If nothing 
else, they show that the West essentially continued to live in a post-Victorian age, a time 
culturally removed from its etymological source by the length of a four-letter prefix and a 
hyphen.   
These are the cornerstones of all previous analyses. In the world of siren and mermaid 
literature, these titles have been, and still are, pop stars. They have been analyzed for their 
melancholic tone, psychoanalytic value, structural inversion of the human and aquatic worlds, 
for their dreams. But, all around, underneath, and above them, the Victorian space was teeming 
with siren/mermaid poems, stories and novels, and it is our intention to bring at least a couple 
of them up to be discussed within this book.345 Henry Carrington’s poem about a desiring and 
tormented siren, entitled The Siren, will be of particular importance, as well as The Siren by F. 
Anstey (Thomas Anstey Guthrie), The Story of the Siren by E. M. Forster and couple of other 
distinctive short siren stories. Many of them are, unfortunately, left out, the textual space being 
of an insufficient size to accommodate close readings of all of them properly. Such a fate will 
befall The Siren by Thomas Trollope, a three-volume novel that would require a separate book 
to analyze it.  
The fragments of the subject’s fundamental illusion, his pursuit of transcendental 
wholeness, were not just accidental and occasional occurrences, separated by decades of 
silence and darkness rising between the most famous siren-related creations of the age. Sirens 
and mermaids populated the mindscape of the nineteenth century so densely that it might come 
as a surprise that their literary proliferation remained unnoticed. However, for those of us who 
read between the lines, pursue voids and blank spaces, and love unuttered ‘paranoid’ truths, 
this critical silence becomes the most fertile analytical ground imaginable.    
Sirens and mermaids of the nineteenth century arrive on the Victorian stage in a number of 
awkward forms, their mixed avian-aquatic nature being only one of them. Their skin is still 
pale, and, in some instances, the fatality of their nature and song still persists. But in general, 
Victorian sirens break the bonds of the classical and medieval lore, becoming consistently more 
                                                 
345 Only a couple of examples will be mentioned here, in poems: Thomas  Moore, ‘The Origin of the Harp,’ in 
The Poetical Works of Thomas Moore, Complete in One Volume (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1863), 
239; William Butler Yeats, ‘The Mermaid,’ in The Collected Works of W. B. Yeats, vol. I: The Poems (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1989), 222; Zavarr Wilmshurst, The Siren (San Francisco: unspecified, 1876); 
Miss Crumpe, ‘The Siren’s Song,’ The National Magazine 2:2 (1831): 196; H. C. ‘The Piper and Mermaid,’ The 
Dublin Penny Journal 2:104 (28 June 1834): 415; Allen Upward, ‘The Mermaid,’ Poetry 2:6 (1913): 195; in 
notes, John A. Scott, ‘Patrick Henry and the Siren,’ The Classical Journal 17:4 (1922): 1922; in novels, Grant M. 
Overtone, Mermaid (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1920); Lilly Dougall, The Mermaid: A Love Story 
(New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1985); Thomas A. Trollope, A Siren (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1870). 
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and less than their previous nature allowed. It would not be too harsh a judgment to say that in 
the nineteenth century sirens were reborn. In short, the most important changes fall into the 
following themes:  
1. Sirens become protagonists of their own narratives;  
2. Sirens lose their mirrors, their representations almost completely divorced from their 
centuries-old weapons;  
3. Paradoxically, in the face of the previous theme, sirens grow overly visual, their 
appearance becoming the focus of their changed powers;  
4. Sirens become silenced, or the narrative of their skin deals with the issue of silence in 
some way;  
5. Ulysses and the Sirens begin shifting their places back and forth, sometimes even in the 
same narrative, suggesting that they convey a message of semiotic confusion together, and that 
they cannot be separated;  
6. In the post-Victorian twentieth century, sirens become transcendental beings, portrayed 
by the same language of lack and excess discussed in the context of mirror narratives, only 
from the perspective of fullness instead of a lack;  
7. Finally, sirens begin expressing, and embark on, a deep search for a transcendental 
wholeness, structurally identical to the subject’s search from the mirror narratives.  
At the bottom of this overview of modern siren traits a conclusion awaits: sirens became an 
expressive vehicle of the Victorian male desiring subject who created them, the one seduced 
by the illusion of coherence of his omnipresent mirror image.   
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SPIRAL 1: ‘THE LITTLE MERMAID’; OR, SPLIT SKIN FROM THE INSIDE OUT 
 
She knew it was the last night that she would breathe the same air as he, and would look 
upon the mighty deep, and the blue starry heavens; an endless night without thought and 
without dreams awaited her, who neither had a soul, nor could win one. 346 
Hans Christian Andersen 
 
Sirens have shed their mythical veil to reveal the interior of the male Victorian subject. In 
the ages past, they had embodied cultural dreams, fears, and religious morals; in the nineteenth 
century they embodied desire itself, and their face grew theatrical. Victorian sirens ceased 
being just objects of desire, they became desiring subjects themselves. They stopped being a 
conditional limit for the understanding of danger, punishment, and sin, and assumed the leading 
role in their dismal narratives: they became protagonists of their own stories.  
This is the first and the most significant change pertinent to the argument that the Victorian 
siren bodies hold for us a topology of the subject, hidden in their scaly or feathered (or neither) 
bodies. As the nineteenth century progressed, sirens migrated from the corners of imagination 
– from the margins of manuscripts, hidden or less exposed architectural ornaments, from the 
fringes of scientific inquiry – into the heart of popular literature. Book pages no longer featured 
accounts of heroes’ wayward encounters with sirens in uncharted waters of the moody mother 
sea; now the pages became the playground of sirens as the main characters, allowing us to read 
about their quests, dreams, and desires. Haraway’s ‘limits of community in Western 
imaginations,’ and Butler’s ‘zones of uninhabitability’ collapse, faced with an overwhelming 
number of examples where Victorian monsters were positioned as subjects of literary works, 
not as the subject’s limits. In this overwhelming buzz of subjectified hideousness, nineteenth-
century literature was swarming with inversed ‘Ulysses and the Sirens’ episodes, where the 
reader could not distinguish the huntress from her prey. Leaving Frankenstein’s monster, Lucy 
Westenra (or Mina Harker) and Dr. Jekyll/Mr. Hyde aside, as the examples too obvious to even 
be considered, a couple of examples from siren literature would back up this new emergence 
of monstrous subjectivity.  
Undine (being a nymph) aside, Hans Christian Andersen introduced this change of 
perspective, inventing the Little Mermaid and inviting the reader to identify not with the siren’s 
                                                 
346 Hans Christian Andersen, ‘The Mermaid,’ in Faery Tales from Hans Christian Andersen, trans. Mrs. E. Lucas 
(London: J. M. Dent, 1910), 19. 
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victim, but with this melancholic and melodramatic heroine whose only wish in life was to get 
human love and a human soul. In Andersen’s story we find most of the traits characteristic of 
modern sirens converging. The younger audiences inculcated with Disney’s sanitized version 
of the fairytale could be convinced otherwise, but the original story of The Little Mermaid is 
hard, grievous, dramatic and overly abject. The story starts under the sea, in the dark recesses 
of the ‘primordial mother’s body,’ as Silla Consoli describes it, where five mermaid sisters, 
each a year older that the next, are waiting for their fifteenth birthday to come to be allowed to 
go to the surface and witness the glorious world above.347 Their father, the king, is a widower 
and the mermaids are raised by their grandmother, a strong-willed figure who teaches them an 
important lesson in life: mermaids do not have souls. Instead, they live a long, long life, 
spanning almost three hundred years, turning to foam at the end. The only way for a mermaid 
to acquire a soul is to marry a human being.  
 
“Man […] have a soul which lives forever, lives after the body has become dust; 
it rises through the clear air, up to the shining stars! Just as we rise from the 
water to see the land of mortals, so they rise up to unknown beautiful regions 
which we shall never see.”348 
 
The youngest mermaid is the prettiest and the most restless one. She has been dreaming of 
the surface for too long, and when her time comes she surfaces in the night, only to witness a 
storm wrecking a ship having a prince on board, a human the Little Mermaid falls in love with. 
Although she is not to get involved in the fates of men, the Little Mermaid rescues the prince, 
brings him to the shore, and sings gently to him until he wakes up. But when his eyes open, 
she hides from his view and prince never gets to find out about her heroic deed. Desperate, the 
Little Mermaid decides to visit a sea-witch’s cave, where she trades her captivating voice for 
human legs. In a painful act of splitting of her tail she arrives to the surface as a professedly 
human being. But then, she cannot express herself vocally, all her powers leaving her 
millennia-old aural nature and moving to her body. ‘With every motion her grace and beauty 
became more apparent,’ says the narrator, ‘and her eyes appealed more deeply to the heart than 
the songs of the slaves.’349 It is her appearance and not her voice that enchants humans, while 
every step she takes feels like knives slashing her feet, the enormous pain being the price of 
                                                 
347 Consoli, Candeur d’un monstre, 77-78. 
348 Andersen, ‘Mermaid,’ 10.  
349 Ibid., 15. 
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her bodily transformation. The Little Mermaid has to suffer if she wants the love of the prince 
and a human soul that would grant her the immortality she longs for. Unfortunately, although 
the prince grows very fond of her, he never really falls in love with the Little Mermaid, deciding 
to marry a princess from another kingdom instead. During the wedding, on a boat far away 
from the coast, the Little Mermaid is given the last chance to save herself and undo the 
unfortunate mutilation of her fragile body. Her sisters rise from the sea, hairless because they 
have sacrificed their beautiful braids for a magic dagger that would help their sister in her 
doom. Now all the Little Mermaid has to do is kill the prince with the dagger, and when his 
blood splashes her legs, she will turn into a mermaid once again. This being a tale of unrequited 
love and sacrifice, the Little Mermaid decides to give up her own life, and her desire for a soul, 
so the prince can live. ‘Once more she looked at the prince,’ the storyteller says, ‘with her eyes 
already dimmed by death, then dashed overboard and fell, her body dissolving into foam.’350 
But the tragic story has a moral: the Little Mermaid is rewarded for her sacrifice with ascension 
to the celestial realm of daughters of the air, to a world of spirits even higher than the world of 
men, where she earns her immortality by bringing smiles to children around the world.  
It was necessary to recount this famous story because it has all the elements we are to find 
in most of the nineteenth-century siren narratives. Critics have observed that the world down 
below mirrors the world above, with fish swimming through the sea like birds flying through 
the air, and that there is a plain hierarchy of worlds in the tale which cries out for a structuralist 
analysis.351 Our goal here is of a different kind, for we are approaching the tale from the 
perspective of the change in the mermaid’s representation that characterizes the Victorian 
subject.  
It seems that the tale falls into the category of impossible love stories, but the Little Mermaid 
also intrinsically embodies the topology of the Victorian male subject, the creator of the story, 
whose spasmodic, incoherent self is expressed by the mermaid’s monstrous skin. As in the 
mirror narratives from the same century, the subject, epitomized this time by the body of the 
mermaid, is in search of wholeness, of crossing the limits and boundaries of materiality and 
language. The longing mermaid, being a nineteenth-century male fantasy, expresses the desire 
for a corporeal totality, an illusion offered by the ubiquitous mirror reflection and appropriated 
as an illusionary core of the self. The story, in its plot and its details, reveals all the traits of the 
new modern siren lore, traits characterizing the body of the subject. The mermaid is a mirror-
                                                 
350 Ibid., 20. 
351 For an interesting overview of different readings of The Little Mermaid, see Pil Dahlerup, et al., ‘Splash! Six 
Views of “The Little Mermaid,”’ Scandinavian Studies 63: 2 (1991): 140-163. 
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less, silent being, her visual nature eclipsing her aural one. She is a sad protagonist of her 
poignant story, and the reader is pushed into her perspective, into her body, instead in that of 
Ulysses, or another siren/mermaid victim. Now we look at the story from behind the mirror, 
gazing inside the mermaid’s selfhood instead. And this selfhood craves wholeness, a 
transcendental experience of the human soul, an object a that keeps escaping through all the 
material and spiritual transformations she endures.  
As a monster, the Mermaid bears a void; there is a blank space inside her, a nothingness that 
lures the desire that drives her forward. The human world constantly ‘seem[s] so infinitely 
bigger than hers,’ says the narrator, in the same fashion as the human soul seems better than 
her long, carefree life undersea.352 Willful as she may seem, she is still slave to a specific 
fantasy, to the illusion of an object in front of her that says: ‘This void you are feeling could be 
filled, if only you acquired a human soul.’ The soul is her objet a, a dark, empty space of desire 
waiting to be touched, attained, possessed and impossible to describe. There is a distressing 
love story between the mermaid and the prince, but scratching the surface of the text (the plot 
that gives itself to us) we find more existential issues raised by the Little Mermaid’s quest. In 
the center of the tale, just as in the mirror narratives we analyzed, there is a jouissance expected, 
a promise of pure pleasure beyond desire and the split existence. It is interesting to note that 
the same could be said of commodities of the century, the soul becoming the ultimate 
commodity that never stops slipping away down the signifying chain of différance. The Little 
Mermaid is prepared to endure an otherworldly pain, she is even prepared to renounce her 
nature and take human legs, just to get closer to acquiring what she has been dreaming of – that 
which she finds again and again in its absence – a void beyond language, beyond signification, 
beyond materiality; the Little Mermaid is in search of semiotic coherence and immortality 
promised by the breaking of the Law leading to jouissance, promised by the highest commodity 
of the age – the soul.  
But this final jouissance will never happen, just as it never happened for Alice. In so many 
ways, the story of the Little Mermaid distressingly resembles that of Carroll’s favorite heroine. 
Both of them are on the path to transformation and they both succumb to the illusion of 
wholeness that the mirror of the age promises. Alice and the Little Mermaid both live out their 
personal odysseys, following in the footsteps and taking advice from old, powerful women who 
know everything about the marvels and dangers of the world. With Circe as a role model, Alice 
listens to the Red Queen, while the Little Mermaid has her grandmother and the sea-witch, all 
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of whom are summoned into existence by the Victorian male obsession with grandiose, female, 
magical figures and their power of transformation. In both stories, the male subject is hidden 
behind a fictional female character, expressing his fragmentary self through a seemingly 
innocent narrative of a wandering child/adolescent. But there is an important disparity between 
The Little Mermaid and Through the Looking Glass, a difference that strikes us as odd in the 
face of their structural similarities: there are no mirrors in the Little Mermaid’s world.  
Since the Middle Ages sirens and mermaids have been represented with mirrors (and 
combs), mirrors symbolizing their demonlike, insidious, wicked nature. The reflections in the 
mirror witnessed their carnal sin that left them outside the Ark, while the world was being 
drowned into oblivion. Because of them, sirens were literally beyond redemption, envoys of 
the Apocalypse, flesh related to the voracious nature of sex and seduction, demons of the noon-
day heat, huntresses of souls. But the nineteenth century obliterated this connection to the point 
of obscurity, and The Little Mermaid stands at the inception of this new siren lore. Now there 
is a gap in their representation, an emptiness dwelling where their mirrored images used to be.  
This gap is the center of this book: the gap of missing mirrors. It is always there, behind 
every narrative that is to be analyzed, not always called upon explicitly, due to its conspicuous 
absence (the fact that the mirror is not there). In the age of glass and mirrors; at the time when 
mirrors populated every corner of the Victorian world; at the moment when the language of the 
subject’s representation was reshaped by them; precisely when this subject, seduced by the 
mirror image, began expressing himself in the monstrous siren/mermaid form that had been the 
symbol of the mirror’s deception for centuries – sirens lost their mirrors. If nothing else, one 
would expect to find mirrors in every monstrous image, in every hideous figure, every siren 
narrative. How do we read this change? How do we account for this sudden transformation of 
the age-old narrative? The disappearance of mirrors from the representation of sirens is actually 
the main trait of the male Victorian desiring subject; it is where the languages of the Victorian 
commodity and monstrosity converge. As the nineteenth-century went on, and as mirrors 
became more and more present in everyday life, reflecting desire and a haunting strangeness 
of the Self, monstrosity became the focal fantasy of the subject, his fierce expression, his prime 
vehicle of unconscious speech. In this kind of monstrous universe, where the monster is an 
identity worthy of a leading role and not the margins of the subject’s possibility, where the 
monster is the subject, sirens became the subject’s mirrors themselves, acquiring all the 
characteristics of the mirror’s language. Mirrors themselves disappeared from the 
representation; alienated and culturally naturalized, their materiality was absorbed into the 
sirens’ split skin. The monstrosity of sirens became the strangeness of the subject’s shattered 
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Being, a mirroring surface put in front of the subject’s face uncovering desire and fear; it 
became the fabric of his profound dream of the Real beyond the signifying chain, of his sleep 
he was never to awake from.  
Although the structure of The Little Mermaid perfectly expresses the path of the subject’s 
desire for coherence beyond the incongruity of the Victorian representational language, we will 
not dwell on it too much, focusing more on the details of the mermaid’s image than on the 
overall narrative. The plot that expresses the subject’s search for fullness is characteristic of 
many siren/mermaid narratives of the time and we will delve deeper into it in the next chapter, 
giving voice to a literary work not written about as extensively as The Little Mermaid. 
 
Silence and Sight 
 
Introducing an insightful idea of deafness as a critical modality, Lennard J. Davis observes 
that ‘from the eighteenth century onward, the reading public has increasingly valorized sight 
over hearing.’353 This is not a new insight for us, the scopic turn in the visuality of mirrors, 
exhibitions and voyeurism already having been touched on in the previous chapters. What is 
interesting and important in his observation, though, is that sight overtook the realm of the 
voice, reading eclipsing hearing as a modality of narration. Further, Davis concludes that while 
blindness has been the primary expression of insight in the West (we just need to remember 
Homer), deafness has signified a simple absence of language.354 From this perspective silence 
arrives as the outside of language itself, appearing from pauses in speech or in a sentence, from 
between words, from empty visual spaces. Turned upside down, silence becomes nothingness 
from within the language, nihil that gives meaning to representation itself. Silence as a critical 
modality, assumes the role of Derrida’s silent a of différance, the part of meaning that cannot 
be read or heard, but which essentially conditions the existence of a continuously postponed 
meaning.355 We will approach the silence of sirens from Davis’ perspective. At this point, we 
are not interested in scopic regimes of the Victorian culture, leaving this issue for the part on 
the visuality of sirens in the Pre-Raphaelite painting. We are interested in the move away from 
orality, the absence of speech gaining precedence. If we could agree that the narratological shift 
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pushed sirens into the role of protagonists, the subject’s very own monstrous bodies, we would 
like to explore the ways in which the silence of sirens develops the idea further.  
After she got her legs, the Little Mermaid is doomed to silence, all her formerly vocal 
powers now fleeing into her body, accentuating visual pleasures of the Victorian culture and 
making the tale revolve around the mermaid’s corporeal mutilation, and the insufficiency of 
her human body. Two main issues here are the lack of voice and visual nature of the Victorian 
culture, as two inseparable semiotic moments. To make the argument stronger, we will include 
other siren narratives into analysis to show that they all involve substitution of voice by visual 
pleasures.  
One of the most popular examples – the most straightforward one at least – is the famous 
parable by Franc Kafka, The Silence of the Sirens. In the space of just three superb pages of 
rewritten siren lore, Kafka managed to capture and immortalize the epistemic shift from vocal 
to written knowledge discussed by Davis, the voyeuristic nature of (post)Victorian culture and 
the subject’s silenced Being. Ulysses has approached the Sirens, we read in Kafka’s parable, 
but this time he had his ears stopped with wax. In this slightly distorted encounter, distorted 
from the perspective of the original story, the Sirens have already learned their lesson too: they 
have learned that their silence is stronger than their song, and decided not to sing at all. 
However, that proves to be insufficient for Ulysses, for in his mind, in his fantasy, he actually 
sees their voices nevertheless:  
 
For a fleeting moment he saw their throats rising and falling, their breasts lifting, 
their eyes filled with tears, their lips half-part, but believed that these were 
accompaniments to the airs which died unheard around him.356 
 
Ulysses has always been a cunning hero, but Kafka’s parable gives us an example of a new, 
visual, modern nature of his encounter with the Sirens: what matters here is not some fragile 
idea of reality, of truth or objectivity; the appearance of the Sirens’ voices is what matters, the 
fantasy that materialized in Ulysses’ mind. We are not able to distinguish the huntresses from 
their prey anymore, the Sirens being seduced by Ulysses’ appearance in turn: 
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[T]hey – lovelier than ever – stretched their necks and turned […] They no 
longer had any desire to allure; all they wanted was to hold as long as they could 
the radiance that fell from Ulysses’ great eyes.357 
 
The visual nature of the siren story converges with its aural death as well as with the semiotic 
confusion that pervades the episode as a whole. The protagonists are confused, the insubstantial 
nothingness of appearances becoming the very foundation for the establishment of reality. The 
silence of the Sirens’ voices collapses under their power of visuality, and absence as the core 
of the story – absence of voice, absence of action – crushes the participants in this floating 
theater of shadows. Semiotically merging Ulysses and the Sirens, and merging them into one 
and the same subjectivity, seduced by the power of appearances, a form without content 
(nothingness, death), Kafka’s parable depicts a modern Victorian subject, devoured by the 
power of the signifier. Meanwhile, both Ulysses and the Sirens remain mute, subdued, tamed, 
broken.  
In The Siren by F. Anstey, published in 1884, a siren is sitting on a rock on a faraway island, 
singing to passing ships and bringing them destruction and doom, as usual. But one day, as she 
gazes into the distance, she misses a small boat drifting close to the shore. She sees it only as 
a man disembarks on the beach, and the Siren decides to let him approach her, because she 
feels a strange curiosity to hear his voice, a feeling she has never felt before. Here the inversion 
begins. After the man approaches her without going mad, the Siren realizes that ‘it was only 
her voice – nothing else, then – that deprived men of their senses.’358 So the man sits on a rock 
below and reveals to her what love is: unconditional care for the other as an equal. The Siren 
is puzzled by this notion, since she never knew of such a thing as love; but then, she never 
knew of death either. The tide claims all the men who perish on her beach, and she never sees 
their dead or dying bodies. ‘I did not know,’ she says, ‘I did not mean them to die. And what 
can I do? I cannot keep back the sea.’359 If she knew what love was, she would certainly have 
to die. So she starts singing to the man at last, weaving her irresistible song around him, as 
everything he has ever known fades away from his memory. Her voice ‘[takes] away his power 
to speak,’ and as he gazes at her radiant beauty, ‘[h]e wished for nothing better now than to lie 
there, following the flashing of her supple hands upon the harp-strings and watching every 
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change of her fair face.’360 But as the waves begin rising to claim the body of the wretched 
man, the Siren notices she cannot part from him, that she wants him forever to stay by her side. 
In the final stroke of her song, her voice gives up on her, and she falls silent and in love with 
the man she was leading to destruction. She decides that she cannot go on with this loathsome 
act, and as the result of her finding love, she jumps into the sea and dies. For a siren, the 
experience of love brings only silence, an emptiness that can only be ravenous and annihilating.  
The story tries to be a vocal one, but its Victorian nature surfaces in the end. The man cannot 
stop looking at the Siren, at every detail of her face. The Siren is thoroughly scrutinized by the 
man’s gaze, stripped bare in the act of enchantment. She is seduced by the thought of his voice 
at the beginning, but her victim falls silent in the end. Than the tables turn: the Siren falls in 
love with her victim, her voice disappearing, as her existence is torn by desire. At the end of 
the path, the Siren is promised absolution, a re-appropriation of coherence, but the price is, as 
usual, death.   
As the last example of the sirens’ vocal deaths, we shall briefly analyze E. M. Forster’s The 
Story of the Siren, dating from the same time as Kafka’s The Silence of the Sirens, 1920s. In 
The Blue Grotto on the island of Capri, traditionally the ‘Siren Land,’ a ‘magical world apart 
from all the commonplaces that are called reality,’ 361 an unknown Sicilian boy is telling a siren 
story to a girl whose book he is about to rescue from the water. ‘Have you ever seen her [the 
Siren]?’ she asks.  
 
“Often and often.” 
“I never.” 
“But you have heard her sing!” 
He put his coat and said impatiently. “How can she sing under the water? 
Who could? She sometimes tries, but nothing comes from her but great 
bubbles.”362  
 
The Siren of the story is impossible to hear, all her vocal properties disappearing within her 
monstrous body. But the image of her body is ever more dangerous than her voice now. The 
Sicilian boy continues the story of his brother Giuseppe who, diving into the big blue for the 
pleasure (and money) of British tourists, encountered the Siren, and went mad. ‘We pulled him 
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into the boat,’ the boy says, ‘and he was so large that he seemed to fill it, and so wet that we 
could not dress him. I have never seen a man so wet.’363 How wet a man who dived into the 
sea can be? In this siren story, even objective facts like this are exaggerated, being too much 
or too little for language to express their fullness. ‘We put him to bed, though he was not ill. 
[…] He was too big – like a piece of the sea.’364 Giuseppe went mad and was ostracized from 
his village. Having found a girl who was as mad as he, who had the same ‘silent demons,’ he 
married her and got a child. ‘They loved each other,’ the boy says, ‘but love is not happiness. 
We can all get love. Love is nothing. Love is everywhere since the death of Jesus Christ.’365 
Like in so many siren stories, death (as nothingness) and love (as fullness) converge to express 
their mutual ambiguity: love is just the other face of death, fullness is just the other face of 
nothingness. Song is just the other face of silence. Death and love both transcend the radical 
incongruity of language, and sirens and their victims both yearn for this illusionary place, 
because they are all subjects now.  
Giuseppe’s wife was killed in the end, and he left the village. But an old witch prophesized 
that their child would return to the sea and ‘fetch up the Siren into the air and all the world 
would see her and hear her sing,’ as she brings the Apocalypse about.366 ‘I do not suppose there 
is anyone living now who has seen her,’ concludes the boy.  
 
“There has seldom been more than one in a generation, and never in my life will 
there be both a man and a woman from whom that child can be born, who will 
fetch up the Siren from the sea, and destroy silence, and save the world! […] 
Silence and loneliness cannot last forever. It may be a hundred or a thousand 
years, but the sea lasts longer, and she shall come out of it and sing.”367 
 
The siren of this narrative is part of a distinct literary fashion of post-Victorian sirens, 
transcendental beings of the beyond that leave men not dead, but in a profound existential crisis. 
As such, she is the topic of the last chapter of this part and we shall get back to her shortly. But 
there is the prophesy that ‘silence and loneliness cannot last forever’: the world has been 
plagued by silence; both sirens and their victims – these inseparable, shifting embodiments of 
modern visual pleasures, of alienating human condition and of a split, visually exposed 
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(exhibited) subject – are mute and tamed, lost in a maddening signifying maze of the Victorian 
and post-Victorian language. ‘Silence equals death, absence, meaninglessness,’ Davis tells us. 
‘Silence becomes the modernist’s answer to words, to narrativity.’368 If this is true, than the 
siren body becomes the answer to her silence, and she carries the answer to the silence of the 
Victorian subject inside her skin. Time and again, we are seduced into empathizing with sirens’ 
silent destiny, just so we could be moved into the human skin of their victims. The narrative of 
The Story of the Siren silences the Siren’s voice, and accentuates her body as a vehicle of 
Victorian scopic regimes. At the time when reflective surfaces invaded the subject’s existence, 
sirens lost their mirrors, but their nature, though broken and subdued, became fundamentally 
visual, their bodies saturated with voyeuristic pleasures. 
 
Hide that Monstrous Skin 
 
After this brief digression, we come back to the beginning, to the Little Mermaid, her silence 
and her disappearing monstrous skin. In The Little Mermaid, although monstrosity assumes the 
leading role, the reader almost forgets that he/she is reading about a monster. This is another 
characteristic of the new siren lore, or better, of the sirens’ crossing from myth into the poetic 
realm of literature. Just like a commodity – an alienated thing, naturalized to the point of its 
own cultural imperceptibility – Victorian sirens became exploited as protagonists, while the 
incongruity of their representation sank into cultural naturalization. This attitude would 
progressively continue into the early twenty-first century. Paradoxically, though, the reader of 
the nineteenth-century siren narratives is pushed into the viewpoint of a monster who is (now 
we can say ‘who,’ because the monster is a subject) agonizingly aware of her/his own physical 
(or emotional) odiousness. Victorian monsters – and at this point we are not talking only about 
sirens, but about other creatures of the dark like Dorian Grey or Frankenstein’s monster, too – 
are all self-conscious, they understand that they are different, nefarious and ugly, that they do 
not belong. Frankenstein’s monster is compelled to roam on the fringes of social space, his 
shameful escape leading him to the North Pole; Dorian Gray’s picture is hidden in an attic; the 
Little Mermaid pushes her own nature away, hiding it behind human legs. Victorian monsters 
have monsters of their own, their hidden skeletons; they shed their skin and appropriate the 
other’s image. These monsters appear inconsolably human, slowly burying their monstrosity 
under piling layers of humanity. But, actually, monsters are not the ones to have become aware 
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of themselves: rather, it is their creators who became aware of their monstrosity. For sirens, 
along with their desire for wholeness and their falling prey to the illusion of semiotic coherence, 
dwelling somewhere beyond the fathomable world of materiality and language (be it a soul or 
death or love or a heart), they loathe and despise their cursed destinies as split subjects, 
expressing the Victorian subject, their Creator, to the fullest. 
It is interesting, this change in Victorian siren monstrosity that compels the sirens to hide 
their monstrous skin. Their repulsiveness has been tamed, and sirens of the age are becoming 
sorely aware of the inappropriateness of their skin. The Little Mermaid’s shrewd grandmother 
teaches her grandchild the lesson of the times well: ‘That which is your greatest beauty in the 
sea, your fish’s tail is thought hideous upon the earth.’369 So the Little Mermaid tries to hide it, 
to hide the essence of her aquatic nature and the fierceness of the price she is willing to pay is 
excruciating. ‘You have to endure pain for the sake of the finery!’ exclaims the grandmother 
in one of her lessons, and she hits the bull’s-eye as far as the Little Mermaid (and the Siren 
from our next chapter) is concerned.370 For Victorian sirens nothing is too high a price for 
humanity, nothing is as valuable as a human heart or a human soul. This narratological twist in 
their destinies leads the reader towards a place in their representation that has never been 
explored before in literature. As we browse numerous pages describing sirens’ rising self-
consciousness and self-abjection, we are invited into the very heart of these aquatic monsters, 
whatever that heart may be and whatever it may consist of. As the perspective oscillates 
between sailors, marines, doomed souls, putrefying bodies and the emotionality of sirens, we 
dive deeper into the sirens’ inner lives, into their merriments, obsessions, sadness and, most 
often, misery. In the same representational sweep that turned the mirror from a moral and 
religious symbol of lies into the language of Victorian desire, the sirens’ diabolic, apocalyptic 
nature has been turned into the reflection of the subject’s desired object. Now we see her fears, 
we stare into her passionate life, as she tries to hide her nature from our view. There is 
something profoundly voyeuristic in this new attitude towards Victorian sirens. In the 
nineteenth century, these creatures are exposed, presented to the public in a new fashion, 
resembling world fairs and commodity culture once again. In a way, literary sirens have been 
dissected and depicted as more solid than their fake, material counterparts from the last chapter 
could ever have been. For our eyes and pleasure, their souls (or the lack thereof) have been 
delivered to us, their bodies turned inside-out, forcing their monstrosity to flee, to hide from 
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our penetrating gaze, behind an ostensible humanity that is bound to be exposed as a fraud. 
Victorian sirens moved from the marginal medieval space and Renaissance uncharted waters 
into the heart of popular literature, but in this flight our gaze followed them every step of the 
way, robbing them of their monstrosity. ‘Surely I have caught all the fish that swim […], or 
some thing of horror,’ exclaims Wilde’s Fisherman, as he pulls the heavy fishnet into his boat. 
‘But no fish at all was in it nor any monster or thing of horror, but only a little Mermaid lying 
fast asleep.’371 There is no horror in the siren body for the Fisherman, only a sleepy, inert, 
peaceful Mermaid. Leaving myth and entering literature, sirens became literary expressions of 
textual pleasures, fears and dreams of the male Victorian desiring subject. They became words 
referring both to his desire for semiotic wholeness and his nightmarish dream, bestowing upon 
him, and upon themselves, a hellish fantasy that would last till the present day. 
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SPIRAL 2: ‘THE SIREN’; OR, THE ANGST OF THE SPLIT 
 
“Yourself shall writhe with every cry, 
With every death yourself shall die.” 372 
Henry Carrington  
  
The change of perspective, the point of view from which we witness the monstrosity of 
sirens, is crucial in a marvelously written poem by Henry Carrington, simply entitled The Siren. 
Written in 1898, this siren story structurally resembles The Little Mermaid, as it fits perfectly 
into the modern siren literature. It addresses many, if not all, issues raised by this book. We 
shall see how a familiar siren narrative, in its very structure, manifests the path of the subject’s 
desire, as the subject repeatedly reaches for his objet a only to experience jouissance in the fall.  
The poem follows the eponymous Siren in her epic, inner struggle for a gentle and 
compassionate heart, a gift that has been allowed to mortals only. Having been previously 
denied this glorious thing, not even being aware of its existence (or of the lack of it) the Siren 
was spending her immortal days with her two sisters in reckless mirth. Singing to the passing 
ships was undeniably in her nature, love and compassion meant nothing, anguish and pain even 
less. Drowned bodies and rotting cadavers had been piling up on her faraway shore, but the 
sight of them meant little to her, death of men being the very air she breathed. Then one day, 
as she was swimming with a triton, the Siren realized that the triton could understand the 
animals that swam by their side, so she turned to Jove (Jupiter) to grant her this provoking gift. 
The new knowledge of animal speech opened a whole new world to her, one in which she 
began longing to know, have, and possess. She learned from the animals she now could 
understand, that she was the vilest and the most despised of them all, because, while they 
hunted for food, she killed for nothing, not even for joy. Something irreversibly changed inside 
of her; a desire for a heart that can feel invaded her immortal peace. She turned to Jove once 
again, but Jove was wise and compassionate enough to warn her that the heart of mortals would 
bring her excruciating pain and eternal sorrow, a kind of suffering that inevitably leads to 
craving death in the end. Though kind and compassionate, she would still have to perform her 
task of lethal singing, bodies and shipwrecks would still suffocate her rotten shore. But, in her 
resolution, she noticed that now she wanted it even more, so Jove promised her a gentle heart, 
but to her future suffering he added a one-time way out: when the Siren could bear the anguish 
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no more, she would be allowed to take the heart of stone once again. After her transformation 
into a compassionate being was complete, the Siren, being able to feel, fell into a dark abyss 
of desperation and agony. For now she empathized with the men she was luring to death, but 
she was a slave to her voice, to her own monstrous nature, both killing and morning her victims, 
going round in circles unable to stop the endless horror of her own monstrosity. Incapable of 
coping with her fate any longer, and repulsed by the peaceful evil with which her sisters 
continued performing their deadly task, the Siren fled to an isolated island, where the beginning 
of the poem finds her, grieving the rotting fruit of her thralldom, desiring only one thing – to 
die.  
The poem is dramatic and tragic from its first verse almost to its very last and, like The Little 
Mermaid, it is a story of sacrifice and pain. At the very end of the poem, Jove decides that Circe 
is going to release Ulysses (who appears only then in the story), and that the Siren must be 
tested, so she could prove her worthiness. So Ulysses continues his journey home, passing the 
Siren’s two sisters unscathed on the way. In disbelief, or despair, not understanding how it 
could happen that a mortal did not succumb to their voices, the two sisters fall from a cliff into 
the sea, where they are saved by Neptune and turned into nymphs. The Siren itself is offered 
the heart of stone once again, or the gift of death instead. Of course, the Siren realizes that the 
lives of innocent men are worthier than her own, so she jumps from a cliff in a final act of 
sacrificial desperation. But winged Hermes catches her in the fall and Jove proclaims her queen 
of her island, bringing back to life all the men who had fallen prey to the Siren’s song. 
Heart-breaking and dramatic, The Siren is, in my view, the most beautiful piece of Victorian 
siren literature ever written. The Little Mermaid is overly melancholic and predictable, written 
as a fairytale, and as such it succumbs to the vanity of a love story that melts hearts of stone. 
Its approach is moralizing and Christian, and in the last instance, it builds upon the medieval 
notion of the mermaid as a soul catcher. The Siren, too is a story of love and sacrifice, but it 
pushes the narrative of The Little Mermaid to the extreme, delving deep into the realm of desire 
and ‘psychical life’ of an individual, thus having a tremendous importance for the 
understanding of the male desiring subject. The poem is a most curious combination of the 
Homeric siren episode and the modern mermaid plot introduced by Hans Christian Andersen. 
As such, as we discuss the inception of the subject’s desire typified by the Siren’s hurting 
image, a slightly comparative approach would be useful. We will proceed with a closer reading 
of the poem and show that the poem beautifully weaves a net of the objet a, it tells a tale of the 
invocation of the subject into/by language/culture; it describes the never-ending path of desire, 
on whose nonexistent, illusionary end death (the object of desire) awaits, death that is the very 
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nature and echo of all other desired objects. Death is pure void, a dark flame of desire burning 
fiercely, and, as with a mirror, if we approach it too openly we risk losing that which we name 
ourselves.     
 
Monstrosity of the Subject  
 
The Siren is a poem written for audiences familiar with the classical Homeric narrative, but 
at the same time it clearly speaks to its own age. The setting draws heavily upon the Roman 
version of the Greek mythology, featuring Neptune and Jupiter, Hermes, Ulysses and Circe, 
and the very ‘Ulysses and the Sirens’ episode is constructed so as to explain and expand on the 
events in the Odyssey. Although he is mentioned sporadically throughout the poem, we actually 
meet Ulysses only in one of the last chapters. By then, the emotionally ruined Siren had already 
fled to her isolated island, far in the west. The Siren had earned her poisonous voice as 
punishment for assuming she could sing better than the Graces (Muses), and we are also given 
a solution to another issue that troubled ancient authors: the Sirens had previously been three, 
but due to the events described in the poem, only two of them remained to witness the passing 
of Ulysses. For a knowledgeable audience, this is a very shrewd invention, playing both with 
the ancient lore and its modern counterpart. In a true Victorian spirit that finds everything 
classical sacred, we are invited to revel in the imagination of Henry Carrington, clearly brought 
up on classical scholarship. On the other hand, the differences with the Odyssey might be more 
than just a pleasant guessing-game for specialists – they might give us more than an outline of 
a creative mind. In Carrington’s poetic imagination, the famous companion of the Sirens, 
namely Ulysses, has been reduced to a single chapter – one out of thirty-two. The roles have 
been reversed: instead of following Ulysses on his epic journey around the Mediterranean Sea, 
we follow the Siren on her spiraling journey around a desired object. Instead of being oriented 
towards an outside adventure, a physical voyage home, the narrative of The Siren revolves 
around the Siren’s inner journey, around her thorny path to the heart of desire. As much as it 
struggles to be classical, the poem ends up being devastatingly modern in nature, with the 
Victorian take on siren lore being the core of the narrative, transforming the classical myth into 
the Siren’s odyssey instead. Though abundant, scenes of voracious shipwrecking are not the 
focal point of the plot – the main emphasis pushes us towards the Siren’s crumbling within. 
We are beckoned to understand, empathize with and pity her cursed existence, her grief-
stricken life and her intrinsically split self. The Homeric Siren turns into a profoundly Victorian 
one, the very reverse of her monstrous nature – she assumes the role of the human subject.  
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The poem goes a long way to establish the candor and sincere mildness of the Siren’s nature, 
suppressing her monstrous body as the result. We are told that the Siren’s beauty is beyond 
compare: her face, her hair, her lips, her eyes.373 But, the question of whether this beauty hides 
hideous monstrosity is what interests the narrator as he paints the Siren’s glittering portrait: 
 
Not so! That form no fraud we find, 
No veil by Nature’s freak designed 
To hide the foul reality; 
The monster ill, that lurks behind! 
Her face did not her heart belie; 
But 'twas an index of the mind; 
Where all its secrets you may know; 
Or ‘twas a mirror framed to show 
The charms, that in her spirit lie.374 
  
The verse gives us an image of the Siren after her transformation, and if we read the 
Victorian siren lore closely we shall find that normalized monstrosity is a prerogative of most 
stories. The monster has to abandon its monstrous nature; it has to keep its murderous, 
unacceptable features and impulses hidden. Some other analysis could make a clear parallel 
between Foucault’s view of the nineteenth century, as the time when normalization of the 
subject occurs, and this tendency towards normalization of monstrosity.375 But for us, this 
normalization leads straight to humanity that lurks beneath the monstrous skin, straight to the 
subject who created the monster, infusing it with his own alienated humanity. As we shall see, 
the issue at hand in the poem is our Siren’s trying not to be a monster. Her face reflects her 
genuine kindness and empathy, but she carries on performing her fatal task all the same:  
 
She, but the passive instrument. 
The slave, that doth his lord's command. […] 
The Siren is compelled to sing: 
A captive longing to be free. 
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And, that her song must ruin be […]376 
 
The Siren is not to blame for her monstrous actions; she is but a thrall, slave to her ‘lord’s 
command’: she is a slave to Jove, to the highest power, thus to the Law, to the Symbolic, to 
culture (in the same fashion as F. Anstey’s Siren says ‘And what can I do? I cannot keep back 
the sea.’377) Other aspects of her figure having been sanitized – her body beautiful and pure, 
her gorgeous face reflecting a candid heart and a caring mind – the only monstrous part left is 
her ‘poisonous voice,’ that ‘intoxicating balm / That all around, above, beneath, / Through soul 
and senses found[s] its way’378 The monstrosity of the Siren has been cornered into this small 
part of her existence, but this part, a remnant of her true nature, is exactly the one she cannot 
resist. She is still compelled to sing, bound to her monstrous nature. Like a proper creature of 
desire, she is swept away by this vocal stream that leaves her in the jaws of fate.  
Once again, Victorian monstrosity becomes a vehicle of desire. Bound by the heavenly Law 
that does not allow her to cease to sing and that makes her crave one thing over all others, death 
establishes itself as that which is beyond the Law, beyond materiality, the place of jouissance 
expected. A desired object (heart equals death, as we shall see) had been promised to the Siren, 
but this promise was bound to bring pain. As I have already discussed in the Exhausted at the 
Lake’s Shore chapter, there is no jouissance without a Law to be broken, without a limit to be 
transgressed. In the same fashion, there is no abject without a ‘border that has encroached upon 
everything,’379 without the shifting notion of the beyond promised. Going back to the prologue 
of the book, we see more clearly that this poem corresponds well with Ulysses’ desire, with his 
unfathomable wish to, against all warnings, indeed exactly because of them, touch the dark 
flame of desire and encounter death itself. 
 
 
The Heart as Commodity 
 
As the subject of the poem, the Siren sets off on her dim, consuming inner path. The 
approach the poem takes on desire, as well as the language and expressions used to describe it, 
                                                 
376 Carrington, Siren, 18, 20. 
377 F. Anstey, ‘The Siren,’ in The Black Poodle, and other Tales (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1896 
[1884]), 175. 
378 The phrase ‘poisonous voice’, or the ‘poisonous nature’ of the Siren’s singing is a constant throughout the 
poem (pages, 9, 19, 21 etc); 2. 
379 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), 4. 
175 
 
are so curiously Lacanian, that if we had not known that the fate of this Siren was originating 
in the late nineteenth century, we would have placed it into the Lacanian times. On the other 
hand, the similarity with the psychoanalytic notion of desire shows, once again, Lacan’s 
profoundly Victorian imagination, the one he inherited from Freud. From the very start of the 
poem, even before we are introduced to the Siren’s sable journey that led to her miserable state, 
we face a subject ravished by an inner split. The Siren is perched on a rock as she gazes into 
the distance, fearing that another ship might come and compel her to destroy it by her 
irresistible singing, and we feel that the state of her existence is intolerable, that she explicitly 
has only one wish – to die.  
 
When she at last may sink to rest, 
All pains and wrongs and woes forgot. 
Upon the earth, her mother’s breast, 
Or in the ocean’s stilly deep. 
Where motion, sound, and sight are not, 
Find that unbroken stilly sleep. 
The happy envied mortal lot. 
The only boon she asks; – to die.380 
 
 
She feels torn, split inside between the Law that forces her to kill, and her kind heart that 
rejects the aggressiveness of destruction. But even more, she is torn by her inability to attain 
absolution for her deeds; she is torn by the impossibility to reach the nothingness of fullness 
that once was her existence. The Siren is in a desperate need of stillness, of silence, of the gift 
bestowed upon mortals – she is in a desperate need of death. There is a Promised Land: beyond 
materiality, beyond sound and motion. It is in the ‘ocean’s stilly deep, where motion, sound, 
and sight are not’; it is the safe place on the mother’s breast; it is where mortals go when 
everything is over and done, and they are allowed a totality of existence – a darkness that sooths 
‘all pains and wrongs and woes,’ an emptiness that promises oblivion. She wants it, she needs 
it and envies mortals for it, and she desires it – death. 
How did it come to this? How did the Siren become insufferably tormented by the specters 
of her murderous deeds? Before the fateful events described in the summary took place, before 
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she understood animals and came to the realization of her lack, the Siren was semiotically 
whole. There were no waves in her soul, no cracks in her selfhood. ‘She felt her life,’ the 
narrator says, ‘[w]ithout a want, without a pang.’381 She never knew what loving, hating or 
desiring meant. Incapable of any inner motion aside from a ‘reckless joy’ that has been 
established in the poem as wholeness of her existence ‘performed in mirth and peace,’382 the 
Siren had a direct access to others’ objet a, she was the objet a, thus she was a perfect objet a 
for others, for men unfortunate enough to stumble upon her faraway shore. She could not desire 
herself, thus everyone desired her.  
 
Her beauty sank into the heart. 
And stole the heart away, it left. 
Once seen, instead, ne’er to depart. 
A hunger, thirst, a longing void, 
A craving never satisfied: 
The captive soul, by love subdued, 
Of all resistance was bereft; 
And thus, the charms her singing wrought 
Were by her loveliness renewed; 
Which, though but for a moment viewed, 
Was ever loved, and ever sought.383 
 
The Siren of the poem, the honeyed, seductive voice and face of the ‘pleasure in pain,’ was 
a wholeness incarnate, the subject’s fantasy of coherence prior to invocation into language, into 
culture, before the appropriation of his external coherence that would imprison the subject 
inside his split ego forever. She was death personified, the creature of the Real: for her victims 
she was what haunted their minds, souls and Beings – their own lack, their own objet petit a.  
Then the word arrives: the enticing, shattering word of death that will crush the Siren’s 
‘reckless’ wholeness and introduce her as the subject to her lack. Taken over by curiosity, like 
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a toddler in front of a mirror, the Siren asks the highest power (Jove) to grant her the knowledge 
of the animal tongue. The summoning of the subject into culture begins: the moment she 
understands the language around her, the Siren hears the animals talk of something precious, 
bright and worthy; from them she learns that ‘she lives for ever, dispossessed / Of all most 
joyous, brightest, best / Among the gifts that fortune deals’; she lives without a heart, so she 
begins desiring it.384 The circle of wanting is open and the Siren will never be the same again. 
 
That much she longed to know, to feel, 
What could that strange possession be, 
Which all the forms of life reveal 
As height of all felicity. 
True, she herself no guilt could own, 
Nor want, nor lack; yet, all the same, 
Compassion like she not, not blame […] 
And long this thought possessed her mind, 
And with desire strong and strange, 
She more and more became inclined 
To claim of Jove the promised change.385 
 
It is interesting to see how slowly desire creeps on the Siren. She is not consumed by it 
immediately in an inextinguishable fire that burns flesh and blazes bones into dust. She is 
introduced into the Symbolic by the power of language, of the animal tongue; the understanding 
of the world around her is revealed to her, a landscape that we call culture. A crack opens 
within her, and she cannot fathom this ‘desire strong and strange.’ In the above passage we see 
that previously she has not been able to understand want nor lack, wanting and lacking taken 
as two sides of the same coin, same as the above opposition between compassion and blame, 
one leading to another in a game of desire. The moment the game began, an eternal 
displacement of the language took place, a substitution of one object of desire for another. ‘If 
I entreat thee to resume,’ prays the Siren to Jove the Father, 
 
That former gift, and one bestow, 
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Which all thy creatures here below, 
Whose speech thou gavest me to know, 
Have made me long for – in its room.386 
 
The knowledge of animal language is not enough anymore, as nothing is ever enough where 
objects of desire are concerned. There is something better this time, a shiny thing everyone 
(animals) is talking about, an elevated substitution for the last gift given. It is almost distressing 
to read how the inner life of this modern Siren develops in a fashion familiar to ‘everyone who 
has entered a supermarket or been exposed to the manipulation of an advertisement,’ as 
Agamben ironically says.387 The narrative of the poem revolves around the heart, death and 
desire – and the heart, appears as just another commodity, just another facet of the already 
mentioned commodified soul, to be asked for, given, taken, or otherwise acquired. Thus Siren 
asks for a gentle heart, she wants to feel and she wants to know. The object of desire moves 
away from speech to the heart, which  
 
Is the best boon that from on high, 
Thy bounty to creation deals; 
A heart that pities, loves, and feels.388 
 
The heart is the shiny thing that lures desire; it is the ‘it’ of the moment. It is better than the 
previous ‘it,’ better than the ability to understand animals. As much as Carrington would have 
liked it to be classical in theme and structure, The Siren consistently shows an essentially 
modern, consumerist nature of its narrative. 
 
 
Warning of Death as Jouissance Expected 
 
At this point in the narrative the poem structurally converges again with its classical role 
model. In fact, at this point it merges with all the texts on sirens and mirrors we have analyzed, 
showing once again that the structure of the mirror narrative persists at the heart of the modern 
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siren narratology. As it was in the case of Ulysses, Alice and the Little Mermaid, a moment of 
warning comes. This moment is crucial for them all, because under the surface of praise-worthy 
bravery (Ulysses), curiosity (Alice), and sacrifice (the Little Mermaid), a profound desire for 
an utter dissolution of selfhood, devastation of Being, and transcendence of the limits of 
language is hidden. In a word, the moment carries in its pregnant womb a dream of escaping 
the semiotic incoherence, of exiting the maze of signification, of awakening and reaching out 
for the absolute – it holds on to the Victorian fantasy of the beyond. On her journey towards 
becoming a chess-piece, Alice was reaching out for a material transgression leading to the 
beyond of the materiality promised by the mirror. In her departure from the sea, the Little 
Mermaid was reaching out for a spiritual and bodily transgression leading to the beyond of her 
hideous body and soulless being. The Siren, being an authorial creation and expressing the self 
of the author in question, reflects the same desire to transcend existence that we have seen in 
the analysis of Ulysses and the Sirens by John William Waterhouse in the prologue. They both 
embody a subject who, seemingly against all odds, decides to ‘sleep with the woman of his 
dreams but be hanged afterwards.’ But only apparently, I would argue. The transgression the 
Siren and Ulysses are both rushing to is a transgression of the boundaries of life itself, an abject 
desire to reach the desired object that in Victorian culture stands behind all desired objects – 
death. Being of an impossible nature and essentially nonexistent, always found again only as 
an absence of the object desired, every objet a is in its essence a death epitomized – nothingness 
without a beginning and an end, the Real beyond every reality, ex nihilo that gives birth to life 
itself. When I say death, I do not necessarily mean the physical death (as death of the body), 
but what Adrian Johnston calls ‘psychical death’ as death of desire, as stillness of meaning, 
pure enjoyment beyond language. At least since the nineteenth century, every desired object 
has always relied on the realm of death as a pure signifier – a signifier without a signified, 
without Being. Every commodity ever produced has been a small death incarnated, carrying an 
impossible unsignifiable void that lured desire ever forward, ever in circles, promising fullness 
at the end, promising a jouissance pure as death itself. 
Every death needs a prophet, though, a benefactor and a limit setter combined. Otherwise, 
there is no expectation; the subject does not know that there is a jouissance waiting for him on 
the other side. Alice was warned by the Red Queen of all the ordeals, hardships and sufferings 
she would endure (funny as they may seem, veiled as an ostensibly children’s narrative of 
Through the Looking Glass). The Little Mermaid had the witch, a monstrous figure woven out 
of Victorian male misogynist fear. Ulysses had Circe, another witch-whore, a figure 
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representing dangerous female sexuality, promising death to those who do not follow her 
advice. Our Siren has Jove, and his warning, or should I say his ‘promise’ is as follows: 
 
‘Tis doomed by fate that you must sing, 
And doomed by fate you must bring 
Ruin, and death, on all that hear; […] 
But soon as by this heavenly guest, 
This loving, melting human heart, 
Your bosom’s threshold shall be crossed, […] 
Then shall those other guests depart, 
That now within your bosom throng – 
Laughter and mirth, and piece and joy, 
The careless, jocund company […] 
But every note [of thy song] shall wound you ear, 
And shall hate you late-loved song, 
And feel its witching powers pierce, 
The soft kind heart for which you long. […] 
Yourself shall writhe with every cry, 
With every death yourself shall die. […] 
Anguish unheard of, and unknown, 
Shall so consume your life with grief, 
That you shall supplicate for death: 
To sleep the earth or waves beneath, 
As sole succor and relief, 
From terrors that your soul appal. 
Ask death with eager vehemence, 
With longing, craving more intense 
Than you can e’ver imagine now.389 
 
The Siren has been warned, though this warning comes as a long promise of pain, anguish 
and misery. It was necessary to quote this long passage, so that the reader becomes aware of 
how intensely disturbing is the warning/promise given to the Siren. I have quoted only the 
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smallest piece of it, the horrendous promise stretching through two whole chapters! Compared 
to this, the price the Little Mermaid pays seems ridiculously naïve – her loss of voice and 
bleeding feet (along with possible death in the end), appear almost benign comparing to this 
promise of an abiding infernal agony. The Little Mermaid at least had a chance at winning the 
prince and the soul; Ulysses at least had a weapon – the wax, and mast and cords. But for the 
Siren the price is not only death; there is no advice for her, no tools of salvation. Her destiny 
has been promised to her clearly from the start: ‘Yourself shall writhe with every cry / With 
every death yourself shall die.’ The price of a heart is eternal damnation, searing pain and an 
endless fall. Faced with this choice, we would have thought that the Siren would side with the 
Kantian perspective, at least: no being would choose enjoyment if promised not death, but 
perennial horror afterwards. Thus the answer that the Siren gives to Jove, becomes important. 
‘The words, the danger, you disclose,’ she says, 
 
Increase, not lessen my desire: 
An impulse that I strive in vain 
Myself to fathom, or explain, 
Such as I ne’er have felt before, 
Makes me all future chance disdain, 
This unknown region to explore: 
This craving fills and rules my soul, 
And brooks not reason or control.390 
 
Desire works in roundabout ways, as I have discussed in the chapter on the language of 
excess in mirror narratives; it does not strictly follow historically contingent rules of rationality 
though it follows culturally contingent objects of desire. Alice does not go back home through 
the mirror right away. What all of the above mentioned characters have in common is that they 
have all been warned, and that every single one of them decided to pay the price. Even more, 
desire begins consuming them from the moment the warning is uttered, the warning itself 
becoming a spark adding flames to the fire already burning in the void within, waiting to be 
filled. They all follow their objet a towards the promised jouissance, a pure enjoyment beyond 
the limits of materiality, body, language, life, existence. They all crave the nihil where it all 
began, and the jouissance of transgression gets pushed to the extreme and explicitly framed in 
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the poem we are analyzing. Enjoyment does not have to be pleasant; jouissance can be pleasure 
in pain. But it has to be promised – a line has to be drawn somewhere, so that the subject can 
be seduced by the fantasy of crossing it. This line, the promise made, signals an emotional 
overflow, a semiotic surplus; it lures with images of purgatorial ecstasy, transcendence worthy 
of life itself. The fiercer the price, the more the Siren wants it: ‘The words, the danger you 
disclose, increase, not lessen my desire,’ she says, as her monstrosity is fading away. The 
monster is seduced by the promise of death itself, suppressing its abject nature and bringing 
out, through its doomed monstrous skin, the male Victorian subject in its stead.  
In Lacanian psychoanalysis, what is desired when a demand is made to another is, in its 
essence, a cry for love. ‘I love you,’ says Lacan, ‘but, because inexplicably I love in you 
something more than you – the objet petit a – I mutilate you.’391 This desire for something 
more in a person, more in a thing, signifies the absence of the desired object. What I love in 
you is not something you have, but something I find in you and recognize as my own lack. 
Taking this symbolic absence further, one could say that every desire is a cry for death, driven 
by the impulse of nothingness that can be acted upon, but it cannot be satisfied, it cannot be 
fulfilled. We could say that every desire, as a reaching out for this emptiness, is ecstasy in itself, 
a little death, une petite mort. In the image of a siren, especially a Victorian siren, epitomized 
by our torn heroine, is there a difference between love and death? They both merge with each 
other, just as the huntress and her prey merge in this extraordinary, (but historically 
conditioned), inversion of the plot of ‘Ulysses and the Sirens.’ The mirror, the Victorian symbol 
of desire, structurally sharing its narrative with that of monstrosity, stands between the subject 
and his Victorian monstrous face, merging them into an epiphany of jouissance waiting on the 
other side of the subject’s monstrous nature. 
The Fall, and What Happens After 
 
The last episode of the Siren’s inner journey arrives with the Fall. As the Siren begins to 
understand animals, as the crack opens within her allowing desire to appear, the signifying 
chain moves on, in an everlasting substitution of desired objects. Never will an object be 
enough, though, because the fundamental dream that supports desire is one of pure wholeness 
delivered only in death. As long as there is a subject who desires, as long as there is a desire 
which, along its path, constitutes the subject, satisfaction is bound to be postponed, always 
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introducing new objects to the game. The poem we are analyzing presents us with this scenario, 
making explicit the mechanics of longing. Since it is unattainable, reaching out for the objet a 
inevitably leads to the fall of the subject, to the place where the subject falls short of jouissance 
expected, of the ecstasy mythically promised by the Prophet of Death. Instead, the subject 
experiences jouissance obtained, an extreme emotional overflow barely within the limits of the 
Law, at the gates of the Purgatory, excessive enough to allow the substitution of objects, but 
insufficient enough to bring a semiotic resolution of death to the split subject.  
In the prologue I called this void, this death in a desired object and in the subject himself, a 
dark flame of desire burning fiercely. I painted it in somber, monstrous colors because of a 
strong belief that this unsignifiable part of the self is the very core of the subject’s existence as 
well as of his modern Victorian monstrous skin. Desire lures the subject to approach it, to look 
at its ebony, blazing heart, but since that heart is present only as its own absence, as 
nothingness, the subject cannot actually arrive at the point of encounter. The subject always 
misses the appointment with the Real. An encounter not missed would be the end of the 
subject’s ‘psychic life,’ as Adrian Johnston says; it would mean Alice coming straight back 
through the mirror home; it would mean Ulysses breaking the ropes and dying at the Sirens’ 
shore or at the bottom of the sea; it would mean the Little Mermaid acquiring an immortal soul. 
Finally, it would mean the Siren ceasing to exist.  
Is that what happens to our wretched heroine? Does she succeed in reaching death? At the 
end of her libidinal existence the Siren would have to die, she would have to actually see and 
touch the flame of her desire. Is that what happens in our story? Almost. In her search for 
wholeness, for silence, stillness and peace, the Siren approaches the limit of existence, of life 
itself. After the promise and her acceptance of the price, the transformation begins as an 
aggressive experience of the fall. We have seen the same scenario in Through the Looking 
Glass, with things going berserk in a mad semiotic haze of the final dinner, and Alice crashing 
things and falling short of her goal, falling short of a complete material transgression. We also 
saw it in The Little Mermaid, with the eponymous heroine jumping overboard and dissolving 
– turning into foam, just so she could ascend once more, falling short of her spiritual 
transgression, a soul.  
The Siren goes through the same, agonizing, excessive experience, worthy of an ecstatic fall 
of the subject. She is ready to receive her gift, the thing that is the momentary ‘it’ (a gentle 
heart) embodying her objet a (death). She is put to sleep by Jove, so she could survive the 
aggression of the transformation, and first to visit her are Furies, sinister creatures of Hades 
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whose task is to suck out all the poison from her stony heart. The black flame of desire 
approaches: 
 
From Pluto’s realms of ghastly gloom, 
From the black land of pain and death; […] 
Bade the fell snake-haired sisters come 
Nor dare the Furies to delay.392 
 
The following scene, in which the Siren is transformed into a modern diva worthy of our 
sympathy and pity, is a horrifying experience of bitterness and pain. The Furies approach the 
Siren with their ‘icy touch’ and they press their ‘deadly lips’ on the Siren’s pale face. ‘Terror 
and anguish [are] such,’ the narrator says, that ‘her soul amazed [is] seek[ing] to fly.’393 The 
Furies lay their ‘cold hands,’ on the Siren’s chest, and  
 
[W]hile each shuddering fibre quakes, 
With threat’ning hiss and livid fold, 
Entwine and mix the Furies’ snakes, 
Amid her locks of tangled gold.394 
 
The Siren’s soul is attempting to flee, the experience of the transfer being too much even 
for her immortal body. She is covered in the Furies’ snake hair, the drama of the scene rising 
in an agonizing crescendo. In the apogee of ecstasy, her beautiful body is tainted; her golden 
locks that covered her lower part like a fish tail are full of snakes, as the Furies hiss and her 
body quakes. The Siren’s Being is literally dying away, ‘[f]rom her soft cheeks, in horror sped, 
[t]he blood, and all her colour fled.’395 Her body is losing its natural properties, turning into 
stone, into a monstrous nothingness of inanimate matter, reaching out for the other side of life 
itself. At the gates of Hades, the siren’s natural habitat reserved for human victims since time 
immemorial, the Siren is on the road to death, the objet a upon her reach. Death is encroaching 
on her: 
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Her own [eyes], then shrinking ‘neath the sway, 
Appeared to die, to fade away, 
Burnt out to darkness by dismay; 
Then closed again, and all had said, 
So white, so cold, the maid was dead. […] 
When these Tartarean forms had left 
The Siren, as of life bereft, 
She lay, pale, cold, and motionless; 
A marble statue, you had said, 
To represent some beauteous maid, 
Who died of terror and distress.396 
 
It may seem that the Siren finally arrived at the end of her path, that the search for the objet 
a is over; she has found wholeness again, her body turning into stone, into a ‘marble statue,’ 
the jouissance experienced being pure, leaving only an empty shell behind, ‘pale, cold, and 
motionless,’ empty as death itself. But this, of course, cannot be. After Furies had departed, 
love, pity and compassion were poured into her heart by Graces, restoring the Siren back to 
life, and instilling the void, the split into her once again. What appeared to be an end, what 
appeared to be the jouissance promised to her, was only the Siren’s fall, an experience of 
jouissance obtained, an extreme emotional overflow at the limits of the Law, at the gates of the 
beyond. Before the fall – desire; after the fall – desire again; an indestructible circle of objects 
lining one after another, a never-ending chain of signification that is the alpha and omega of 
desire never ceasing to exist and to instill the différance into the heart of the subject’s split.  
The Siren came a long way on her inner odyssey, and at the end of her long journey there is 
only the beginning to be rediscovered – the infinite circle of horror of alluring nothingness. She 
wanted the ability of animal speech, and then she craved a gentle heart. The poem starts with 
the Siren desiring death, desiring absolution, a way out, and it returns to the same place of 
sorrow and misery, reproducing the narrative structure of the Odyssey, along with the libidinal 
structure of the Ulysses’ desire. After the split, after she has received a gentle heart, she moves 
to an island in the far West, in the land of death, where tormented souls find their final resting 
place of peaceful wholeness. Even space itself betokens the Siren’s desire for death. Far in the 
West, in this Land of the Dead, we see the Siren sitting on a rock, mourning the devastated and 
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decaying bodies of dead and dying men scattered across the landscape that seems to be her 
whole world. Her nature is fundamentally abject, bound to her monstrous voice, unable to attain 
what she desires the most.  
At the end of the poem and of our analysis, we turn briefly to the last scene: the Siren jumps 
into the sea, but is saved by Hermes from her fall, and restored as a queen to her island. The 
moral of the story follows: only an external higher power can bestow absolution; the subject is 
mercilessly immersed in the culture that shapes his libidinal existence, and is incapable of 
making the transition alone. After the warning, after the promise of death, the only thing the 
subject is capable of is the jouissance obtained, an ecstasy of the fall from a cliff into the sea, 
right into the embrace of his own dream that does not allow him to awake from the libidinal 
circle. If not reached and saved by gods, by the winged Hermes or the almighty Jove, without 
a deus ex machina the sea envelops him, lulling him into sleep once again, turning the 
jouissance obtained into just another turn of the deathless circle of desire. The sleeping subject, 
the Victorian dreamer, be it a Ulysses or a Siren, dreams his dream of transcendence, unaware 
of the agonizing circles, time and again thinking he has been saved.   
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SPIRAL 3: ‘THE SEA LADY’; OR, THE OTHER SIREN 
 
“It is illusion,” he said. “It is a sort of glamour. After all. Look at it squarely. What is she? 
What can she give you? She promises you vague somethings… She is a snare, she is a 
deception. She is the beautiful mask –” He hesitated. 397 
H. G. Wells 
  
As the twentieth century opened and parts of the Victorian culture began descending towards 
a new modernism or oblivion, in terms of its relationship to the issue of desire, siren lore 
apparently came full circle, returning to the same place where it had been before the nineteenth 
century. The history of the lore arrived at the point we have been calling, lacking a better term, 
‘post-Victorian’ siren literature, whose two main examples are The Sea Lady by H. G. Wells 
and The Professor and the Siren by Guissepe Tomasi di Lampedusa. ‘Post-Victorian’ mainly 
serves the descriptive purpose of referring to the siren lore of the first half of the twentieth 
century, but it also emphasizes its fundamental connection with the preceding century. The two 
stories appeared in the following order, separated by more than five decades, the first one 
written in 1902, the other in 1957. In our view, these two works respectively mark the 
beginning and the end of a new phase of siren representation, the issues raised in The Sea Lady 
having their logical climax in The Professor and the Siren.  
As the twentieth century moved on, sirens regained their traditional properties, namely their 
mirrors. We find examples on cover pages of The Siren advertisement magazine,398 as well as 
in Hollywood movies that were gaining momentum at the time (Mad About Men (1954), or Mr. 
Peabody and the Mermaid (1948)). In Virginia Woolf’s Orlando: A Biography from 1928, we 
find the mermaid/siren and the mirror conflated again, with Orlando gazing at her mirror 
reflection:  
 
[T]he glass was a green water, and she a mermaid, slung with pearls, a siren in 
a cave, singing so that oarsmen leant from their boats and fell down, down to 
embrace her; so dark so bright, so hard, so soft, was she, so astonishingly 
seductive that it was a thousand pities that there was no one there to put it in 
                                                 
397 H. G. Wells, The Sea Lady: A Tissue of Moonshine, A Critical Text of the 1902 London First Edition, with an 
Introduction and Appendices, ed. Leon Stover (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2001). 
398 The Siren 3:1 (September 1913). We see a beautiful, modern siren looking at herself in a mirror, while a young 
man with a cane and a cigarette looks at her. The image of a mermaid holding a mirror also appears around the 
title of the magazine in number of the magazine’s issues, for example The Siren 2:1 (October 1922). 
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plain English, and say outright, “Damn it, Madam, you are loveliness 
incarnate,” which was the truth.399  
 
In the light of the proposed approach to the relationship between the subject, the mirror and 
monstrosity of sirens, the return of reflecting surfaces becomes indicative of a new 
configuration of humanity/monstrosity. If sirens began reappropriating mirrors, as visible parts 
of their representational language, the subject’s relationship to their bodies must have changed 
again to account for this reappraisal. And sure enough, sirens did change, their bodies and their 
nature displaying some old/new properties.  
The main characteristic of post-Victorian sirens, as portrayed by Wells and Lampedusa, is 
their otherworldly, transcendental nature. While the Victorian sirens mainly assumed the roles 
of heroines in pain, virgin-like creatures worthy of pity and sympathy, seeking a soul, a heart, 
love and death that would never be, the post-Victorian sirens are immense, overpowering 
creatures, their nature is semiotically whole, transcending materiality reserved for mortals, and 
almost exclusively expressed by the language of excess. Their existence and their revelation to 
mortals, is literally beyond language, their presence impossible to be fully described and 
conveyed by words. Their agenda is not to catch a human soul, like in the medieval times, not 
even to acquire one through sacrifice and pain like the Victorian sirens; their purpose is to 
bestow souls on mortals, to teach them how to dream ‘better dreams,’ better than their small, 
harrowing existence allows them.    
The Sea Lady is the first one to introduce this theme, but we will be analyzing both works 
as we go along. One reason is that, apart from sharing the idea of a utopian, limitless existence 
hidden in the mermaid’s body, they actually cross-reference each other while characters of both 
stories read the same source, Undine by Motte Fouqué.  
The Sea Lady tells a story of a gorgeous, enchanting mermaid, who, rescued from a fake 
drowning, manages to insinuate herself into the household of her rescuers, the Bunting family. 
The family is large, and the characters are many, but the important for ones are Mrs. Bunting, 
the matriarch; Adeline, her elder daughter, a serious girl with her head in books; and Harry 
Chatteris, Adeline’s fiancé, socialist, the victim of the siren in the novel. The story is mostly 
told from the perspective of a nameless narrator, who acquired all the information on the 
curious events at the Buntings from Melville, his second nephew. Melville actually plays the 
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leading male role in the story and is a partial victim of the mermaid’s song himself. After she 
is rescued, and the Buntings in horror realize she has a fish tail, the Buntings take the poor 
‘girl’ in, Mrs. Bunting taking it as her duty to teach the mermaid what being human is all about. 
The mermaid gets a proper name, Miss Waters, pays the Buntings for her stay with gold from 
a hidden treasure chest and confesses that her real agenda has been to come to the world of 
men and learn all about their existence. On the surface, the story is just a slightly updated 
Victorian siren narrative, but Miss Waters is not what she seems to be: as the plot unfolds, we 
find out that her real target is Mr. Harry Chatteris, and that she came to land to teach men 
‘better dreams,’ to show them their blindness and their essentially illusionary existence. She 
enchants Harry with her promises, as she lures him to his doom. 
The other story in our analysis, The Professor and the Siren, is of a completely different 
narrative. Paolo Corbera, having been left both by his mistress and his girlfriend, spends time 
in a loud bar frequented by intellectuals in Turin, in 1938. There he meets a curious, 
misanthropic professor, a famous Italian Hellenist, whom he befriends in the course of several 
nights. During one of Paolo’s visits to the professor’s house, the professor confides in him a 
story from his youth he never told a soul, an extraordinary tale of his encounter with a siren, 
portrayed as an otherworldly, omniscient being, whose full existence escapes the 
comprehension of mortals. After he had related the story to Paolo, in what was for him an 
unprecedented outburst of loquaciousness, he sails away to Portugal, only to disappear 
somewhere in the blue depths of the Mediterranean Sea.  
At the level of the plot, these two stories could not be more different. Wells’ story is highly 
satirical and political, Mr. Chatteris being a liberal political figure and Miss Waters’ ‘better 
dreams’ hinting at utopian totalitarian future.400 Lampedousa’s story is a romantic piece on the 
disease called the ‘human condition.’ We are not interested in the structure of the plot, though, 
and we will leave the political notions for some other, more suitable occasion. What we are 
interested in is the language of siren representation. We will discuss the image of this larger-
than-life aquatic creature and see if we could find a solution to the question: what is the 
relationship of this character to the subject’s split self? It has been said so far that the Victorian 
sirens are topologies of the Victorian subject who created them, and the argument was 
supported by discussing the disappearance of mirrors from siren representations; of the 
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oscillation between Ulysses and sirens as protagonists of narratives; of the silence of sirens and 
their victims, as signs of a suppressed monstrosity and the split of the subject himself; and of 
the self-awareness of monsters as the language of the subject’s split. Victorian sirens were 
fundamentally split beings, like haunting images breaking loose from the subject’s mirror 
reflection. They sought souls and craved wholeness; they were not the subject’s desired objects, 
they were Victorian desiring subjects themselves.  
What happens, then, in the twentieth century, when sirens/mermaids return to being full 
again, not split like the subject seduced by his mirror image? How do they relate to his notion 
of the self, previously conveyed by siren bodies proper? Not seeking fullness anymore, but 
being fullness themselves, sirens stepped out of the subject’s body becoming his objet a again 
and bringing about the semiotic absolution that the subject sought. These sirens are not oddities 
anymore, nor nightmares looking from the mirror, but the mirror’s promise itself, the 
wholeness of the corporeal illusion the mirror offers, the very dream the subject has been 
dreaming for more than a century at least. Sirens now come to teach the subject ‘better dreams,’ 
to expose the illusionary nature of reality to him, to save his split self and give him a soul, but, 
as we shall see, they just deepen the subject’s dream further, their fullness being another, and 
necessary, face of the subject’s fantasy.  
 
Becoming a Cripple; or, the Victorian Face of Miss Waters  
  
The Sea Lady is a watershed in the modern siren lore, a borderline identity whose two-faced 
presence reflects what was and what shall be. Appropriately, she appears at the very turn of the 
century. Behind her is the long nineteenth century whose sirens suffer, loathe and despise their 
abject nature; in front of her is the even longer twentieth century, in whose first half sirens bath 
in a godly omniscience. The Sea Lady’s nature is of the latter kind, but her appearance is of the 
former.  
As she infiltrates the Buntings’ household, her image is shown to be fragile, her nature pure 
and sincere. Her body is held back by her monstrosity, her tail making her a cripple in the land 
of humans. The moment she is rescued, the horror of her inappropriate skin begins. 
 
“Mother,” said Nettie [the younger daughter], giving words to the general 
horror. “Mother. She has a tail!” 
And then the three maids and Mabel Glendower [a family friend] screamed 
one after the other. “Look!” they cried. “A tail!” 
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“Oh!” said Miss Glendower, and put her hand to her heart. 
And then the one of the maids gave a name. “It’s a mermaid!” screamed the 
maid, and then everyone screamed “It’s a mermaid.”401 
 
The mermaid tail is where the horror of her body begins; it is the place of her dread’s 
inception. She is both a monster and a protagonist of the story, revealing to the Buntings the 
secrets of life undersea and learning about life on land. As a mermaid she inspires fear, so she 
must be hidden, her monstrosity must be suppressed. As a subject/protagonist she breaks down 
at her waist, the split of the subject appearing where her monstrous tail begins. Here, in the 
land of men, everyone is appalled by her tail, the wretched thing ruining the mermaid’s chance 
at seduction. ‘She had a beautiful figure, I understand,’ says the unknown narrator, ‘until that 
horrible tail began.’402 
The Sea Lady enters the home of the Buntings and pays them in gold to teach her humanity. 
This desire for humanity presents itself as a two-way normalizing process. Both of the parties 
want it: the Sea Lady wants it; the Buntings want it. ‘She wants to be treated exactly like a 
human being,’ Mrs. Bunting confesses to Mr. Melville,  
 
“to be a human being, just like you or I. And she asks to live with us, to be one 
of our family, and to learn how we live, to learn to live.”403 
 
From Mrs. Bunting’s perspective, there is only one way of living, and that is not the 
underwater way, that is not the monstrous way of a mermaid. Her stigma and taint needs to be 
covered so that the threat of her body is disposed off. By now, we have learned the lesson from 
other Victorian siren stories – a monster can never fully become human, thus the Sea Lady 
could never become a flawless woman. Conveniently, in order to hide her embarrassing, horrid 
tail, Mrs. Bunting turns Miss Waters into a cripple. ‘[F]or everyone except just a few intimate 
friends,’ continues Mrs. Bunting in her confession to Mr. Melville,  
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“she is to be just a human being who happens to be an invalid – temporarily an 
invalid – […] and we shall dress her in long skirts – and throw something over 
It, you know –”404  
 
The mermaid tail is so dreadful, or more precisely, inappropriate, that it is hard to say the 
word, at first. It lingers in silence of the unfinished sentence, in an empty space of the 
unutterable dash, turning the tail into nothingness, canceling existence of the mermaid’s very 
nature.  
The Sea Lady’s transformation needs to be all-encompassing, the erasure of her nature 
complete. Since in the sea she has been denied a name, on the land she takes one of Miss Doris 
Thalassia Waters, leaving the fullness of her nameless existence behind and entering the 
shattered realm of the mortal language. Her material possessions speak the language of her 
transformation, too. One could ask how a mermaid pays mortals for their normalizing deeds. 
Miss Waters points the Buntings to a place on the beach where she hid a rope with a treasure 
chest attached. The treasure belonged to some shipwrecked sailor (whom she had seduced to 
his death, no doubt), whose name was Tom Wilders, as the name on the chest testifies. As she 
turns her monstrous skin inside-out and appropriates a human name, the name Tom Wilders 
disappears from the chest, only to be substituted for Miss Doris Thalassia Waters. ‘Wilders’ as 
‘the one who leads astray’ is erased, in this act of cultural oblivion of writing, and water, the 
element obviously susceptible to humanization in this novel, takes its place instead. The 
deceiving face of Miss Waters – the Victorian face of hers that has the appropriate traits of 
humanity – is the face that will lead Mr. Chatteris astray. When all is said and done, all the 
changes in the physicality of Miss Waters finished, ‘save for her exceptional beauty and charm 
and the occasional faint touches of something a little indefinable in her smile, she had become 
a quite passable and credible human being.’405 
  
The Great Outside of Better Dreams; or, the Post-Victorian Face of Miss Waters 
 
That ‘something indefinable in her smile’ will never go away, because her nature can never 
be normalized completely. This impossibility of her complete taming occurs due to the fact 
that this ‘something indefinable in her smile’ belongs to the nature of her other face, the one 
                                                 
404 Ibid., 45. 
405 Ibid., 63. 
193 
 
that Miss Waters is so eager to hide. This other face is the face of post-Victorian sirens, and 
Miss Waters arrives as their harbinger. In the above passage, these two faces collide; they both 
dwell in the same sentence hinting at each other, the otherworldly presence of a twentieth-
century siren not capable of diminishing its intense and ravishing radiance. The Buntings are 
completely fooled by this game of appearances, or at least Mrs. Bunting is. As a real audience 
for the Victorian siren, Mrs. Bunting actually empathizes with and pities the mermaid’s soulless 
destiny. The connection of Miss Waters’ image with the rest of the modern siren lore is made 
explicit: 
 
“You know it’s most extraordinary and exactly like the German story,” said 
Mrs. Bunting. “Oom – what is it?” 
“Undine?” 
“Exactly – yes. And it really seems these poor creatures are Immortal, Mr. 
Melville, – at least within limits, creatures born of the elements and resolve into 
the elements again – and just as it is in the story – there’s always a something – 
they have not Soul! No Souls at all! Nothing! And poor child feels it. She feels 
it dreadfully. But in order to get souls, Mr. Melville, you know they have to 
come into the world of men. […] To get a soul. Of course that’s her great object 
[…]”406 
 
The Sea Lady’s first face is the face of a Victorian siren par excellence. It belongs to Undine, 
whose translation into English was a great success. In preparing her disguise the Sea Lady has 
studied her recent history well. But, though it might seem that the novel is going in this 
direction, that we are about to read of one more tormented siren/mermaid in the pursuit of a 
soul, death or love, it becomes evident that it is only a mask, only an outer layer, a veil hiding 
the future of the siren image. The Sea Lady pretends to be what all her Victorian predecessors 
and cousins had been, namely Undines, but beneath the fragile skin, easy to manipulate and 
easy to normalize, another face lurks, more glorious and overwhelming that any of the Buntings 
could imagine. 
The post-Victorian face of Miss Waters has been hinted at from the beginning, all the 
participants in this little drama sensing something, but unable to put their finger on it. 
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Inexpressible, incomprehensible – that is the Sea Lady’s real nature. ‘There were times when 
it seemed to [Melville],’ says the narrator,  
 
you might have hurt her or killed her as you can hurt and kill anyone – with a 
penknife, for example – and there were times when it seemed to him you could 
have destroyed the whole material universe and left her smiling still.407  
 
As soon as we see the Other face of Miss Waters (we might appropriately capitalize it, to 
express its otherworldly, transcendental nature), everything that could possibly be described 
begins to elude language, escaping the possible images and existing words, scattering blank, 
unexplainable spaces and silence around the sentence. This Other mermaid is not a subject; she 
is not a split being in search of fullness, peace, or stillness of the beyond. She is the stillness 
beyond language and materiality, beyond the small, limited world of mortals. She is the illusion 
incarnate of the reflection in the mirror. As Adeline, the elder daughter, points out, Miss Waters 
comes from ‘an Inconceivable World,’ ‘the strangest World,’ the one mortals cannot attain, 
since it exist only as an absence, as the presence of an absence.408  
 
She [the Sea Lady] regarded them for a moment with a frank wonder, the 
undying wonder of the Immortals at that perpetual decay and death and 
replacement which is the gist of human life.409  
 
The very core of human existence is what this grandiose figure lacks: the replacement – the 
never-ending circle of reproduction, of life and death, of différance; of a continual 
re(dis)placement of meaning. Being beyond language, on the side of death, as a pure signifier, 
she has the ability to influence things, to control the flow of meaning, never succumbing to it. 
‘It is a digression,’ says Adeline to Mrs. Bunting, sensing the alienating power behind the frail 
story of an Undine. ‘She diverts things. She puts it all wrong. […] She alters the value of 
things.’410 Wherever there is death, things lose their meaning, transcendence is revealed to 
subjects as a Promised Land that will never be reached.  
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* * * * * 
 
This is the right moment to bring the other story into the analysis, if only to emphasize the 
transcendence in the Sea Lady’s image. Lampedusa’s professor encountered the same type of 
a siren, the one that alters the value of things, leaving the professor in an agony of 
disenchantment that was the real source of his misanthropy. ‘[Y]ou people,’ exclaims the 
professor, ‘slaves to decay and putrescence, always with ears strained for the shuffling steps of 
Death.’411 The disgust for humanity as an incurable disease is, for the professor, the 
consequence of a ‘diverting of things.’ During the hot summer that the professor spends with 
the Siren, she reveals herself as a creature of the beyond, the fullness of her image being the 
embodiment of death and emptiness. ‘I am everything because I am simply the current of life,’ 
says the Siren,  
 
“with its detail eliminated; I am immortal because in me every death meets, 
from that of the fish just now to that of Zeus, and conjoined in me they turn 
again into a life that is no longer individual and determined but Pan’s and so 
free.”412 
 
Death is just another name for fullness, just another name for the ultimate object of desire. 
The siren is everything and thus nothing; she is all the possible deaths in one, merging into the 
stream of life. Death is life generalized, without waves, without motion; it is the final, promised 
resting place of the split subject. 
The same alteration of values is encountered in Forster’s already mentioned 1920 The Story 
of the Siren, falling historically within the frame of the post-Victorian siren lore. Giuseppe is 
saved from the water where he encountered the Siren and returns onboard ‘so large [and] so 
wet’ that he is pulled into the boat with difficulty. He looked ‘like anyone who has seen the 
Siren. […] Unhappy, unhappy, unhappy because he knew everything. Every living thing made 
him unhappy because he knew it would die.’413 Giuseppe looked the fundamental illusion of 
life in the eye, and saw the illusion of the life’s reality. The Siren has changed the value of 
things for him; she has seemingly ‘put it all wrong,’ as Adeline said. All Giuseppe ‘cared to do 
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was to sleep.’414 But, in fact, the Siren put everything right, as she revealed to Giuseppe that 
the life he was living was a dream, a nightmare as haunting as the strangeness behind a 
reflection in the looking-glass.  
This is the real purpose of the post-Victorian siren, of the Sea Lady, the professor’s and 
Giuseppe’s Sirens – to ostensibly expose the fraud of reality, to confront the subject with his 
soulless existence and give him a real, eternal soul in return. This Other Siren comes to the 
Victorian subject to shake off his exhausting dream. ‘[A]ll the elements of your life,’ explains 
the Sea Lady, finally revealing her real nature and intentions to Melville,  
 
“the life you imagine you are living, the little things you must do, the little cares, 
the extraordinary little duties, the day by day, the hypnotic limitations, – all 
these things are a fancy that has taken hold of you too strongly for you to shake 
off.”415  
 
Her transcendental nature starts revealing itself, and the Sea Lady admits why she has come. 
And as she unveils her towering existence, Melville cannot help but feel like he is drowning.416 
Looking at her eyes ‘was like looking into deep water. Down in that deep there stirred 
impalpable things.’417 The mermaid’s figure is becoming larger than life, pulling the subject to 
a dark, deep bottom, textually enacting Edward Burne-Jones’ The Depths of the Sea. With this 
image in mind, that Melville saw a long time ago, ‘of a man and a mermaid rushing downward 
through deep water,’ the Sea Lady is pulling him ‘elsewhere,’ a metaphysical place that is, in 
Haraway’s words, promised by the monster.418 She is here to seduce Harry Chatteris and 
explain this ‘elsewhere’ to humans. ‘He is a man rather divided against himself,’ says Melville 
of Harry Chatteris, ‘[w]e all are.’419 The human subject is desperately divided against himself, 
eternally seduced by the mirror’s fantasy of reality. But there are places that do not belong to 
reality, places not real but of the Real. ‘What you too are beginning to suspect…,’ continues 
the Sea Lady,  
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“[ is t]hat other things may be conceivable, even if they are not possible. That 
this life of yours is not everything. That it is not to be taken too seriously. 
Because… there are better dreams!”420 
 
There are better dreams… the promise of the monster. These dreams are what the Other 
Siren brings to the subject. She is not yearning for these dreams like her Victorian ancestors – 
she embodies them with the semiotic fullness of her Being, with a coherence that is 
simultaneously both fullness and emptiness. In the final act of desperation, after Harry Chatteris 
has been seduced, Adeline begs Melville to tell her, to explain to her ‘[w]hat is this Being who 
has come between him [Harry Chatteris] and all the realities of life?’421 At this point, for Wells 
it was impossible not to capitalize the word ‘being,’ since it became obvious that this Being is 
beyond all other earthly creatures, that there is a difference between Her and everything that 
exists. ‘What is the difference?’ Adeline insists. As ever, the answer comes as a broken 
discourse, as a silence within the human language. ‘There are impalpable things,’ replies 
Melville, ‘[t]hey are above and beyond describing.’422 The Sea Lady is ‘above and beyond’ 
language, but just like in the encounters with reflective surfaces, the subject tries to describe 
this impossibility nevertheless, to appropriate it by language, the very falling short of the 
illusion’s appropriation bringing jouissance obtained. ‘She is – she has an air of being – 
natural,’ says Melville as he struggles to reach for this inexplicable fullness.  
 
“She is as lax and lawless as the sunset, she is as free and familiar as the wind. 
She doesn’t […] respect him when he is this and disapprove of him highly when 
he is that – she takes him altogether. She has the quality of the open sky, of deep 
tangled places, of the flight of birds, she has the quality of the high sea. That I 
think is what she is for him; – she is the Great Outside.”423 
 
The post-Victorian siren is the Great Outside. She crosses the boundaries of language and 
meaning, she leads the subject to the illusion of wholeness, ‘she takes him altogether,’ as a 
coherent, not a split subject. The Sea Lady is the illusion incarnate; she whispers that ‘other 
things may be conceivable, even if they are not possible.’ She is not a strangeness of différance, 
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an uncanny familiarity of something postponed or repressed, but still the same; she is a 
difference, an opposite, the subject’s limit of existence and possibility, the condition of his 
possibility. ‘She comes,’ Melville sighs,  
 
“whispering that this life is a phantom life, unreal, flimsy, limited, casting upon 
everything a spell of disillusionment […] She is a mermaid, she is a thing of 
dreams and desires, a siren, a whisper, and a seduction. She will lure him [Harry 
Chatteris] with her –”  
He stopped.  
“Where?” she whispered.  
“Into the deeps.” “The deeps?” They hung upon a long pause. Melville 
sought vagueness with infinite solicitude, and could not find it. He blurted out 
at last, “There can be but one way out of this dream we are all dreaming, you 
know.”424  
 
Death. We arrive again at the beginning of our introduction and at the ultimate nature of the 
post-Victorian siren – nothingness, emptiness, absence that ‘[hangs] upon a long pause’: the 
inexplicable, unattainable, inappropriable non-nature of desired objects that weave the dream 
that dreams about awakening. ‘You are young and handsome,’ implores the professor’s Siren,  
 
“follow me now into the sea and you will avoid sorrow and old age; come to 
my dwelling beneath the high mountains of dark motionless waters where all is 
silence and quiet, so infused that who possesses it does not even notice it. I have 
loved you; and remember that when you are tired, when you can drag on no 
longer, you have only to lean over the sea and call me; I will always be there 
because I am everywhere, and your thirst for sleep will be assuaged.”425 
 
For all the differences between Victorian and post-Victorian sirens, there can be only one 
way out of the subject’s hellish dream of the semiotic maze called reality, in which he 
constantly falls short of the fullness he is yearning for – death. Harry Chatteris, Giuseppe, 
Melville, and the professor have all been promised a one-time way out, the same exit point that 
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Jove promised the Siren from the previous chapter. The Sea Lady, as well as the professor’s 
Siren, comes as a savior of humanity, she comes to give humanity a soul, but this soul is just 
another dream, another absence of the objet a, another call to death that resides in the corners 
of every desire, in the hidden recesses of every desired object. ‘She is nothing’ says Melville 
finally. ‘She is the hand that takes hold of him, something that stands for the thing unseen. […] 
Something we never find in life […]. Something we are always seeking.’426 The image of the 
Sea Lady is both death of the subject and his birth, like the death of the subject at his very birth, 
this Lacanian image of aphanasis perfectly embodying the Derridean différance, an absence 
within the signifying chain that keeps the chain moving on and on. It is the place where ‘every 
death meets,’ ‘the current of life, with its detail eliminated.’ Destruction by the Sea Lady or the 
professor’s Siren leads to a birth ‘elsewhere’ where there are ‘better dreams’ than the subject’s 
small, finite existence – it leads to an illusion of awakening. ‘So small, so infinitely small!’ the 
Sea Lady cries, lamenting the human condition. But that ‘elsewhere’ is just a dream, ‘a blind 
mute place of formless waters, eternal, without a gleam, without a whisper,’ attainable only in 
death, thus essentially forbidden to the subject. The Sea Lady, the post-Victorian siren, is the 
presence of an absence, a creature of the Real calling the subject to step out from the circle of 
language, to enter the Great Outside and transcend his limited existence. She whispers to his 
sleep-bound mind that the appropriated exteriorized fullness is just a chain that binds him to 
the bottomless pit of his reverie. But she does that from within this dream, from within the 
subject’s fantasy. Once again the subject steps out, reaching for an absolution, thinking he has 
finally attained it. In a way, the Sea Lady has come to fulfill the promise of Anstey’s witch, to 
‘destroy the silence, and save the world,’ because ‘[s]ilence and loneliness cannot last forever.’ 
But it is all just a labyrinth that includes its own exits. It is all just an ineluctable vortex of 
dreams…    
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PART THREE 
 
THE AGE OF THE WORLD PICTURE: ULYSSES’ ARRIVAL 
 
To the extent that necessity is socially dreamed, the dream becomes necessary. The spectacle 
is the nightmare of imprisoned modern society which ultimately expresses nothing more than 
its desire to sleep. The spectacle is the guardian of sleep.427 
Guy Debord 
 
So far we have discussed the impact commodifiction of mirrors had on the perceiving male 
Victorian subject, as well as the changes in monstrosity of Victorian sirens/mermaids. We have 
seen how the new, omnipresent mirror pulled the subject into a spiraling loop of representation 
and conveyed the language of semiotic incoherence of commodities, thus revealing the 
monstrous fragmentedness of the subject himself. At the same time, the representation of sirens 
underwent profound changes introducing a new, quite original narrative of sirens/mermaids as 
virgin-like, occasionally religious, victims in pursuit of their happily ever after. They have lost 
their two faithful weapons – their voices and their mirrors. Arguments were provided for the 
existence of the monstrous semiotic incoherence of the male subject himself by analyzing his 
monstrous dream of haunting, uncanny mirrors and of the split sirens’/mermaids’ skin. It was 
shown that narratological and representational changes in sirens lead to a conclusion that their 
monstrosity is not a condition sine qua non of the subject’s humanity, but that the sirens 
topologize the Victorian male subject himself.   
An important issue of the changed modality of the sirens’ powers was also raised. Previously 
essentially aural seductresses, Victorian sirens stopped singing, the power of their voice 
shifting into their bodies. They became profoundly visual, epitomizing nineteenth-century 
scopic regimes of visual pleasure and voyeurism. In this last part of the book, that is entirely 
dedicated to the Pre-Raphaelite painting, we will discuss this visual pleasure in connection with 
the dreaming labyrinth of language we have been deconstructing all along. We will discuss the 
place where the two previous sections intersect – the Pre-Raphaelite visual field populated by 
images of sirens. By analyzing the role and place of mirrorless sirens/mermaids in the Pre-
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Raphaelite painting, we shall see once again that the age-old topos of ‘Ulysses and the Sirens,’ 
comes in a new, essentially visual form. 
‘Ulysses and the Sirens’ is a topos that has retained its strength for millennia. As we have 
seen from the prologue onwards, Ulysses’ ordeal of seduction, love, knowledge and death is, 
in a word, timeless. In every era, this struggle against seduction expressed the immediate fears 
and dreams of the culture in question. Harry Vredeveld has shown that this topos in the 
Renaissance, for instance, had a different meaning: Ulysses actually stopped his ears and 
became deaf to the cries of the feral Sirens.428 The whole Part Two of the book emphasized, in 
different ways, the fact that, throughout the nineteenth-century, Ulysses and sirens kept 
changing places, being irrevocably interlocked in one and the same image. But in Spiral 1: 
‘The Little Mermaid’, we saw how, at the fringes of the Victorian era, Kafka turned this topos 
up-side-down, making Ulysses use his eyes and not his ears as the tools of his hallucinatory 
revelation. In all the narratives we tackled – in the new, modern siren lore – visuality as a 
modality of knowledge eclipsed the previous predominance of orality. The Pre-Raphaelite 
visual field was no different regarding historical contingency: the Pre-Raphaelite artists shared 
their reveries and desires with the age that gave rise to them. But in the Victorian culture, this 
episode exploded in such a great number of images that James Joyce’s so obviously titled 
Ulysses is just one example from the edges of the Victorian age. Sirens, symbols of seduction 
and death, were called into existence in the nineteenth-century to epitomize and deal with a 
new form of modernity – with new gender roles and subjectivities, new types of spectacular 
pleasures. Their monstrosity, transformed into silence and virginity through the works of 
literature, was just one facet of the changes that pervaded the age as a whole.  
In this part, the book builds upon the conclusions of the previous chapters regarding 
changing places of Ulysses and the Sirens, as each other’s mirror images.  We follow the 
change of ‘Ulysses and the Sirens’ topos further into the Victorian visual field, with a clear 
understanding of the relationship of the topos with a peculiar Victorian scopophilia, reading 
Ulysses in different places, even if he is not represented – sometimes exactly because he is not 
represented. Sirens are monsters that are essentially relational: like Medusa and unlike the 
centaur, they need an object in order for their monstrosity to emerge. Without an object, without 
a Ulysses somewhere on the horizon, their existence is benign and meaningless. Thus we will 
see that in the images of mirrorless sirens in the Pre-Raphaelite painting we can always find a 
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Ulysses lurking, craving the gift of death they can bestow. In their mutual, sometimes silent 
relationship, in their narrative, sometimes expressed only in fragments, we can again find the 
topology of a male desiring subject and his appropriation of his own mirror image. This subject 
is essentially incoherent, bound to the Victorian scopic field in the corridors of the visual 
labyrinth, where he sleeps and dreams – of himself, of sirens. Not every nightmare is an ugly 
one. 
 
The Pre-Raphaelite Love 
 
September 1848, the year of revolutions: three young friends, painters and enthusiasts met 
in a house in Gower Street, off Bedford Square, London and signed a secret pact that marked 
the foundation of a group that would forever change the artistic face of England, if not Western 
Europe altogether. Their names were William Holman Hunt, John Everett Millais and Dante 
Gabriel Rossetti and they swore to oppose the traditional painting of the Royal Academy of 
Arts and express their own original world view. Their fervor was most in earnest and – being 
young and gifted – they felt it their duty to transform modern painting and give something 
different and true to the world: a new way of structuring perception. What they did not know, 
however, was that the little movement they called ‘Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood’ would prove 
as powerful as any social, political and artistic earthquake shaking Europe on a global scale at 
the time. Robin Ironside calls it ‘a small explosion,’429 but another late twentieth-century 
authority, Christopher Wood, asserts that ‘they set in motion an artistic revolution that was to 
have momentous consequences.’430 Derek Stanford even goes so far as to insist that ‘[i]n 
whatever direction we turn in the later nineteenth century, whatever seems new, proves, as 
likely as not, to have its roots in Pre-Raphaelitism.’431 So the importance of Pre-Raphaelitism, 
in its broadest sense, was tremendous. Their enthusiasm was a prophetic one, best captured in 
the words of Holman Hunt himself:  
 
If an open road ended in an impassable waste, we had to make a new way; it 
might be to push through the forest darkness, to root out venomous 
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undergrowth, to substitute wholesome stock, grafting these with shoots, to ripen 
hereafter for the refreshment of travelers overcome by their toilsome march.432 
 
The Brothers’ mission was to make a novel, fresh path for generations to come. Soon after 
the formation of the Brotherhood – an event that left history and transcended into a myth – four 
new members arrived; William Michael Rossetti, a writer, critic and chronicler of the 
Brotherhood, and also brother to Dante Gabriel Rossetti; James Collinson, a narcoleptic painter 
who soon left the Brotherhood and entered a Jesuit college in pursuit of priesthood; Frederick 
George Stephenson, who quit painting, became a critic and loyally defended the Brotherhood 
to its end; and Thomas Woolner (1825-1892), the only sculptor in the Brotherhood, who soon 
left for Australia after the initial founding of the alliance.433 With them a seven-member group 
had been established and the official story of the movement began. But Hunt the ‘reformer,’ 
Millais the ‘executant’ and Rossetti the ‘dreamer,’ as Percy H. Bate called them in 1901, were 
the real heart of the group, and each of them, in their own fashion, paved the way for others to 
follow.434 
 On the first day, the Brothers signed a manifesto that would guide them in their efforts to 
oppose the institutionalized contemporary painting. Michael Rossetti, who never truly became 
a painter, but took the role of the chronicler of the Brotherhood, said that what they fought for 
‘was simply this: 
 
to have genuine ideas to express; to study Nature attentively, so as to know how 
to express them; to sympathize with what is direct and serious and heartfelt in 
previous art, to the exclusion of what is conventional and self-parading and 
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learned by rote; and most indispensable of all, to produce thoroughly good 
pictures and statues.435 
 
 The manifesto spoke against the prevailing tide of triviality of the Grand Style that was 
embodied in the teachings of the Royal Academy of Arts. The Academy had utmost 
institutional power over the recognized artistic production at the time. And although the 
Brothers were all part of the community that they condemned fiercely, they continued to oppose 
the artificial chiaroscuro of the preceding centuries, determined as Wood says, ‘to paint with 
complete fidelity to nature, studying each figure from a model, and painting landscape on the 
spot, out-of-doors.’436 The walls of the annual Summer Royal Academy exhibition, the most 
prestigious event in the lives of young, aspiring artists of the time, were populated by 
uninventive historical scenes, still lives and portraits, all subjugated to the same rules of 
composition painted with one purpose: to be ‘beautiful.’ Madox Ford Brown, one of the 
external associates of the Brotherhood, who was for a short time a teacher of D. G. Rossetti 
and a precursor of their ideas, thought that the art of the age was caged in by conventions and 
rules that were utterly obsolete; that instead of rendering a painting beautiful, the focus should 
be on the reality of the represented action.437 The prevailing color of paintings tended to be 
dim-brown, engulfing them in a veil of somber despondency. The Brothers, on the other hand, 
argued that the real, true expression died after Raphael, and assumed the name ‘Pre-
Raphaelites’ so as to distinguish themselves from centuries of mannerisms, conventions and 
traditions of the Old Masters that came after, killing expression and suffocating the painting’s 
life, as the Brothers saw it. They found their inspiration in the Italian Quattrocento, venerating 
painters such as Giotto, and Fra Angelico, and resuscitated painting by using white plaster as a 
background on which colors shone vividly, luminously and full of life. The effect that their 
colors had on the public was astounding. Lionel Stevenson maintains that ‘their brilliant 
coloring almost hurt the eyes of the mid-nineteenth century, […] by the contrast of high lights 
and dim shadows and by death of perspective.’438 
The subjects they usually chose to depict were revolutionary as well. Historical scenes were 
commonplace in British painting, but the Pre-Raphaelites painted contemporary scenes under 
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the guise of historical ones.439 As we shall see, this technique was one of the true expressions 
of the age, when a distance emerged between the subject and the world. For Victorians, only 
by assuming a distance from the present, by shrouding it in the robes of historicism, history 
itself could be perceived and reality could be approached. But for now, it is sufficient to note 
that in their crusade for a different worldview, the Pre-Raphaelites, at times, emphasized 
contemporary social issues, addressing ‘risqué subjects,’ as John Dixon Hunt referred to them: 
fallen women, prostitution, brothels, madhouses, slums, anything that would ‘épater le 
bourgeois.’440 
 
The Wider Picture  
 
 Before we delve into a more detailed analysis of Pre-Raphaelite painting, it is very important 
to remark that what the Pre-Raphaelites did, what they fantasized about and craved for, was by 
no means an event ex nihilo, a revolution out of a cultural vacuum that abruptly discharged its 
electric power over the British artistic landscape. Nor was the revolution limited, in its reveries 
and its new worldview, to the Island and the Pre-Raphaelites alone. Wood argues that many of 
the novelties, in the technique as well as in the ideas, traditionally attributed to the first Pre-
Raphaelites, actually had their antecedents during the 1830s and the ‘hungry’ 1840s. The 
technique had been anticipated by artists such as William Mulready, who used white 
backgrounds for his paintings to emphasize their colors in the early 1840s. William Henry Hunt 
was ardent in his detailed visual rendering, ‘anticipat[ing] the Pre-Raphaelites’ reverence for 
the minutiae of nature.’441 Oriental scenes of John Frederick Lewis were familiar to the Pre-
Raphaelites, and the writings of Lord Lindsay and Mrs Jamesone had already played a part in 
resurrecting the interest in the early Italian ‘Christian’ art. Ford Madox Brown himself was 
engaged with another romantic German group called the Nazarenes who worked along the lines 
similar to the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood.442 On a wider scale, the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood 
inspired, directly or indirectly, a great number of painters, sculptors, poets, artists of all kinds, 
widely across Europe. Dixon Hunt’s discursive analysis of the Pre-Raphaelite imagination 
makes a particularly strong case for Pre-Raphaelitism as an aesthetic introduction into 
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Aestheticism and French Symbolism of the fin-de-siècle.443 French Impressionists, although 
disliked by the Pre-Raphaelites on the grounds of ‘mere transcription of the surface of 
nature,’444 also shared with them the ideational and technical mindscape, in their application of 
light, distinction between daylight, sunset and sunrise, and practice of painting en plein air. 
The formidable effect that Pre-Raphaelite ideas had on wider European audiences is the reason 
why William E. Freedman, in his seminal work Pre-Raphaelitism: A Bibliocritical Study, calls 
for broadening the term ‘Pre-Raphaelitism’ to include three different, but not mutually 
exclusive, stages of the phenomenon: The Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood of the mid-century, the 
Pre-Raphaelite Movement, and Pre-Raphaelitism, as ‘sequential terms descriptive of a 
continuous, if not unified aesthetic force.’445 This tripartite scheme corresponds to Wood’s first, 
second and third stage: the first stage is foundational for the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood (1848-
1860), embodied by the Brothers themselves, the period Quentin Bell calls ‘hard edge’446; the 
second corresponds with Pre-Raphaelitism and the Aesthetic Movement (1860-1890), adding 
William Morris and Edward Burne-Jones into the picture; their death, around the end of the 
century inaugurated the third phase (1890-1920), incarnated, most importantly, in the work of 
John William Waterhouse, whom Peter Trippi calls ‘the modern Pre-Raphaelite.’447 
‘Although the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood was established as a rebellion against Victorian 
art,’ observes Dixon Hunt, ‘it soon manifested interests and anxieties that link it intricately to 
the movement of mind and art in the period.’448 Something stronger than a simple artistic revolt 
manifested itself in the vehemence and devotion of the Brotherhood, an epistemic change 
burning its way behind their eyes and their brushes – a new visual order of representation that 
would restructure reality itself and become one more expression of the void out of which the 
Victorian subject, Ulysses the Spectator (accompanied by the sirens, or the other way round), 
would emerge. We will try to descend into that very void. 
Although the Brotherhood, as such, existed for a very brief period of time, after which it 
formally fell apart – Hunt went on his religious journey to Palestine, Woolner to Australia, 
Stephenson turned to art criticism, and Rossetti to his new ‘Oxford boys’, to Edward Burne-
Jones and William Morris – their ideas continued to live on in the form of a ‘continuity of 
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admiration,’449 as Dixon Hunt describes it. Their dream was trans-cultural; their legacy trans-
temporal. But what intrigues us here the most is how this dream of a new visual reality 
resonated with the rest of the Victorian culture; how, without even knowing, it absorbed the 
convulsions of the cultural unconscious and reproduced these spasms of imagination in the 
least conspicuous cultural products. We have already connected the Brotherhood with wider 
artistic tendencies of the nineteenth century, but it should be understood that something greater, 
stronger, more prodigious and innate to the age crept into their dreams, shaping their desires, 
inviting their eyes into the gaze of the world, personifying an epistemic change that transformed 
the cultural world from the ground up. The Pre-Raphaelites where children of the society of 
the spectacle, the one that brought the dream to the subject in the first place. As they painted 
their adulteresses, fallen women, saints in ragged clothes and angels, a new ocean of visual 
possibilities opened up in front and around them. It rested behind the eye, in a place emptied 
of meaning, in an unreachable place of the object of Pre-Raphaelite desire that gave birth to a 
new visual subject feeding on a void, on a distance of the subject from the world, from Being, 
from the ‘Real.’ Over this empty ocean without a beginning or end, the protagonist of our visual 
epic sails to embody the world that becomes a picture – Ulysses the Spectator has arrived. 
 
The Spectacle of the World 
 
It was, at first, as if the Brotherhood looked at the world without eyelids; for 
them, a livelier emerald twinkled in the grass, a purer sapphire melted into the 
sea. On the illuminated page that nature seemed to thrust before their dilated 
pupils, every floating, prismatic ray, each drifting filament of vegetation, was 
rendered, in all its complexity, with heraldic brilliance and distinctness; the floor 
of the forest was carpeted not merely with the general variegation of light and 
shadow, but was seen to be plumed with ferns receiving each in a particular 
fashion the shafts of light that fell upon them; there were not simply birds in the 
branches above, but the mellow ouzel was perceived, fluting in the elm.450 
 
 This elegiac paragraph, taken from Robin Ironside’s book The Pre-Raphaelite Painters, 
exquisitely captures the nature of Pre-Raphaelite naturalism. This new visual phenomenon 
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could be approached in terms of realism, which – taken in a wider artistic, literary and cultural 
context – would prove useful and true. But Holman Hunt himself insisted that the ‘Pre-
Raphaelite Brethren were never realists.’451 True, they were always more romantic than realist, 
which is why Ironside sees them as ‘one expression of that phase of the Romantic movement 
that was the flower of European reaction amid the ruins […] of the ambitious generalizations 
of 1789.’452 But in their effort to represent nature as accurately as possible, to ‘make us feel 
that every blade of grass is a window into the infinite,’453 sometimes they went to great lengths 
to dissolve the vision into details of reality. A couple of examples will, without doubt, throw 
some light on this new phenomenon: when painting Ophelia, a beautiful stream-bound cadaver 
of a young drowned female, Millais had Elisabeth Siddal lying in a tub full of water until she 
got sick, so that he could catch all the peculiarities of a half-submerged physicality454; when 
dealing with a subject of the underwater world in his The Depths of the Sea, Burne-Jones 
actually borrowed a large tank filled with a green-blue tint from his friend and colleague Henry 
Holiday who used it for the same purpose while creating his picture Das Rheingold455; Ford 
Madox Brown borrowed some pictures of Italy from William Michael Rossetti which he used 
for painting the background for his Romeo and Juliet,456 and so on. On the surface, it seems as 
if the artists were just concerned with the exactness of their representation, but seen in a wider 
cultural context, what they expressed, every single one of them, was a new vision of reality. 
This panoptic approach to the real, penetrating the interstices of physicality, was an artistic 
counterpart of the wider ‘exhibitionary’ issues of the Victorian culture. 
At the time of the Brothers’ most fervent efforts and their greatest struggles with the 
authority of the Academy, other important events took place in London, Europe and the western 
world in general. We are going back to the event we have already discussed from another 
perspective, namely, the perspective of commodities and visual and semantic overload. On 
May 1st 1851, the same day the annual Royal Academy exhibition was held, a monstrous glass 
project of Sir Joseph Paxton, the Crystal Palace, opened its doors to the public in Hyde Park. 
The Great Exhibition of 1851 began and in the six months that followed, about six million 
people visited the exhibition, which, at that time, corresponded to one-third of the British 
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population. The audiences were stunned. Inside the Palace the whole world was put on display. 
The bedazzled visitors wandered through the architectural giant and encountered new miracles 
of technology, experienced a new magic of Orient, or consumed a new commodity at every 
corner. The official descriptive and illustrated catalogue of the event (the monstrously 
confusing one) lists exhibitors, not only from all over Britain, but also from its ‘Colonies and 
Dependencies’ and 44 ‘Foreign States’ of Europe and the Americas.457 13,000 in total, the 
exhibits included a Jacquard loom, an envelope machine, kitchen appliances, steel-making 
displays and a reaping machine sent from the United States.458 An average rate was 42,823 
visitors per day, culminating on October 7th with 109,915 visitors.459 For an ordinary visitor, it 
must have seemed like the whole world was there within the reach of the hand, contracted into 
one building, one single piece of space and time, and in that piece, the whole history of human 
progress appeared to be enveloped. In this new visual spectacle, every spectator could find their 
own place in the general grid of things, which unfolded backwards into the past and forward 
into the future. Walter Benjamin, in The Arcades Project, cites A. J. Wiertz, a Belgian romantic 
painter and sculptor, who commented on the Exhibition:  
 
What strikes one at first is not at all the things people are making today but the 
things they will be making in the future. The human spirit begins to accustom 
itself to the power of matter.460 
 
This illuminating insight from the 1870s reflects profoundly on the way people interacted 
with the phenomenon of world fairs. The Great Exhibition was not an exception but part of a 
trend, an expression of a new visual ordering of the reality that was uniquely Victorian.461 All 
at once, the world was in a place where the reality presented itself in one stroke of spatial 
architecture, as the world and the age became a picture. 
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 The evolutionary, orientalist and epistemic causes and consequences of world fairs have 
been thoroughly investigated, and studies on these issues will prove useful for the background 
of our search for the Victorian subject.462 But our focus is on how this new way of perceiving 
the reality, or rather the new way of producing the reality as such, corresponded to the structural 
level of Pre-Raphaelite painting. As we draw lines between these two revolutionary 
phenomena, we will see a new, peculiarly Victorian subject emerging from a void in 
representation in the age the world became a picture. He emerges from the illusion of coherence 
of his own appropriated mirror reflection, the illusion that introduces the subject into language 
where he dies as Being so he can emerge as meaning. The age of the world picture is the age 
of the mirror image. The age of the mirror image is the age of the subject’s birth as aphanasis. 
 ‘Initially, the word “picture” makes one think of a copy of something,’ says Martin 
Heidegger, as he penetrates the spectacle of the modern era. ‘This would make the world 
picture, as it were, a painting of beings as a whole. But “world picture” means more than this. 
We mean by it the world itself.’463 As we stand in front of the world picture and grasp a new 
reality in the optical order of ‘the Panorama, the Cosmorama, the Diorama, the Europorama 
and the Uranorama’464 we are witnessing not the representation of the world, but the world 
itself, emptied of Being and shrunk to a sign. As we look at it, this world keeps receding, 
because the nineteenth-century perception of reality keeps losing itself in the circles of 
representation. Timothy Mitchell marvelously deconstructs the phenomenon of exhibitions, 
concluding that world exhibitions represent the world and construct reality as a representation, 
as something different and detached from reality itself. But, as it was obvious to the eastern 
visitors – whose ordering of reality did not follow the same structural rules of a distance 
between representation and Being – once they had left the exhibition, they realized that the rest 
of the city – and the western world for that matter – kept producing the same representation in 
circles. ‘Everything seemed to be set up as though […] it were the model or the picture of 
something,’ explains Mitchell, ‘arranged before an observing subject into a system of 
signification, declaring itself to be a mere object, a mere “signifier of” something further.’465 
However, this labyrinth of representation that kept reproducing itself was a precondition and a 
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464 Mitchell, ‘World as Exhibition,’ 220. These are all devices for conveying a panoptic view – invented, 
constructed and displayed over the course of the nineteenth century. Their names differ according to their objects.  
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consequence of the dream of modernity. ‘The real has to be sought beyond the dream – in what 
the dream has enveloped, hidden from us,’466 says Lacan, and, as we have seen in mirror and 
siren narratives, modernity kept dreaming this beyond. It was a fundamental fantasy that 
supported the existence of a new shattered subject, a subject that mirrored within himself this 
perpetual reaching out for the Real that never stopped backing away. In this labyrinth, the 
Victorian male subject was born as a sign, at the expense of his own Being. 
Heidegger argues that this fundamental change in perception, where the representation of 
Being is foregrounded, put in front of us as a reality, is the condition of Being in the modern 
era. To represent something means that  
 
the matter itself stands in the way it stands to us, before us. […] Understood in 
an essential way, “world picture” does not mean “picture of the world” but, 
rather, the world grasped as a picture. […] Whenever we have a world picture, 
an essential decision occurs concerning beings as a whole. The being of beings 
is sought and found in the representedness of beings. Where, however, beings 
are not interpreted in this way, the world, too, cannot come into the picture – 
there can be no world picture.467 
 
In the age where the world has become a picture, a being acquires its Being only by being 
represented, so the main epistemic condition for the modern being to come to being is to be 
absorbed and eclipsed by meaning. This paragraph leads us to the conclusion that in order for 
the subject to be, he has to acquire a distance from Being. So, paradoxically, in order to be, the 
subject has to die as Being, so that a sign – understood as radically divorced from Being – can 
be born. For Heidegger, the ‘representedness’ of Being and the emergence of the subject are 
two sides of the same coin, the essence of modernity.468 
 Distance is exactly what we have been aiming at in the age of the world picture. The moment 
when the world became a picture, when the subject took his mirror image as his reality, when 
Being changed its epistemic precondition requiring a distance in order to be, is the moment 
when a new subject appeared, the one that required the same distance from Being itself. 
Therefore, in this new visual order of the world, the world was grasped as a panorama of reality, 
                                                 
466 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 
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from a specific panoptic and deeply penetrating viewpoint – from the outside of the reflection. 
As a precondition of his own arrival, this new subject, had to die as Being so that he could be 
born as a sign – aphanasis. 
 The nineteenth century assumes this new way of capturing reality through a process that 
Tony Bennett calls the ‘exhibitionary complex,’469 but the term ‘denuding of culture’ would 
suit it better, emphasizing its voyeuristic nature. Tony Bennett quite shrewdly observes, 
building upon the work of Michel Foucault on prisons and asylums that the world had 
transformed into a public spectacle in the nineteenth century by opening previously restricted 
areas of culture to the public, like museums and fairs. Timothy Mitchell adds theaters, zoos 
and botanic gardens to the list – all the little heterotopias where the world was put on display.470 
But, these public spaces were not all there was to it. By the turn of the century, Dean 
MacCannell notes, visitors to Paris  
 
were given tours of the sewers, the morgue, a slaughterhouse, a tobacco factory, 
the government printing office, a tapestry works, the mint, the stock exchange 
and the supreme court in session.471 
 
This process of disclosing restricted spaces to wider audiences is much more than an 
exhibition. It is an exhibition, for sure, but by gazing at the intestines of the society and culture, 
into excrement, dead meat and decaying human flesh, the Victorian era became not only 
exhibitionary, but also morbidly exhibitionistic, scopophilic and voyeuristic, revealing a new 
desire that revolved around an abject wish to see and be seen. Bennett sees this as a structural 
panopticon by concluding that the world on display at exhibitions was, in return, visually 
controlled by visitors who were also on display.472 But, being concerned with other issues, he 
failed to perceive the profound resonance between this panopticon and the voyeuristic desire 
of the age. In this novel sweep of scopic fantasy, the spectator, the tourist, stands not only as a 
perceiver of things, he stands as a voyeur, taking pleasure in this distance, inviting the Other, 
the culture he is peeping at, into his own exhibitionistic fantasy, enacting the loop of the scopic 
drive out of which Ulysses the Voyeur appears.  
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In Lacanian theory, a drive secures satisfaction (jouissance obtained) in the face of desire’s 
inability to attain the impossible objet a, the only thing with which it can be satisfied. Lacan 
distinguishes the aim and the goal of the drive. While the aim of the drive is inevitably inhibited 
because ultimate satisfaction (jouissance expected) is impossible, the goal of the drive 
(jouissance obtained) is always attained because the very path and restlessness of the drive is 
its goal, a movement that always brings satisfaction. By circling around an objet a, the drive 
brings the Other into play, in enacting its passive aspect – for example, to be seen. This ‘inviting 
of the Other’ is fundamental for the drive’s return and results in the appearance of the subject. 
‘The appearance of ein neues Subjekt [is] to be understood as follows,’ says Lacan,  
 
not in the sense that there is already one, namely the subject of the drive, but in 
that what is new is the appearance of a subject. This subject, which is properly 
the other, appears insofar as the drive has been able to show its circular course. 
It is only with its appearance at the level of the Other that what there is of the 
function of the drive may be realized.473 
 
Ulysses, as the other face of Victorian sirens, enacts his visual fantasy of strangeness, 
uncanniness and incoherence, reaching for a whole that has never been and will never be, 
perpetually caught in the dissatisfaction of desire, caught in the loops of the scopic drive, 
appearing from the loops of the drive. Therefore, out of the distance that opened up between 
Being and the subject, the spectator and the world, in a world that became a picture, a mirror 
image, the Victorian male subject emerged as a fundamentally broken, split subject, whose 
Being died as soon as he emerged as the effect of the signifier. Aphanasis of the subject was 
the new reality of the Victorian age. 
 
 
 
From Naturalism to Exhibitionism  
 
After this excursus into the exhibitionistic nature of the Victorian visual field, we shall go 
back to the naturalism, or ‘realism’ of Pre-Raphaelite painting. The intense Pre-Raphaelite 
insistence on a panoptic, overarching view of their chosen subjects – a ‘cult of detailization’ or 
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a ‘poetry of particulars’474 as Derek Stanford calls it – stands in line with the process of cultural 
voyeurism. Some time before the actual founding of the Brotherhood, in a period when Hunt 
and Millais were still only discussing their desire for change in their work, Hunt came to Millais 
with a copy of Modern Painters, burning with enthusiasm and urging his friend to read the 
book that he felt was talking directly to him. In it the author, John Ruskin, one of the most loyal 
defenders of the Brotherhood, brought the importance of their artistic ideas to the fore by 
saying:  
 
[The artist] should go to Nature in all singleness of heart, and walk with her 
laboriously and trustingly, having no other thoughts but how best to penetrate 
her meaning, and remember her instruction; rejecting nothing, selecting 
nothing, and scoring nothing; believing all things to be right and good, and 
rejoicing always in the truth.475 
 
The influence Ruskin and other figures, such as Rossetti, had on Hunt, especially the 
astonishing eloquence and pertinence of Modern Painters, cannot be emphasized enough. The 
book itself and this quote in particular, went straight to the heart of the Pre-Raphaelite myth. 
Audrey Williamson describes it as a ‘revolutionary work, which helped to inspire a whole 
generation of young artists; and it set a pattern for descriptive and imaginative criticism, in all 
branches of the arts […].’476 Although, of course, it is impossible for an artist to grasp 
everything and omit nothing, it is clear that some of the Pre-Raphaelites – Holman Hunt 
particularly – took Ruskin’s words almost religiously, as a sacrament leading him to his own 
artistic enlightenment. We can see this clearly in his Awakened Consciousness (1853) (fig. 24), 
where a fallen woman is caught in the act of adultery, while a hyper-abundance of objects and 
details threatens to drown the eye of the spectator in the confusion and sharpness of the new 
naturalism. We can also see this in the more class-aware Work (1863) (fig. 25) by Ford Madox 
Brown, a painting that takes a truly panoramic and panoptic view of a workday street; or we 
can see it in a masterpiece Ophelia (1852) (fig. 26) by John Millais, where the realism of the 
plants was, at the time, almost uncanny.  
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Figure 24 William Holman Hunt, Awakened Consciousness (1853) 
 
This new attitude towards composition, a way of divulging reality to the eye of the viewer, 
an overload of details that exhaust the viewer, runs parallel with the exhibitionism of Victorian 
world fairs. Annual Royal Academy exhibitions, or the exhibitions in the prestigious, more 
progressive, Grosvenor Gallery in Bond Street, were structurally not so different from the rest 
of the exhibitions of the age. Dozens of paintings hung densely on the high walls of the 
Academy, lined one next to the other, every painting a miniature of the world, the gaze of the 
era caught in between. In an age without television, cinema or the internet, nineteenth-century 
artists were like movie stars, and the annual exhibitions places of worship and rejection. In 
these halls, visual rules of culture were being established; a new bare, devastated and distressed 
modernity was being created. In order for the Victorian modernity to be, a representational 
distance towards Being was necessary, and we can see this act in the strength of Pre-Raphaelite 
naturalism that stripped the reality bare, so that it could expose it (as though) at an exhibition. 
Culture was stripped bare in these paintings, leaving a void in representation, a distance or a 
blank space of Being, allowing the Victorian subject to appear.  
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Figure 25 Ford Madox Brown, Work (1863) 
 
But in dealing with the emergence of the subject, in dealing with his birth, it is not possible 
to order events in a linear fashion, arguing for the precedence of one over the other. We are 
still dealing only with the symptoms of the age, where what we are looking at is not what we 
wish to see. And our wish is to go deeper into the existential register of the age, and delimit a 
particular desire that revolves around this core, this distance, around this objet a, a phantom 
object that the desiring subject is yearning for but cannot reach, permanently circling around 
that void that cries, implores, and beseeches him – coherence, Being, the Real, death. This void 
got unleashed across all forms of cultural expression – material, visual, and textual, but in this 
part of the books we shall deal with the visual aspect of the representational rupture, ever 
searching for the hopelessness of the Victorian desiring subject. And we shall find the subject 
emerging from the void in the wake of the voyeurism of the scopic drive, to express and re-
signify a denuded, exposed culture, and we shall follow him back to the nothingness of his 
mirror image from which he came, only to be born again in loops of never-ending 
representational horror.  
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Figure 26 John Everett Millais, Ophelia (1852) 
 
The Arrival 
 
Let us imagine: from a far-away, half-forgotten time Ulysses steers a vessel of dreams. On 
the deck, chained to the mast of a broken, disrupted representation, the eternal voyager-dreamer 
gazes into the terrifying Sirens’ faces. He is struggling, trying to break free, but the more he 
struggles the stronger the ropes get. Every new effort, every new dream of congruity, every 
effort of transcending his mirror-induced split, is getting him closer to his own doom. We 
assume that his ship struggles bound for the putrid, decomposing island of the Sirens, but as 
we can see with John William Waterhouse (fig. 1) and Herbert James Draper (fig. 27), the 
Victorian sirens/mermaids are not waiting on the rotting shore, but are besieging him from up 
close.477 He listens, but the sirens are silent; he gazes, but what he sees is only an illusion, a 
fantasy, Franz Kafka says.478 Ulysses is in a trance as his desire pulls him towards the dark, 
watery depths and he leaves his small isolated piece of ground rocked by the waves, says 
Edward Burne-Jones, to drown his soul and his Being in an irresistible embrace of a mirrorless 
mermaid.479 This is to be the final resting place of the Victorian Ulysses, at the somber and 
troubling bottom of the sea, inside the horrid crack of representation. Ulysses is to fall through 
his own mirror image, reaching out for coherence. But his desire for Being comes as a 
nightmare, because Ulysses actually desires death itself. 
 
                                                 
477 Ulysses and the Sirens (1891) by John William Waterhouse and Ulysses and the Sirens (1909) by Herbert 
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Figure 27 Herbert James Draper, Ulysses and the Sirens (1909) 
  
The game of seduction and restraint had been played for centuries and millennia, until 
Ulysses finally arrived at the Victorian shores and landed in their visual field. And there – he 
drowned, so as to be born again as a sign. For Ulysses had not been prepared for the void that 
opened up in front of him – on his very boat, between his very feet – in the form of a whirlpool 
that devastates and consumes all life and all knowledge. And as he gazed into nothingness, and 
gave himself to the empty horror of desire, his Being left his body never to return, morphing 
him into a picture, a spectacle, a performance, chaining him to a seat in an all-consuming and 
all-representing show. The eternal Wanderer became a Spectator, peeping through a keyhole 
at the society of spectacle, his body slowly turning into a commodity, and his soul into an 
exhibit, just one more commodity, like the heart of Carrington’s Siren. Seeing himself at the 
ever-lasting exhibition of humanity, Ulysses died as Being and rose from the ashes as a sign, 
caught in the voyeurism of the Victorian culture.  
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Figure 28 John William Waterhouse, Circe Offering the Cup to Ulysses (1891) 
 
Ulysses – our Victorian hero and the Siren’s inalienable complement – the Siren’s mirror 
image, if we are to believe the siren literature of the age, could appear in the world that became 
a picture only at the expense of his own Being, because the Ulysses we are talking about is the 
one that manifests himself only as a sign. We can see this, for instance, in the painting Circe 
Offering the Cup to Ulysses (1891) (fig. 28), by John William Waterhouse. The witch Circe is 
seducing our Ulysses into a corporeal transformation, but he appears only in a mirror behind 
her tremendous, arcane body, revealing his coherent existence only as a reflection, only as a 
sign, a call of the Other on the threshold of subjectivity. 
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Figure 29 William Whitley, A Sail! (1898) 
 
William Whitley also caught this moment perfectly in his work A Sail! (1898) (fig. 29). In 
this painting, we see a jugged sea rock engulfed by a hysterical, raging sea, waves crashing 
onto the hard surface of the sirens’ rocky lair. On the rock, the sirens in their human disguise 
call and lure the ship in the distance, exposing their bodies to the voyeuristic gaze of the 
nineteenth century. These sirens are human, they have legs, but the context of the painting is 
obvious. The plainness of the scene would be enough to show us the bareness of cultural 
expression, but we should account for the ship that disappears in the upper left-hand corner, 
hinted at only by the title. The ship is all but invisible, rendered as a mirage amid dense sunset 
fog, and it reveals itself only to a very keen eye. The only reason we would even look for it are 
the nude bodies of the seductresses that signal Ulysses for us, and the title that signals to us 
that there is A Sail! in the picture. So we gaze into the painting only to understand that the 
Ulysses we are looking for has disappeared altogether, turned into a sign, conveyed only by 
language of his arrival. Ulysses has been chained in the visual spectacle of the age of the world 
picture, and what he left behind is a void that he himself brought on his vessel woven out of 
dreams. 
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Figure 30 Lajos Márk, Sirens' Nest (1900) 
 
In 1900, at the Universal Exhibition in Paris, Lajos Márk, a Hungarian painter, exhibited a 
painting called Sirens’ Nest (fig. 30).480 Following the usual line of fin-de-siècle ‘idols of 
perversity,’ Dijkstra describes it as  
 
showing a nest of sirens stylishly coiffed in turn-of-the-century hairdos, all 
remarkably naked, receiving offers of gold and jewelry from a massed throng 
of madly desirous – who could blame them? – males of all ages. It was 
abundantly clear from Márk’s image that the impetuous fervor of their male 
admirers was likely to end in a fall from the precipitous cliffs on which they 
were huddled in the throes of temptation.481 
 
Yet, keeping in mind the argument about the exhibitionism of the era, and the role the 
Victorian painting of sirens and mermaids played in it, what we discover in the painting is a 
nest of sirens on display, bodies exhibited as if on stage, a performance of a denuded culture to 
be consumed, a culture whose representational loops never end. As we gaze into the picture, 
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we become aware of the painted audience’s gaze and, in the loop of the drive in its search for 
satisfaction, the gaze of the audience is diverted back to us, transforming the spectator into 
Ulysses the Voyeur once again. There is only a slight slip of the tongue between Ulysses the 
Voyeur (the Spectator) and Ulysses the Voyageur (the Tourist), and not even that much cultural 
space between them. 
Many other contemporary paintings structurally deal with the topic of the sirens’ 
exhibitionism and the death/birth of the Victorian male subject.482 All of them feature a more 
or less secluded scene, where the spectator sits behind a peephole in a show, feeling like an 
uninvited guest, participating in the loop of the visual drive of the painter’s desire. The 
paintings all appear from this loop, pushing the split subject into the fore. Close framed, 
submerged into silence and calm backgrounds, as in a somewhat later painting The Echo (1911) 
(fig. 31) by Jean-François Auburtin, these paintings bring the void of the sirens’ representation 
into the picture. Victorian mermaid and siren paintings actually stand for the picture of the 
world. They are a playground of the visual coquetry that circles around the rupture, the 
unfathomable objet a, around the lack of the world in the process of appropriation of its 
reflected image – the loss of Being, of the self, eternally caged in an abject call of the Other. 
 
 
Figure 31 Jean-François Auburtin, The Echo (1911) 
 
                                                 
482 For instance, J. Humphreys Johnston’s The Mystery of the Night (1898), Gustav Moreau’s The Poet and the 
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Introducing the Fragments 
 
Edward Burne-Jones and John William Waterhouse were stars of the Victorian art world. 
Both of them were, at least for a time, members of the Royal Academy, but the thoughts and 
creations of both were part of the Pre-Raphaelite mindscape.483 John William Waterhouse was 
the younger of the two, and his more classical choice of topics occasionally got him excluded 
from Pre-Raphaelite studies. Wood assumes that he was excluded from one of the first 
comprehensive works on Pre-Raphaelitism, that of Percy H. Bate, on the grounds of his being 
a follower of Leighton, who dedicated himself more to classical than medieval imagery.484 On 
the other hand, Edward Burne-Jones was a clear, bright, shining star of the movement, tapping 
the very source of Pre-Raphaelite inspiration. He was a protégé of Dante Gabriel Rossetti and 
artistically came of age on the wings of Dante’s uniquely charismatic and medievalist 
imagination. He followed the philosophy of the Brotherhood in his own way, with a bent for 
fantasy, painting angels, sirens, knights, sorceresses and other characters of his extraordinary 
dream world, earning the title of a ‘licensed escapist’485 in the process. D. G. Rossetti called 
him ‘one of the nicest fellows in Dreamland,’486 while Aubrey Beardsley considered him ‘the 
greatest living artist of Europe.’487 Both of the artists – together with everything Victorian for 
that matter – ostensibly faded away after World War I, Waterhouse dying in 1917, as the war 
raged on, Burne-Jones long before that, in 1898. But, during the Victorian revival, after the 
World War II, and particularly during the 1970s, they both came into the spotlight, as the 
academic material on Pre-Raphaelitism started piling up. John Russell Taylor said in The Times 
in 1978 that Waterhouse was ‘not a forgotten painter; it is just that nobody remember[ed] 
him.’488 
 A thing that Burne-Jones and Waterhouse had in common, a passion that they shared with 
their age, was their obsession with female beauty – a particular type of beauty that Dixon Hunt 
                                                 
483 Burne-Jones was a member only briefly. During that short period he exhibited The Depths of the Sea, the work 
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calls ‘Rossetti’s ideal.’489 This gorgeous, majestic, fantastic figure, that was ‘ubiquitous in her 
desultory existence’490 would eventually be appropriated by Art Nouveau artists, where its 
grandeur of expression would become a vehicle of design, a mere decoration, emptied of its 
raging, irrational fullness.491 But this wide-eyed, red-haired glamazon appears with both 
painters as a devious virgin-monster, hiding behind its relationship to Ulysses the topology of 
the Victorian male subject. This larger than life figure is the one we will be dealing with.  
 Waterhouse and Burne-Jones approached sirens in their own unique fashion: Waterhouse 
being overzealous where details of facial expression were concerned, Burne-Jones painting 
them in a transcendental, otherworldly fashion. While Waterhouse’s ‘nymphs and goddesses 
[as] flesh-and-blood people’492 call the viewer to drown in the depth of their minutely painted 
faces, Burne-Jones’s are offering nothingness, as if their being was all but erased. Nevertheless, 
both types convey their monstrosity at the level of visual language. By penetrating the surface 
of two impressive siren/mermaid paintings created by these unique minds, we shall show that 
the realism, abstraction and plainness of Burne-Jones’ mermaids, and the naturalism of their 
Waterhouse’s counterparts, although on the surface the antipodes of one another, were actually 
two sides of the same phenomenon that ran deeper in their background. Both nothingness and 
hyper-naturalism were parts of a new visual approach to Being, expressions of a denuding of 
culture in the voyeuristic spectacle of consumption. Sirens and mermaids of the era stood in 
the center of the world picture, signifiers robbed of their signified. Their monstrosity was an 
expression of the inability of language to convey the impossibility of their existence, and this 
inability was a uniquely Victorian issue; it carried the subject away from ‘here’ to the 
‘elswhere’ of the void – the non-Being of language. In the next two chapters/fragments 
dedicated to two of the most cherished Victorian painters, we shall see how monstrosity appears 
in the field of the visual drive announcing once again the chained Ulysses of the modern age. 
The Pre-Raphaelite mermaids/sirens are as much subjects and protagonists as the 
mermaids/sirens from the literature – protagonist of their own visual narratives, succumbing to 
the same relationship of the male subject to a female monstrous body. We shall follow the 
language of Waterhouse’s A Mermaid and Burne-Jones’ The Depths of the Sea focusing on the 
ways in which it conveys the never-ending horror of the Victorian male subject – Ulysses the 
Chained, the Spectator, the Voyeur. Both representations of mermaids have the same nodal 
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reference point, an unapproachable black heart of desire that Lacan calls objet a – an 
inexpressible break in signification rising from the appropriated mirror image of the age. 
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FRAGMENT 1: PEEPING OF THE VICTORIAN SUBJECT 
 
Whatever it is, I must go there. 
Sigmund Freud 
 
 The semiotic incongruence of a monster’s body leads the eye of a viewer through uncanny, 
peculiar loops: not to the image of the body, not even through that image, but right back to the 
eye itself. Although every representation involves this interplay between a viewer and an 
image, looking at a monstrous figure results in a particularly painful restructuring of the eye in 
the process. The viewer’s gaze vivisects this impossible representation, but this game of 
meanings, the restlessness of signs as they unfold in a signifying chain, is only a game of 
appearances. What happens beyond appearances? What becomes of the desiring subject in this 
game? Or, pertinent for this book, what becomes of the male desiring subject that comes into 
existence only as the effect of a sign? A picture is always only an external screen, a façade 
hiding the subject from the unwanted, meddling gaze, but it is possible to peer into the picture 
and plunge through, to pierce the screen of the image and go deeper into the background, if one 
only knows how to look. The act of looking is at stake here, because ‘what I look at is never 
what I wish to see.’493 
 How does one look at a picture and insinuate oneself into the world of the visual? What is 
there to be witnessed beyond a picture and how does the subject relate to the act of witnessing? 
What is needed is a cautious gaze, not one that feeds on the obvious and the given, but one that 
lingers between words, between signs, detecting meaning, and thus, desire itself. When one 
plays in the field of the scopic drive, in the realm where what matters is not so much what one 
sees, but where the act of seeing comes from and leads to, one has to lose oneself completely 
in order to find one’s way. The heart of every picture is an elusive, hollow place where the 
object of desire resides. It cannot be reached nor seen, but it lingers there signalling, 
conditioning, and challenging the desire that will never be satisfied. Thus visual drive, once 
awakened and feeding on desire’s desperation, relapses into its source, delimiting the phantom 
object, re-enacting the subject’s fall. It is exactly this path, the boomerang-shaped path of the 
scopic drive, which we will try to pursue here. As we meditate on the painting A Mermaid by 
John William Waterhouse, the pleasures of visual coquetry of seeing and being seen will lead 
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us, through the artist’s desire, to the nineteenth-century male desiring subject who created it 
and his relation to visual representation. It shall become clear that A Mermaid is the Victorian 
male subject’s (Waterhouse’s, in the last instance) mirror image, a screen that merges Ulysses 
and his Siren into one and the same image. Victorian sirens lost their mirrors because they 
came to embody the desiring subject himself, and we shall see that the structure we found in 
the written siren narratives, persists through the visual mermaid/siren culture as well: Ulysses 
is always ‘in the picture,’ even if he is not there. As it was the case with all the other 
siren/mermaid narratives analysed so far, monstrous bodies are, essentially, the male subject’s 
expression of, and interaction with, himself.  
 The male Victorian subject appears in all his glory as an essentially disrupted self, one that 
gorges himself on his own dissolution and destruction. In other places, we called him Alice, 
we called him The Little Mermaid, and we called him the Siren. Here, we call him Ulysses 
(and we will call him A Mermaid), owing to his essential dependence on his murdering 
enchantress, the mermaid (in accordance with the painting we are about to analyse). Ulysses 
arrives as a fundamentally seduced subject in the spectacle of the world. He appears as a split, 
spasmodic self once the world becomes an exhibition, once the mirrors are widely introduced 
into everyday life, and once he dies as Being in order to be. In his core, gasping for air from 
the dark chasm of his non-Being, lies the same note, the same rhapsody of a gap and a perpetual 
lack around which the unconscious weaves its web. What is this formidable place and how can 
we approach it? By following A Mermaid in a spiral, centrifugal stroke, we shall empty the 
painting of its meanings and reach out for the unsignifiable part of the subject’s desire – his 
objet a. This attempt – both rewarding and futile from the very start – will leave us empty-
handed. But these empty hands are exactly what we need, for in them we shall find that which 
is lacking – the object of Waterhouse’ desire – the lost, fundamentally absent, core of the 
Victorian subject. 
The best way to approach nothingness and depict the path of the visual drive in pursuit of 
its lacking goal, is to start from the obvious, from what we know and what has already been 
given to us – what ‘gives itself’ to us. Searching in a picture for an object always already lost, 
the objet a, is never an easy task for a viewer. He (we will presume a ‘he,’ since we are dealing 
with the male phantasy of sirens and with a male subject) has to follow the crumbs left by the 
artist, he has to dive into a mosaic with no order and no meaning, and what he brings back with 
him is, in the last instance, his own lack, his own desire. Thus, these crumbs do not lead 
anywhere, because the object has been lost in the first place. Nevertheless, this is precisely 
where the viewer’s gaze has to go, so he has to lose himself right from the start.  
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This crusade for emptiness involves two separate modes of temporality at the intersection 
between perception and consciousness, forming the ‘interval that separates them, in which the 
place of the Other is situated, in which the subject is instituted.’494 At one level, the viewer sees 
the picture, he perceives it as a whole, arranging all the crumbs, all the clues that the drive – in 
its return to the source – has left for him. At this point, the viewer is drawn into the picture; the 
picture ensnares him, flashing his own desire back at him. At another level, the viewer discerns 
the marks of the path; he becomes conscious of the symbolic baggage left for him. On the 
surface, he decides to abandon his desire and to go along the path, hoping to attain the 
mysterious object that imperceptibly seduces him from the heart of the picture. This conscious 
abandonment is just an illusion, though, because one way or another, the subject who looks at 
the painting merges with the subject that emerges from the painting. This merging disrupts the 
ostensible continuum of the picture, enlisting the subject in the gap of the unconscious that 
Lacan, after Freud, calls die Idee einer anderer Lokalität,495 the Other’s playground between 
perception and consciousness.  
 
The Fall 
 
A Mermaid, John William Waterhouse’s final diploma work for the Royal Academy, saw 
the light of day in 1900, when it was shown in a public display for the first time (fig. 32). The 
painting stands at the end of a relatively long line of sketches and exercises on the same subject. 
On a 96.5 x 66.6 cm canvas, we face a mermaid in a private act of combing her hair. She dwells 
in a secluded alcove walled by rocks, her tail ‘tucked almost felinely beneath her.’496 Her red, 
burning hair falls softly down her curved body, long red wisps touching the body’s nonhuman 
lower part. Her arm is stretched fully in the act of combing, while her gaze disappears 
somewhere in the distance, halfway between the spectator and the background. Right next to 
her, we see a cornucopia of pearls in a shell that reminds us of a seaborne treasure washed upon 
the shore.497  
 
                                                 
494 Ibid., 45. 
495 Ibid., 56. 
496 Meghan Edwards, ‘The Devouring Woman and Her Serpentine Hair in Late Pre-Raphaelitism,’ last modified 
26 December 2004, viewed 14 December 2012, http://www.victorianweb.org/painting/prb/edwards12.html. 
497 Nina Auerbach, Woman and the Demon: The Life of a Victorian Myth (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 
England: Harvard University Press, 1982), 64. 
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Figure 32 John William Waterhouse, A Mermaid (1900) 
 
The water in the alcove is tranquil, as gentle waves roll pebbles in the shoal. Titanic rocks 
enclose the little dwelling place of this sensuous, calm and benevolent being. The scene is 
luminous, indicating (like in every Victorian siren narrative) high noon, the siren’s time, where 
everything gets dispersed and all secrets are revealed, as low tide brings forth the marvels of 
sea depths.498 The mermaid’s lips are slightly apart, suggesting a millennia-old siren song. The 
                                                 
498 The heat of the summer or high-noon is traditionally the sirens’ time. Almost every siren narrative from the 
Odyssey to the Victorian England features this element. Apart from the Odyssey where we see wax malting in 
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general sentiment of the painting follows a soft mermaid lullaby: familiar with the 
mermaid/siren lore, we can almost feel her caressing us with her soothing voice, the heat of the 
hour making us dizzy and sleepy, the velvety waves rocking our half-conscious mind. But as 
it is always the case with paintings of mermaids, the creature begging for our company with 
her indolent gaze and the hypnotic movement of her hand attaches herself to the core of our 
own ruptured self, the stretched hand reaching into the split, right into our unconscious, 
uncovering fear, anxiety and desire. In every painting there is always more than meets the eye. 
Exhibitionistic like the age it embodies (and a clear objectification of monstrous flesh), this 
painting spreads out of a violated coherence that is introduced by the mermaid’s inconceivable 
body. As Nina Auerbach says, commenting on another Victorian, Pre-Raphaelite mermaid, ‘the 
mermaid arrests us because nonhumanity in human form looks out at us.’499 We, the viewers, 
are Ulysses too, subjects born out of the enticement of the visual spectacle, and if we look 
deeper into the painting, beyond the gentle gaze of the mermaid, we will see our own ejected 
Being and perceive the path of desire that encompasses the visual field of the late nineteenth 
century. In this painting something is missing, something is eluded and refused, something that 
preys upon the ecstasy of the gaze, where the subject faces his own loss, his own lair of 
monstrosity. Between the obvious and the expected, between what one sees and what one 
wishes to see, lies an infinite punctiform space of creation and fear that spreads centrifugally 
from the heart of the picture. If we look hard enough into the place which is not there, we will 
meet the lack of the subject who created the painting, which is the same as the lack of the 
subject who emerges from the language of the painting. Ultimately, we are bound to see our 
own lack as well.  
Right from the start we are faced with two different viewpoints in A Mermaid, two lines of 
eyesight that shape the picture and give it a twist through the space delineated by that-which-
is-not-there. We might say that we are presented with two gazes, mapping for us the field of 
the visual drive, out of which the male Victorian subject appears. One of them is obvious and 
starts from the mermaid’s enthralling eyes, it follows the line of her hand, tracing the long, 
carnal-red mane of her hair, ending somewhere outside the picture. Although it is tempting to 
                                                 
Ulysses’ hands, in Bret Harthe ‘The Mermaid of Lighthouse Point’ in Under the Redwoods (Leipzig: Bernhard 
Tauchnitz, 1901) a mermaid appears on ‘a bright summer morning’ (97) and during ‘the hottest hour of the day’ 
(112); The Siren of Henry Carrington sings two times per day: once at noon and once at midnight; in The Sea 
Lady by H. G. Wells, the mermaid appears on ‘a bright blue day in August’ (21), etc. Educated on this issue, we 
imagine the same element in this painting. But the low tide, that reveals the treasure by the mermaid’s tail, cannot 
occur at high noon, but when the moon is high. There is an obvious discrepancy in the painting, since Waterhouse 
painted daytime scene and daylight is seen through the rock in the background. Thus, either it is not low tide, or 
Waterhouse made an (un)conscious mistake. 
499 Auerbach, Woman and the Demon, 94. 
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assume that her gaze falls upon the viewer himself, it would be too easy, too obvious and 
gratifying, if we restricted ourselves to this interpretation exclusively. For, after all, what we 
are searching for in the picture is that which is outside meaning, where the male subject irrupts, 
surprising us in his abyssal ‘fullness.’ He simultaneously appears both full and broken because 
his abyss, his lack, is fundamental for his life-sustaining miscomprehension of his own psychic 
unity. The chasm of absence creates the mirage of wholeness. This unity, ‘that is introduced by 
the experience of the unconscious, is the one of the split, of the stroke, of rupture [...] not the 
non-concept, but the concept of the lack.’500 Thus the mermaid gaze does not lead to the viewer 
directly, but to the viewer’s own lack, his objet a which is literally not. There is nothing 
surprising in a mermaid luring a subject into an abyss, thus rather than saying that the gaze falls 
upon us, spectators, we shall say that it passes right by us, leaving an impression that if we 
move a bit to the left, we will be able to catch it, and drown in the mermaid’s eyes. Bram 
Dijkstra shows that at the time of the painting’s creation, the curious and wicked gaze was 
particularly fashionable in Britain and France, where the tradition of the femme fatale thrived. 
He observes that ‘diabolic women with the light of hell in their eyes were stalking men 
everywhere in the art of the turn of the century.’501 As an example he takes Arthur Hacker’s 
Sir Percival stalked by a cat-like lady, but he also turns to our hero, John William Waterhouse 
in a brief analysis of his Hylas and the Nymphs. If, as Dijkstra argues, it became fashionable to 
paint ladies  ‘looking malevolently at the viewer from under partially lowered eyelids,’502 we 
could assume that our painting appears against the same iconographic background. But our 
mermaid has a different kind of look, not the one that tells all its secrets up front, but one that 
reveals things precisely by not disclosing that which it hides. By following the mermaid’s look 
slightly aside, somewhere towards the lower left-hand corner of the painting, what we 
experience here is the fall of the subject right at the moment when he leaves the scene, when 
he tries to walk away, his guard down. The subject has been caught.  
 
The Redeemer of Victorian Modernity 
  
There is also another gaze in the painting, but in order to see it, in order to trace its move 
and penetrate the game of visual pleasures that is essential to the Victorian subject, we need to 
                                                 
500 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 26. 
501 Bram Dijkstra, Idols of Perversity: Fantasies of Feminine Evil in Fin-de-Siècle Culture (New York, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 252. 
502 Ibid. 
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restructure the image of the mermaid and look for the lines that are not visible. ‘In our relation 
to things,’ says Lacan,  
 
in so far as this relation is constituted by the way of vision, and ordered in the 
figures of representation, something slips, passes, is transmitted, from stage to 
stage, and is always to some degree elided in it – that is what we call the gaze.503  
 
That which is omitted in the picture is the gaze around which the picture revolves; it is the 
object of Waterhouse’s desire, since he himself is the Victorian subject who emerges from the 
language of the picture. Later on, we will be able to describe this apparition of an object more 
precisely, but for now let us follow the path of the scopic drive in the painting and its return to 
the source. 
At this point we must ask what is beyond the appearance of this painting. What structural 
demarcations can we perceive in the unspoken field of the split, in the sombre cave where the 
unconscious dwells? 
 To answer these questions and return to the gaze, it is important to address again the issue 
of what we know, by virtue of it being presented to us. The end of the nineteenth century was 
the age of fierce gender struggles. This issue has been raised in the prologue, so now we will 
go back to it shortly. In his fantasy that had a profound impact on reality, the Victorian male 
subject created an obedient female being, caged inside a drawing room, an ‘angel in the house’ 
waiting for him to come home after a hard day’s work. But, as Auerbach already perceived, 
the Victorian era was engulfed in images that expressed the other side of this fantasy, a dark, 
sinister side hunting the souls of men.504 Dijkstra argued, rightly, that scientifically and 
historically autopsied woman was a culturally base creature, appearing from the previous stages 
of the evolution to serve as a bowl for misogynous attitudes at the fin-de-siècle.505 On the other 
hand, Auerbach shrewdly perceives that textual, material and visual manifestations of female 
wickedness were also an empowering element of female representation.506 Born out of male 
fear, this new image promote the idea of infinite female power of transformation that 
                                                 
503 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 73. 
504 Auerbach, Woman and the Demon. 
505 Dijkstra, Idols of Perversity; see, also, Klaus Theweleit, Male Fantasies: Women, Floods, Bodies, History (vol. 
1), trans. Stephen Conway in collaboration with Erica Carter and Chris Turner (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, 1987), or Patrick Bade, Femme Fatale: Images of Evil and Fascinating Women (New York: 
Mayflower Books, 1979). 
506 For a different version of the female myth (the female aquatic evolution), see Elaine Morgan, The Descent of 
Woman (London: Souvenir Press, 1985). 
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transcended the shrinking male world of reason by appropriating the traditional border-images 
of expected womanhood, such as devils, sirens, fallen women and spinsters, recreating them in 
the light of woman’s immense power over the material world. ‘As woman and character,’ says 
Auerbach about Diana Verno, using Walter Scott’s character as an embodiment of new 
devastating Victorian femininity,  
 
[she] is realer than her fiction, wiser stronger, and freer than the historical man 
who imagined her; her independence of love and marriage leads to 
transcendence of all that does not enhance her own enlarged existence. She 
alone possesses an infinitely expanding life, animating by the richness of her 
presence those limited beings, her novel, her author, and her reader. The 
freedom she promises is both aesthetic and cosmic, a grand and tantalizing hint 
of possible human divinity.507  
 
The male fear of loose sexual boundaries and gender roles created this immense creature 
called woman, summoning it from the realms of obsession and anxiety. We have seen them as 
Prophets of Death in the Victorian siren literature (The Red Queen, Circe in her Victorian skin, 
the sea-witch from The Little Mermaid, as well as the Little Mermaid’s grandmother). The Pre-
Raphaelite Brotherhood imagined it along the same lines, where painting female models was a 
release from hard Victorian sexual taboos imposed on the middle class. As Gay Daly shows in 
her almost heart-breaking biography of the five most prominent members of the Brotherhood, 
while painting women obsessively, they actually knew quite little about them, and even less 
about sex itself.508 Desire, fuelled by the barred object, a constant attraction without a 
possibility of getting close to it, created an impossible atmosphere of anxiety, which, in their 
case, exploded in the images of sirens and mermaids. 
 We are already familiar with the story of Victorian cultural misogyny, since it provides the 
canvas of this book, as something already discussed extensively by other authors. It was 
important to reintroduce it here since it is a cultural milieu that provided the backdrop against 
which our painting was created. This was the language that invited the Pre-Raphaelite painters 
into existence as subjects, filling them, like empty receptacles, ready to be impregnated with 
the fears and desires of their times. Man’s desire is the desire of the Other.509 Although the 
                                                 
507 Auerbach, Woman and the Demon, 182. 
508 Gay Daly, Pre-Raphaelites in Love (Fontana: Collins, 1990), 19. 
509 ‘Man’s desire is the desire of the Other’ is one of Lacan's immortal phrases.  
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issue of femininity was, and still is, quite obvious and we have no attention of diminishing its 
importance, what the Pre-Raphaelite artists also painted – as they drew the balmy, inviting 
bodies of their models with tails, wings and claws – was not just misogyny or praise of 
earthborn goddesses; they painted their own shattered selves. So, what we are interested in here 
is not the representation of women per se, at least not exclusively, nor the ways in which 
femininity became constructed/subjugated in various monstrous images. We are not interested 
in what offers itself as self-evident in Pre-Raphaelite painting. We are interested in the subjects 
who constructed/subjugated this femininity: the painter himself tells us about the cultural 
perception of women by painting it, but the language of the painting, its unconscious structure 
– the one emerging from within the language of the painting, from between the ‘words’ – tells 
us about the male Victorian subject himself, about the painter himself. The painter (the artist 
in general) cannot obliterate himself while painting – on the contrary – he exposes himself in 
the act of painting fully. Ulysses, in a constant struggle to save his soul from the attacks of 
marine, submerging dreams that sing repeatedly about death, destruction and joy, paints his 
own tattered self on a mermaid canvas, once again expressing the love/death from the 
‘underground,’ as Bataille would say, from the souterrain that resides in his brush stroke. A 
Mermaid (as does Ulysses and the Sirens, in the last instance), having been painted by 
Waterhouse, always comes back to Waterhouse himself; it represents Waterhouse’ own desire, 
selfhood and his abject face; it shows his own desire for death, fear, decay and everything 
perversely divine. It represents Waterhouse’s horrid nest of monstrosity, his split subjectivity 
itself.  
 One cannot approach the abyss within oneself, which opens the moment one is called into 
the Symbolic. It is too painful – this primal trauma – too dreadful and unbearable. One cannot 
even paint it directly, nor write about it. That is why one fantasizes about it, veiling it in 
unrecognizable images. The gulf of Being belongs to the Real, the domain that always escapes 
us and stays always beyond our reach; it belongs to the awakening from the dream, to the final 
appropriation of a desired object. This gulf calls us to meet it, to understand the beyond of the 
signifying chain – Being itself – cursing us with ‘an appointment to which we are always called 
[...] that eludes us.’510 We cannot follow the Real because it always comes back to the same 
place, to itself, the only place we are not allowed to go. But fantasy makes the trauma bearable; 
it makes it lucid and viable, because we believe that our fantasy has no rules. However, fantasy 
follows the same path of desire that always leads us back to our own loss, our own unattainable 
                                                 
510 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 54. 
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object – always back to our own gaze. That is why there is always more in a picture than is 
depicted. Being fundamentally a visual medium, it is only natural that this truth that disguises 
itself as a lie, appears somewhere along the lines of the scopic drive – between the pleasures of 
seeing and being seen. 
  
The Curse of the World as a Stage 
 
So far we have seen that A Mermaid is a veil. In its structure it hides a lack, an elision that 
keeps the whole painting together by simultaneously disrupting its meaning, obstructing its 
semiotic coherence. Somewhere between the eye of the viewer and the eye of the mermaid 
(qua the eye of the artist), lies this stygian hole of the Victorian language, structuring and 
deconstructing the painting through a gaze that resides in its background. What this gaze is, is 
our final issue. It is the objet a, the always already list object. It is the fullness, the Being, the 
exit, the awakening. But, in order to face the gaze, in order to understand its onerous and 
illusory nature, all we can do is go around it, circle it, and weave a net of meaning that will, 
hopefully, present us with the gaze in the end. Thus, we have to go back to the painting again. 
In its cracks and crevices, it still hides the path of the scopic drive, it still fulfils the reveries of 
the Victorian subject.  
 One of the ways of approaching desire of the subject is addressing a disturbing feeling that 
the calmness of the picture conveys. Caught in a beautifying act of combing her hair, the 
mermaid radiates a void. Plain, almost smooth rocks are nothing like the jutted peaks of The 
Merman, a 1885 painting by the same author (fig. 33). These two paintings should be 
considered counterparts in a way, since both came into existence on the wings of Tennyson’s 
poems, The Mermaid and The Merman. With Tennyson, these poems were obviously parts of 
the same structure of thought.511  
 
                                                 
511 These two poems are quite parallel in structure and language. See Alfred Lord Tennyson, ‘The Mermaid,’ in 
The Works of Alfred Lord Tennyson, ed. Karen Hodder (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1994), 21 and 
Tennyson, ‘The Merman,’ in The Works of Alfred Lord Tennyson, ed. Karen Hodder (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth 
Editions, 1994), 20. 
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Figure 33 John William Waterhouse, The Merman (cc. 1985) 
 
But while Waterhouse’ The Merman oozes the sharpness and violence of rocks, figures and 
water – of brush strokes in general – A Mermaid is sunk into an almost lethargic state. The 
rocks in the distance, the peaceful surface of the water, the plainness of the alcove; everything 
calls oblivion to the scene, drowning the aggressiveness, lure and sexual seduction coming 
from the mermaid. Oblivious to the danger and death that the mermaid embodies, of the dread 
that a monstrous existence hides in the folds of her deviant skin, the male subject strays to the 
excluded grounds of desire. The abject face of Waterhouse, the mermaid, from whom our 
Victorian subject does not part, is, as Julia Kristeva says in another context, ‘a land of oblivion 
that is constantly remembered.’512 But as the background of the picture is an empty, stark 
surface of inactivity, falling upon itself in a trance of lethargic desperation, the mermaid, in a 
sharp and visible contrast to the merman, is rendered so vividly and in such detail, that it comes 
as a flash of consciousness in a half-forgotten dream. ‘The time of the abjection is double,’ 
continues Kristeva, ‘a time of oblivion and thunder, or veiled infinity and the moment when 
revelation bursts out.’513 With her hand hypnotically stroking her hair, the mermaid reveals the 
return of death into the picture, waking the dreamer who gets confronted with the painful abject 
realization that nothing can be hidden, nothing can be simply put away or subtracted from the 
land of shadows which is called the unconscious, the navel of dreams that the abject feeds 
upon. Her pale, almost marble skin flashes the unconscious right back into the picture. The 
‘once-upon-a-blotted-time,’514 when our subject was a bowl for the desires of the Other, 
                                                 
512 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), 8. 
513 Ibid., 9. 
514 Ibid., 8. 
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suddenly re-emerges from the abyss of the mermaid’s monstrous skin, arousing fear and 
apprehension, turning fascination into shame. What should be salvation – the love, the bliss, 
the fantasy – has been invaded by death. The uncanny feeling, the disturbing sense of 
strangeness that creeps up into the picture, signals that the subject that emerges from the 
language of the painting has been caught. He faces his own gaze.   
 Let us image once again: there is a painter in front of a canvas, and the painter paints a 
mermaid. Only, while painting a mermaid – an expression of his deepest desires – he is actually 
painting, topologizing, himself. The painter and the mermaid, the painter and the canvas, stand 
against each other as in a mirror but for a fact that the mirrored image does not stare directly 
back, its gaze falling next to the painter. The painter stares at himself as through a peephole, in 
a perverse (distortive) act of voyeurism. Thus, at this point, in the act of voyeurism that the 
painting facilitates, there is a spiralling relationship between the painter and the subject that 
appears from the language of the painting. In the exhibitionistic spectacle of the mermaid’s 
exposure, the painter sees himself looking through a keyhole. He is surprised by his own gaze. 
He enters a loop of the scopic drive circling around his loss, around his absent object. This is 
the point where the boomerang trajectory of the drive in the painting manifests itself. Our male 
Victorian subject descends upon the scene in an act of self-awareness. In the painting, the 
painter is shown to himself from the only, utterly paradoxical, point that potentially brings the 
pleasure of the circling drive – he sees himself from the geometral point from where he sees 
the others. In this game of lines of visions, he sees himself from the ‘flesh of the world,’515 he 
sees himself from the geometral point of the painting that is his distorted mirror reflection. But, 
from that point on, the painter disappears as such, he is ‘scotomized,’ he vanishes in the blind 
spot of the world’s vision, deriving pleasure from the act of being seen, as long as he is not 
aware of it. But as soon as the awareness of the gaze breaks in, the lines of voyeurism are 
broken, and the painter’s surprise turns into fear, into an awkward, shameful, abject feeling.  
This is the curse of our painting, of the male subject’s mirror image, at the age when the 
world became a stage.   
 
Death by Drowning 
 
                                                 
515 ‘The flesh of the world’ (la chair du monde) is an expression that Maurice Merleau-Ponty uses in his book The 
Primacy of Perception, trans. William Cobb (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), arguing that ‘the 
perceiving mind is an incarnated mind’ (3) In our case, the term is used to refer to that phenomenological ‘other’ 
space of human intentionality, the material world, that ‘sees’ us from the point of view of material totality.  
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Through the voyeuristic tendencies of the nineteenth-century visual field, the male subject, 
objectified and banished from his own representation, is paradoxically drawn back into it. A 
Mermaid presents us with this paradox, but in order to grasp it fully we have to turn to the 
givens once again.  
 The Pre-Raphaelite painters revolutionized Victorian painting around the middle of the 
nineteenth-century, in such a profound way that by the end of the century Pre-Raphaelitism 
became a driving artistic force on the Island. The way the Brothers approached reality and 
nature itself, as an everlasting source of artistic inspiration, emerged as a result of their 
discontent with the trivialities of the Grand Style of the Academia. At the structural level of 
their art, the old/new approach to naturalism resonated with issues related to the subject and 
his relationship to representation. Graham Parry says that ‘[f]or the Pre-Raphaelites, naturalism 
meant basically a particular way of confronting the object, an attitude of mind which considers 
the object more important than the style.’516 Thus, although light-coloured canvases overthrew 
the brownish, dim atmosphere of the Grand Style, their interest lay in a peculiar dissolution of 
the subject. A Mermaid shows this aspect of their legacy, albeit in a hidden fashion. The alluring 
curves of her body, her arm stretched in the act of calling, her slightly open mouth signalling 
the joy of jouissance, implore the viewer to drown in the picture and lose his misunderstood 
subjectivity. In a slightly different context, Parry calls this dissolution an  
 
imaginative penetration of the subject which makes us conscious of the life 
within. [...] [W]hen a painter can force us into a feeling of becoming part of the 
subject. And they [Pre-Raphaelite painters] were right to concentrate on the 
intensity of the scene, to emphasize those eyes which are almost mesmeric – for 
it is the kind of mesmerism which effects a union between the viewer and the 
object. The most effective paintings depend on this relentless staring between 
subject and object until the distinction is broken down and we move into the 
painting.517  
 
In A Mermaid, the distance between the viewer and the object – the mermaid veil 
topologizing the male Victorian subject – vanishes, and with a flashing intensity we are called 
right into the mermaid’s mesmeric eyes. Through the mermaid’s image, the viewer is called to 
                                                 
516 Graham Parry, ‘The Pre-Raphaelite Image: Style and Subject 1848-56,’ Proceedings of the Leeds 
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dissolve in the details of her face and body, to disappear in the over-consciousness of the 
material world, to kill the distance. This desire of disappearance of the distance is what the 
nineteenth-century has brought into the cultural West in general – cultural maintaining of a 
distance that creates a desire to completely succumb to it. The world on display has caused the 
breaking of the lines of vision, where losing one’s own reflection in fetishized mirror-
commodities left the modern subject empty and abject, it left him monstrous. The ‘hypertrophy’ 
and ‘elephantiasis’ of ornaments and details, that we have discussed in the Exhausted at the 
Lake’s Shore chapter, found their way into Victorian painting, where, as Perry argues, ‘[t]he 
Pre-Raphaelites really envisaged a style in which naturalism merged into supernaturalism.’518 
Ascending from the pacifying, still, almost meek background of the picture, from the land of 
oblivion in the long-gone field of the Other, the mermaid in our painting appears as that double 
time of the abject, as the thunder clad in details that ravishes the picture’s fullness. The scales 
of her tail, the strands of her hair, her burning lips and hypnotic eyes, claim the ecstasy of the 
visual, where ‘[t]he naturalist painter denies himself in favour of his subject.’519  
  
The Loss 
 
From the mermaid’s gaze, as the abject gaze of the male Victorian subject (our Ulysses, 
John William Waterhouse), through his dissolution in the act of peeping at himself, we have 
come full circle, returning to the field of the scopic drive. But in order to complete this journey 
(though when dealing with infinite loops of loss, completion is never possible) and round off 
the peeping of the Victorian subject, we shall return to the beginning once again and ask: what 
happens to the subject in this canvas, in this game of meanings and appearances? 
 
                                                 
518 Ibid. 
519 Ibid. 
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Figures 34, 35, 36 John William Waterhouse, Studies for A Mermaid (1982) 
 
A painting is a ‘function in which the subject has to map himself as such,’520 Lacan says, 
and if we line up the painter’s studies for A Mermaid, we shall see the subject’s topography 
appear. As the face of the mermaid becomes more specific, stronger, clearer and more 
enrapturing from study to study, the self-awareness of the male subject emerges; he reveals his 
abject, monstrous face. In the same act, the dehumanization of the female subject unfolds: a 
serene female portrait turns into a seductive monster. From a vague and crude female face 
(fig.34), through a fleshier one against a blurred background (fig.35), once again we are back 
to the mermaid’s monstrous body and the male subject’s split skin (fig.36). Structured by the 
nineteenth-century visual and iconographic ecstasy and fantasy of female unbridled sexuality, 
the male subject appears once again in the form of a female monster. Painting an object of his 
desire and fear, John William Waterhouse, mapped himself for us, in an uncanny topography 
of a parapraxis, of a disturbed body, arising from the trauma of separation caused by the 
entrance into the symbolic, when the subject died as Being and appeared as meaning. A 
Mermaid, a ‘topology of catastrophe,’521 is a painting in which an expression of love and desire 
corresponds with a symbolic cry of need for these feelings. But this catastrophe is exactly where 
our Victorian subject of the scopic field finds himself, ejected and devastated in no man’s land, 
between the eye and the gaze, in a whirl of the drive whose wandering does not satisfy the 
subject in the end; but it shows. It shows the split, it strips naked the subject in question, 
bringing forth the monstrosity of the mermaid’s body in a desperate act of desire, denuding the 
culture that invoked the subject in the first place. As soon as it appears from the void of the 
                                                 
520 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 100. 
521 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 9. 
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signifying chain, the monster brings violence to the scene, disrupting the pleasure of the 
voyeuristic nature of the nineteenth-century visual representation, turning joy into shame, 
dejection and repulsion. Through the monstrosity of the mermaid’s body, the Victorian subject 
interacts with himself, merging Ulysses with the Siren (or, in this case the mermaid) once again, 
his craving insatiable, despairing over the lost object, that one object that is behind all other 
objects of his desire. He reaches out for the wholeness  promised to him at the gates of the 
Symbolic, in that forgotten, forbidden and suppressed time when he stood in front of the mirror, 
falling for the fantasy of escape from semiotic incongruence, deepening the incongruence in 
the process. So, in that precise moment, he was deceived; he mistook his mirror image for his 
own coherent self, opening up his Being to the meaning, desires, fears and obsessions of the 
Other, believing in the Real, somewhere beyond language and meaning. And from that day on, 
embodied in many monstrous forms he had been roaming the labyrinth of language, the dream 
that never ends, misrepresenting himself in the acts of representation, not realising that at the 
core of his existence, at the end of the bottomless pit, in that ravenous, menacing and 
unreachable non-existence of ‘psychical death,’ stands méconnaissance in which the world is 
a stage.  
From this perspective, the Victorian subject is literally objectified in the spectacle of the 
world, the legacy of the nineteenth century. Our painting is not named The Mermaid, like the 
above-mentioned The Merman, but A Mermaid instead, the choice of an indefinite article 
indicating a vague existence of the creature. She is both a distant mermaid and any mermaid. 
Linda Phyllis Austern assumes that her parting lips sing the siren song, known for centuries for 
its destructive, seducing power over victims.522 But could we imagine that this mermaid sings 
another song – the familiar song of silence? Objectified, commodified and broken, she still 
lures and prays, but being the subject herself, manifesting the male subject in her abject face, 
her lure is not the same. Her song now lures by what it does not say – like in Kafka’s parable 
– it lures by the void, slip of the tongue, parapraxis. It lures by the imperceptible powers of 
objectified modernity. As at the Great Exhibition, where the whole world was put on display, 
the Victorian subject crops up from the split between the eye and the gaze, in the voyeuristic 
pleasures of the visual field. From this unholy lair of monstrosity, over the hypnotic hand of a 
mermaid, through the Pre-Raphaelite painting and right onto the stage of the world, the 
subject’s abject face revolves around an imperceptible object, the one which is not there, that 
                                                 
522 Linda Phyllis Austern, ‘“Teach Me to Hear Mermaids Singing”: Embodiments of (Acoustic) Pleasure and 
Danger in the Modern West,’ in Music of the Sirens, ed. Linda Phyllis Austern and Inna Naroditskaya 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 64. 
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cannot be sustained and cannot be represented, namely, the lack, the loss, the gap, the void – 
death as a pure signifier.  
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FRAGMENT 2: AT THE GATES OF LANGUAGE 
 
Monsters symbolize alterity and difference in extremis. They manifest the plasticity of the 
imagination and the catastrophes of the flesh.523 
Allen S. Weiss 
 
 In this last chapter on the Victorian visual field, we will gaze into another nineteenth-century 
Pre-Raphaelite masterpiece and we will read it as the representation of a crucial moment in the 
life of the Victorian subject – his birth. Through a scopic game of presence and absence, we 
will expose ourselves to The Depths of the Sea by Edward Burne-Jones, and show, once again, 
the essential dependence of Ulysses on his Siren (in this example, it is again a mermaid).  
Edward Burne-Jones is especially suitable for this task, because, as Wood observes, ‘[t]he 
world of Burne-Jones is a Victorian dream world, and epitomizes the spirit of late Victorian 
civilization.’524 If we want to deal with the Victorian visual imagination, with Edward Burne-
Jones we know we are on the right track. 
 Late Victorian painting, particularly that of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, was 
characterized by displaying the subject on the stage of the world, or better, in the world as a 
stage, as a picture. The representational exhibitionism of Pre-Raphaelite paintings and their 
female characters that often crossed over into the distant past or a mythological scene, is a 
hallmark of the Victorian era. A distance appeared: a distance that allowed the subject to see 
himself from the outside, from the eye situated in the field of the Other, ‘the flesh of the world,’ 
experiencing reality in a constant, escapist loop of the visual drive. We named the hole that 
opened within that distance – between the eye and the gaze – the birthplace of the subject 
himself, the void, the ‘irreducible element’ of the Victorian language, as Foucault says. Now 
we are interested in the visual expression of this distance, so we are turning to a painting that 
could be read as the gates of language, where the male Victorian subject is born. 
 
The Depths of the Sea 
   
The Depths of the Sea (fig. 37), just like the great majority of recognized Pre-Raphaelite 
paintings, appeared at the Royal Academy exhibition in Burlington House in 1886. It belongs 
                                                 
523 Allen S. Weiss, ‘Ten Thesis on Monsters and Monstrosity,’ The Drama Review 48:1 (2004): 125, thesis vi. 
524 Christopher Wood, The Pre-Raphaelites (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), 134. 
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to a late phase of Edward Burne-Jones’s oeuvre, to a period by which he had already developed 
his distinctive dream world of ‘lunar landscapes’525 and otherworldly ‘gods and goddesses 
enacting a cruel myth on a remote, barren planet.’526 Its subject is, for most of the critics, 
straightforward enough: Wildman and Christian see  
 
a mermaid, [that] having seized the body of a drowning sailor, drags him down 
to the depths of the sea; her smile expresses her sense of triumph, and she is 
unaware that he is already dead.527  
 
Wood considers it to be a ‘subject based simply on his own [Burne-Jones’s] private dream 
world,’528 while Fiona MacCarthy sees in it ‘images of passion but in the end bleak pictures of 
men’s and women’s incompatibility.’529 Dijkstra is, in his own stylistically superior fashion, a 
bit more elaborate:  
 
In Burne-Jones’s The Depths of the Sea […] a woman with hypnotic eyes and a 
vampire’s mouth has already completed her seduction and is carrying her prey 
– as if it were a huge, flowery bouquet of lost male morality – into the oblivion 
of her sensuality, where, we can be quite certain, he is to suffer the brain death 
which unfailingly accompanied the state of perpetual tumescence promised by 
the hollows of siren’s cave.530  
 
 
 
                                                 
525 Ibid., 119. 
526 Ibid., 126. 
527 Stephen Wildman and John Christian, Edward Burne-Jones: Victorian Artist-Dreamer (New York: The 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1998), 264. 
528 Ibid., 122. 
529 Fiona MacCarthy, The Last Pre-Raphaelite: Edward Burne-Jones and the Victorian Imagination (London: 
Faber and Faber Ltd, 2011), xxiv. 
530 Bram Dijkstra, Idols of Perversity: Fantasies of Feminine Evil in Fin-de-Siècle Culture (New York, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 296. 
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So once again, we are behind a keyhole, 
peeping at a distant and private scene of 
death, destruction, and – due to the presence 
of a mermaid – we presume of love. The 
lovers are abandoned by the world, the 
forlornness and stillness of the picture 
interrupted only by a small school of fish 
moving swiftly in the upper right-hand 
corner, and by the stiffness of the mermaid’s 
tail. A pale, almost surreally smooth and 
evanescent mermaid’s body is pressed 
tightly against the strong, masculine and 
grim human body of her male victim. His 
eyes are closed, as in a puzzling act of 
intoxication, dream or death; his arms are 
invisible, ‘castrated,’531 as Kramer says, 
behind his back. His groins are gone too, 
substituted by the crook of the mermaid’s 
arm, as the couple slowly descends into the 
depths of the sea. By contrast, the mermaid 
is vital and alert, her pallid body fading 
away into her livid tail that hales the picture 
strongly towards the bottom, in straight, 
stiff strokes of the fins. The whole scene is 
submerged in cobalt despondency in so 
many different ways, that it does not come 
as a surprise that we may imagine the image 
rocking us to sleep once again, while we are 
being penetrated by the firmness of the 
mermaid’s gaze. This palette of blue 
seduction is hopelessly empty, the 
                                                 
531 Lawrence Kramer, ‘Longindyingcall: Of Music, Modernity, and the Sirens,’ in Music of the Sirens, ed. Linda 
Phyllis Austern and Inna Naroditskaya (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 194. 
Figure 37 Edward Burne-Jones, The Depths 
of the Sea (1886) 
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surroundings disclosing a ‘somewhere’ like the dusky corners of a sea grotto, where everything 
known dwindle away, except for the pebbles that spark at the bottom of the cavern.  
The first contrast with our previous painting, A Mermaid: while the surroundings of A 
Mermaid reveal the waves wash sea treasures up to the shore, in The Depths of the Sea the light 
of awareness and knowledge is slowly dying away. While A Mermaid lights up the scene, 
bathing us in the midday sun, here we are submerged deep into the unknown, where everything 
is transformed or simply dissolved. ‘[T]he water that thus transforms substance into shadow,’ 
comments Kramer on the everlasting human obsession with the deep,  
 
leaving only the hard bones behind, also serves as a medium that jumbles, blurs, 
and transforms the constituents of the world above while still preserving their 
intelligibility. The preservation is both dangerous, because irrational – fluidity 
here belongs as much to categories as to bodies – and transfiguring.532  
 
Gazing at the death in the deeps, the viewer is provoked into drowning symbolically; he (we 
will assume it is a ‘he’ again, for the same reasons as before) is provoked to take a leap into 
the unknown.  
We are tempted to call the cave of The Depths of the Sea a grave; even more so if we are 
familiar with another image by Burne-Jones, called the Grave of the Sea (fig. 38). It is an 
illustration from The Flower Book, a series of 38 small watercolors, each about fifteen 
centimeters in diameter, made by Burne-Jones from 1882 to 1898. In 1905 they were 
posthumously published by his wife Georgina.533 Grave of the Sea, Plate XVI, features a dead 
male lover in the depths of a mermaid’s cave.  
A mermaid is swimming in the upper left-hand part of the composition, the sight of her 
fallen lover, for whose death she is probably responsible, appears to have left her in a state of 
disbelief. A bell above his head, sinister and gloomy in equal measure, tolls away the last hour 
of his earthly existence.  
 
                                                 
532 Ibid., 199. 
533 On making of The Flower Book, see MacCarthy, The Last Pre-Raphaelite, 312-314. For a more detailed 
account on Edward Burne-Jones, his personal life and relationship with his wife – his dreams, passions and desires, 
see Gay Daly, Pre-Raphaelites in Love (Fontana: Collins, 1990). 
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Figure 38 Edward Burne-Jones, Grave of the Sea (ca. 1890) 
 
These two pictures structurally complement each other; the Grave of the Sea semantically 
reveals what The Depths of the Sea is hiding: the male lover is dead and we are invited to 
meditate upon his inert body. A proposition for reading The Depths of the Sea: the male figure 
is the actual center of the picture; his is the body that acts in the painting, the body that 
transforms it, giving it a meaning at the moment of the male subject’s death. F. G. Stephens, 
one of the founding Brothers who decided to quit painting and dedicate himself to art criticism, 
wrote in Athenaeum that The Depths of the Sea was ‘a picture of importance, representing a 
new and difficult subject. It possesses noble and subtle charms of color, it is finished with 
extraordinary care.’ But he considered the male body to be ‘the weak portion of the work’ in 
comparison to the intoxicating effect of the mermaid.534 Not many things can compete with the 
seductiveness of a mermaid’s simplicity and curves of her body. However, by gazing into the 
nothingness that the lifeless male body semantically introduces into the painting, the viewer is 
pressed to allow himself to face the Other once again.  
As always, we are not interested in the givens in the painting, because the givens always lie. 
In an act of self-miscomprehension, in which the painter takes himself as the locus of (visual) 
speech and meaning – in the act of miscomprehending himself for a coherent whole capable of 
unambiguous speech and meaning – whatever comes out of his mouth/brush is bound to be a 
lie before it has even been conceived, since this locus of speech is an illusion. What we are 
interested in is the structural language of the painting, the language of the unconscious, the one 
that lies in order to tell the truth – the language of desire that emerges from within the painting. 
In empty places of a visual sentence, in disturbance of an ostensible semantic coherence, in 
                                                 
534 Frederic George Stephens, Athenaeum (April 24, 1886): 561; Athenaeum (May 1, 1886): 590.  
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what one does not represent (or even think), we seek the meaning beyond appearances, beyond 
a sentence or an image. It is true that dealing with the unconscious is always an interpretation. 
But just because it is an interpretation, it does not make it less true or valuable. It is not just 
any interpretation we seek; it is not just any connection we are looking for. ‘Interpretation is 
not open to all meanings,’ says Lacan.  
 
It is not just any interpretation. It is a significant interpretation, one that must 
not be missed. […] What is essential is that [the subject] should see, beyond this 
signification, to what signifier – to what irreducible traumatic, non-meaning – 
he is, as a subject, subjected.535  
 
Interpretation is, in a sense, identical with desire; it is desire itself. But how can one face a 
desire? One does not face it, one circumscribes it. 
Therefore, transposing visual to textual is never an easy task, but here, in the linear space of 
a sentence, we are to delineate the subject’s visual dreams, fears and fascinations – which are 
precisely the dreams, fears and fascinations of the Other – facing an event that comes to us in 
the form of death. We read The Depths of the Sea as the birth of the Victorian male subject, the 
radical separation of his Being from meaning: aphanasis. 
 
The Birth 
 
How does one face a semiotic birth? Where is the place that the subject comes from? It 
comes from the lack, from the illusional objet a that is always hidden, always already 
somewhere else. So in order to approach this lacunal, horrendous place of non-existence and 
catch the Victorian subject in the process of becoming, we have to go deeper into the structural 
level of the painting and see what the picture is hollering by being silent about.  
 ‘Everything emerges from the structure of the signifier,’ tells us Lacan, and if we manage 
to deconstruct the painting properly, we will see the Victorian male subject appear. By 
‘everything’ Lacan precisely means ‘the subject,’ namely, the subject of the unconscious, the 
unfathomable one, the subject of desire that spreads in the unconscious like a mycelium.536 The 
                                                 
535 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 
1963-1964, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978), 250-251. 
536 Lacan uses this phrase to discuss Freud’s notion of the central point of a dream. ‘Everything that blossoms in 
the unconscious spreads, like mycelium, as Freud says about the dream, around a central point.’ (Lacan, Four 
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proposed reading of the painting revolves around as an essential dependence of the 
siren/mermaid language on her victim (and the other way around), of Ulysses on his Siren, of 
meaning on Being. The Depth of the Sea epitomizes the moment in which the subject arrives 
as a signifier, a time when Ulysses appears from the split. Kramer shrewdly argues that  
 
Edward Burne-Jones’s painting pretends nothing else is involved by the simple 
device of showing exactly that. It gives us virtually nothing but a male form in 
the fatal grip of a female one. […] But this nothing is not a mere absence; it 
signifies.537  
 
Here, Kramer follows an idea very close to ours. By going further and beyond of what the 
picture says, what the picture wants us to see, Kramer investigates the symbolic climate that 
stands in the background of the picture. But in his analysis, he ends up following the old 
interpretation of the mermaid’s monstrous existence in the fin-de-siècle culture by emphasizing 
social and gender elements of the event. ‘The loving but mindless grip of the mermaid’s 
femininity,’ Kramer continues,  
 
effaces not only her victim’s masculinity but also the symbolic foundation of 
his identity, his whole familiar world of signs, projects and possessions. The 
painting makes this explicit in the bareness of the cavern to which its couple 
sinks, and it all but explicitly presents this effacement as a double castration – 
his arms gone, his loins a slot for the crook of her elbow.538  
 
It is not frequent to find an interpretation of sirens’/mermaids’ monstrosity that surpasses 
this point of equating their monstrosity with the fantasies of changing gender roles in the 
Victorian culture.539 That is the reason why Kramer’s analysis is of the greatest importance for 
us. For, even if he gives the usual, generally approved opinion, he manages to transform it in 
                                                 
537 Kramer, ‘Longindyingcall,’ 195. 
538 Ibid. 
539 On gender readings of the monstrosity of sirens, see Nina Auerbach, Woman and the Demon: The Life of a 
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the end. ‘But far more is being effaced here than simple masculinity,’ he finishes, ‘[c]ulture 
itself is stripped bare.’540 This idea, that the culture ceases to exist as soon as masculinity is 
‘castrated,’ might be read as part of the same misogynist fantasy in which the masculinity is 
‘culture’ (while femininity is ‘nature’). But the act of drowning, in Kramer’s eyes, goes beyond 
the expression of a cultural misogynist phobia. It stands as a canvas on which the whole culture, 
the whole era in question is represented by way of what has been omitted. With The Depths of 
the Sea we are presented with much and more than a simple act of gender-based romantic 
homicide, of a dying ‘steely-browed and lean-loined Ulysses,’ as Dijkstra would say.541 We 
are witnessing the Victorian culture itself becoming exposed.  
At this point we shall just briefly recall the examples we went through, so that we can 
proceed to the interpretation of The Depths of the Sea by way of the previously gained insights 
into the Victorian male desiring subject. In Ulysses and the Sirens we encounter sirens invading 
the realm of the subject. In his insatiable desire to jump over the edge, to plunge into the sea, 
Ulysses expresses a new distance of modernity, the distance of desire, necessary for the subject 
to succumb to it, to succumb to the distance: the distance he needed to become modern, the 
‘representedness’ of Being, as Heidegger puts it. Sirens paint his abject face, his unattainable 
yearning to eject his selfhood in the precipice of the Other. Through many siren/mermaid 
literary narratives, Ulysses and the Sirens kept changing places, sirens becoming protagonists 
and subjects enchanted by Ulysses, their former victim (The Little Mermaid and the prince, F. 
Anstey’s Siren and her prey, Henry Carrington’s Siren and all her victims, etc.). We saw that 
their relationship is essential, that Ulysses and the Sirens mirror each other in their subjectivity 
(thus the disappearance of the mirror itself), and that, in the last instance, the Sirens are Ulysses 
abject faces again. In A Mermaid we were faced with a lone, wooing mermaid, and we followed 
the path of the scopic drive in its loops around death as objet a, concluding that the visual 
flirting of the mermaid topologically mapped the male subject for us, the subject that lost his 
mirror reflection in the devastating sweeps of the commodified culture of spectacle. But in The 
Depths of the Sea, we face Ulysses (the male body, the victim) in the last act of his life, which 
is, consequently, his first one. Desire does not have a beginning and an end; it does not 
culminate in a reachable object that concludes our life-long quest for ‘it.’ Desire always returns 
to itself, it returns to us, to our own fall, to the place that we cannot face and will not directly 
describe, so we dream about it. It always leads us back into the nothingness that we came from, 
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to the trauma at the gates of language. If we follow the desire, we will always end up in front 
of a mirror, searching, hoping, wanting. In the proposed reading, The Depths of the Sea 
embodies this age-long quest by capturing the male Victorian subject in the act of drowning, 
read as the moment of his appearance – by the fact of his death – as a sign in the field of the 
Other. We are not talking only about the male body here, but about the painting as a whole. So 
far it was maintained that the siren/mermaid body held the topology of the subject who created 
it, and that this body was essentially dependent on, and reflective of, the body of her victim. 
The Depths of the Sea, that show us these two bodies in a fatal embrace, linked by a bond that 
cannot be broken, as a whole presents the topology of the male Victorian subject.  
‘The subject is born insofar as the signifier emerges in the field of the Other,’ says Lacan. 
‘But, by this very fact, the subject – which was previously nothing if not a subject coming into 
being – solidifies into a signifier.’542 The subject appears as meaning, only insofar as his Being 
has disappeared somewhere else. Lacan calls this effect of the signifier on Being of the subject 
the aphanasis. In The Depths of the Sea, we see a mermaid, in whom the Victorian subject is 
mapped, looking directly into our eyes, summoning us into the picture, but maintaining the 
distance nevertheless. The male figure appears as her counterpart, her symbolic residue, 
gripped tightly in the process of becoming.543 As life is leaving the motionless, castrated body 
of the male, carrying with itself the Being of the subject-to-come, Ulysses, the male Victorian 
subject, arrives wrapped in the split skin of the mermaid’s monstrous body that invades the 
picture with its symbolic incongruence.  
The Depths of the Sea is a rare example of a siren holding a dead body of her lover, deep 
down at the bottom of the sea. This time we are on her territory, we are playing in the field of 
the Other. Burne-Jones’s painting is a priceless representation of this field. Although fin-de-
siècle culture was overloaded with images of sirens and mermaids, most of them frolicked on 
the surface of the sea or on the shore, calling souls into their embrace to drown them in the blue 
deeps.544 As we gaze at the mermaid in our painting we see the embrace of bodies, a bond born 
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out of a distance between Being and meaning, the boundary beyond which Being of the subject, 
the male body, is left a shell – motionless, inert, ostensibly insignificant, but with a force of 
agency. It is this dead male body, the beautiful cadaver, that makes the birth of the subject 
mapped in the body of the mermaid possible. The mermaid and her lover are one and the same 
image; they are the aphanasis of the subject, the eclipse of his Being and the arrival of his 
meaning in the monstrous field of the empty cave’s nothingness. 
  
The Void 
 
Nothingness, nullity, invalidity are the central theme of this picture, for if we read the image 
as the birth of the subject, we also read the void that the subject comes from and brings into the 
picture with him. From the dawn of their image, Ulysses and the Sirens deliver emptiness into 
the representation, the stillness snatched away from the gates of Hades, that place of the Other 
that embodies death itself. On his ship of dreams Ulysses carries the void of the Sirens’ bodies, 
over the centuries, arriving into the visual field of the Victorian painting. As Kramer observes, 
the desolation of the cavern and the blankness of the mermaid’s face is what reveals the nudity 
of culture, its essential exposure.545 We can observe the same theme in a poem of another 
contemporary artist closely connected to the Pre-Raphaelite circle – William Butler Yeats’ The 
Mermaid. 
 
A mermaid found a swimming lad, 
Picked him for her own, 
Pressed her body to his body, 
Laughed; plunging down 
Forgot in cruel happiness 
That even lovers drown.546 
 
Yeats’ poem resembles the subject of our discussion in so many ways that it is hard not to 
include the poem in it. As Kramer also observes, The Mermaid expresses the same emptiness 
                                                 
Heyser, The Fisherboy and the Water Nymph, John William Waterhouse Hylas and the Nypmhs (1896), The Siren 
(1900), Ulysses and the Sirens (1891), etc. The list of fin-de-siècle paintings representing sirens on the surface of 
the sea or on the shore is overwhelmingly long. 
545 Kramer, ‘Longindyingcall,’ 197. 
546 William Butler Yeats, The Collected Works of W. B. Yeats, vol. I: The Poems (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1989), 222. 
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as The Depths of the Sea, pretending to say only what it says.547 But in the simplicity of the 
verse, in the awkward, uncanny bleakness that weaves its way through the poem, again we see 
the exposure of culture, exposure of the poem’s silent background by its simplicity. The 
Mermaid is as exhibitionistic as any Pre-Raphaelite painting, disrobed in front of the reader’s 
eyes. We are faced with a mermaid in the act of careless love that obliterates Being of the male 
figure, reducing it to herself, to meaning. Its textual poetics resonate with the visual imagery 
of Grave of the Sea, where a mermaid mourns the death of her lover. The culture exposes itself 
to the subject in the poem, in a final, alienating, distancing effect of theater.  
But we are not interested in cultural attitudes per se, we are interested in the deeper epistemic 
register of the Symbolic that is always more and less than the culture itself. This register is 
what calls the subject into being, what creates the spark of life just so that it can take it away 
by the same act. At this level, the subject appears not in attitudes, but in non-attitudes; in what 
has gone wrong, what manifests itself as misleading and untrue; not in cultural codes, or in 
their enactments and reflections, but in the lived experience at the level of what Foucault calls 
the ‘discourse.’ At this level, the bareness of the cavern in our picture says much more about 
the discourse than about the cultural attitudes; the cave’s eerie stillness and emptiness adds to 
the monstrosity of representation. In it, in the siren’s sunken lair, there is literally nothing – 
nothing to be seen, nothing to be described. But this nothingness speaks; more than that, it 
beseeches us to drown with the subject himself.  
 The void of the cave revolves around the center of the picture, in which, once again, we see 
a mermaid’s face. But this face is different than the one we encountered in A Mermaid. While 
the latter shows us parted lips and a gaze that captures the fall of the subject, this face is wholly 
taciturn. Its lips are sealed, its hair is gone, and the gaze transfixes us as a viper’s, in the act of 
saying nothing whatsoever. The mermaid’s face is a void – cold, distant, silent. This kind of 
face became the trademark of Burne-Jones’s female characters. We can see it in The Last Sleep 
of Arthur in Avalon (1881-98), The Baleful Head (1886-87), The Sleeping Princes from Briar 
Rose series (1873-90), The Golden Stairs (1880), etc. In all Burne-Jones’s paintings, female 
characters are marble-like, expressionless, abstracted, cold, alienated, otherworldly. But at this 
point, it would have been of the greatest help if we compared it with the faces of Waterhouse’s 
mermaids. 
                                                 
547 Kramer, ‘Longindyingcall,’ 195. 
254 
 
John William Waterhouse pursued a single artistic vision for most of his carrier. Wood 
describes his success by saying that he ‘had one song to sing, but he sang it very beautifully.’548 
He dedicated a great part of his life, time, and talent to painting mermaids, sirens, nymphs and 
naiads. But there is a curious feature in many of his paintings that might be discarded as a minor 
deficiency of his oeuvre: many of his paintings of mermaids and female characters have 
thoroughly identical faces. We can see that in Ulysses and the Sirens (1891), Hylas and the 
Nymphs (1896), The Awakening of Adonis (1900), A Tale from the Decameron (1916), The 
Enchanted Garden (1916), etc. But having overcome the literal reading of works of art, what 
we see here now is a slip of the tongue, or rather a slip of the mind; an expression of numbness 
and sameness, of objectification and obliteration of individual traces. As Ulysses arrives 
carrying the void in his waterborne vessel, on the surface of the Victorian culture women are 
commodified and fetishized in the works of the greatest artists of the time, like those by 
Waterhouse. But elsewhere, in the works of Burne-Jones, this emptiness appears from beyond 
the aloof faces of mermaids and female characters, rendering them monstrous and desirable. 
From their monstrous bodies, dread appears to violate the structure of a sentence, break the 
coherence of an image, shatter the consistency and solidity of things. The subject without a 
center, reliving over and over again his everlasting entrapment in the field of the Other, 
searching for his mirror image, appears once again to announce a new attitude towards things, 
towards Being, meaning and representation – a new attitude towards reality itself – the attitude 
of the world as a stage.  
 If we moved now to the face of the mermaid in The Depths of the Sea, or any other Burne-
Jones’s female character for that matter, we would see the same blank space of the distance 
from Being as in his other works. The Depths of the Sea belongs to a phase when, as Wood 
observes,  
 
his work has become incredibly austere, monumental and withdrawn. His 
figures move as if hypnotized in stark, barren landscapes, their robes glittering 
as if woven from metallic thread. Henry James, who remained a faithful 
admirer, noted how his late work was growing ‘colder and colder,’ and ‘less and 
less observed,’ the picture becoming almost abstraction.549  
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Audrey Williamson says that Burne-Jones always preferred the simplicity of design over 
the complexity of painting.550 All Burne-Jones’s female characters assume a plain, divinely 
radiating emotional restraint; an expression that can be called nothing but ‘expressionless.’ For 
Williamson this was ‘a quite deliberate reduction of the human factor to a symbol,’551 and 
Stephenson described it as ‘a marvel of wicked witchery.’552 But here again Kramer hit the 
bull’s eye by saying that the mermaid reflects  
 
the world of culture […], blank-faced and simpering, her arms tightly 
enwrapped about the naked man doubly castrated (loins and arms effaced) by 
her grasp and brought down to a cavern that contains, precisely, nothing.553  
 
Her face is a melancholic void, an opening into the vortex of cultural dreams and anxieties, 
the central feature of the painting, its objet a, death incarnate. This is a face without a face, a 
face without a reflection. Both Waterhouse and Burne-Jones’s paintings map their own 
shattered selves in a semiotic game of presence and absence of mermaids’ faces and bodies. 
 But there is a difference between our chosen paintings, there is a directional mismatch 
between A Mermaid and The Depths of the Sea. As structural lines of the visual field revolve 
in a centripetal whirl around the mermaid’s face in A Mermaid, pulling the whole image into 
her gaze, through her face and right back to the painter himself, the mermaid from The Depths 
of the Sea radiates the void in the opposite direction, enveloping the painting in a centrifugal 
stroke. One draws the language of representation in and through, while the other disperses it 
out; one pulverizes it while the other discharges it. But death as a signifier without the signified, 
in both paintings invades the language, drowning the subject in the watery depths of jouissance; 
two monstrous faces, and in them more than a culture preserved.  
 
At the Gates 
  
 As we get entangled in the visual play of the Pre-Raphaelite exhibitionism, our eye gives in 
to the loop of the scopic drive that again turns around a visage, an expressionless face that 
stands for the unattainable objet a of the artist’s desire – death. And in the process we find 
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ourselves standing behind a peephole, as it were, a peephole constructed by the gaze of the 
painting. But this time, as we read the silence of the subject’s birth, we are exposed to the force 
of the mermaid’s ‘neither human nor diabolic’554 gaze that stares directly at us. Her gaze locks 
us in the interruption of the painting’s structure, our eye consumed by the violence of emptiness 
and implosion of the dead body in its submerged tomb. The voyeuristic nature of the painting 
becomes apparent if we accept Lacan’s view that ‘what the subject is trying to see […] is the 
object as absence.’555 So, the instant the painting opens up from the inside out, in the act of 
staging Ulysses’ birth to the world, the eye of the viewer is seduced into the loop of the drive, 
drawn into the absence of the mermaid’s face. We assume that presence is what we are looking 
for, but we end up being enthralled by the very absence breaking loose, once the distance 
between the subject and his mirror image appears. ‘What the voyeur is looking for and finds is 
merely a shadow, a shadow behind a curtain,’556 continues Lacan, and in the restructuring of 
our own eye, which the painting imposes on us, we reach out for the lost object, never to be 
retrieved. In the last instance, every interpretation reveals our own lack, our own objet a, our 
own desire. Ostensibly safely hidden behind the distance of the picture, behind our own gaze 
– a looking-glass turned keyhole – we can fantasize about ‘lost’ coherence, hunting for the Real 
that forever escapes us. ‘It is not only victim who is concerned in exhibitionism,’ finishes 
Lacan, ‘it is the victim as referred to some other who is looking at him.’557 In their eternal 
embrace, the language of the mermaid’s monstrosity calls Ulysses into existence, and the only 
way that he can arrive at the scene of birth is as the unreal, articulating itself as the negative of 
the real. For after all, Ulysses comes to the nineteenth century from the space of oblivion, from 
the ‘once-upon-a-blotted time’ of the abject.  
 The Depths of the Sea functions as a dream, as a fantasy, a vessel for the Victorian subject, 
an expression of his entry point into the eye of the viewer. The mermaid calls Ulysses into 
existence, as mermaids have been doing from the beginning of time, but now she also gives 
him her monstrous body to be a vehicle of his birth. And Ulysses comes, drawn from the void, 
from the split between the subject-to-be and the mirror, but he comes as a broken self. Through 
his relationship with the signifier, he comes as a ‘subject with holes’ (sujet troué).558 The 
painting we are analyzing is one of these holes. In it, Ulysses appears as if at an exhibition, 
called upon by the loop of the scopic drive as ein neues Subjekt that appears in so far as the 
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drive has been able to show its circular course – in so far as the jouissance obtained has been 
experienced.559 He is castrated, exposed, revealed, but still enchained by his own birth. This 
reading proposes the painting as exposing of the Victorian subject, of an objectified Being, a 
Being that can be only if represented, as Heidegger says. The picture is his stage to which he 
is tied, as a spectator and as an exhibit, without visible agency, in a trance. Adorno and 
Horkheimer captured this moment at its height: ‘The prisoner [Ulysses] is present at a concert, 
an inactive eavesdropper like later concertgoers, and his spirited call for liberation fades like 
applause.’560 He is sitting in the audience looking at himself, overloaded with cultural products 
and images, looking at everything and never seeing what he wishes to see – his own coherence, 
his own ‘psychical death.’ And he dreams, not realizing that the dream is not reality, not 
realizing that the exit from the labyrinth of language, the beyond he is dreaming of, is just 
another turn on the path of desire.  
 The Depths of the Sea has told us many things about the visual field of the late Victorian 
culture so far, that when we turn to one of the most important biographers of Edward Burne-
Jones – Fiona MacCarthy – we find an unconscious truth in her words: ‘The life is there, self-
evident, embedded in [his] art.’561 ‘Unconscious’ because the life is there, but not self-evident. 
It is in a significant interpretation that is not to be missed. It is, finally, in our own desire, as 
we play with the painting, reaching out for our own lack. 
 The painting reveals itself to us as a void, as a birthplace of the subject, of the mermaid’s 
monstrosity and of cultural creation, as a vessel for the monstrosity of the male Victorian 
subject himself, to whom sirens/mermaids are his abject faces. We call it the arrival of 
Victorian Ulysses – the Spectator, the Voyeur, the Tourist, the Wandered, the Chained – but it 
is equality the arrival of Victorian sirens too. The subject, in both of his faces, both as Ulysses 
and as the Siren, arrives at the gates of language – and he dreams. In the painting he looks 
exactly like he does in Ulysses and the Sirens by Waterhouse, with his arms chained, this time 
not by cords but by his profound dream. The Depths of the Sea is a fantasy that supports his 
desire; it is a life-sustaining dream, the only thing that holds the pieces of reality together. And 
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he must dream, as he must die as Being, if he wants to become modern. He must become a 
signifier. 
  Kramer argues that  
 
[t]he sirens were called back to life in the nineteenth century not simply to help 
cope with modern forms of identity and desire, but to help cope with the form 
of modernity itself. In a multiplicity of versions and variants, the sirens and their 
song represent precisely what modernity and modern subjectivity have lost, 
precisely that which they must lose or alienate from themselves to become 
modern. For that very reason, the sirens also represent that which the modern 
must fantasize about regaining, even only in treacherous glimpses […].562  
 
What modernity has to fantasize about regaining, what Ulysses has to dream of, is the 
beyond of language and meaning, it is death as an eternal stillness of the Real, his objet a that 
haunts Victorian modernity through many monstrous forms. Ulysses dreams about the void, 
because objet a appears always as an absence only. His reveries are always about attaining the 
lost object, meeting with the Real that he keeps missing. In his dreams, he always leaps into 
the unknown where he is chained to the mast of the void, somewhere between words, in the 
empty spaces of sentences, in the cracks and crevices of images, enchanted, intoxicated, deaf 
or drowned. These are all the most adored topics of the Victorian era.563 He needs to look death 
in the eye, so as to be able to fantasize about himself, and stay in the state of méconnaissance. 
But on his ship, or chained to a concert seat, he leaps into the unknown all the same.  
And the sirens are always there to welcome him. 
 In The Depths of the Sea, Ulysses is shown at the moment of the leap, in the act of drowning 
that gives birth to him as a subject. The space of the canvas is a crack in the image that unveils 
the space that sailors of the modern era used to mark as unexplored waters by writing the sign 
hic sunt sirenae (‘here be sirens’) on their maps. The painting represents the unknown waters 
of the void, of the subject’s split, where the monstrous silence of the mermaid is the signifier 
that calls Ulysses into existence in the field of the Other. But they are two faces of the same 
subject. The monster is an unsignifiable place in language, a place of semiotic violence, an 
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expression of a cultural trauma conveyed by language. Sirens and mermaids embody this 
sullen, desolate, uncharted space of the self, they embody Ulysses’ fantasy of death, dissipation 
and destruction in the face of an emerging distance, in the face of the Victorian modernity. In 
the game of fetishism and substitution, sirens and mermaids stand for the subject’s fundamental 
illusion brought about by the mirror, accentuated by the fact that throughout the whole era 
sirens and mermaids are always represented without it, without the mirror. Like the Victorian 
male subject’s abject faces, they appear with Ulysses from the rupture between words and 
things, expressing the anxieties of materiality that introduced the loss in the first place. The 
modernity they represent is not only an exhibited, visual, voyeuristically interrupted, but also 
a Beingless modernity, in which the subject is radically alienated from himself. This alienated 
subject, chained by his own dream that never ends, sees himself only from the field of the 
Other, he sees only his mediated, represented Being. As a consumer, he looks into a mirror and 
sees a commodity. Without Being, he arrives as a meaning through the semiotic incoherence 
of commodities. 
 In his dream, in all the narratives analyzed as expressions of this dream, the Victorian male 
subject tries to break free to become modern, but he doesn’t understand that it is this fall, this 
enchainment, this dreaming maze, this mermaid’s grip that makes him modern in the first place. 
The more he struggles, the more strongly he is tied to the mast, as the Odyssey says. So he 
drowns and dreams. He dreams of the loss that he will never extinguish, he paints it, sculpts it, 
and writes about it. Ulysses represents. He is John William Waterhouse, as well as Edward 
Burne-Jones. He is Henry Carrington, Hans Christian Andersen, Lewis Carrol, he is F. Anstey. 
He maps his soul for us on the canvas that he names Ulysses and the Sirens, A Mermaid, Grave 
of the Sea, Through the Looking Glass and so on, until he arrives at his own birthplace – the 
void. And there, in The Depths of the Sea, he finally stands before a mirror. In the painting we 
see him in the arms of the Other, his monstrosity and his subjectivity are one. The mermaid 
introduces him to his own mirror reflection – the gates of a labyrinthine language, the entrance 
of modernity. She is facing us, gazing at us, holding Ulysses in her arms, but what does she 
want from us – what does the other want? The mermaid is everywhere in the picture and 
nowhere, overwhelming and insufficient, like Wells’ the Sea Lady or Lampedusa’s Siren; she 
is pulsating with the desire of the Other, which is the male subject’s own desire. This question 
of a lack that the mermaid poses to the subject, Ulysses answers with his own death, 
appropriating the false image of wholeness which he is shown in the beginning. To the lack he 
answers with a lack, creating a link between him and the Other which will finally allow him 
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the everlasting fantasy about his own completeness. He will finally become modern. Ulysses 
thinks he is saved. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
We all have something to hide, some dark place inside us we don’t want the world to see. So 
we pretend everything is ok, wrapping ourselves in rainbows. And maybe that’s all for the 
best, because some of these places are darker than others.564 
Dexter 
 
A myth persists that a monster can be written about or painted on a canvas. In the nineteenth-
century literature, we read about vampires, golems and sirens, and in these words we believe 
we see a whole, we are convinced that we have experienced the creature’s fullness. But the 
experiential fullness of a monster does not actually exist, because the monster has no Being, it 
has only meaning. For a monster to be fully representable, that monster has to stop shifting. In 
order for words to capture a monster, to assign a specific and permanent image or a written 
word to it, the monster has to enter the language and be represented in it as Being: in other 
words, it has to be.  
If there is a place where a monster can exist in the Victorian culture, though, even as a 
haunting glimpse of possibility, that place is precisely in language. While language cannot 
capture it, it can channel its impossible existence. Only words and images are capable of 
translating and overcoming what cannot be approached by Being. The Victorian monster is an 
abject subject, an expelled and forbidden entity, whose nature is one of the protagonist, and 
language is its signifier. Writing about Victorian monstrosity means giving existence to the 
impossible, the monstrosity that changes even as it is articulated. 
Accordingly, reading monstrosity is reading a text without an object – a signifier without its 
signified. That is why a Victorian monster always destroys semiotic systems, assuming the role 
of the subject in the process – it cannot be (re)presented, yet there it is, on a sheet of paper or a 
piece of linen, veiling itself in empty words and hollow images, crying, loving, hating and 
suffering. In the last instance, the Victorian monster lurks in the eye, mouth, and hand of the 
beholder.  
This fundamental existential impossibility of the monster in the Victorian era is closely 
connected to the notion of linguistic space. If it is non-representable, and still stares at us from 
a painting or a page, where does it come from? What is this place that allows it to be, to spread 
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and fill this blank, still unexplored, creative space? Like an apparition born from the 
interruption of a sentence, the Victorian monster dwells in the unknown white zone betwixt 
words, flanked by two signs, referring to neither of them. In Victorian representation, the 
margins of imaginable possibilities collapse, opening up a new world seemingly free of subject-
object desperation, where non-imaginable impossibilities have a place as subjects. The world 
of abject bodies, tenebrous and icy passion, is a universe of plausible ambiguities and equally 
plausible transgressions. 
This place where meanings implode, is a place where the subject of Victorian monstrous 
representation is born. Its viewers/readers cannot but be seduced and admit that the cry of the 
damaged bodies is too sweet and beyond horrifying. They must resign themselves and lend 
their eye to the structuring of these repulsive corporealities. As they read, they transform 
themselves from the inside out, because text (graphic, visual or material) is coming from 
within, even if it has been written by others. Through readers/viewers, through their textual 
pleasures, the text frees its own shackled soul, and ejects itself in a boomerang-shaped flight 
path. Invading the eye and recreating the self of the consumer, the text continuously recreates 
itself by simultaneous self-construction and deconstruction, luring the viewers/readers closer 
to the heart of darkness that flickers inside of their dreadful desire. The readers become ‘tireless 
builders’ – they stray, to use Julia Kristeva’s expression.565 The reader wanders blindly,  
 
on a journey, during the night, the end of which keeps receding. He has a sense 
of the danger, of the loss that the pseudo-object attracting him represents for 
him, but he cannot help taking the risk at the very moment he sets himself apart. 
And the more he strays, the more he is saved.566 
 
The viewers/readers, as vagabonds, nomads, or strays, without a beginning or an end, 
wander through the monstrous text, searching for salvation, for catharsis that never comes 
because this kind of text leads nowhere but to itself, to its own rejected world, the Netherworld 
of creation. In the Victorian monster the readers/viewers face their own shattered selves. 
 
Today 
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 Snapshot one: every year, since 1983, on the Saturday closest to the summer solstice, Coney 
Island USA art group has been organizing a parade that celebrates ‘the artistic vision of the 
masses.’ A procession of people, mainly (but not exclusively) New Yorkers, streams through 
streets named Mermaid and Neptune, in a district ‘often regarded as entertainment.’567 They 
are a curious group of people: led by a King and a Queen, riding in huge vehicles or simply 
following on foot, the crowd enacts life under the sea, and the event is named the ‘Coney Island 
Mermaid Parade’ for a very simple reason – everyone is dressed like a mermaid. In this colorful 
walking theater, we can spot high fashion mermaids, mermaid nurses, Hindu mermaids, drag 
mermaids, mermaid bodybuilders, as well as mermaid kids whose birthday happened to be on 
the same date so their parents arranged for places in the parade to be provided for them. For a 
day, it seems that mythology accidentally spilled hundreds of fantastic creatures in a 
carnivalesque explosion of public joy. And it seems only natural, to dress as your favorite 
Disney character, to assume Ariel’s, the Little Mermaid’s, role – at least for a day.  
This is the contemporary monstrous subject’s snapshot number one. 
   Snapshot two: as a passionate mermaid-lover, for the last couple of years I have been 
following the trend of ‘mermaid professionalism.’ Yes, this term actually exists. Who are 
mermaid professionals? Mermaid Melissa, Hannah Mermaid, Mermaid Kariel: these are all 
women who dedicated their professional lives to entertainment, channeling the mermaid myth. 
They bought or made customized mermaid tails of all shapes and colors, and they perform 
mermaid theatricals in large water tanks. Most of them are green activists, raising their voices 
against pollution, whale killing, and rainforest eradication. The example of Mermaid Melissa 
will make the phenomenon clearer: Mermaid Melissa (says the home page on her website), is 
the ‘only woman in the world legally named Mermaid!’ Her slogan is: ‘Let’s help save the 
oceans before all creatures become mythical.’ She performs with Mermaid Entertainment 
Aquatic Company, which includes ‘trained professional mermaids, mermen and pirates.’ She 
performs underwater breath hold showcases and does ‘live featured performances in 
aquariums, poolside parties, marketing promotions for companies, and VIP events for clients.’ 
Just a bit further down in the text on the home page, the visitor has an option to ‘Hire a 
Mermaid.’ ‘It was an ultimate fairy-tail for any young girl who has watched The Little Mermaid 
and Splash!’ comments Mermaid Melissa on the reasons for becoming a mermaid, ‘a way that 
I viewed to find a balance between staying human, and joining their world as part dolphin. […] 
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Our belief in dreams coming true,’ she concludes, ‘can be lived, with each new passion that we 
pursue.’568 Mermaids are going professional, before humans turn into myth.  
This is the contemporary monstrous subject’s snapshot number two. 
 Snapshot three: ‘2014 Is the Year of the Mermaid,’ informs us Groupon.com, a large and 
very popular website that features discounted gift certificates usable at local or national 
companies. Twenty-two-year-old designer Eric Ducharme, who is spending time tailoring 
mermaid tails and using them in his own private life, is also the CEO of Mertailor, LLC, a 
company he founded when he was only thirteen. There is a thing about Eric: he ‘does not only 
believe in mermaids – he can help you become one,’569 by making perfect custom mermaid 
tails that will allow you great agility underwater. In 2013, Eric appeared in TLC’s show ‘My 
Crazy Obsession,’ talking about his obsession with mermaids, about his merman lifestyle, and 
the problems he has with other people because of it. His ‘mother’ and his boyfriend have been 
interviewed too, expressing appreciation, understanding and support for Eric’s curious 
lifestyle. ‘Eric is obsessed with mermaids,’ said Candy Ducharme, self-proclaimed merman’s 
mother. ‘We have our own passions. That’s Eric’s life.’ ‘When I put on a tail, I feel 
transformed,’ Ducharme says in an interview. ‘I feel like I’m starting to enter into a different 
world when I hit the water. Being under water I feel, I’m just totally away from the world.’570 
Seen from the perspective of Eric and his family, 2014 might indeed be the year of the 
Mermaid. 
   This is the contemporary monstrous subject’s snapshot number three. 
 
* * * * * 
 
 It is the year 2015, and mermaids are literally everywhere. In major European and American 
cities, at every corner there is a Starbucks coffee shop with its two-tail mermaid shining bright. 
Every cup of Starbucks coffee bears this sign too and so do their other commercial products. 
Mermaids are used in advertising everywhere, even in the places where you would, never, ever, 
expect them, like shoe stores (fig.39).  
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http://www.mermaidmelissa.com/.  
569 ‘2014 Is the Year of the Mermaid,’ viewed 29 September 2014, http://www.groupon.com/articles/2014-is-the-
year-of-the-mermaid-sb.  
570 ‘Eric Ducharme: Meet Real-Life Man Mermaid, AKA “Merman,” and Owner of The Mertailor [VIDEO],’ 
viewed 29 September 2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/eric-ducharme-meet-real-life-man-mermaid-aka-merman-
owner-mertailor-video-1171525.  
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Figure 39 A Berlin shoe store (2013) 
 
From the above snapshots, we can conclude that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
the mermaid, as a creature and as an idea, has become a profession, immersed deeply into the 
fabric of consumption and capitalist desire. The professional mermaids are not only 
‘professional’ at what they do; not only do they earn a lot on money (some Eric’s tails cost 
$2,759 and his customer list includes celebrities, like Lady Gaga); professional mermaids are 
all beautiful, voluptuous, sexy and alluring, their image and their bodies selling the products 
they advertise, or rallying people around a cause. Their monstrosity is erased: little girls, like 
the one that met Mermaid Melissa, want to be mermaids. They advertise shoes despite the fact 
that they do not have legs; their bodies are turned human, appropriated as signs referring to 
consumption. When thinking about contemporary mermaids, the words of Benjamin Disraeli 
from a faraway context echo true: ‘the East is a career.’ Well, in 2014 I say: ‘the mermaid is a 
career.’ And no one can deny it. 
 But there is a far more important issue at work here. Sirens have been luring men to their 
doom since the time immemorial, so in the era of high capitalism, it seems only natural that 
their powers have been transformed into visual pleasures of commodities. This has been 
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happening over the entire twentieth century. We have discussed, in many different ways, the 
relationship between the monstrosity of sirens and the language of commodities throughout the 
nineteenth century. But, once again, we need to ask the question: what does this new fashion, 
of sirens taking possession of human bodies completely, mean for the subject? 
 This is not a question to be analyzed here, in the conclusion, and I would like to raise it only 
as a graphic way of taking the pulse of the contemporary Western society. In all the snapshots 
above, in the example of the Coney Island Mermaid Parade, Eric the Merman and Mermaid 
Melissa, beneath all the commercialism and consumption, we can see a new relationship of the 
subject to monstrosity, a configuration of their game that we, contemporary consumers, find 
natural, if a bit eccentric. In 2014, the examples of monstrosity we have discussed so far are 
such that compared to them nineteenth-century monstrosity seems ridiculously naïve. In the 
Victorian era (early years of the twentieth century included), the monster was the subject and 
the bodies of sirens, in conjunction with the bodies of their victims, contained the topology of 
the male Victorian subject. On the surface, it seems that the same is true for the contemporary 
mermaids: Eric Ducharme lives his life as a merman – what can be more of subject nature than 
that? But on the other hand, this is exactly the radical difference between Victorian and 
contemporary monstrosity: we do not need to read the monster ‘paranoically’ any more. It is 
not hidden within the language, in the cracks and crevices of representation; it does not hide 
from view suppressing its monstrous skin. In the twenty-first century, there is a tendency for 
the monster to live on the surface of our body; there is a tendency not for the monster to be an 
implicit subject, but for the subject to be an explicit monster. In the snapshots above – and I 
have chosen only three out of many – monstrosity is shown off publicly, it does not live in 
literature or cinema, it does not need the language to exist. The monster of today is the one that 
tries, with all the representational power it has, to roam free: not in the semantic space like in 
our prologue, but the real public space of the Coney Island. The monstrosity of the nineteenth 
century has become an imperceptible reality of the twenty-first.    
 Strange as it may seem, I find this tendency to have monsters step into the public space of 
real life liberating. There are several reasons for this, the most obvious one being that, due to a 
new configuration of knowledge and meaning, the monster is not a monster any more. In 1889, 
lamenting mythical monsters, Joris-Karl Huysmans said: ‘The monster in art does not exist 
anymore […].’571 He might have commented on the twenty-first century. The monster has 
                                                 
571 Joris-Karl Huysmans, ‘Le Monstre,’ in L’Art moderne: Certains (Cacém, Portugal: Gris Impressores, S.A.R.L., 
1976), 379. 
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never been ‘just a monster,’ it has always been connected to other identities that were seen as 
different. But monstrosity, as a radical alterity to what is generally accepted, pales in the face 
of an endless stream of new monsters that the twenty-first century keeps producing by the tons. 
Monstrosity, as something disturbing and gloomy, something that implodes semiotic systems 
and crashes meaning, just does not stand as a concept today, when we turn on the television 
and just slide into the narratives featuring dismembered bodies and vampire-like blood-sucking 
creatures on every channel. I am aware that monstrosity is a historically contingent concept, 
and that if it dies in its nineteenth-century incarnation it will rise in a new one. That is way I 
emphasize the need to stop discussing monstrosity as liminality, as something ‘elsewhere,’ 
because, in doing that, we are applying a defunct concept with no real power in the 
contemporary pop-culture (understood broadly). In the world of monsters, nobody is a monster. 
Only in the twenty-first century, Lady Gaga can sport an image explicitly modeled on 
monstrosity, making of it a new fashion, an individual choice that involves ‘being a monster.’ 
Her esthetics is as eclectic as it gets, her costumes are comprised of inappropriate elements, 
things turned into something else, like cigarettes into eye glasses, or a police ‘crime scene’ tape 
into a bodice in her video Telephone. And Lady Gaga is the mainstream popular culture. Only 
in our times can Lady Gaga openly call for what I find the crucial feature of today’s 
monstrosity: a complete appropriation of the monster within. 
 
When they're young, all Little Monsters learn that they are scary. 
Ugly, stupid, shunned by Cupid, overweight, and hairy. 
But every Monster needs to find that secret deep inside 
that transfers Dr. Jekyll into sexy Mr. Hyde. 
All my Monsters are beautiful, discostoodiful, squarerootiful, oldcootiful. 
Monsters don't need implants or a bitchin' Monster car, 
Monsters only need to love the Monsters that they are.572 
 
 Psychoanalysis has been teaching us the same thing: we all need to turn to the inside and 
look at our own lack. We need to face it, and we need to embrace it. These are the essential 
tactics for survival in the contemporary world of alienation: the only way to deal with the 
monster within is to accept that this monster is exactly who we are. We need to accept that the 
                                                 
572 Lyrics of Lady Gaga’s song ‘You Are All My Little Monsters,’ the phrase she repeatedly uses to refer to her 
fans. 
268 
 
loss we carry is our own reality and that the objet a that we are constantly reaching out for will 
never be attained. But out of this recognition an exit is born: a monster accepted is not a monster 
anymore, and in today’s world of monstrosities (emerging as visible esthetic, political or 
individual actions against the alienation of the post-human man), I understand monstrosity as 
the very condition of the monster’s absolution. The monster within, the one the European mind 
has been dreaming of for centuries, the one that epitomizes the labyrinth of language that 
included its own exists, the dream that dreamed about awakening, has to be pushed to its 
extreme in order to absolve itself from monstrosity – it has to be made visible and appropriated 
completely, if it is to stop being a monster. For the monster to disappear, a human has to become 
monstrous. The appropriation of the monster within, as the true incoherent self of the individual 
is the only way out of the dream that never ends; it is a way out of the search for the beyond of 
semiotic incoherence thanks to the ultimate revelation that there is nothing there and that the 
subject’s core is this incoherent, monstrous self that needs to awake and face its own face in 
the mirror. It needs to face the mirror image as what it is: an illusion, a mirage, a dream that 
feeds on the dreamer’s compulsion to sleep.  
  
The final snapshot of the contemporary monstrous subject: Dexter is a man who, when he 
was only three years old, watched his mother being killed and dismembered with a chainsaw 
as he sat in a pool of her blood. Since then, he has an urge that consumes him, a passion that 
runs his life: he needs to kill and to feel another living being dying. And so he kills, he acts 
upon his dark, inappropriate desire, but he has a code given to him by his Father: Dexter kills 
only those deserving death – he kills only other killers. And most importantly, Dexter is the 
protagonist of the eponymous TV show, and we all root for him. Dexter is our (anti)hero of the 
alienated twenty-first century. 
As a subject, Dexter is a split subject par excellence. He has two faces, one dark, substantial 
and confusing, the other ‘normal,’ superficial and friendly. I say superficial, because at the 
beginning of the show, this other ‘normal’ face is just a mask, a cover for his life of a serial 
killer. Dexter does not feel, he is a shell of a man, but his dark face is real and it even has a 
name: Dexter calls it the Dark Passenger. In his night life, Dexter tracks killers, and once they 
are his he wraps them in plastic, stabs them through the heart, cuts them into pieces and dumps 
them into the ocean. This way Dexter continually reenacts his primal trauma, from day to day 
recreating his mother’s murder. Dexter, the real one, the one that lives out his dark passion, is 
born out of a sign, called into culture by the monstrous language of his mother’s fragmented 
body. So the main theme of Dexter’s life is coping with the stygian place inside him, coping 
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with his inappropriate desire. He needs to look into the heart of his desire directly, but in his 
inability to do so he moves from one dismembered body to the next, reaching out for 
satisfaction that none of the bodies can provide. They are all insufficient, they are all just a 
passing ‘it,’ while the real objet a always withdraws from him, and Dexter misses absolution, 
he misses the appointment with the Real. Dexter’s desire remains insatiable, his thirst for blood 
(and for the life of his victims that is slowly dying away) unquenchable.  
As described so far, Dexter perfectly epitomizes what I have called ‘the male Victorian 
subject.’ He personifies the Victorian quest for the exit from the labyrinth of language, and the 
ineptitude of the subject to find it, to stop dreaming. But Dexter has for us another message 
coming: the monster stops being a monster if appropriated as such. The whole critically 
acclaimed show, which lasted for eight years, conveys Dexter’s search for wholeness. And the 
only way for him to achieve that wholeness is not to die, like our Victorian sirens, but to accepts 
himself as who he is: to accept himself as a monster. Only by accepting the Dark Passenger as 
the real core of his self, and understanding that the Dark Passenger is not something beyond 
him, but the very condition of his possibility, can Dexter find peace and release from his 
tortured state of mind. He needs to fully become a monster in order to be.  
Dexter, our modern Ulysses whose desired object is his own self, is the true protagonist and 
redeemer of the twenty-first century alienated world. He pushes his monster to its extreme, so 
he can cease being one. He kills the monster with its own monstrosity. 
There is a future for the monster, after all – that is for the monster with a human face. 
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